IWVERSITY 


OF 


PROBLEMS    OF    POWER 


PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

A  STUDY  OF   INTERNATIONAL 

POLITICS  FROM  SADOWA 

TO   KIRK-KILISSE 


By 
WM.  MORTON  FULLERTON 

Author  of  "In  Cairo,"  "Patriotism  and  Science,"  and 
"  Terres  Francaises  " 

i        (Sometime  Correspondent  of  The  Times) 


NEW  YORK 
CHARLES    SCRIBNER'S    SONS 

1913 


"  Cum  igitur  animum  ad  Politicam  applicuerim,  nihil  quod 
novum,  vel  inauditum  est ;  sed  tantum  ea,  quae  cum  praxi 
uptime  conveniunt,  certa,  et  indubitata  ratione  demonstrare, 
aut  ex  ipsa  humanae  naturae  conditione  deducere,  intendi ; 
et  ut  ea,  quae  ad  hanc  scientiam  spectant,  eddem  animi  libertate, 
qud  res  Mathematical  solemus,  inquirerem,  sedulo  curavi, 
humanas  actiones  non  ridere,  non  lugere,  neque  detestari ; 
sed  intelligere  :  atque  adeo  humanos  affectus,  ut  sunt  amor, 
odium,  ira,  invidia,  gloria,  misericordia,  et  reliquae  animi 
commotiones,  non  ut  humanae  naturae  vitia ;  sed  ut  proprie- 
tates  contemplatus  sum,  quae  ad  ipsam  ita  pertinent,  ut  ad 
naturam  aeris  aestus,  frigus,  tempestas,  tonitru,  et  alia  hujus- 
modi,  quae,  tametsi  incommoda  sunt,  necessaria  tamen  sunt 
certasque  habent  causas,  per  quas  eorum  naturam  intelligere 
conamur,  et  Mens^eorum  verd  contemplatione  aeque  gaudet, 
ac  earum  rerum  cognitione,  quae  sensibus  gratae  sunt." 

SPINOZA  :    Tractatus  Politicks,  capnt  I.  §  4. 


INTRODUCTION 

"  T  T  7  HEN  God  wipes  out,"  says  Bossuet,  "  he  is  getting 
VV       ready  to  write."     "  Quand  Dieu  efface  c'est  qu'il 
se  prepare  a  ecrire." 

During  the  last  ten  years  the  Eternal  would  seem  to 
have  been  preparing  what  one  of  his  vicegerents,  the  Ger- 
man Chancellor,  recently  called  "  the  policy  of  the  clean 
slate."  Not  even  Bossuet  would  venture  to  divine  the 
sense  of  the  still-hidden  writing  on  the  wall.  Modern 
Europe  is  working  out  its  destiny  in  blind  obedience  to  the 
will  of  its  two  demiurgic  creators,  Napoleon  and  Bismarck. 
But  neither  the  one  nor  the  other  saw  ten  years  ahead. 
When  Napoleon,  at  Tilsitt,  in  conversation  with  the  Tsar 
Alexander  and  the  King  of  Prussia,  said  to  the  latter,  on  his 
complaining  of  the  humiliating  conditions  of  peace  imposed 
by  the  great  Emperor,  "  It  is  part  of  my  system  to  weaken 
Prussia  ;  I  mean  that  she  shall  no  longer  be  a  power  in  the 
political  balance  of  Europe,"  J  he  magnificently  formulated 
a  policy  which  might  have  become  the  principle  of  action  of 
successive  French  statesmen ;  but  he  could  not  guess  that 
within  seven  years  Stein  and  Hardenberg,  Fichte,  Schiller 
and  Schleiermacher  would  have  inflamed  the  soul  of  a 
regenerated  Prussia,  and  that  that  Prussia  would  be  at  the 

1  "  II  est  dans  mon  systeme  d'affaiblir  la  Prusse  ;  je  veux  qu'elle 
ne  soit  plus  une  puissance  dans  la  balance  politique  de  1'Europe." 
Quoted  from  the  "  Report  of  the  Princess  Louise  on  the  interview  of 
Tilsitt,"  addressed  to  her  husband  when  he  was  on  a  mission  to 
Vienna.  See  Quarante-Cinq  Annees  de  Ma  Vie  :  1770-1815,  by 
Princess  Radziwill. 

vii  b 


viii  INTRODUCTION 

head  of  the  coalition  to  which  he  himself  was  to  succumb  at 
Waterloo.  Nor  could  the  same  Napoleon  who  prophesied, 
"  Within  a  hundred  years  Europe  will  be  Republican  or 
Cossack,"  foresee  Bismarck,  Sadowa  and  Sedan.  Bismarck, 
who  presided  at  Versailles  over  the  conferences  that  resulted 
in  the  dismemberment  of  France,  failed  to  perceive  the  logical 
consequence  of  his  own  vast  designs,  a  Franco-Russian 
Alliance  and  a  Triple  Entente  resolutely  directed  towards 
giving  a  more  reasonable  modern  form  to  the  perspicacious 
provisions  embodied  by  Napoleon  in  the  Treaty  of  Tilsitt. 
Nor  did  the  same  Bismarck,  who  said  to  Lord  Salisbury  in 
1876  that  the  Eastern  question  was  "  not  worth  the  bones  of 
a  Pomeranian  grenadier,"  reflect  that,  by  driving  Austria- 
Hungary  eastward  down  the  Danube  and  towards  the 
Balkans,  in  order  to  bring  her  face  to  face  with  the  Cossack, 
he  prepared  the  movement  of  Pan-Slavism  which  was  soon 
to  result  in  the  Russo-Turkish  war  of  1877  •  rendered  in- 
evitable in  1878  the  Congress  of  Berlin,  whence  Russia  was 
to  come  forth  humiliated,  and  the  potential  friend  of  Ger- 
many's mortal  enemy  ;  and  created  those  new  nationalities, 
the  alliance  of  which  a  generation  later  was  to  stultify  the 
efforts  of  the  Powers  to  maintain  the  integrity  of  the  Otto- 
man Empire,  and  to  establish  on  the  ruins  of  European 
Turkey  a  United  States  of  Balkany.1 

"  Prevision  of  the  past,"  to  use  an  ingenious  phrase  of 
M.  Clemenceau,  is  not  altogether  beyond  the  powers  of 

1  On  March  28,  1903,  one  of  the  leaders  of  the  Bulgarian  revolu- 
tionary committees  for  the  organization  of  Macedonian  autonomy, 
the  orator  and  poet  Mikhailowsky,  told  M.  Maurice  Kahn  (vide 
Courriers  de  Mac6doine,  Cahiers  de  la  Quinzaine,  Aug.  1903),  that 
the  only  way  for  the  Balkan  States  to  avoid  falling  under  German 
protection  was  to  form  a  Balkan  federation.  The  Servians,  Bul- 
garians, Rumanians  and  Greeks,  he  said,  were  less  different  than 
Bretons,  Burgundians  and  Gascons.  Dread  of  the  foreigner  had 
forced  union  on  the  Gallic  tribes.  The  German  peril  would  impose 
union  on  the  Slav  peoples.  Six  years  later  the  Bulgarian  poet's 
dream  came  true. 


INTRODUCTION  ix 

the  human  intelligence.  Plotting  the  curve  of  the  future 
is  quite  another  matter.  It  is  certain,  moreover,  that 
neither  any  approximately  accurate  forecast  of  the  future, 
however  immediate,  nor  yet  any  satisfactory  compre- 
hension of  the  present,  is  possible  without  careful  scrutiny 
of  the  past.  Present,  Past  and  Future  are  merely 
three  moods  of  one  and  the  same  active  Verb.  Their 
reciprocal  relations  are  organic.  The  observer  who  sur- 
veys the  latest  forty  years  of  history  from  the  quaking 
vantage  point  of  his  own  moment  of  time  inevitably  dis- 
covers that,  although  what  are  called  "  events  "  seem  to 
hang  so  neatly  together  that  they  might  be  strung,  like 
beads,  on  chains  of  general  laws,  this  impression  is  an  illusion, 
and  that  no  philosophy  of  history  is  possible.  But  he  per- 
ceives, at  the  same  time,  that  there  is  an  art  of  history,  and 
that  this  art  consists  in  representing,  in  any  given  field, 
Actions  in  their  right  perspective.  History  treated  as  an 
art  becomes  less  a  record  of  the  vicissitudes  of  artificially 
isolated  States,  less  a  eulogy  of  heroes,  less  a  matter  of 
edification,  than  a  kind  of  telescopic  penetration  and  fore- 
shortening of  the  human  nebulae,  those  agglomerations  com- 
posed of  bustling  molecules,  whose  infinitely  complex  move- 
ments are  determined  by  the  size,  the  weight,  and  the 
individual  drift  of  their  myriad  fellows. 


TABLE   OF   CONTENTS 

PAGE 

INTRODUCTION 

HISTORY  AN  ART       .         .         .          .         .  »*         .      vii 

Napoleon  and  Bismarck,  the  Creators  of  Modern  Europe — Their 
inability  to  foresee  the  future — "  Prevision  of  the  past  " — No  philo- 
sophy of  history  possible — An  art  of  history  possible — History  as  an 
art,  the  representation  of  actions  in  their  right  perspective. 

FIRST  BOOK 

World  History  from  Sedan  to  the  Coup  d'Agadir. 

CHAPTER    I 

THE    Two    FORCES    DETERMINING    THE    DESTINY    OF    THE 

WORLD  .,«,. .      .  .         .         .         .         .         .         .         i 

CHAPTER    II 

ECONOMIC  INTERESTS  AND  THE  DEVELOPMENT  OF  STATES  .         i 
Illustrations  of  the  fact  that  money  is  the  key  of  history. 

CHAPTER    III 
PUBLIC  OPINION  AND  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  SOCIETY      .         .         4 

CHAPTER    IV 
ECONOMIC  CONDITIONS  AND  MODERN  POLITICAL  EVOLUTION     .         5 

Internationalization  of  the  human  consciousness  and  of  social 
problems — Political  aspect  of  the  World — Situation  described  by 
Count  Berchtold — Significance  of  "  insurance  "  treaties — Subordina- 
tion of  national,  to  general,  interests,  shown  by  the  results  of  the 
temporary  closing  of  the  Dardanelles — The  duel  between  national 
patriotism  and  European,  or  world,  patriotism — Real  nature  of  the 
modern  outburst  of  nationalism — National  spirit  manifested  only 
when  nationality  is  menaced. 

CHAPTER    V 

THE    SURVIVAL    OF    MODERN     STATES    IN    SPITE    OF    THE 

CORROSIVE  ACTION  OF  ECONOMIC  FACTS  10 

xi 


xii  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

CHAPTER    VI 
THE  CASE  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES n 

Effect  of  the  expansion  of  American  trade  on  American  curiosity 
as  to  international  conditions — The  two  cardinal  American  policies  : 
the  "  Monroe  Doctrine  "  and  the  "  Open  Door  " — The  America  of 
twenty  years  ago  and  the  America  of  to-day — The  "sky-scraper" 
and  American  idealism — Steady  advance  in  political  and  social 
unification — Awakening  of  a  national  spirit — American  individual- 
ism doomed — A  new  sense  of  joint  responsibility — Comparison 
between  the  passion  for  sport  in  America  and  that  of  the  ancient 
Greeks — New  conception  of  play — An  American  eleventh  command- 
ment— Effect  of  sport  on  the  human  type  in  America — Survival  of 
the  old  religious  ideals  as  "  forms  of  thought  "  accounting  for  Ameri- 
can idealism  and  optimism — General  ignorance  of  the  United  States 
in  Europe — European  recognition  of  America  as  a  world-power  due 
to  career  of  Mr.  Roosevelt — Mr.  Roosevelt's  visit  to  Europe  in  1909 
— His  visit  to  France  especially  significant — Justification  of  this 
statement  by  analysis  of  French  state  of  mind  as  regards  the  Franco- 
Russian  Alliance — The  appeal  of  the  Tsar  in  1898,  in  favour  of 
disarmament — French  disappointment  when  the  nation  realized 
that  the  Franco- Russian  forces  were  the  "  Army  of  the  Hague  " — 
Ambiguous  consequences  of  Franco- Russian  Alliance  :  pacifism  or 
war  ? — Apparent  solution  offered  by  rough-rider  of  Cuba,  who  had 
also  been  the  laureate  of  the  Nobel  Peace  Prize — Anxious  curiosity 
in  France  as  to  Mr.  Roosevelt's  "Message" — Impressiveness  for 
Frenchmen  of  a  President  of  the  American  type — The  Consular 
character  of  Republican  Government  in  the  United  States  illus- 
trated by  Mr.  Roosevelt's  policy  in  San  Domingo  and  at  Panama — • 
Possible  risks  of  Presidential  independence  for  popular  liberty — 
Comparison  of  the  constitutional  role  of  the  German  Emperor — • 
No  analogy  between  "republican"  government  in  France  and  in 
the  United  States — Analysis  of  the  French  Constitution  of  1875  as 
regards  the  part  played  by  the  head  of  the  state — Signs  of  prevailing 
desire  in  France  for  reform  of  the  Constitution. 


THE  CASE  OF  EUROPE  :  THE  SEQUENCE  OF  EUROPEAN  EVENTS 

SINCE  THE  FRANCO-GERMAN  WAR         ....       43 

The  plans  of  Bismarck,  and  the  struggle  in  Europe  for  the  balance 
of  power — The  Treaty  of  Berlin — Colonial  expansion  of  France 
and  its  European  consequences — Fall  of  Bismarck — Attitude  of 
William  II — The  German  Emperor  and  the  Tsar — Proposed  Franco- 
Germano- Russian  Alliance — German  overtures  to  France — Russian 
aspirations  in  the  Far  East — Results  of  German  policy  from  1890 
to  1898,  Adowa,  Port  Arthur,  Manchuria,  Fashoda — Importance 
of  the  date  of  1898 — The  Balkans  and  Europe — The  Dreyfus  affair — 
Germany  triumphant,  Italy,  England  and  France  unhappy  Powers 
— Italian  mediations  :  a  Franco- Italian  entente — The  Mediter- 
ranean policy  of  M.  Delcasse — Effects  of  Transvaal  War — The 
Anglo-French  agreement  of  1904. 


CONTENTS  xiii 

PAGB 

CHAPTER    VIII 

THE    CASE    OF    EUROPE  :     CONSEQUENCES    OF    EUROPEAN 

EVENTS  SINCE  THE  FRANCO-GERMAN  WAR  ...       58 

The  dove-tailing  of  the  nations — National  interests  matters  of 
international  concern — Sense  of  the  word  "  Nationalities "  for 
Louis  Napoleon — Results  of  his  pathetic  blunder — Mystical  states- 
men— "The  International  [Mind" — The  commonsense  view  of 
Spinoza:  human  passions  "properties"  of  human  nature — Resist- 
ance of  England  to  the  influences  making  for  the  dove-tailing  of 
the  nations — Detailed  examination  of  the  doctrine  of  "  splendid 
isolation  " — The  Rise  of  German  naval  power  and  its  effect  on 
England's  policy — Sir  Edward  Grey  on  the  Liberal  policy  of  indis- 
criminate interference  in  world  affairs — Necessity  for  England  of  a 
military  convention  with  France. 

CHAPTER    IX 

THE  CASE  OF  EUROPE  :   SUMMARY  OF  THE  CONSEQUENCES  OF 

EUROPEAN  EVENTS  SINCE  THE  FRANCO-GERMAN  WAR  .       68 

A  new  era  opened  in  Europe  by  the  Anglo-French  Entente — 
William  II  at  Tangiers — German  aims  to  destroy  the  friendship 
between  France  and  England — The  fall  of  M.  Delcasse — Unexpected 
consequences  :  revival  of  French  national  spirit. 


SECOND  BOOK 

The  Domestic  Crises  of  the  European  States  and  the  Foreign 
Policy  of  the  Powers. 

French    Domestic    Politics    and   British    Domestic    Politics    and 
German  Foreign  Policy. 

CHAPTER    I 
THE  STABILITY  OF  THE  FRENCH  REPUBLIC          ...       73 

Influence  of  French  home  politics  on  French  policy — Necessity 
of  examining  French  domestic  politics  to  understand  European 
history — Pretensions  of  the  foreigner  to  meddle  in  French  affairs — 
France,  the  most  stable  and  conservative  state  in  Europe. 

CHAPTER    II 
CHURCH  AND  STATE  IN  FRANCE          .....       75 

The  expulsion  of  religious  orders,  the  abolition  of  the  Concordat 
and  disestablishment  of  the  Churches,  a  logical  incident  in  develop- 
ment of  French  Society — History  of  France,  steady  effort  of  seculari- 


xiv  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

zation — Foundation  of  the  Republic,  a  "  necessary  accident " — 
Difficulties  that  beset  its  founders — The  Constitution  of  1875 — 
Attitude  of  the  Catholic  Church  towards  the  Republican  regime — 
The  French  clergy  functionaries  of  the  State — Condition  of  servility 
of  the  bishops  owing  to  the  Concordat — Political  utility  of  mainten- 
ance of  Concordat  during  early  period  of  the  Republic — Advantages 
of  the  pact  slowly  transferred  to  the  Catholics  owing  to  new  social 
legislation — Role  of  the  French  clergy  during  period  of  Republican 
combat  against  reactionary  parties — The  Syllabus  of  Pius  IX — 
Collusion  between  Anti-  Republican  parties  and  the  French  Catholics 
— "  Le  clericalisme,  voilk  1'enneroi  " — Catholic  persecution  of  the 
Republic — Counter-persecution  of  the  Catholics  by  fanatical  Repub- 
licans— A  national  school  system — Hostile  attitude  of  the  clergy 
to  the  State  schools — Catholic  political  organizations — Episcopal 
breaches  of  the  Concordat — The  accession  of  Leo  XIII — Bou- 
langism — Leo  XIII's  encyclical  recommending  submission  to  the 
Government — Conciliatory  temper  of  French  Government — Ideal 
of  an  open  and  tolerated  Republic — Attitude  of  the  irreconcilable 
reactionaries,  revival  of  hostilities — The  Meline  Ministry,  the  Dreyfus 
case,  the  Croix,  the  "Nationalists" — Republican  defence  under 
Waldeck- Rousseau — The  Associations  Law  of  1901 — Excessive 
abuse  of  this  law  by  M.  Combes  :  State  persecution  of  religious 
orders — Impolitic  attitude  of  the  Vatican — M.  Loubet's  visit  to 
Italy — The  "Temporal  Power" — Rupture  of  the  Concordat — 
Consequent  embarrassment  of  France  as  regards  its  foreign  relations. 

CHAPTER    III 
THE  DREYFUS  CASE  ........       95 

Its  politico-religious  character — Conflict  between  two  French 
ideals  :  la  raison  d'etat  and  les  droits  de  I'homme — Almost  universal 
ignorance  of  real  significance  of  this  ten  years'  civil  war — Foreign 
incapacity  to  understand  real  character  of  French  form  of  civiliza- 
tion— Construction  of  a  strongly-centralized  Power,  the  real  evolution 
of  France — Revocation  of  the  Edict  of  Nantes — Logical  fitness 
of  sacrifice  of  individual  in  French  State — Antisemitism,  anti- 
Protestantism — French  characteristics  explained  by  nature  of 
French  political  and  social  evolution — The  "  genius  "  of  France 
contrasted  with  the  "  genius  "  of  other  countries — Natural  division 
of  Frenchmen  into  Dreyfusists  and  Anti-Dreyfusists — Two  legitimate 
forms  of  French  patriotism — Pressure  by  the  foreigner  a  necessary 
condition  of  French  national  unity. 

CHAPTER    IV 
THE  SOCIAL  AND  ECONOMIC  EVOLUTION  OF  FRANCE  .         .     100 

"  The  only  absolute  fact  in  the  world  is  that  all  things  are  rela- 
tive " — The  Postman's  Strike,  1909,  and  the  Jacquerie  in  the  Cham- 
pagne district,  1911,  indications  of  the  crisis  of  the  State  in  France 
— Necessity  of  studying  in  detail  the  political  and  administrative 
organization  of  France — Purely  relative  character  of  socio-political 
phenomena — General  cause  of  the  crisis  of  the  State  in  France, 
clash  between  Napoleonic  administration  and  Parliament — Pecu- 
liarity of  French  Parliamentary  Government :  antinomy  between 
representative  government  and  the  French  civil  service  system — 
Eight  million  voters  and  nine  hundred  thousand  functionaries — 


CONTENTS  xv 

PAGE 

Omnipotence  of  the  deputy — Effect  of  the  syndical  movement  on 
the  centralized  French  administration — Proposed  solution  :  a  bill 
determining  the  status  of  civil  servants — Malady  of  France,  a  con- 
fusion of  powers — Social  unrest  in  France,  legitimate  ground  for 
optimism — Craving  for  reform — Question  of  "  Pretenders  " — 
Government  in  France,  the  tyrannical  monopoly  of  a  minority — 
Absence  of  a  constitutional  opposition  in  France — No  real  parlia- 
mentary government — The  Constitution  of  1875  a  concoction  of 
the  Orleanists,  intended  to  facilitate  restoration  of  the  monarchy — 
Irreconcilability  of  the  Royalist  Constitution  of  1875  and  the  Re- 
publico-Napoleonic  Administration — French  civic  and  social  irrespon- 
sibility— Disappearance  of  spirit  of  authority — Tyranny  of  the 
deputy  in  France — The  idealistic  Republican  period — Scrutin  de 
liste  and  Scrutin  d'arrondissement — Necessity  of  reestablishment 
of  the  principle  of  separation  of  powers — Need,  to  this  end,  of 
creation  of  a  party  system,  based  on  reform  of  the  electoral  law 
which  has  produced  in  France  a  tyrannical  boss-system — Need  of 
decentralization  and  of  an  independent  magistracy  (study  of  the 
role  of  the  Constil  d'Etaf) — Need  of  organizing  the  status  of  function- 
aries— Reasons  for  optimism  as  to  Frenchmen's  capacity  to  effect 
the  necessary  reforms. 

CHAPTER    V 

THE  BALKAN  QUESTION,  AND  THE  RELATIONS  BETWEEN  THE 
MEMBERS  OF  THE  TRIPLE  ENTENTE  PRIOR  TO  THE  "  COUP 
D'AGADIR  "  ........  131 

Before  dealing  with  the  British  internal  crisis  advisability  of 
summarizing  previous  chapters  in  connexion  with  the  Balkan  Ques- 
tion— Germany  and  the  Eastern  Question — Plausible  explanation 
of  German  policy  after  1904 — The  Young  Turks  and  Macedonia — 
The  Committee  of  Union  and  Progress — Presumption  of  its  Members 
— Possibility  of  Balkan  Federation  including  Turkey — The  Turkish 
Revolution — Inevitable  Growth  of  the  Balkan  League — The  Berlin 
Treaty  and  the  Treaty  of  San  Stefano — Anti-German  policy  of 
Bismarck — Temporary  success  of  German  policy,  however,  during 
the  period  from  1904  to  the  formation  of  the  Balkan  League  and 
to  the  Coup  d'Agadir — Anglo- Franco -Russian  ataxy — England's 
indifference  and  irresolution,  prior  to  Agadir,  owing  to  her  grave 
domestic  situation — Russia's  parallel  absorption  in  her  home  affairs 
— Summary  of  French  feeling  with  regard  to  the  significance  of  the 
Alliance  with  Russia — Germany's  attempts  to  utilize  the  Alliance 
in  her  own  interests — Birth  of  the  Entente  Cordiale — Discomfiture 
and  embarrassment  of  Germany — Causes  of  the  growth  in  France  of 
a  European  sense — Reasons  for  her  keen  concern  as  to  England's 
domestic  affairs — Surprise  in  France  at  the  persistence  in  England 
in  1910  and  1911  of  ignorance  as  to  the  strategic  conditions  governing 
European  politics — France  has  learned  the  lessons  of  experience — 
Practical  interpretation  by  the  French  of  the  meaning  of  the  words 
"  Triple  Entente  " — Inability  of  England  and  Russia  to  realize  the 
real  conditions  of  European  equilibrium — Doubts  in  France  as  to 
the  utility  of  the  Entente — England  about  to  be  roused  from  her 
lethargy  by  the  Coup  d'Agadir — The  havoc  wrought,  meanwhile, 
by  Mr.  Taft's  proposals  relative  to  the  settlement  of  "matters  of 
national  honour  "  by  Courts  of  Arbitration — Optical  illusion  of  the 


xv  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

foreigner  as  to  the  "  real  France  " — The  real  France,  a  France  aware 
of  its  responsibilities  as  an  integral  part  of  continental  European 
soil — The  question  of  Alsace-Lorraine — Text  of  the  declaration  of 
French  deputies  protesting  against  the  alienation  of  Alsace-Lor- 
raine— European  armaments,  the  result  of  seizure  by  Germany  of 
the  two  French  provinces — French  feeling  as  to  Mr.  Taft's  pro- 
posals relative  to  arbitration — Impossibility  of  disarmament  for 
France — Self-respect  requires  France  never  to  forget  Alsace-Lorraine 
— Criticism  of  The  Great  Illusion  by  Mr.  Norman  Angell — Feeling 
in  Alsace-Lorraine  as  regards  France  and  Germany — The  New 
Constitution  for  the  Reichsland — The  buffer-States  between  France 
and  Germany — Worthlessness  of  international  treaties  not  based 
on  common  interests — The  spoils-policy  of  the  cave-dweller  iden- 
tical with  the  modern  "principle  of  neighbourhood  rights" — 
Meaning  for  Frenchmen  of  the  word  "national-honour" — "  Neigh- 
bourhood rights "  and  Holland — The  fortification  of  Flushing — 
Necessity  of  converting  the  Entente  Cordiale  into  a  close  Dual 
Alliance — The  beatific  apathy  of  England  in  1910  and  1911  con- 
trasted with  France's  sceptical  vigilance. 

CHAPTER    VI 

THE  "  COUP  D'AGADIR  "  AND  BRITISH  DOMESTIC  POLITICS        .     172 

Despatch,  July,  1911,  of  a  German  armed  vessel  to  Agadir — 
Motives  of  this  surprising  act — The  Franco-German  Agreement  of 
1909 — German  misconception  of  the  internal  condition  of  France 
and  England — British  constitutional  crisis — General  considera- 
tions as  to  Parliamentary  Government — Modern  social  legislation — 
Lord  Morley  on  danger  of  entrusting  public  affairs  to  doctrinaire 
politicians — The  British  Parliament  Bill — Party  government  and 
the  "rights  of  the  majority" — The  "Royal  Prerogative" — Lack 
of  checks  to  hasty  legislation :  Single-Chamber  government — Was 
the  British  parliamentary  crisis  a  constitutional  crisis  ? — Effects 
of  crisis  in  England  on  England's  position  abroad — Reciprocity 
between  the  United  States  and  Canada — Tendency  of  British  Empire 
to  disintegration — Opinion  in  Canada,  opinion  in  the  United  States, 
opinion  in  England — Contagion  of  American  ideas  in  Canada  ;  Cana- 
dian forms  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine — Sir  Wilfrid  Laurier's  attitude 
at  the  Imperial  Conference — Sudden  effect  of  Germany's  action 
in  Morocco — Reciprocity  buried,  the  Anglo-American  arbitration 
treaty  paralysed,  Mr.  Borden  the  new  Prime  Minister  of  an  awakened 
Canada — Real  identity  of  the  ends  sought  by  Sir  W.  Laurier  and  Mr. 
Borden — England  saved. 

THIRD  BOOK 

Economic  Factors  affecting  the  Political  Attitude  of  Modern 

States 

CHAPTER    I 
CONTEMPORARY  MONEY-GETTING  AND  MODERN  IDEALISM         .     195 

Statement  of  the  problem  of  this  "Book" — Modern  peoples 
want  Reform  as  much  as  they  want  Money — Are  these  cravings 
different  aspects  of  the  same  state  of  mind  ? 


CONTENTS  xvii 

PAGE 
CHAPTER    II 

WORKING-CLASS   MIGRATION,    LABOUR   PROTECTIONISM,    AND 

INDUSTRIAL  INTERNATIONALISM    .....     196 

The  "  Internationale  " — The  world- wide  emigration  of  the  working- 
man — Demand  for  protection  on  the  part  of  labour-syndicates 
against  competition  of  transient  foreign  labour — Detailed  analysis 
of  this  phenomenon — Signer  Giuseppe  Prato's  book — Typical 
illustrations  of  the  movement  :  the  Case  of  Luxembourg  and  of 
the  Valley  of  the  Meuse — International  frontiers  scaled  by  the 
nomad  labourer — The  German  metallurgists  and  Luxembourg  inde- 
pendence— The  interest  of  France  in  this  question. 


CHAPTER    III 
GERMAN  COMMERCIAL  EXPANSION        .         .         .  .     206 

The  flag  follows  trade — Industrial  development  of  Germany — 
Plausible  reasons  for  growth  of  German  naval  estimates — Germany's 
ambiguous  action  as  regards  England's  proposals  for  disarmament — 
The  peace  of  the  world  depends  on  Germany,[Hkewise  her  own  prosperity 
— By  abandoning  an  aggressive  policy  Germany  could  outstrip  all 
the  Powers — Her  genius  for  the  only  kind  of  colonial  expansion 
that  tells — German  colonizers  are  of  the  cuckoo-race — Germany, 
a  parvenu  Power,  and  a  legitimate  object  of  sympathy  owing  to  the 
nature  of  her  national  problems — In  international  relations  Germany 
reduced  to  a  day-by-day  policy  of  opportunism — Optimism  of  the 
plutocratic  Germany  oligarchy — German  Commercial  Imperialism 
in  South  America — Pan-Germanism  and  the  Monroe  Doctrine — 
Germans  ceasing  to  emigrate — Necessity  of  an  open  market  for 
purchase  of  essential  products — The  various  stages  of  Germany's 
fiscal  policy — Her  flexible,  but  precarious,  banking  system — The 
lesson  of  September  and  October,  1911 — The  legend  of  the  "  encircle- 
ment "  of  Germany — Germany  has  no  legitimate  grievance — Peculiar 
German  view  that  the  world  owes  her  something  :  "  theory  of  com- 
pensations " — Germany  treats  other  world- tribes  as  primitive 
peoples :  the  match-striking  trick — The  imperious  call  of  iron — 
Curious  interdependence  of  French  iron-masters  and  German  mining 
proprietors — German  efforts  to  bribe  France  into  dangerous  financial 
and  commercial  arrangements — An  economic  forecast — The  German 
Emperor  and  Corneille. 


CHAPTER    IV 

GENERAL    CONCLUSIONS    FROM    THE    FOREGOING    ECONOMIC 

FACTS 226 

The  facts  adduced  in  preceding  chapter  may  be  used  indiscrimi- 
nately by  the  apostles  of  peace  and  the  prophets  of  war — Fresh 
proofs  of  importance  of  part  played  by  public  opinion  and  inter- 
national finance — Public  opinion  to-day,  often  more  bellicose  than 
Governments. 


xviii  CONTENTS 

PAGE 
CHAPTER    V 

~  .     229 

Criticism  of  the  admirable  French  credit  system — Necessity  of 
reform  of  French  banking  system — Question  of  credit  for  small  shop- 
keepers and  business  men — The  question  of  the  exodus  of  French 
capital — Lack  of  private  initiative  and  individual  responsibility  in 
France — The  French  testamentary  law — The  depopulation  of  France 
— Complex  causes  of  the  enfeeblement  of  the  spirit  of  enterprise, 
consequent  on  French  thrift — Political  and  social  advantages  of 
French  economic  and  industrial  backwardness — France,  the  most 
conservative,  least  revolutionary,  of  nations — Potential  useful  role 
of  syndicalism. 

CHAPTER    VI 

THE  POLITICO-ECONOMIC  RELATIONS  BETWEEN  FRANCE  AND 

GERMANY  .........     239 

Radical  difference  of  temperament  between  the  two  peoples : 
impossibility  of  understanding  each  other's  points  of  view — Diplo- 
matic methods  of  France  ;  diplomatic  methods  of  Germany — "  Busi- 
ness "  the  sole  principle  of  German  diplomatic  action — These  ideas 
illustrated  by  the  history  of  the  diplomatic  relations  between  France 
and  Germany  since  1909 — The  Agreement  of  1909 — A  method  of 
solving  the  Moroccan  problem  that  would  have  destroyed  the  Entente 
Cordiale — Franco-German  Economic  Co-operation :  the  Ngoko- 
Sangha ;  Scheme  for  a  railway  through  the  French  Congo  and  the 
German  Cameroons — The  Caillaux  Ministry  ;  the  role  of  M.  Andre 
Tardieu — The  Franco-German  Treaty  of  November  4,  1911. 

CHAPTER    VII 

PREDOMINANCE  OF  SOCIAL,  ECONOMIC  AND  FINANCIAL,  OVER 

POLITICAL,  QUESTIONS  .         .         .         .          .          .247 

The  first  obligation  of  the  modern  diplomatists,  acquaintance 
with  economic  facts — Necessity  of  scrutinizing  diplomatic  instru- 
ments to  the  letter,  illustrated  by  Franco-German  Treaty  and  numer- 
ous instances — Two  remarkable  and  typical  illustrations  of  the  in- 
creasing force  of  financial  considerations  in  determining  the  policy 
of  States :  the  Turco-Italian  War  and  Servia's  struggle  for  economic 
emancipation — Final  answer  to  the  question  formulated  in  first 
chapter  of  this  "  Book." 

FOURTH  BOOK 

The  Present  Outlook. 

CHAPTER    I 

GERMANY  AFTER  THE  SETTLEMENT  OF  HER  MOROCCAN  DIFFI- 
CULTIES WITH  FRANCE         .         .         .         .         .         -255 

Failure  of  German  efforts  to  sunder  England,  France  and  Russia 
— The  Moroccan  Question  settled,  yet  the  Great  Misunderstanding 
persists — World-wide  consequences  of  Germany's  foreign  policy — 


CONTENTS  xix 

PAGE 

Germany  temporarily  learns  the  lesson  of  her  discomfiture— The 
meeting  of  the  German  Emperor  and  the  Tsar  at  Port-Baltic — Ger- 
many's confession  on  that  occasion — Baron  Marschall  von  Bieber- 
stein  and  his  successor — Necessity  for  the  members  of  the  Triple 
Entente  to  keep  ever  before  them  the  precariousness  of  European 
peace,  owing  to  peculiar  condition  of  Germany. 

CHAPTER    II 

THE  PRESENT  GROUPING  OF  THE  POWERS  :  How  THE  RELA- 
TIONS BETWEEN  THE  GROUPS  CAN  BE  MAINTAINED  .  .       260 

The  real  conditions  of  international  peace — Germany  remains 
Germany  in  spite  of  the  Balkan  League — Field  of  common  action 
of  the  members  of  the  Triple  Entente — The  [necessary  preliminary 
of  such  action — The  "  European  Concert "  no  longer  possible — The 
kind  of  international  business  that  can  be  carried  on  with  Germany 
— Views  of  the  ex- President  of  the  Iron  and  Steel  Institute — The 
limits  of  England's  "  business-relations "  with  Germany. 

CHAPTER    III 

THE  DOMESTIC  PROBLEMS  OF  THE  MEMBERS  OF  THE  TRIPLE 

ENTENTE    .........     264 

The  internal  problems  confronting  France,  England  and  Russia 
— Rapid  improvement  in  the  domestic  situation  in  France — Pro- 
blems now  being  solved — The  case  of  England — The  admirable  con- 
sequences of  the  incident  of  Agadir — Formation  of  a  Commonwealth 
of  British  nations — Growth  of  a  sense  of  unity — The  Imperial  symbol 
of  unity  :  sudden  aggrandizement  of  the  constitutional  significance 
of  the  sovereign — King  George — Construction  of  a  brand  new  Im- 
perial Constitution  now  imperative. 

CHAPTER    IV 

SPHERES   OF  COMMON  ACTION    OF   THE   TRIPLE   ENTENTE  : 

THE  NORTH  SEA 271 

CHAPTER   V 

SPHERES  OF  COMMON   ACTION   OF  THE  TRIPLE  ENTENTE  : 

THE  MEDITERRANEAN  ......     272 

The  lapsing  of  the  Triple  Alliance — Utility  of  its  renewal — Circum- 
stances in  which  Italy  decided  to  renew  the  Alliance — Real  nature 
of  the  Triple  Alliance :  a  self-denying  ordinance  between  three 
mortal  enemies — Chronic  and  latent  hostility  between  Italy  and 
Austria  :  the  Tripolitan  expedition  and  Albania — Italian  nationalism 
— The  Triple  Entente  has  need  of  the  Triple  Alliance  to  simplify  its 
own  problems — Common  aims  of  France  and  England  in  the  Mediter- 
ranean— Effects  of  the  Italo-Turkish  War  and  of  the  victories  of  the 
Balkan  States — Kirk-Kiliss6,  the  beginning  of  a  new  era — Turkey 
no  longer  a  European  Power — Consequences  of  this  fact :  effect  on 
Russia  ;  effect  on  Germany  ;  effect  on  Austria-Hungary — Detailed 
analysis  of  the  new  situation  of  Austria-Hungary — Kirk-Kiliss6,  a 


xx  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

blessing  in  disguise  for  Austria — Crispi's  interview  with  Bismarck 
in  1877 — The  re-birth  of  German  Austria — Effect  of  this  new  situation 
on  Italy — Italy  humiliated  by  Austria  and  Germany  at  the  Berlin 
Congress — Steady  encroachments  of  Austria  in  the  Eastern  Adriatic 
— Forms  assumed  by  Italian  vengeance — Italy's  "  insurance " 
treaties  with  England  and  France  concerning  the  Mediterranean — 
Remarkable  results  of  Italian  diplomacy — Italy's  probable  future 
policy — The  New  Year's  day  speech  of  M.  Barrere — Settlement  of 
the  questions  raised  by  Italo-Turkish  War  and  by  the  success  of 
the  Balkan  League,  will  be  the  supreme  test  of  the  solidity  of  the 
Triple  Entente. 

CHAPTER    VI 

SPHERES  OF  COMMON   ACTION   OF   THE  TRIPLE   ENTENTE  : 

THE  FAR  EAST 293 

The  three  special  arrangements  fixing  the  conditions  of  action 
in  the  Far  East — The  Russo-Japanese  Agreement,  and  the  duties 
thereby  imposed  on  England  and  France — Mr.  Taft's  Manchurian 
policy  and  the  Open  Door — The  Russo-Mongolian  Agreement — The 
Anglo- Japanese  treaties  of  alliance  and  the  Taft  project  of  unre- 
stricted arbitration — The  bugaboo  of  the  Yellow  Peril — Advantages 
for  Great  Britain,  France  and  the  United  States  of  Russo-Japanese 
co-operation  in  China — Japan,  pacific  :  her  policy  of  retrenchment — 
Projects  for  the  opening  of  the  hinterland  of  Asia  to  the  play  of 
economic  and  financial  forces — The  Trans-Persian  Railway. 

CHAPTER    VII 

SPHERES   OF  COMMON   ACTION   OF   THE   TRIPLE    ENTENTE  : 

THE  CARIBBEAN          .......     299 

Close  of  the  era  of  ' '  narrow  views  " — The  opening  of  the  Panama 
Canal — The  Powers  are  rushing  into  the  Caribbean — France  and 
England  confronted  in  the  American  Mediterranean  with  a  new 
Power — Is  the  United  States  yet  aware  of  the  changes  in  store  for 
her  owing  to  the  Panama  revolution  and  the  construction  of  the 
Canal  ? — Summary  of  growth  of  American  Imperialism  after  the 
Spanish-American  War — Difficulty  of  readjustment  of  Monroe 
Doctrine  to  modern  conditions — Immediate  necessity  for  the 
United  States  to  adopt  a  consistent  world-policy — American  coast- 
wise trade  and  fortification  of  the  Panama  Canal — The  Canal  and 
the  Dardanelles — Suggestion  of  Italian  confiscation  of  foreign  life- 
insurance  companies  established  in  Italy — Opinion  of  international 
jurists  on  limits  set  to  the  rights  of  a  State  to  legislate  in  sovereign 
independence — Need  of  the  United  States  to  construct  a  powerful 
battle  fleet — The  fate  of  the  United  States  sealed  by  her  decision 
to  build  the  Panama  Canal — The  United  States  has  come  forth 
definitively  from  her  magnificent  isolation — The  Canadian  frontier, 
a  frontier  of  the  British  Empire — The  question  no  longer  is  :  "Is 
an  Anglo-American  alliance  useful  ?  "  but  "Is  an  Anglo-American 
Alliance  imperative  ?  " — The  warring  interests  of  the  Powers  in  the 
Pacific — Asiatic  immigration — Shifting  of  geographical  centre  of 
gravity  from  the  Mediterranean  to  the  Caribbean — Practical  conse- 
quences for  the  United  States — Necessity  of  an  understanding 
with  the  British  Empire — The  dream  of  Jefferson — Preparations 
of  the  Powers  to  establish  themselves  in  the  Pacific — The  French 
"  all-blue  "  route — A  Franco- Anglo- American  pact  for  the  peace  of 
the  world. 


BOOK    I 


BOOK  I 


BEHIND  the  fa$ade  of  Governments  two  occult  powers 
are  now  determining  the  destinies  of  the  world. 

One  of  these  is  the  disseminated  Wealth  of  the  Democracy, 
canalized  both  by  the  plutocratic  oligarchy  of  the  Bankers 
(la  Haute  Finance),  whose  clients,  the  Modern  States,  great 
and  small,  are  constrained  to  apply  to  them  for  immense 
loans,  and  by  the  great  manufacturers  and  mining  pro- 
prietors, who  tend  to  be  actuated  solely  by  economic  interest, 
and  who  often  combine  in  international  trusts,  the  opera- 
tions of  which  are  merely  hampered  by  patriotic  questions 
of  national  policy  and  national  honour. 

The  other  power  is  the  mysterious  pervasive  force  known 
as  Public  Opinion,  which  is  becoming  more  and  more 
conscious  of  its  efficacy,  and,  as  its  curiosity  concerning  the 
public  weal  and  concerning  international  facts  and  corre- 
lations grows  more  alert,  is  manifesting  a  proportionately 
livelier  jealousy  of  its  prerogatives. 


II 

It  is  a  commonplace  to  say  that  the  entire  social  edifice 
is  reared  on  a  substructure  of  economic  interests.  From 
the  colonizing  activity  of  the  Greeks,  in  the  Dark  Ages 
before  Solon,  seeking  in  Sicily  and  on  the  north  shores  of 
the  Pontus  the  foreign  corn  which  their  own  land  could 

i  B 


2  PROBLEMS  OF   POWER 

not  produce,1  to  the  period  of  Caesar's  colonial  expeditions 
in  Gaul  ;    from    the    Spanish    voyages    into  the  West  in 
search  of  the  wealth  of  the  Indies,  and  from  the  declar- 
ation  of   American    Independence,    consequent   upon    the 
violation  of  the  principle  of  no  taxation  without  represen- 
tation, to  the  most  recent   consortium  of  Franco-German 
capitalists    in    the    Congo,  or  to    the    episodes    connected 
with  the  efforts  of  the  Chinese  Republic  to  negotiate  loans 
with  the  Western  Powers,    money  has  been  the  key  that 
generally  unlocks  the  problems  of  history.    For  instance, 
the  development   of  the  transport  system  in  America  is 
part    not    only   of    the    social    and    political,    and    even 
Constitutional,  evolution  of  the  United  States,    but  also 
of    the    economic    and     social    development   of    Europe. 
The  detailed  history  of  the  European  State  loans  to  the 
Turkish  Government,  from  the  Crimean  War  to  1912,  and 
of   the  development   of   the  Administration  of  the   Public 
Debt,  in  consequence  of  the  activity  of  the  bankers  of 
Galata,   is  a  tale  of    usury  at  which  even    the   imagina- 
tion of  a    Prince   of  Golconda    would    marvel,  but  it  is 
likewise  one   of  the  salient  chapters  of  world-history,  and 
it   concerns   not   merely  the   Anatolian    peasant,   but    the 
British  publican,  the  New  England  farmer  and  the  Breton 
sailor.     In  one  great  modern  State  in  particular,  the  French 
Republic,  eight  or  nine  gigantic  establishments  of  credit 
have  formed  a  veritable  trust  which  has  tended  to  kill  the 
minor  banks,  and,  by  whetting  the  French  middle-class  dis- 
trust of  modern  democratic  social  legislation, [have  cultivated 
the  prejudice  that  French  securities  are  unsafe,  and  thereby 
so  monopolized  the  employment  of  the  public  wealth  that 
France  may  be  said  without  exaggeration  to  be  virtually 
a  financial  monarchy.    The  apathy  of  the  French  parlia- 
ment as  regards  the  construction  of  great  public  works, 

1  See  Thucydides  and  the  History  of  His  Age,  by  G.  B.  Grundy, 
pp.  58-96.     (Murray  1911.) 


A  STUDY  OF   INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS         3 

such  as  modern  ports  and  canals,  is  often  cited  as  one  of 
the  main  causes  of  the  relative  industrial  backwardness  of 
France,  and  of  the  increasing  invasion  of  French  territory 
by  enterprising  German,  Belgian  or  Swiss  capitalists.  A 
more  potent  cause  assuredly  is  the  fact  that  a  large  pro- 
portion of  French  savings  are  systematically  exported 
abroad,  on  the  pretext  of  assisting  needy  foreign  States 
while  affording  safe  investments  to  the  French  rentier,  but, 
in  reality,  with  the  object  of  securing  monstrous  profits 
which  benefit  only  the  banks  in  question,  a  few  interme- 
diaries and  a  certain  section  of  the  press,  and  with  the 
result  of  developing  the  wealth  and  the  defensive  force  of 
rival  peoples,  favouring  the  depopulation  of  France,  and 
preparing  the  gravest  complications  for  that  country  in 
case  of  a  European  war.1 

1  During  the  Balkan  Scare  of  October  1912  no  country,  not  even 
Austria-Hungary,  was  so  immediately  interested  in  the  maintenance 
of  peace  as  France.  More  than  one  thousand  million  francs  of 
French  capital  have  been  lent  to  Rumania,  Bulgaria  and  Servia. 
M.  Alfred  Neymarck,  the  Vice-President  of  the  French  "  Society 
of  Political  Economy,"  states  (vide  L' Information,  Jan.  10,  1913)  that 
France  possesses  at  present,  in  foreign  State  bonds  and  foreign 
securities,  forty  milliards  of  francs,  paying  an  annual  interest  of 
about  two  milliards.  He  argues  that  "  a  great  country  which  has 
at  its  disposal  a  considerable  stock  of  annual  savings,  and  which, 
after  having  satisfied  its  own  needs,  employs  a  part  of  its  savings 
in  carefully  chosen  investments  in  foreign  State  bonds  and  foreign 
securities — without  hampering  its  national  foreign  policy,  and  after 
having  taken  all  necessary  guarantees — far  from  impoverishing  itself, 
puts  money  by."  This  is  incontestable.  But  M.  Neymarck,  in  this 
carefully  worded  sentence,  begs  the  whole  question.  The  question 
is  whether  France  is  now  "  satisfying  its  own  needs,"  before  lending 
money  abroad,  and  whether  "  all  necessary  guarantees  "  are  being' 
taken  before  sending  a  part  of  its  money  out  of  the  country.  Finan- 
cial protection  and  financial  nationalism  are  absurd.  It  is  a  policy 
which  even  the  socialist  leader,  M.  Jaures,  has  called  etroit  et  sterili- 
sant ;  and,  as  M.  Briand  recently  said  in  the  French  Chamber  of 
Deputies,  c'est  une  force  pour  le  pays  qu'on  ait  a  1'exterieur  le  desir 
de  son  or  ;  but  a  country  should  always  have  the  control  of  its  money- 
market,  and  the  present  fiscal  regime  in  France,  whatever  its  advan- 
tages, is  in  certain  respects  open  to  adverse  criticism.  See  pp.  229—238. 


4  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

III 

The  other  power,  the  power  of  Public  Opinion,  has  not 
been  a  steady  factor  in  the  evolution  of  society.  Though 
preponderant  in  Greece  after  the  Medic  wars,  and  not  less 
obviously  potent  at  many  another  moment  of  history — in 
the  Europe  of  the  Crusades,  in  the  France  of  1789,  in  the 
American  Colonies  prior  to  the  Revolution,  in  the  Italy  of 
Garibaldi,  or  in  that  of  1911  and  1912,  and  in  the  Balkans 
of  the  autumn  and  winter  of  1912 — it  has  not  been  one  of  the 
constant  determinants  of  historical  events.  There  have 
been  vast  periods  when  societies  have  apathetically  allowed 
themselves  to  be  governed  by  rulers  whom  they  had  not 
chosen  or  even  sanctioned :  whole  epochs  when,  owing  to 
the  inorganic  character  of  the  community,  no  national  self- 
consciousness  could  thrive,  and  when  the  destinies  of  a 
people  seemed  committed  to  the  accidental  charge  of  a 
mere  handful  of  men. 

A  different  state  of  things  characterizes  the  present  period. 
The  varied  facilities  for  the  dissemination  of  ideas  have  re- 
suscitated the  authority  of  Public  Opinion,  stimulated  its 
energy,  and  increased  it  a  thousand-fold.  No  sociological 
phenomenon  has  greater  importance  to-day  than  the  re- 
appearance of  Demos  in  discussions  of  problems  which,  at 
certain  moments  of  the  past,  have  been  debated  between  a 
responsible  few  in  the  ivory  towers  of  diplomacy.  An 
Aehrenthal  and  a  Prince  of  Bulgaria  may  still  effectively 
conspire  to  tear  up  a  "Treaty  of  Berlin,"  and  a  half-dozen 
Indian  specialists  may,  of  their  own  initiative,  secure  the 
consent  of  the  British  India  office  and  of  the  Emperor  of 
India  to  a  measure  revolutionizing  the  administration  of 
Hindustan ;  but  the  consequences  of  these  acts  are  not 
spent  ;  Public  Opinion  alone  is  to  determine  their  direction— 
and  how  pretend  even  that  such  acts  have  been  "  accom- 
plished "  until,  some  years  hence,  it  shall  be  possible  to  pro- 
nounce a  verdict  as  to  some  of  their  international  bearings  ? 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS      5 


IV 

The  political  evolution  of  modern  Europe,  which  has  been 
the  fatal  consequence  of  the  method  mistakenly  adopted 
by  Prussian  statesmen  for  the  formation  of  a  united  Germany 
— namely,  the  seizure  of  Alsace,  and  a  part  of  Lorraine,  in 
order  to  convert  those  French  provinces  into  German  soil 
intended  to  be  the  keystone  of  the  Empire — this  evolution, 
which  has  been  characterized  by  the  incapacity  of  the  Great 
Powers  to  settle  the  Eastern  Question,  and  which  has 
resulted  to-day  in  the  creation  of  two  reciprocally  hostile 
groups  of  virtually  allied  nations,  the  Triple  Alliance  and 
the  Triple  Entente,  has  been  continually  affected,  frequently 
hampered,  and  partially  compromised,  by  the  action  of  a 
set  of  general  causes  which,  while  not  peculiar  to  the  present 
time,  have  never  been  manifested  so  unremittingly,  or  on 
so  vast  a  scale.  These  general  causes  are  the  whole  series 
of  economic  conditions  so  exceptionally  characteristic  of 
our  industrial  and  financial  period.  The  moment  is  one 
in  which  the  exchange  of  products,  the  marvellous  develop- 
ment in  the  organization  of  credit,  and  the  intercommunica- 
tion of  discoveries  and  ideas,  are  altering  the  whole  content 
of  the  human  consciousness  and  the  moral  aspirations  of 
the  masses  of  mankind,  and  are  giving  an  international 
aspect  to  many  a  social  problem  that  had  hitherto  been  solely 
national. 

Count  Berchtold,  the  successor  of  Count  Aehrenthal  in 
the  post  of  Austro-Hungarian  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
addressing  the  Hungarian  Delegations  on  April  30,  1912, 
thus  summed  up  suggestively  the  political  aspect  of  the 
world-situation : — 

"  Until  the  close  of  the  nineteenth  century  the  grouping  of  the 
Powers  inaugurated  by  the  Triplice  appeared  to  be  merely  a  clearly 
denned  pattern.  Since  then,  in  consequence  of  England's  abandon- 
ment of  the  principle  of  splendid  isolation,  in  consequence  of  Japan's 
entrance  into  a  European  alliance,  in  consequence  of  the  working 


6  PROBLEMS   OF   POWER 

arrangement  between  Japan  and  Russia,  and,  what  is  no  less  im- 
portant, in  consequence  of  the  determination,  by  agreement  among 
the  Great  European  Powers,  of  the  advantages  that  they  could 
draw  from  Asia  and  Africa,  a  closely  woven  network  of  agreements 
and  ententes  has  been  formed  between  the  Powers  belonging  to  the 
same  groups  or  to  different  groups,  a  fact  which  necessarily  profoundly 
complicates  the  international  situation.  We  must  not  forget  that 
such  new  combinations  may  help  to  temper  the  contrasted  differences 
and  to  serve  the  cause  of  peace.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  we  must 
remember  that  the  spheres  of  interest  recently  created  under  the 
shelter  of  these  special  agreements  have  brought  into  existence  other 
points  of  contact  and  other  zones  of  friction,  a  fact  that  has  intro- 
duced into  foreign  politics  an  element  of  trouble,  of  which  it  is 
prudent  for  us  to  take  note  in  time." 


The  counter  "  insurance "  treaties  referred  to  by  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Foreign  Minister  are  indeed  among  the 
most  characteristic  marks  of  the  present  situation. 
But  they  are  superficial  phenomena,  the  sole  interest  of 
which  lies  in  the  fact  that  they  are  the  signs  of  essential 
changes  below  the  surface.  They  are  the  evidence,  not  of  a 
peaceful  world-condition,  but  of  a  latent  state-of-war. 
They  are  the  indication  of  the  risks  involved  in  the  expansive 
tendency  of  modern  communities  under  the  pressure  of  econ- 
omic motives  ;  they  are  the  necessary  political  formulas  of 
compromise  intended  to  conjure  away  possibilities  of 
international  collision  due  to  other  than  political  causes. 

They  bear  witness,  thus,  to  the  most  salient  reality  of 
modern  civilization,  namely,  the  increasing  predominance  of 
economic  laws,  with  the  consequent  interpenetration  of 
peoples,  a  state  of  things  that  has  multiplied  zones  of 
friction ;  the  blind  but  ineluctable  evolution  towards  a 
condition  of  "  socialistic  "  reciprocity,  coterminous  with  the 
circumference  of  the  planet,  and  tending  to  annihilate 
national  barriers. 

In  April  and  May,  1912,  the  Turks  temporarily  closed  the 
Dardanelles.  One  of  the  largest  markets  in  the  world  was 
thus  shut  off  from  the  activities  of  the  British  shipowner. 


A  STUDY  OF   INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS       7 

The  grain  of  Russia  was  left  to  rot  in  the  bins  of  the 
wharves  of  the  Black  Sea,  and  her  loss  amounted  to  millions 
of  pounds.  England  lost  £15,000  to  £20,000  per  day ; 
Rumania,  Bulgaria,  Greece  as  much.  British  steamers, 
headed  for  the  Black  Sea,  had  to  be  diverted  through  the 
Suez  Canal  towards  Indian  markets,  with  the  result  of  de- 
pressing freights  from  the  East,  and  with  a  consequent 
further  loss  to  the  shipowner.  The  world  was  thus  pro- 
vided with  a  singularly  clear  and  instructive  object-lesson 
in  International  Political  Economy.  The  Turk  had  sealed 
the  straits  and  he  awaited  the  result,  while  the  nations 
looked  helplessly  on.  It  was  merely  a  laboratory  experi- 
ment in  Physics  on  a  scale  sufficiently  vast  to  permit  of  the 
demonstration  being  visible  in  every  quarter  of  the  Medi- 
terranean amphitheatre.  Lord  Lansdowne,  as  one  of  the 
trained  observers  who  witnessed  the  plight  of  the  185  vessels 
anchored  east  and  west  of  Constantinople  on  May  2,  1912, 
lost  no  time  in  deploring  the  financial  losses  involved.  He 
remarked  quietly  to  his  colleagues  in  the  House  of  Lords 
that  "  sooner  or  later  "  the  nations  would  have  to  decide 
to  what  extent  a  belligerent  Power,  controlling  narrow  waters 
which  form  a  great  trade  avenue  for  the  commerce  of  the  world, 
was  justified  in  entirely  closing  such  an  avenue  in  order  to 
facilitate  the  hostile  operations  in  which  that  Power  might 
find  itself  involved.  And,  enlarging  the  inquiry  to  all  its 
philosophic  bearings,  he  observed  :  "  Just  as  public  opinion 
in  any  country  would  be  slow  to  tolerate  arrangements 
under  which  a  local  trade  dispute  might  have  the  effect  of 
paralysing  the  whole  industrial  life  of  the  country,  so  public 
opinion  amongst  the  Great  Nations  would  be  slow  to  tolerate 
a  state  of  things  under  which  a  local  conflict  involving  only 
two  Powers  would  be  allowed  to  create  such  serious  detriment 
and  disturbance  to  the  whole  trading  community  of  the 
world."  Thus,  in  Lord  Lansdowne 's  view,  the  lesson 
taught  by  the  Dardanelles  experiment  was  that  perhaps, 
after  all,  the  life  and  death  interests  even  of  two  nations 


8  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

must,  in  certain  circumstances,  be  sacrificed  to  the  interests 
of  "  the  trading  community  of  the  world."  1 

Whatever  the  verdict  on  this  question,  no  man  can  have 
any  doubt  that  the  question  has  arisen,  and  that  the  reason 
is  to  be  found  in  the  fact,  the  stupendous  modern  fact, 
of  the  predominance  to-day  of  economic  over  political 
conditions.  The  problem  of  the  maintenance  of  national 
traditions,  national  characteristics,  national  integrity  im- 
plies a  constant  compromise  between  world-interests,  human 
interests  in  general,  on  the  one  hand,  irrespective  of  national 
classifications,  and,  on  the  other  hand,  those  sentimental, 
hereditary,  beautifully  persistent  impulses  and  prejudices 
that  shape  a  nation's  soul,  as  such  a  soul  has  been  created 
by  the  interplay  of  historical  accidents  and  geographical 
determinism.  It  is  a  mark  of  the  time  that  the  same  duel 
which  formerly  took  place  in  France  between  la  raison 
d'etat  and  les  droits  de  I'homme  is  now  taking  place  between 
national  patriotism  and  European,  or  world,  patriotism. 
Every  natural  impulse  of  conservative  feeling  peculiar  to 
the  citizens  of  whatever  country  is  now  aggravated  by  the 
necessity  of  self-preservation  against  the  assaults  of  the 
corrosive  influences,  economic  and  financial,  set  to  work  by 
modern  scientific  inventions.  The  modern  outburst  of 
nationalism  is  general.  A  quarter  of  a  century  ago  the 
ideal  of  the  federation  of  the  world  and  the  parliament  of 
man,  a  "  passion  for  the  planet,"  fired  many  a  heart.  To- 
day, throughout  the  world,  the  steady  encroachment  of 
the  wave  of  imperialism  would  make  Alexander  the  Great 

1  The  lesson  of  the  Dardanelles  incident  is  an  ominous  one  for 
the  United  States,  when  that  incident  is  reviewed  in  connexion 
with  certain  potential  aspects  of  the  problem  of  the  control  of  the 
Panama  Canal  (see  p.  302  et  passim).  The  lesson,  moreover,  will 
have  eventually  to  be  learned  in  other  parts  of  the  world.  There 
is  a  "  Question  of  Flushing  "  which  will  one  day  have  to  be  settled. 
The  Scheldt  is  an  international  highway.  It  is  not  only  the  natural 
access  to  Antwerp  ;  it  is  one  of  the  historic  roads  between  the  two 
French  interior  ports,  Conde  and  Valenciennes,  and  the  sea. 


A  STUDY  OF   INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS       9 

or  Genghiz  Khan  feel  at  home  in  both  hemispheres.  Na- 
tionalistic concentration  is  general.  Italy,  France,  Eng- 
land, even  the  United  States,  Austria,  China,  Turkey, 
Canada,  the  Balkan  States,  above  all  Germany,  impres- 
sively illustrate  the  strange,  apparently  reactionary  recoil. 
At  Count  Aehrenthal's  death,  his  compatriots — who,  as  Mr. 
Steed  wrote  in  The  Times,  are  not  given  to  critical  analysis, 
but  are  usually  guided  by  large  undifferential  impressions 
— mourned  the  loss  of  the  statesman  who  had  taken 
Bosnia-Herzegovina,  but  chiefly  of  the  statesman  who  had 
affirmed  Austro-Hungarian  independence  of  Germany, 
and  who  had  caused  the  name  of  his  country  to  be  once 
again  respected  and  feared  in  the  world.  "  He  appealed 
to  their  pride,  which,  for  all  its  being  timidly  hidden  or 
masked  by  self-depreciation,  is  still  their  strongest  senti- 
ment." 

Thus,  the  twentieth  century  tendency  will  almost  uni- 
formly be  found  to  be  towards  a  greater  "  national  "  activity. 
This  activity  is  real,  but  the  question  is  what  is  its  origin, 
what  is  likely  to  be  its  duration.  The  chances  are  that  the 
present  phenomena  of  national  expansion  and  of  nation- 
alistic concentration  fall  under  the  general  "  law "  that 
"  nationalism,"  national  spirit,  is  manifested  only  when 
nationality  is  menaced.  The  long  agony  of  the  several 
States — which  are  being  gradually  throttled  by  the  bonds 
of  international  finance  and  of  the  labour  conditions 
that  have  everywhere  engendered  class-war,  and  which 
are  being  crushed  into  a  monotonous  uniformity  by 
the  combined  pressure  of  all  the  forces  that  make  for 
the  creation  of  a  standard  "  minimum  man,"  l  the  product 
of  a  virtually  identical  set  of  educative  influences  in  the 
several  countries — this  agony  might  be,  and  probably  will 
be,  prolonged  by  a  series  of  wars  which  will  aggravate  the 
present  temporary  tendency  of  each  State  to  seek  to  pre- 

1  See  The  Future  of  England,  by  the  Hon.  George  Peel.  Mac- 
millan,  1911. 


io  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

serve  its  national  traditions,  and  its  national  integrity  ; 
but,  from  any  comprehensive  point  of  view,  this  revival 
of  nationalism  the  world  over  is  only  the  death-throe  of  the 
principle  of  nationality.  It  is  a  magnificent  reaction,  a 
pathetic  convulsion  of  the  principle  of  life,  in  each  of  these 
separate  organisms,  calculated,  biologically  speaking,  to 
retard  the  disintegration  with  which  they  are  menaced  in  a 
hostile  environment.  It  is  no  doubt  the  drift  of  the  time, 
but  the  drift  of  only  a  very  brief  instant  of  time  ;  and  it 
signifies,  in  reality,  a  general  tendency  of  just  the  opposite 
character  :  national  spirit  is  manifested  only  when  nationality 
is  menaced. 

V 

This  is  an  appreciation,  the  accuracy  of  which  it  is  obvi- 
ously impossible  to  prove.  That  some  such  conclusion  may 
be  rendered  plausible  will,  however,  probably  be  suggested 
by  the  considerations,  based  on  concrete  facts,  to  be  devel- 
oped later  on.  But  the  new  economic  facts  that  are  be- 
coming— that,  indeed,  have  already  become — such  a  pre- 
dominant element  in  determining  the  nature  or  world 
civilization,  are  not,  after  all,  exercising  their  influence  in 
a  void.  They  are  acting  on  governments,  communities, 
administrations  that  possess  definite  political  and  social 
characteristics.  They  are  altering  the  whole  conception 
of  the  State,  and  they  are  making  breaches  in  frontiers ; 
but  these  frontiers  are  boundaries  fixed  by  treaty,  and 
maintained  superficially  intact  by  military  force,  or  by  the 
still  powerful  prestige  of  international  convention. 

Before  displaying  one's  little  collection  of  economic  facts, 
all  belonging  to  a  class  calculated  to  cosmopolitanize  the 
still  very  appreciably  differentiated  rival  nations  and  peoples,1 
it  will  be  well  to  review  the  present  political  and  social  con- 
dition of  such  States  as  are  most  exposed  to  these  economic 
ravages.  The  social  state  of  the  Europe  and  the  United 
States  of  to-day  constitutes  a  kind  of  definite  pattern  woven 
1  See  Book  III. 


A  STUDY  OF   INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     n 

in  political  looms.  But  the  pattern  is  being  rapidly  over- 
laid by  fresh  designs,  and  no  time  should  be  lost  if  the 
spectator  would  contemplate  it  approximately  as  it  first 
came  from  the  hands  of  its  famous  artisans.  Before  illus- 
trating by  typical  instances,  and  with  some  detail,  the  work- 
ing of  the  occult  forces  that,  relentlessly  destroying  the 
society  in  which  we  were  born,  are  now  making  over  the 
world  anew,  it  will  be  useful  to  cast  a  rapid  glance  at  the  last 
few  years  of  the  political  history  of  certain  of  the  Powers. 
It  is  important  to  note  the  present  political  and  social  aspects 
of  the  picture  on  which  the  new  economic  influences  are 
now  wreaking  their  indelible  and  curious  work. 

VI 

The  United  States  may  properly,  perhaps,  be  dealt  with 
before  any  of  the  European  Powers,  as  being  apparently 
a  more  isolated  case  ;  though  this  isolation,  as  the  merest 
scrutiny  shows,  is  only  a  "  mirage  of  the  map,"  and  the  next 
few  years,  following  upon  the  opening  of  the  Panama  Canal, 
will  reveal  the  immense  increase,  during  less  than  the  last 
quarter  of  a  century,  of  the  number  of  purely  North  Ameri- 
can factors  in  the  total  data  now  determining,  not  only  the 
policy  of  the  conscious  nations,  but  the  well-being,  or  the  ad- 
versity, of  the  inhabitants  of  the  earth  as  a  whole.  Rear- 
Admiral  Mahan,  who,  with  Mr.  Chamberlain,  has  been  one 
of  the  seminal  minds  of  the  last  generation,  relates  in  his 
brilliantly  suggestive  essay,  "  The  Interest  of  America  in 
International  Conditions,"  that  not  so  very  long  ago  a  shrewd 
old  Member  of  Congress  advised  a  newly-elected  colleague 
"  to  avoid  service  on  a  fancy  Committee  like  that  of  Foreign 
Affairs  if  he  wished  to  retain  his  hold  upon  his  constituents, 
because  they  cared  nothing  about  international  questions." 
It  is  no  longer  witty  even  for  the  average  voter  in  America  to 
express  such  an  opinion  as  this.  Every  American  citizen  is 
vaguely  aware  that  the  expansion  of  world  trade  has 


12  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

slowly  altered  the  bearings  of  the  famous  Doctrine  of  Monroe, 
making  of  this  rapidly  rusting  weapon,  forged  solely  for 
defensive  purposes,  an  intermittently  flashing  effective  in- 
strument of  imperialism. 

The  chain  of  logical  sequence  in  the  rise  of  American 
national  power  has  been  clearly  denned  by  the  philosopher 
of  Anglo-Saxon  Sea-Power :  the  birth  of  industry,  the 
need  for  markets,  the  demand  for  control  of  the  highways 
leading  to  them  by  means  of  a  navy,  and  the  consequent 
necessity  of  establishing  naval  bases.  Thus  a  certain 
American  spread-eagleism  had  the  same  cause  as  the 
British  political  egoism  that  gave  rise  in  France  to  the  legend 
of  per  fide  Albion,  and  as  the  present  aggressiveness  of  a  Ger- 
many bent  on  establishing  her  preponderance  in  all  the  con- 
tinents and  on  every  sea.  It  is  by  the  force  of  things  that 
the  United  States  has  evolved  two  cardinal  policies  :  a  hitherto 
practically  effective  "  Monroe  Doctrine,"  and  also  a  less 
successful  principle,  that  of  "  The  Open  Door."  Non-inter- 
ference with  European  international  relations  has  ceased  to 
be  possible  for  that  Power,  owing  to  its  own  imperial  ini- 
tiatives, to  the  birth  of  a  real  British  Empire,  and  to  the  par- 
allel rise  of  German  and  Japanese  aspirations  in  the  Pacific. 
And  the  force  of  things,  the  force  of  economic  things,  may 
ultimately  cause  the  United  States  to  be  brought  to  bay  by 
rival  Powers  summoning  her,  if  not  to  repudiate  the  first  of 
her  cardinal  policies,  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  at  least  so  to 
readjust  it  as  to  bring  it  into  harmony  with  the  new  interests 
of  those  Powers.1  If  the  United  States  Senate  had  sanc- 
tioned such  a  treaty  of  Arbitration  as  was  proposed  in  1911 
by  President  Taft  to  the  British  and  French  ambassadors  at 
Washington,  their  Governments,  as  well  as  those  of  Germany 
and  Japan  and  the  South  American  States,  might  easily  one 
day  raise  "  justiciable  "  questions,  with  regard  to  which 
American  "  national  honour  "  could  not  temporize.  The 
points  to  be  insisted  on  for  the  moment  are  that  the  United 
1  See  pp.  299-314. 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     13 

States  has  become  a  World-Power,  and  that  in  becoming 
members  of  a  World-Power  the  Americans  have  been  so 
astonishingly  transformed  that  even  one  who  has  been  absent 
from  their  shores  for  a  period  of  only  twenty  years  must 
inevitably,  upon  his  return,  find  his  compatriots  almost  un- 
recognizable. 

An  Englishman  returning  to  London  after  so  long  a  period, 
from  a  sojourn  in  Montreal,  New  York,  or  Seattle  ;  a  French- 
man coming  back  to  Paris  after  the  same  length  of  time  passed 
in  Canada  or  in  the  United  States,  would  not  find  the  familiar 
aspects  of  his  home  essentially  altered.     There  is  still  in 
London  "  the  same  old  crush  at  the  corner  of  Fenchurch 
Street  "  as  when  Matthew  Arnold  wrote  the  preface  to  his 
Essays  in  Criticism.     And  the  Boulevards  are  still  the  axis 
round  whose  polished  surface  spins  the  bright  Parisian  world. 
The  English  ancestral  domains,  and  the  French  national 
parks,  are  still,  in  spite  of  Mr.  Lloyd  George  and  of  the 
French  Radicals — in  spite  of  the  economic  conditions  that 
are  altering  the  whole  content  of  the  human  consciousness — 
inhabited  and  frequented  by  men  and  women  who  are  think- 
ing and  feeling  in  the  same  British  or  Gallic  fashion  in 
which  they  felt  and  thought  a  quarter  of  a  century  ago.     In 
the  United  States,  on  the  contrary,  so  numerous  have  been 
the  changes  within  the  period  reaching  from  1890  to  1910 
that  they  have  cumulatively  resulted  in  differentiating  the 
America  of  to-day  from  the  America  of  the  earlier  date  by  a 
real  and  impressive  alteration  in  quality  and  in  kind.     Not 
merely  the  surfaces  of  things  have  changed  :  the  mental  and 
the  moral  traits  of  the  American  people  have  seemed  to  alter. 
It  is  obvious,  however,  that  this  latter  change  is  partially  an 
illusion.     The  American  of  to-day,  who  was  "  in  being  "  in 
the  America  of  twenty  years  ago,  is  only  developing,  with 
astounding  rapidity,  and  in  an  unexpected  variety  of  ways, 
the  traditional  American  characteristics.     But  when  the  for- 
eigner, fresh  come  to  the  New  World,  or  the  exile  who  returns 
to  it  after  a  long  lapse  of  time,  is  suddenly  confronted  with 


I4  PROBLEMS   OF   POWER 

the  bewildering  bulk  of  these  transformations,  both  super- 
ficial and  moral,  he  cannot  but  contemplate  the  spectacle 
with  wonder. 

This  impression  of  astonishment  is  due  not  merely  to  the 
feeling  of  being  dwarfed  by  the  "sky-scraper." 

The  "  sky-scraper  "  is  as  natural  and  as  inevitable  a  pro- 
duct of  the  human  effort  to  adapt  itself  to  the  pro- 
visional environment,  it  is  as  logical  a  consequence  of  the 
interplay  of  the  social,  geographic  and  economic  conditions 
of  civilization  on  Manhattan  Island — and  even  now  in  other 
characteristic  centres  of  American  life — as  was  its  early  model 
at  Lyons,  where  the  houses,  constructed  on  a  tongue  of  land 
hemmed  in  between  the  Saone  and  the  Rhone,  reach  heights 
for  the  most  part  unknown  in  Paris  ;  as  was  the  Roman 
amphitheatre,  rising  from  the  broad  expanse  of  flat  meadow- 
lands,  or  the  Greco-Roman  theatre,  imbedded  in  a  side-hill, 
with  the  convex  of  its  tiers  of  seats  backed  against  the  after- 
noon sun.  No  other  form  of  architectural  expression  was  so 
beautifully  suited  at  once  to  the  topography  of  the  spot  and 
to  the  social  purposes  of  the  structure.  And  one  of  the 
happier  consequences  of  the  combination  of  the  steel  frame- 
work and  of  the  "  elevator,"  is  that  New  York  of  to-day 
among  the  great  cities  is  virtually  the  only  one  where  you 
can  see  the  stars. 

The  insolence  of  its  Shinar  towers  is  a  constant  affront  to 
the  gods.  But  the  idealism  of  American  life — for  idealism  is 
the  most  characteristic  note  of  the  American  character — is 
expressed  in  these  structures  as  completely  as  is  the  practical 
energy  of  this  people,  whose  preoccupation  with  a  certain 
class  of  fact,  whose  inevitable  interest  in  the  tangible  or  visi- 
ble thing,  has  so  often  led  the  foreigner  to  describe  them  as 
"  material."  It  is  a  spectacle  as  disconcerting  as  it  is  ex- 
hilarating to  behold  a  whole  nation  rushing  in  where  angels 
fear  to  tread.  The  ignoring  of  obstacles,  the  shattering  of 
conventions,  the  faith  in  individual  action,  the  callous  neglect 
of  all  those  inhibitions  which  arrest  wild  impulse,  these  are 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     15 

traits  of  character  which  no  one  but  an  Athenian  of  the  fourth 
century,  an  Italian  of  the  Renaissance — or  a  man  of  their 
temperament — would  have  understood. 

The  electoral  period  of  1910  brought  to  the  surface, 
even  for  the  detached  observer,  cumulative  illustration, 
and  in  fact  definitive  proof,  of  the  disconcerting  mixture  of 
idealism  and  practical  sense  in  the  American  people  ;  and 
the  Presidential  campaign  of  1912  gave  added  confirmation 
of  the  impressions  that  were  to  be  gathered  two  years 
previously.  The  founders  of  American  society  were  ideal- 
istic even  unto  mysticism,  but  they  were  practical  and 
hard-headed  even  to  sharpness,  "  cuteness  "  and  canniness. 
Dr.  Henry  van  Dyke,  in  his  excellent  lectures  on  The  Spirit 
of  America,  affirms  that  the  blended  strains  of  blood  which 
made  the  American  people  in  the  beginning  "  are  still  the 
dominant  factors  in  the  American  people  of  to-day."  And 
this  intellectual  and  spiritual  heredity  has  been  communi- 
cated to  millions  of  immigrants  from  all  parts  of  the  world. 
Throughout  the  electoral  period  of  October  and  November, 
1910,  and  again  of  1912,  the  spectacle  was  one  which  re- 
sembled nothing  which  has  ever  taken  place  elsewhere. 
It  revealed  the  existence,  after  all,  of  a  national  spirit,  capable 
of  ultimately  completing  the  work  of  unification*  which  even 

1  The  work  of  unification  will  be  a  long  effort  in  "  constructive 
nationalism."  It  is  not  merely  "  the  problem  of  the  preservation 
of  the  national  resources  "  of  the  United  States,  which  has  been 
sketched  out  by  Mr.  Roosevelt  in  his  article  on  "  The  Pioneer  Spirit 
and  American  Problems  "  (The  Outlook,  Sept.  10,  1910),  and  which 
Mr.  Frank  Bumngton  Vrooman  analyzed  brilliantly  in  his  lecture 
delivered  to  the  Oxford  School  of  Geography  on  March  8,  1909  (cf. 
"  Theodore  Roosevelt :  Dynamic  Geographer."  Henry  Frowde, 
Oxford  University  Press).  It  is  the  achievement  of  a  national 
policy,  and  a  national  responsibility,  based  on  a  national  unity. 
Many  of  the  "  rights  "  of  the  several  States  must  be  amalgamated 
in  a  general  "  law  of  the  land  "  rendering  impossible,  for  instance, 
such  scandalous  anomalies  as  the  fact  of  the  continued  existence 
of  defaulting  American  States  over  which  the  central  Administration 
has  only  inadequate  control.  In  the  autumn  of  1912  North  Carolina, 
which  has  defaulted  obligations  amounting  to  over  $12,000,000, 


16  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

the  Civil  War,  supplemented  by  the  vast  material  co-ordinat- 
ing forces  of  our  time — railways,  electricity,  the  printing-press 
— had  not  yet  sufficed  to  achieve. 

A  genuine  passion  for  reform ;  a  desire — oh,  sometimes 
a  very  exorbitant  and  fanatical  desire — to  make  social  re- 
lations and  civic  ideals  square  with  a  crude  notion  of  justice 
and  fair  play ;  a  recognition  of  the  fact  that  the  old  con- 
fidence in  the  inevitable  success  and  the  obvious  superi- 
ority of  the  American  democracy  was  stupid  and  childish,  and 
must  give  way  before  a  systematic  endeavour  to  work  out 
a  social  ideal  on  a  rational  basis  ;  the  rejection  of  the 
former  insolent  attitude  of  laisser-aller ,  of  devil-we-care 
fatuousness,  for  the  adoption  of  strenuous  and  methodical 
tactics  aiming  at  the  organization  of  a  really  democratic 
existence,  in  which  the  useful  impetus  of  characteristic  Ameri- 
can individualism,]or  the  sacrosanct  principle  of  State  rights, 
would  be  curbed  only  in  so  far  as  individualism  and  State 

appealed  for  a  loan  of  $550,000  based  on  the  credit  of  the  State. 
Mississippi  also,  notwithstanding  her  repudiated  debt  of  $7,000,000, 
is  trying  to  borrow.  A  memorandum  of  the  British  Council  of 
Foreign  Bondholders  recently  recalled  that  the  official  Controller 
of  Savings  Banks  in  the  United  States  had  taken  steps  to  compel 
certain  of  the  banks  to  sell  then:  holdings  of  bonds  of  some  of  the 
Southern  States,  as,  although  such  bonds  were  being  regularly  paid, 
the  Savings  Bank  Law  prohibits  investment  by  the  banks  in  securities 
of  States  which  are  in  default  on  previously  contracted  obligations. 
The  British  Council  of  Foreign  Bondholders  expresses  its  surprise 
that  prosperous  and  wealthy  communities  should  persist  in  sheer 
refusal  to  enter  into  a  reasonable  arrangement  with  the  holders  of 
their  defaulted  obligations.  They  recommend  an  uncompromising 
opposition  to  the  attempts  of  these  States  to  obtain  new  money. 
At  present  the  only  two  countries  in  the  world  in  default,  outside 
of  the  Southern  States  of  the  American  Union,  are  Guatemala  and 
Honduras.  Constructive  statesmanshp  in  the  United  States  would 
find  some  way  to  render  it  no  longer  possible  for  a  paper  like  the 
London  Times  to  comment  as  follows  on  the  present  situation  : 
"Unless  the  American  States  take  prompt  steps  to  remedy  the  present 
regrettable  state  of  affairs  it  would  appear  probable  that  they  will 
incur  the  unenviable  distinction  of  being  the  only  communities  barred 
from  the  money  markets  of  the  world." 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     17 

Autonomy  injured  the  interests  of  the  vast  community 
at  large — all  these  signs  of  an  awakened  national  spirit,  these 
preoccupations  of  practical  reform  which  had  moralized 
politics,  and  which  were  peculiar  to  no  political  party,  but 
which  were  as  much  the  key-note  in  1910  of  the  speeches  of 
the  Democratic  candidate  for  governor  of  New  Jersey 
(destined  to  be  President  of  the  United  States)  as  they  were 
the  war-cry  of  1912  of  the  Nimrod  of  the  Progressist  party, 
bespoke  a  transformation  in  American  conditions  which 
marked  only  a  newer  and  more  potent  phase  of  the  earlier 
high-minded  sense  of  obligation  to  subordinate  life  to  a 
moral  ideal.  The  period  of  what  the  Canadians  of  the 
West  call  "  making  good,"  is  ended,  and  the  American 
population  is  now  developing  a  critical  spirit  as  to  the 
quality  of  the  results  of  their  civilization.  It  is  taking  to 
politics  with  a  "  strenuousness  "  that  has  an  ethical  fervour. 
The  legitimacy  or  the  illegitimacy  of  the  triumphs  of  a 
rampant  individualism — the  literally  imperial  achieve- 
ments of  the  unmolested  money-getters  who  have  built 
the  railways  and  founded  the  corporations  of  the  United 
States  ;  the  problems  of  national  economic  conservation  ; 
the  present  position  and  the  future  of  American  women  ;  the 
moral  aspects  of  tariff  bills  or  of  banking  legislation  :  such 
subjects  as  these  are  the  recurrent  themes  of  the  great 
popular  magazines  and  reviews  which  are  read  by  hundreds 
of  thousands  of  American  citizens  and  gibbering  candidates 
for  American  citizenship.  This  last  fact  is  in  itself  extraor- 
dinarily impressive. 

The  sense  of  a  moral  purpose,  constantly  revealed  by 
the  articles  in  the  American  magazines,  is  a  fact  classing 
itself  immediately  with  the  general  impression  left  by  the 
whole  spectacle  of  American  life.  It  is  one  with  the  cases 
of  advertised  philanthropy  on  the  part  of  the  plutocrats ; 
one  with  the  titles  of  the  books  published  by  the  presidents 
of  the  colleges ;  one  with  the  inspiration  of  the  sermons  in 
the  churches,  and  one  with  the  texture  of  the  various 

c 


i8  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

planks  in  the  political  platforms.  Save  for  the  cult  of 
sport — and,  after  all,  why  exclude  this  Hellenic  passion 
from  the  category  of  moral  impulses  ? — no  activity  is  any 
longer  conceivable  in  America  except  in  relation  to  the 
whole  problem  of  the  national  interest  and  of  national 
improvement.  Heedless  individualism,  inspired  by  the 
merely  selfish  instinct  of  getting  rich,  or  of  being  a  success 
without  thought  of  one's  neighbour,  is  no  longer  American. 
The  theory  of  "  equal  rights  "  has  been  tried  and  found 
wanting.  The  tradition  of  that  persistent  Jeffersonian 
principle  is  being  hopelessly  demolished  by  the  lessons 
which  Americans  of  the  last  generation  have  drawn  from 
their  political  and  economic  experience.  Everything  now 
to  be  seen,  everything  to  be  read,  everything  heard  in 
America,  leads  the  observer  to  believe  that  American 
society  is  already  becoming  what  Mr.  Croly,  in  his  remark- 
able book,  The  Promise  of  American  Life,  declares  that  it 
must  become,  short  of  utter  failure.  It  is  becoming  a 
democracy  of  selected  individuals,  who  are  obliged  constantly 
to  justify  their  selection.  It  is  no  longer,  as  Matthew  Arnold 
called  it,  the  home  of  das  Gemeine.  Its  members  are  be- 
coming united  in  a  sense  of  joint  responsibility  for  the 
success  of  their  political  and  social  ideal. 

A  Bossuet,  rhetorically  falsifying  history  in  conformity 
with  an  a  priori  principle  of  pre-established  harmony, 
might  be  tempted  grandiloquently  to  recall  that  the  north 
and  south  axis  of  the  planet  is  that  of  the  five  great  com- 
mercial and  ethnic  highways  of  world-civilization :  the 
Canal  of  Panama,  the  Suez  Canal,  the  Nile  valley,  the 
valley  of  the  Rhone,  and  Manhattan  Island,  and  to  find  a 
"  providential  "  fitness  in  the  fact  that  a  self-conscious 
people,  with  a  common  political  and  social  ideal,  should 
be  developed  round  each  of  these  highways.  But  he  would 
roll  out  anathema  at  one  of  the  most  characteristic  aspects 
of  American  life,  the  universal  interest  in  sport,  the  passion 
for  play.  Autumn  in  America  to-day  is,  indeed,  a  season  in 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     19 

which  not  merely  the  youth,  who  are  donning  the  toga 
virilis,  and  their  beautiful  partners,  but  men  and  women  of 
all  ages,  abandon  themselves  to  strenuous  amusement. 
Join  the  wonderful  crowds  who  assemble  in  their  several 
amphitheatres,  round  the  football  field,  from  Andover  Hill, 
by  way  of  New  Haven  and  Cambridge,  to  West  Point. 
It  is  an  imperial  spectacle,  and  the  spectator  will  have 
the  sensations  of  a  patrician.  A  quarter  of  a  century 
ago  the  great  American  public  cared  little  for  the  fate 
of  a  university  team  pitted  against  its  rival.  In  America 
to-day  the  entire  community  participates  in  the  tense 
curiosity  with  which  the  college  graduates  hasten,  with 
their  womenkind,  to  the  tournament  fields  to  see  the 
youth — who  are  more  like  gladiators  than  like  knights — 
do  battle,  and  the  newspapers  of  the  continent,  in  the 
small  as  in  the  great  towns,  devote  as  much  space  to 
the  games  as  they  do  to  home  politics,  and  infinitely 
more  than  they  do  to  foreign  affairs.  That  thirty  thou- 
sand or  forty  thousand  people,  among  those  who  are 
doing  all  the  serious  things  in  the  society  of  their  time, 
should  scramble  for  the  privilege  of  watching  a  football 
game,  that  the  fifty  thousand  others  who  are  excluded 
from  the  privilege,  more  or  less  by  chance,  should  envy 
them  their  good  fortune,  and  that  hundreds  of  thousands 
of  others  should  be  waiting  at  nightfall,  at  the  ends  of  the 
telegraph  wires  and  in  front  of  the  bulletins  posted  up  by 
the  newspapers,  to  learn  the  result  of  a  battle  lasting 
ninety  minutes ;  this  is  a  fact  which  Europe  could  not 
understand,  but  of  which  it  has  perhaps  gained  an  inkling, 
since  the  American  victories  in  the  Olympic  Games  of  1912 
at  Stockholm.  It  is  a  fact  of  a  Pindaric  quality,  and  one 
which  throws  a  beautiful  light  on  the  growth  of  the  hero- 
cult  in  the  civilization  of  Greece.  America  has  not  yet 
a  national  poet  like  Pindar,  capable  of  celebrating  the 
glory  of  a  Boston,  or  a  Duluth,  or  a  New  York,  or  a  Rich- 
mond, or  a  Chicago  boy,  in  verses  to  the  glory  of  these 


20  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

several  cities,  but  it  already  has  the  pretext  and  the  incen- 
tive for  a  Pindar ;  and  when  such  a  writer  is  born  he  will 
say  in  English,  as  his  predecessor  said  in  Greek  :  "  Best 
of  physicians  for  a  man's  accomplished  toil  is  festive  joy." 

At  Lenox,  where  the  rich  families  of  New  York  have 
created  vast  domains  around  their  country  houses;  exactly 
as  the  rich  Roman  and  Gallo-Roman  colonists  of  the  Bur- 
gundian  highlands,  by  natural  capillary  advance  up  the 
Rhone  valley,  built  in  a  wilderness  villas  crammed  with 
the  art  treasures  of  Greece  or  of  the  home-country — on 
Long  Island,  on  the  Connecticut  slopes,  in  the  hinterland 
of  the  Boston  suburbs,  or  at  Morristown,  in  New  Jersey, 
where,  in  an  atmosphere  of  admirable  history,  and  in  a 
region  of  beautiful  hills  and  poetic  waters,  still  other 
favourites  of  American  fortune  have  organized  a  life  warm 
with  a  rich  comfort  which  only  England's  aristocracy  had 
anticipated ;  the  impression  left  upon  the  visitor  is  of  an- 
other kind.  It  is  distinctly  that  which  Signer  Ferrero,  the 
historian  of  Rome,  has  chronicled  in  his  notes  on  American 
society.  The  immense  extension  of  the  class  which  possesses 
the  money  to  buy  leisure,  and  enough  money  to  buy  the 
leisure  to  be  wise — even  if  all  of  them  be  not  yet  wise 
enough  to  buy  that  kind  of  leisure — is  a  new  fact  which 
illustrates  once  more  how  useful  the  economic  key  may 
be  to  open  the  problems  set  by  history.  And  these 
citizens,  who  can  now  afford  to  play,  are  being  imitated 
by  the  entire  people,  all  of  whom  are  "  making  money," 
or  who  are  somehow  enjoying  the  mysterious  privilege  of 
economic  credit. 

A  quarter. of  a  century  ago,  most  Americans  doubted 
whether  they  had  a  right  to  play.  None  thought  it  "  moral  " 
to  play  long.  This  feeling  was  part  and  parcel  of  the  emo- 
tion with  which  they  clung  to  the  validity  of  the  univer- 
sally disseminated  eleventh  commandment :  Thou  shall 
not  like.  Of  that  commandment  not  a  shred  remains.  The 
Americans  have  issued  forth  from  the  dank  Puritanism  of 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS      21 

their  old-time  places  of  worship  and  of  study.  They  have 
come  out  into  the  open.  They  have  treated  their  moral 
rheumatism  by  a  bath  of  sunlight.  They  are  marching 
to  the  step  of  an  imperial  movement,  and  they  are  rapidly 
substituting  for  the  old  precepts  a  moral  philosophy  as 
realistic,  as  "  pragmatic,"  as  that  which  was  born  in  the 
Greek  palaestra,  and  which  a  little  effort  of  mysticism  might 
easily  enhance — and  no  doubt  will — with  all  the  virtues  of 
the  famous  kalokagathos.1  At  present  America  has  only 
reached  the  stage  of  calisthenics.  With  their  emancipation 
from  the  book,  the  Americans  are,  alas,  recklessly  shat- 
tering the  language,  inventing  new  idioms,  sharpening 
certain  words,  or  destroying  others  ;  but  they  are,  mean- 
while, evolving  in  the  open  a  physical  type  of  man  and 
woman  which  has  already  considerably  altered  the  appear- 
ance of  the  race. 

Dr.  van  Dyke,  in  the  book  already  cited,  denies  the  truth 
of  the  contention  that  any  general  and  fundamental  change 
has  taken  place  in  the  human  type  in  America.  But  that 
very  trait  of  Americans,  the  expressions  of  which  he  analy- 
ses so  suggestively,  their  spirit  of  self-reliance — the  char- 
acteristic which  Professor  Miinsterberg  calls  the  "  spirit  of 
self-direction " — has  unquestionably  given  to  the  male 
and  female  face  a  look  which  distinguishes  it  from  the  ex- 
pression of  the  British,  French,\>r  German,  face,  and  which 
climatic  or  other  external  causes  would  not  have  sufficed 
to  induce.  The  British,  Dutch,  or  Irish  animal,  homo, 
transplanted  to  America,  might,  perhaps,  have  become 
what  Quatrefages  declared  he  was  becoming,  a  species  of 
man  resembling  the  North  American  Indian,  if  it  had  not 
been  for  the  play  of  moral  and  economic  factors  which  have 
saved  him  from  that  degeneracy. 
At  all  events,  it  is  just  because  these  handsomer  and 

1  The  Catholic  University  of  America  has  conferred  on  Mr.  J. 
Pierpont  Morgan  a  unique  degree  :  "  Patron  of  Fine  Arts  and 
Letters."  (N.Y.  Herald,  Jan.  3,  1913.) 


22  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

healthier  Americans  of  the  present  generation  are  'the  de- 
scendants of  men  and  women  who  had  a  peculiar  endow- 
ment of  energy,  and  a  special  training  that  was  productive 
of  real  will-power ;  it  is,  in  a  word,  just  because  they  have 
been  able  to  preserve  their  "  forms  of  thought,"  that  they 
have  been  able  to  expand  with  such  abounding  elasticity, 
and  such  a  steady,  and  often  insolent,  optimism,  within 
the  vast  limits  of  their  continent,  and  that,  furthermore, 
now  those  limits  have  been  reached,  they  have  been 
able  to  develop  the  sanely  sceptical  attitude  as  regards  the 
quality  of  their  achievements,  and  the  unflinching  resolve 
to  justify  their  belief  in  themselves,  which  are  bound  to 
strike  any  observer  as  characteristic  of  American  society 
to-day.  The  horizon  of  a  religious  mind  is  not  confined 
within  the  meridians  traced  on  the  surface  of  the  earth. 
For  many  generations  the  Americans  were  profoundly  re- 
ligious, and  their  perspectives  reached  outward  into  spaces 
the  reality  of  which  was  as  characteristic  as  their  remote- 
ness. The  Americans  of  to-day  are  less  religious,  notwith- 
standing the  evidence  afforded  by  the  statistics  of  church- 
membership.  But  the  habit  that  they  have  acquired,  of 
taking  the  idealistic,  mystical,  religious,  far-view  of  human 
actions,  their  utter  failure  to  comprehend  the  narrow  terre- 
d-terre  point  of  view,  remains  with  them  as  a  "  form  "  of 
thought,  which  has  been  singularly  and  happily  adjusted 
to  the  purely  geographical  conditions  of  their  national  ex- 
pansion. An  energy  and  a  will  to  organize  American  society 
on  a  national  basis,  is  now  being  manifested  in  a  spirit  hostile 
to  some  of  the  most  sacred  political  and  social  traditions  of  the 
people  of  the  independent  States.  This  is  the  impressive  im- 
plication of  the  whole  wondrous  spectacle  of  modern  America. 
Now,  this  pervasive  domestic  unrest,  the  internal  trans- 
formations, have  uniformly  escaped  the  notice  of  the  foreign 
observer,  or,  when  he  has  obtained  some  inkling  of  them, 
he  has  usually  misinterpreted  them.  The  great  fact,  how- 
ever, which  has  impressed  itself  upon  him  with  extraordinary 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS      23 

lucidity  is  that  the  United  States  has  become  a  World- 
Power,  and  he  is  taking  this  fact  into  his  calculations  to  a 
degree  that  is  unsuspected  by  the  average  American,  and 
is  sufficiently  appreciated  only  by  certain  members  of 
the  Senatorial  Committee  for  Foreign  Affairs.  When,  in 
1909,  ex-President  Roosevelt,  coming  up  out  of  Africa, 
made  his  tour  of  the  European  continent,  the  gravest  ex- 
ponent of  British  public  opinion  welcomed  him  in  language 
which  it  is  pertinent  to  recall.  The  spectacle  of  the  un- 
failing enthusiasm  excited  by  Theodore  Roosevelt,  as  he 
passed  from  country  to  country,  was  compared  to  the  fer- 
vour aroused  by  Garibaldi,  when  his  romantic  exploits 
were  still  fresh  in  men's  minds,  and  his  red  shirt  was  the 
symbol  of  struggling  causes.  "  There  has  been  nothing 
like  it  in  Europe  since  the  days  of  Peter  the  Hermit,"  said 
The  Times',  and  this  great  organ  of  British  feeling  under- 
took to  account  for  the  mystery  of  a  phenomenon  which 
the  mere  psychology  of  crowds  is  admittedly  inadequate  to 
explain.  The  reason  why  Mr.  Roosevelt's  progress  in 
Europe  was  such  as  the  greatest  monarchs  have  not  always 
enjoyed,  was  taken  to  be  the  fact  that  the  substance  of  all 
his  speeches  was  one  needful  and  welcome.  Mr.  Roosevelt 
came  to  a  Europe  which  was  sick  and  very  weary  of  talk, 
perpetual  talk,  about  rights ;  and  it  listened  with  avidity 
and  hope  to  a  man  who  spoke  of  duties,  and  spoke  of  them 
plainly  and  emphatically.  The  opportuneness  of  Mr. 
Roosevelt's  message  is  the  explanation  which  was  given  of 
the  astonishing  success  of  his  odyssey.  There  is  no  reason 
for  rejecting  this  version  of  the  matter ;  but  it  should  be 
borne  in  mind  that  Mr.  Roosevelt's  message  was  an  "  Ameri- 
can "  message,  and  that  the  importance  ascribed  to  his 
utterances  and,  in  fact,  his  very  presence  in  Europe,  was  due 
to  the  significance  attributed  to-day  by  the  rest  of  the  world 
to  any  characteristic  American  demonstration.  In  order 
to  illustrate  this  truth  one  single  episode  of  Mr.  Roose- 
velt's journey  suffices — his  visit  to  France.  The  great  im- 


24  PROBLEMS   OF  POWER 

pression  left  by  Mr.  Roosevelt  in  France  could  not  have 
been  made  if  he  had  not  arrived  there  with  a  singular  pres- 
tige. To  Europe  he  was  a  convenient  symbol  of  American 
world-power ;  and  France,  in  particular,  had  just  had 
excellent  reasons  for  congratulating  herself  on  having  greeted 
Franklin  with  sympathy  a  century  and  a  half  ago,  and  for 
having  aided  the  British  colonies  beyond  the  Atlantic  to 
achieve  their  independence.  At  Algeciras  she  reaped  the 
reward  for  her  attitude  during  the  Anglo-American  diffi- 
culties of  the  eighteenth  century.  At  Algeciras  the  con- 
ciliatory intervention  of  President  Roosevelt,  by  thwart- 
ing the  German  Emperor's  efforts  to  destroy  the  diplomatic 
block  which  gave  France  a  firm  stand  in  the  defence  of  her 
Moroccan  interests,  did  more  than  save  that  country  from 
a  humiliation  which  might  have  led  to  a  European  war. 
It  confirmed  again  a  fact  which  Continental  Europe  had 
learned  during  the  Spanish-American  War,  but  which,  if  it 
had  not  been  for  Mr.  Roosevelt's  conspicuous  personality, 
it  might  easily  have  forgotten — the  fact  that  the  United 
States  existed,  and  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  did  not  neces- 
sarily imply  that  the  American  Government  ignored  the 
presence  of  other  Powers  on  this  planet.  Mr.  Roosevelt, 
who  had  been  a  soldier  in  Cuba,  and  an  official  of  the 
Navy  Department,  had  also  been  the  foremost  promoter  of 
arbitration  among  the  nations.  At  The  Hague,  at  Alge- 
ciras, and  at  Portsmouth,  he  proved  to  Europe  that  America 
was  no  mere  cartographic  figment.  For  France,  as  for  the 
rest  of  the  European  Continent,  Mr.  Roosevelt  meant  the 
United  States.  His  coming  was  the  arrival  of  the  magician 
who  had  made  America  to  loom  over  the  top  of  the  sea,  and 
finally  to  become  visible  from  Madrid,  Paris,  Berlin  and  Lon- 
don, and  even  from  China  and  from  the  islands  ofathe  Pacific. 

Such  was  the  European  point  of  view.  Its  correctness 
or  its  superficiality  need  not  here  be  discussed.  The  fact 
remains  :  for  France,  as  for  Europe,  Mr.  Roosevelt  personi- 
fied, and  still  personifies,  an  epoch  of  American  history. 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL   POLITICS      25 

The  curiosity  which  the  ex-president  evoked  in  Paris  sprang 
from  a  feeling  of  genuine  and  disinterested  admiration  for 
the  man  who  had  made  the  Republic  of  the  United  States 
more  than  merely  visible  to  the  naked  eye,  who  seemed  to 
have  introduced  it  into  the  concert  of  the  Powers  ;  and  the 
sympathy  with  which  he  was  greeted  in  France  was  but  the 
natural  payment  of  a  debt  of  gratitude  to  a  man  who  had  done 
that  country  signal  service  at  a  moment  of  grave  crisis. 
Moreover,  as  chance  would  have  it,  he  came  to  France  "  in  the 
nick  of  time."  He  was  the  representative,  it  is  true,  of  ideals 
which  are  not  new,  some  of  which,  indeed,  had  been  uttered 
by  a  foreigner  more  than  twelve  years  before,  but  which  had 
then  fallen  on  stony  soil.  The  time  was  ripe  for  his  visit. 

During  the  period  in  which  the  United  States  was  material- 
izing for  European  observers  out  of  the  mirage  which  had 
seemed  for  so  long  a  time  a  mere  cloud-bank  in  the  Western 
Atlantic,  the  relations  of  the  European  States  were  evolving 
in  accordance  with  the  laws  of  equilibrium,  which,  in  the 
language  of  politics,  means  that  those  States  were  engaged  in 
a  struggle  for  the^balance  of  power.  Bismarck  did  more  than 
create  an  approximately  united  Germany ;  he  destroyed 
Europe.  He  pitted  the  Continental  nations  against  one 
another  in  a  reciprocal  enmity  which  seemed  likely  to  endure. 
The  history  of  Europe  during  the  last  twenty  years  has  been, 
in  its  broadest  aspect,  merely  the  often  blind  but  consecu- 
tive effort  to  shatter  German  hegemony,  and  to  establish 
equilibrium  among  the  Great  Powers.  A  necessary  condi- 
tion of  the  restoration  of  equilibrium  in  Europe  was  the  re- 
nascence of  France.  England  was  long  in  coming  to  this 
point  of  view,  but  Russia  clearly  perceived  the  fact  only  a  few 
years  after  the  conclusion  of  the  Treaty  of  Frankfort,  and 
the  result  of  her  perspicacity  was  the  Franco-Russian  Alli- 
ance, and  ultimately  the  Triple  Entente  between  France, 
Russia,  and  England,  which  was  a  device  for  counter- 
balancing the  prestige  of  the  Triple  Alliance. 

No  fact  is  more  characteristic  of  our  time  than  the  Franco- 


26  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

Russian  Alliance.  But  no  fact  was  for  a  long  period  more 
misunderstood,  even  in  France.  The  French  Foreign  Office 
left  French  public  opinion  in  such  complete  ignorance  of  the 
real  diplomatic  bearings,  and  of  the  practical  significance  of 
that  alliance — which  was  interpreted  by  the  nation  as  an  ear- 
nest of  ultimate  recovery  of  Alsace-Lorraine — that  when,  in 
August,  1898,  the  Tsar  appealed  to  Europe  in  arms  to  meet 
for  discussion  of  the  problem  of  disbanding  the  standing 
armies,  there  was  a  spontaneous  protest,  a  wail  of  disenchant- 
ment, throughout  the  whole  French  nation.  When  the 
young  Tsar  visited  Versailles,  in  the  autumn  of  1896,  he  was 
led  through  the  famous  Galerie  des  Glaces,  where  the  Ger- 
man Princes  had  proclaimed  the  birth  of  an  empire  won  by 
the  partial  dismemberment  of  France.  The  presence,  in  that 
accursed  spot,  of  a  more  arbitrary  potentate  than  even  a 
Hohenzollern  drunk  with  victory,  was  given  almost  a  lustral 
importance  by  certain  observers,  who  had  no  difficulty  in  con- 
vincing the  quick  French  imagination  of  their  perspicacity.1 
Nicholas  II  was  conceived  by  them  as  a  great  and  friendly 

1  I  was  one  of  the  few  unofficial  guests  of  the  French  Government, 
in  the  Palace  of  Versailles,  on  the  occasion  of  the  Tsar's  visit, 
October  8,  1896.  That  night  I  telegraphed  to  the  London  Times 
a  long  dispatch  describing  the  scene  in  the  Palace.  That  dispatch 
contained  the  following  paragraph  :  "  We  were  in  the  historic  hall, 
where  the  old  Emperor  William,  all  the  German  Sovereigns,  and  the 
Iron  Chancellor  proclaimed  the  German  Empire.  We  were  awaiting 
the  coming  of  the  great  Imperial  friend  of  France,  who,  by  his 
presence,  was,  in  the  eyes  of  Frenchmen,  to  purify  this  hall  of  the 
associations  that  for  twenty-five  years  have  made  Versailles  a  name 
not  of  glory,  but  of  humiliation.  We  had  been  convened  to  witness 
an  act  almost  religious  in  its  seriousness.  High  over  our  heads, 
at  the  base  of  the  central  painting  of  the  ceiling,  was  the  legend 
'  Le  Roi  Gouverne  Par  Lui-meme.'  Beneath  this  haughty  assump- 
tion of  the  old  Monarchy,  William  I  had  proclaimed  the  birth 
of  an  Empire  won  by  the  partial  dismemberment  of  France. 
He  had  chosen  this  proud  vantage-point  with  a  bitter  irony, 
the  sting  of  which  could  be  mitigated  only  by  the  passage  across  this 
spot  of  a  monarch  still  more  autocratic  than  he.  The  palace  had 
waited  a  quarter  of  a  century  for  the  grand  purification  which 
was  soon  to  restore  it  unsullied  to  the  admiration  of  Frenchmen." 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS       27 

monarch  who  had  hunted  the  German  spectre  from  that 
historic  hall,  and  had  purified  it  for  French  ends.  If  the 
French  nation,  as  a  whole,  welcomed  the  Russian  Alliance, 
it  was  because  it  felt  that  France  could  now  hold  up  her  head 
in  Europe,  and  that  one  day,  perhaps,  she  could  tear  up  the 
Treaty  of  Frankfort.  The  burst  of  enthusiasm  which  greeted 
the  Russian  sovereigns  on  their  several  visits  to  France  had 
no  other  meaning  than  this  :  "  You  are  our  friends,  and 
some  day  you  and  we  together  will  put  Prussia  in  her  place." 

Thus,  two  great  people,  utilizing  all  the  democratic 
forces  of  publicity  at  their  disposal,  so  transformed  the  arts 
of  diplomacy  that  the  union  which  they  had  formed  could 
no  longer  be  defined  in  the  old  idioms,  and  by  such  oft- 
used  words  as  "  treaty  "  and  "  alliance."  But  there  was  to 
be  a  rude  awakening. 

In  August,  1898,  the  Imperial  Russian  Gazette  published  the 
appeal  of  the  Tsar  in  favour  of  disarmament.  In  France 
this  publication  was  an  unexpected  peal  of  thunder  shattering 
all  the  hopes  of  the  nation.1  Public  opinion  in  France, 
dumbfounded  at  the  blow,  accused  her  rulers  of  having 
been  duped  by  the  Russian  Foreign  Office,  which  was  re- 
presented as  having  acted  in  the  interests  of  the  two 
autocratic  conspirators,  the  German  Emperor  and  the 
Tsar.  An  eminent  historian,  M.  Lavisse,  Academician  and 
professor  at  the  Sorbonne,  expressed  on  this  occasion  the 
feeling  not  only  of  the  masses  but  of  the  nation  as  a 
whole  when  he  said  :  "  Never  has  our  Government  taken 
care  to  explain  to  us  the  exact  meaning  of  the  alliance.  It 
has  thus  far  spoken  and  acted  as  if  there  were  an  under- 
standing warranting  vast  hopes.  It  has  encouraged  the 
very  natural  illusions  of  a  country  given  to  enthusiasms. 
It  has  not  perceived  that  we  needed  the  real  truths,  naked 
and  dry — harsh  if  necessary." 

The  "  real  truth  "  was  that  the  French  statesmen  who 
had  extolled  an  alliance  with  Russia  had  done  so  in  the 
1  See  note,  p.  48. 


28  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

interests  of  peace,  but  that  they  were  of  the  school  of  Gam- 
betta,  whose  maxim  was  that  if  France  would  come  to  an 
understanding  with  Russia,  she  could  do  more  than  recover 
her  position  in  Europe  :   she  would  be  able  to  destroy  Ger- 
man hegemony.     In  a  period  when  the  carking  desire  for 
the  revanche  still  dominated  French  society,  it  would  have 
been    impossible,  in  a  democratic  community  like  that  of 
France,  to  undertake  to  dispel  or  even  to  temper  "  the 
natural  illusions  of  a  country  given  to  enthusiasms,"  and  to 
substitute  for  the  misconstructions  of  French  opinion  as  to 
the  Russian  Alliance  truer  conceptions  of  the  European  situ- 
ation, and  an  exact  notion  of  the  scope  of  the  defensive 
alliance  with  the  Tsar.     The  essential  thing  for  those  who 
were  responsible  for  the  destinies  of  France  was  to  effect  the 
alliance  at  all  costs.     Its  bearing  and  significance  could  be 
explained  later  on.     The  disillusionment  caused  throughout 
France,  as  Frenchmen  gradually  grew  to  understand  that 
the  alliance  implied  no  active  policy  of  aggression  culminat- 
ing in  the  revanche,  but  meant  the  melancholy  maintenance 
of  the  status  quo  as  determined  by  the  Treaty  of  Frankfort,1 
and  that  all  that  subsisted  of  the  "  long  hopes  and  the  vast 
thoughts  "  of  the  early  epoch  of  enthusiasm  was  the  some- 
what mystical  faith  of  Gambetta  in  an  "  immanent  justice," 
— this  disillusionment  was  one  of  the  most  tragic  experiences 
that  ever  befel  a  generous  nation.     The  experience  tended 

1  The  situation  was,  I  believe,  described  with  absolute  accuracy 
by  the  Socialist  leader,  M.  Jaures,  in  a  speech  in  the  Chamber  of 
Deputies  on  March  22,  1912.  He  said  :  "  Vous  savez  bien  que  1'al- 
liance  russe  n'a  pas  eu  explicitement  pour  base  le  maintien  du  statu 
quo,  mais  si  vous  voulez  scruter  a  fond  les  evenements,  si  vous 
voulez  recueillir  le  temoignage,  le  jugement  que  portait  M.  Albert 
Vandal  et  que  notre  collegue  M.  Denys  Cochin  commentait  1'autre 
joureloquemmentarAcademieFran9aise,  vous  verrez  qu'en  fait  la 
Russie,  tou  jours  ten  tee,  malgre  tout,  de  menager  la  dynastie  alle- 
mande  ne  vous  a  donne  la  main  que  pour  une  oeuvre  de  paix 
continuee ;  et  vous  savez  bien  que  si  la  revanche,  si  la  reparation 
devrait  dependre  d'entreprises  belliqueuses,  vous  savez  bien  que 
tout  le  jeu  de  votre  politique,  depuis  quarante-deux  ans,  aurait 
etc  de  I'ajourner." 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS       29 

to  cultivate  in  it  as  a  whole  that  spirit  of  positivism  and 
resignation  which  had  previously  been  characteristic  of  only 
a  part  of  the  nation.  It  cultivated  also  the  stoic  courage 
to  see  and  to  take  things  as  they  are,  which  is  the  primary 
condition  of  practical  statesmanship ;  and  France,  in 
seeking  to  readjust  herself  to  the  conditions  revealed  by  her 
belated  perspicacity,  fell  back  upon  the  resolve  to  "  make 
the  best  "  of  the  best  bargain  which  her  rulers  had  been 
able  to  arrange  in  their  efforts  to  restore  her  to  her  place 
in  the  world. 

The  Tsar's  appeal  to  Europe  was  examined  in  this  fresh 
light.  On  reflection  it  was  seen  to  be,  after  all,  an  utterance 
and  an  act  inspired  by  some  of  the  soundest  of  French  tra- 
ditions. What  it  really  amounted  to  was  the  convocation 
of  the  Etats-Generaux  of  the  nineteenth  century ;  and  it 
was  not  that  by  a  figure  of  speech,  but  actually  that.  Only 
the  conditions  of  our  "  laic  " l  time,  the  multiple  material 
conditions,  had  made  such  an  appeal  possible.  Europe  as  a 
whole,  to-day,  is  smaller  than  the  France  whose  woes  and 
reclamations  were  considered  in  1789  by  Necker  and  the 
king  ;  but  to-day,  as  then,  "  orders  "  corresponding  with 
those  of  the  ancien  regime  are  interested  in  preventing  the 
possibility  of  the  reform  proposed  by  the  Tsar.  The  National 
Assembly  had  declared  "  fraternity,"  had  cried  urbi  et  orbi  : 
"  there  shall  be  no  more  war."  The  time  was  not  yet  ripe. 
It  was  not  ripe  when  the  reform  was  extolled  by  Napoleon  III 
in  i863.2  But  it  was  all  but  ripe  in  1898,  and  it  is  still 
riper  to-day  because  of  the  march  of  the  factors,  or  rather 
the  multiplication  of  the  peculiar  material  conditions, 
which  are  transforming  the  very  mentality  of  the  race. 

1  See  note,  p.  80. 

2  My  old  chief,  M.  de  Blowitz,  writing  in  The  Times  of  August  30, 
1898,  on  the  subject  of  the  Tsar's  proposal,  compared  that  monarch 
to  Napoleon  III,  and  said  :    "  Napoleon  III  once  dreamed  of  some- 
thing of  the  sort,  and  in  a  solemn  speech  published  his  dream  to 
an  astonished  world.     The  dream  melted  away,    before  common- 
sense  and  reality,  without  bringing  about  a  catastrophe." 


30  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

Bismarck  retarded  the  work  of  the  French  Revolution, 
gagging  France  and  flinging  Europe  back  into  the  old  regime. 
Louis  Napoleon  had  begun  in  the  revolutionary  spirit,  but 
Germany  blocked  the  way.  At  last  France  resumed  her 
onward  march,  and — irony  of  ironies  ! — the  Tsar,  arriving 
with  his  historic  appeal  to  the  nations,  showed  himself 
the  real  heir  of  the  Revolution,  the  continuator  of  the  work 
of  the  National  Assembly. 

There  are  two  French  ideals  :  that  of  les  droits  de  I'homme, 
and  that  of  la  raison  d'etat,  and  the  struggle  between  them 
makes  French  history  the  most  fascinating  and  human  of  all 
histories.1  The  Tsar,  personifying  the  first  of  these  ideals, 
pointed  the  way  to  France,  and  gave  voice  to  her  revolu- 
tionary spirit,  her  concern  for  right  and  human  liberty,  her 
scorn  for  privilege  and  la  raison  d'etat,  her  sublime  Utopian 
logic.  Three  years  after  his  famous  appeal  in  favour  of  dis- 
armament the  Tsar  paid  a  second  visit  to  France.  At  Com- 
piegne,  on  Friday,  September  19,  1901,  he  gave  audience  to 
M.  Bourgeois,  the  French  plenipotentiary  at  the  Hague 
Conference.  This  was  the  morrow  of  the  day  spent  by 
the  Tsar  on  the  field  of  manoeuvres  at  Betheny,  where  at 
luncheon,  in  the  casemates  of  the  Fort  of  Vitry,  he  proposed 
a  toast  in  the  following  words  :  "  I  drink  to  the  brave  French 
army,  to  its  glory  and  to  its  prosperity,  and  I  like  to  look 
upon  it  as  a  powerful  support  for  those  principles  of  equity 
on  which  repose  the  general  order,  the  peace,  and  the  well- 
being  of  the  nations." 

It  was  impossible  to  affirm  more  explicitly  that  the  army 
of  the  Franco-Russian  Alliance  was  the  army  of  the  Hague. 
"  Equity  "  on  the  lips  of  a  Russian  emperor  was  synonymous 
with  "  Justice  "  in  the  mouth  of  a  Roosevelt.  France  no 
longer  had  any  excuse  for  not  understanding. 

She  did  understand  :    not  merely  her  rulers,  but  her 
people.     And  yet,  how  many  of  their  sentimental  instincts 
were  wounded,  how  many  of  their  natural  impulses  arrested, 
*  See  pp.  96-99. 


A  STUDY    OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS      31 

by  the  certainty  that  "  the  principles  of  equity  on  which  re- 
pose the  general  order,  the  peace,  and  the  well-being  of  the 
nations  "  must  henceforth  be  their  only  resource  !  The 
Tsar  had  sown,  in  the  teeth  of  a  driving  Gallic  wind,  the 
germs  of  pacifism  in  France.1  But  the  seeds  had  pushed  to 
the  light  amid  a  rank  undergrowth  of  aspirations  towards 
"  revenge."  Was  there  no  way  of  making  a  harmonious 
garden-plot  of  these  blades  of  corn  and  of  these  scarlet 
poppies  ?  Pacifism  and  War !  Here  were  two  reciprocal 
contradictory  ideals.  Could  nothing  be  done  to  reconcile 
them  ? 

The  problem  seemed  to  the  French  to  have  been  solved 
by  the  ex-president  of  a  friendly  nation  and  a  "  sister  re- 
public." The  rough-rider  of  Cuba  had  been  the  laureate  of 
the  Nobel  Peace  Prize.  Frenchmen  awaited  Mr.  Roose- 
velt's arrival  with  anxious  expectations,  hoping  to  learn 
from  his  lips  the  formula  which  the  United  States  had  found 
useful,  and  which  might  serve  as  a  remedy  for  their  own 
malaise.  They  were  not  disappointed.  Here  is  what  the 
ex-president  said  to  them  at  the  University  of  Paris,  in  a 
lecture  which  was  disseminated  by  the  Temps  among  some 
fifty  thousand  school-teachers  throughout  the  country  : 

"  The  good  man  should  be  strong  and  brave,  that  is  to  say,  capable 
of  fighting,  of  serving  his  country  as  a  soldier,  should  the  occasion 
arise.  There  are  well-intentioned  philosophers  who  declaim  against 
the  iniquity  of  war.  They  are  right,  provided  they  insist  merely 
on  the  iniquity.  War  is  a  horrible  thing ;  and  an  unjust  war  is  a 
crime  against  humanity.  But  it  is  a  crime  of  this  sort  because  it  is 
unjust,  not  because  it  is  war.  The  choice  should  always  be  in 
favour  of  right,  whether  the  alternative  is  peace  or  war.  The  ques- 
tion should  not  be  simply  :  '  Is  there  going  to  be  peace  or  war  ?  ' 
The  question  should  be  ;  '  Shall  the  cause  of  right  prevail  ?  Are  the 
great  laws  of  justice  once  more  to  be  observed  ?  '  And  the  reply  of 
a  strong  and  virile  people  will  be  :  '  Yes,  whatever  the  risk  may  be.' 
No  honourable  effort  should  ever  be  neglected  in  order  to  avoid 
war,  just  as  no  honourable  effort  should  be  neglected  by  an  indi- 
vidual, in  private  life,  to  avoid  a  quarrel ;  but  no  self-respecting 
individual,  and  no  self-respecting  nation,  should  submit  to  injustice." 

1  See  p.  159. 


32  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

And  dotting  the  i's  with  a  vigorous  stroke,  in  a  hand- 
writing which  all  could  read,  the  speaker  concluded  with 
an  inspiriting  and  illuminating  definition  of  patriotism, 
and  of  its  bearing  on  international  relations.  He  seemed 
to  be  giving  a  voice  to  the  finer  idealism  of  French  foreign 
policy  under  the  Third  Republic.  The  truly  patriotic  nation, 
he  said,  made  the  best  member  of  the  family  of  nations. 
It  should  stand  up  for  its  rights,  but  it  should  respect  the 
rights  of  others.  "  International  law,"  however,  was  not 
private  law,  and  it  lacked  as  yet  a  recognized  sanction. 
For  the  present,  every  nation  must  be  the  final  judge  of  its 
own  vital  interests,  and  in  the  last  resort  must  have  the  will 
and  the  strength  to  withstand  the  wrong  which  another  would 
inflict  upon  it.  The  nations  were  all  for  peace  and  justice, 
but  "  if  peace  and  justice  were  at  loggerheads,  they  would 
despise  the  man  who  did  not  take  the  side  of  justice,  even 
though  the  whole  world  were  to  rise  up  in  arms  against  him." 

No  lips  since  Gambetta's  had  addressed  Frenchmen  with 
this  lucidity  and  this  authority.  And  the  lips  were  those  of 
the  one  distinguished  foreigner  whose  sincerity  was  beyond 
suspicion.  Mr.  Roosevelt  justified  Frenchmen  to  them- 
selves.1 He  capped  the  work  of  the  Tsar,  reconciling  the 
two  great  principles  which  had  presided  over  the  evolution 
of  French  history :  the  spirit  that  had  informed  the  De- 
claration of  the  Rights  of  Man,  and  the  spirit  that,  from  the 
defeat  of  Ariovistus  to  the  Treaty  of  Nimegue,  had  animated 
the  soul  of  the  nation  in  its  long  struggle  towards  unity  and 
la  raison  d'etat. 

The  man  who  had  thus  eloquently  expressed  the  aspira- 
tions of  the  French  soul  and  its  anxious  reflections  on 
problems  which  concern  the  very  existence  of  France  as  a 

1  The  author  of  Le  Patriotisme  en  France  et  I' Stranger,  1912, 
M.  Paul  Pilant,  publishes  in  his  excellent  book  an  article  written 
by  him  in  June  1910,  and  "  dedicated  to  the  French  pacifists," 
in  which  he  cites  Mr.  Roosevelt  as  an  admirable  professor  of  energy 
for  the  French  people. 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS       33 

nation,  could  be  permitted  to  utter  certain  home  truths 
which  would  have  been  tolerated  from  no  one  else ;  and  Mr. 
Roosevelt  made  the  most  of  his  advantage.  It  was  not 
merely  a  matter  of  his  reminding  a  people  who  had  inscribed 
the  word  "  Egalite  "  on  all  their  public  monuments  (not 
excepting  the  portals  of  their  cemeteries — perhaps  the 
only  place  where  it  deserves  to  figure)  that  "  Equality  " 
is  an  absurdity  ;  that  there  are  degrees  of  worth,  and  thus 
degrees  of  legitimate  superiority,  and  consequently  of 
desert  and  social  rank ;  and  that  only  men  who  are  equal 
are  equal.  It  was  not  merely  a  matter  of  his  paean  in  honour 
of  the  man  of  action  and  character,  which  contained  pas- 
sages of  withering  scorn  for  the  cynic  who  watches  the  fray 
from  afar,  regarding  it  as  vulgar  to  take  part  in  the  battle  and 
"  distinguished  "  to  criticize,  and  to  count  the  blows  dealt 
by  others — utterances  as  stinging  as  those  in  which  the  Abbe 
Coyer  castigated  the  aristocracy  of  his  time  for  their  indiffer- 
ence to  the  great  civic,  political  and  commercial  interests  of 
the  community ;  and  utterances,  moreover,  that  were 
singularly  audacious  in  a  society  where  so  small  a  proportion 
of  the  electorate  care  to  indulge  in  their  right  of  suffrage. 
It  was  not  even  Mr.  Roosevelt's  haughty  assumption  to  be 
speaking  to  the  doctors  of  the  Sorbonne  as  the  Paul  of  a 
New  Dispensation,  and  his  venturing  to  assure  these  Gama- 
liels that  all  the  science  of  the  schools  is  as  nothing  in  com- 
parison with  common  sense  and  those  qualities  which,  while 
giving  a  man  self-confidence,  give  him  at  the  same  time  a 
sentiment  of  his  responsibility  as  a  member  of  society.  It 
was  not  the  fact  of  Mr.  Roosevelt's  fulminating  as  a  kind 
of  Protestant  Savonarola,  in  the  downright  Anglo-Saxon 
way,  that  moved  the  heart  of  France.  It  was  the  mere 
fact  of  his  existence  as  a  type  ;  the  fact  that  a  man  who  had 
been  President  of  a  Republic  should  possess  ideas  of  his  own, 
and  take  himself  seriously  as  a  leader  of  men  and  a  teacher, 
whereas  in  their  own  country  the  head  of  the  State  was  a 
vague  personage  without  known  views  of  any  kind,  without 

D 


34  PROBLEMS  OF   POWER 

initiative  or  authority,  and  a  man  who,  if  he  were  to  venture 
to  enunciate  any  ideas  or  to  play  a  role,  would  expose  him- 
self, in  spite  of  the  Constitution,1  to  the  French  form  of  im- 
peachment, and  perhaps  eventually  be  brought  up  for  trial 
before  Parliament  sitting  as  a  High  Court  of  Justice. 

As  an  illustration  of  what  one  may,  what,  indeed,  one 
must,  call  the  Consular  character  of  Republican  government 
in  the  United  States,  one  need  only  quote  the  words  of  Mr. 
Roosevelt  in  his  address  delivered  at  Christiania,  May  5, 
1910,  on  "  The  Colonial  Policy  of  the  United  States." 
He  warned  his  hearers  on  that  occasion  that  his  remarks  on 
peace  as  incumbent  of  the  Nobel  Prize  should  be  taken  in 
the  light  of  what  he  "  actually  did  "  as  President.  The 
United  States  kept  her  promise  to  the  letter  as  to  the  eva- 
cuation of  Cuba,  and  her  intervention  in  San  Domingo  was 
solely  to  "  prevent  the  need  of  taking  possession  of  the 
island."  But  what  was  the  President's  role,  his  "  manner  " 
as  a  responsible  exponent  of  American  policy  ?  In  a  period 
of  anarchy  and  revolution  Mr.  Roosevelt  negotiated  a  treaty 
with  the  Government  of  the  Island  in  virtue  of  which  an 
American  was  placed  at  the  head  of  the  Customs  Houses  and 
the  United  States  agreed  to  turn  over  to  the  San  Domingo 
Government  45  per  cent,  of  the  revenue,  keeping  55  per  cent. 

1  "  In  spite  of  the  Constitution."  The  French  Constitution  un- 
questionably grants  the  President  the  rights  of  message  and  sus- 
pension, the  rights  of  prorogation  and  dissolution  of  Parliament. 
And  no  doubt,  as  Mr.  Henry  Leyret  says  in  his  brilliant  book  : 
Le  President  de  la  Republique  (Colin,  1913),  p.  ix,  "  not  to  use  these 
rights  c'est  trahir  les  citoyens."  The  whole  question,  however,  is 
whether  the  President  is  free  to  apply  the  Constitution.  Elected 
by  the  members  of  the  two  Houses  can  he  be  expected  to  take  initia- 
tives which  may  create  friction  between  the  Chamber  and  himself  ? 
M.  Leyret  argues  that  he  can,  provided  he  keeps  ever  in  mind  the 
principle  of  the  Separation  of  Powers.  But  that  principle  has  become 
painfully  blurred  in  France.  At  all  events,  whatever  may  be  the 
letter  of  the  Constitution,  its  practical  application  has  more  and 
more  tended  to  limit  the  role  of  the  President,  and  the  real  problem 
at  present,  as  will  be  seen  later  on  (pp.  127-129),  is  how  to  restore 
the  Separation  of  Powers,  so  as  to  prevent  usurpation  of  the 
executive  by  the  legislative  authority. 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL    POLITICS       35 

as  a  fund  to  be  applied  to  a  settlement  with  the  creditors. 
The  creditors  acquiesced.  The  United  States  Senate  alone 
held  out.  But,  says  Mr.  Roosevelt,  "  /  went  ahead  anyhow 
and  executed  the  treaty  until  it  was  ratified."  By  his 
"  going  ahead  anyhow,"  without  constitutional  sanction, 
the  San  Domingo  Government  has  received  nearly  double 
the  amount  of  the  revenues  they  got  when  they  collected  it 
all  themselves,  and  the  United  States  gave  the  world  the  im- 
pression that  it  was  acting  in  good  faith.  Mr.  Roosevelt's 
policy  in  San  Domingo  was  attacked  by  those  whom  he 
calls  "  the  hysterical  sentimentalists  for  peace,"  but  "  he 
went  straight  ahead  and  did  the  job,"  in  spite  of  the  charge 
that  he  had  "  declared  war  "  against  San  Domingo.  In 
the  same  way,  referring  to  the  Isthmus  of  Panama,  where 
the  responsible  Government  was  incapable  of  crushing  out 
lawlessness,  he  says  :  "As  nobody  else  was  able  to  deal  with 
the  matter,  I  dealt  with  it  myself,  on  behalf  of  the  United 
States  Government,  and  now  the  Canal  is  being  dug,  and 
the  people  of  Panama  have  their  independence  and  a  pros- 
perity hitherto  unknown  in  that  country."  One  need  not 
for  the  moment  concern  oneself  with  the  result  of  these 
policies,  but  merely  with  their  Constitutional  character  ; 
and  the  obvious  fact  is  that  the  Constitution  of  the  United 
States,  alone  among  the  Constitutions  of  the  civilized 
Powers,  is  sufficiently  elastic  to  permit  the  Head  of  the 
State  to  act  thus  irresponsibly  for  responsible  ends  ;  to  "  deal 
with  the  matter  himself  on  behalf  of  the  Government  "  ; 
to  "  go  ahead  anyhow,"  provisionally  indifferent  as  to  the 
Constitutional  sanction  of  his  actions.  This  is  a  form  of 
real-politik  which  is  Bismarckian  in  its  processes,  but  which 
no  modern  Bismarck,  even  in  Germany,  could  successfully 
imitate.  No  British  sovereign,  or  French  President,  or 
Turkish  Sultan,  hardly  any  Russian  Tsar,  could  act  in  a 
manner  so  arbitrary.  The  fact  that  the  scope  of  the  powers 
of  the  Head  of  the  United  States  is  potentially  of  this  almost 
unlimited,  positively  Montenegrin,  character  is  one  of  the 


36  PROBLEMS  OF   POWER 

most  interesting  and  singular  features  in  the  whole  history  of 
Constitutional  government. 

This  fact,  to  be  sure,  can  be  viewed  under  another  light ; 
it  is  not  merely  "  interesting  and  singular "  :  it  may 
conceivably  constitute  a  danger  for  what  is  called  popular 
liberty.  In  connexion  with  the  Presidential  campaign  of  1912, 
above  all  with  reference  to  the  discussion  of  the  question  of 
the  third  term  for  Mr.  Roosevelt  himself,  there  was  proposed 
to  Congress  a  scheme  extending  the  American  President's 
term  of  office  from  four  to  six  years,  and  rendering  him  in- 
eligible for  a  second  term.  The  framers  of  this  measure  were 
fully  aware  of  the  immense  range  of  powers  conferred  in  the 
United  States  upon  the  Executive  Authority.  Commander- 
in-Chief  of  the  army  and  the  navy,  the  President,  as  the 
appointing  officer,  has  also  beneath  him  a  great  army  of 
civilian  officials  who  look  to  him  for  their  continuance  in 
office.  As  the  organ  of  Mr.  Roosevelt,  the  Outlook,  acknow- 
ledged (May  25,  1912,  p.  152),  "There  are  other  powers 
inherent  in  the  executive  authority  that  help  to  render  the 
President  of  the  United  States  powerful  beyond  the  dreams 
of  many  a  king."  The  high-minded  but  doctrinaire,  and 
therefore  unsound,  thinkers  who  (notwithstanding  their 
recognition  of  the  fact  that  "  there  is  undoubtedly  an  evil  in 
the  misuse  of  patronage/'  and  that  "  there  is  a  danger  in  the 
possibility  of  a  President's  continuing  himself  in  power 
longer  than  the  people  wish  ")  objected  to  the  proposal  to 
limit  the  President's  authority,  ventured  upon  the  fol- 
lowing :  "  Any  President  who  is  continued  in  office  through 
the  mandate  of  the  people  furnishes  no  danger  of  dictatorship." 
It  is  a  beautiful  case  of  deductive  reasoning,  of  a  scholastic 
perfection,  the  rotten  root  of  which  is  the  petitio  principii 
that  the  people  can  do  no  wrong ;  that  the  people  have  a 
right  to  rule  ;  and  that  right  in  this  last  phrase  has  a  clear, 
axiomatic,  religiously  binding,  sense,  requiring  no  com- 
mentary or  justification.  Worse  still,  the  assumption  that 
a  President  who  is  not  ousted  by  92  million  Americans,  to 


37 

whom  he  owes  his  election  by  "  direct  primaries,"  is  neces- 
sarily the  best  exponent  of  the  people's  wishes,  is  a  kind  of 
a  priori  major  premiss  which  the  most  superficial  knowledge 
of  history,  from  Csesar  to  Napoleon  III,  tends  to  discredit. 
The  truth  is  that  "  any  President  who  is  continued  in  office 
through  the  mandate  of  the  people  furnishes  "  many  a 
"  danger  of  dictatorship."  There  is  at  the  same  time  even 
more  abundant  evidence  in  historic  precedent,  as  well  as  in 
psychology,  to  show  that  the  whole  idea  of  mandate,  of 
representative  government,  of  plebiscitary  elections,  or  refer- 
endum legislation,  are  relatively  primitive  conceptions  for  the 
attainment  of  that  social  justice  for  which  democratic  com- 
munities are  all  clamouring,  but  which  their  leaders  seem 
less  and  less  likely  to  be  able  to  offer  them.  The  case  of  Ger- 
many throws  on  these  problems  only  a  dim  light,  for  the 
Prussian  King  who,  by  the  Constitution,  has  become  the 
"  German  Emperor,"  that  is  to  say  a  life-president,  is  the 
visible  and  central  keystone  that  holds  together  the  arch 
of  the  confederated  German  States.  Therein  lies  his  chief 
utility  as  an  essential  part  of  the  Constitutional  mechanism. 
A  stable  head-of-the-state  is  a  logical  corollary  of  the  idea 
of  German  unity.  Less  organically  bound  up  with  that 
idea  is,  perhaps,  the  Bismarckian  notion  that  the  Emperor, 
through  his  Chancellor,  is  the  necessary  counterpart  of  uni- 
versal suffrage,  and  that  there  should  exist  a  "  Federal 
Council  "  independent  of  the  Reichstag.  When,  in  the  last 
German  elections,  no  socialists  were  returned  to  the 
Reichstag,  Herr  von  Bethmann-Hollweg,  the  Chancellor, 
took  occasion  to  remind  his  compatriots  that  Germany  is 
not  a  land  of  parliamentary  government,  and  to  proclaim 
that  he  was  independent  of  any  parliamentary  manifesta- 
tion of  the  people's  will  as  expressed  in  the  elections.  These 
brave  words,  however,  cannot  drown  the  murmurs  of  un- 
rest that  are  more  and  more  loudly  heard  in  Germany,  as  the 
signs  of  a  Constitutional  crisis  accumulate.1 

1  See  p.  211. 


38  PROBLEMS  OF   POWER 

Mr.  Roosevelt's  visit  to  France  coincided  with  the  period 
of  the  general  elections  for  the  Chamber  of  Deputies.  The 
ex-Minister  of  Finance,  M.  Jules  Roche,  a  leading  Paris 
editor,  stood  in  those  elections,  as  he  had  stood  for  many 
years,  for  a  constituency  in  the  Department  of  the  Ardeche, 
and  was  elected.  In  his  address  to  his  constituents,  in  which 
he  thanked  them  for  their  confidence,  he  said  : — 

"  At  the  very  moment  when  the  ex-President  of  the  United  States 
was  so  magnificently  expounding  in  Paris  the  conditions  of  a  true 
republic  and  the  role  of  a  citizen,  you  were  offering  the  example  of 
an  entire  population  of  free  citizens  in  a  false  republic,  which  is  at 
the  mercy  of  arbitrary  action  and  the  prey  of  anarchy.  It  was  in 
vain  that  certain  so-called  republican  electors  trampled  under  foot 
the  essential  principles  of  a  republic,  and  acted  in  a  spirit  of  hostility 
toward  liberty  and  right.  You  proclaimed  in  loud  utterances, 
you  as  well  as  Mr.  Roosevelt,  that  there  is  no  republic  without 
citizens,  and  no  citizens  without  the  love  and  exercise  of  liberty, 
and  no  liberty  without  institutions  which  are  its  consecration  and 
its  guarantee." 

M.  Roche's  electoral  rhetoric  should  be  taken  cum  grano 
sails  ;  but  the  passage  cited  is  significant  in  connexion  with 
what  followed  it.  This  was  nothing  less  than  the  announce- 
ment of  M.  Roche's  intention  to  propose  a  radical  revision  of 
the  Constitution  of  1875,  in  addition  to  the  indispensable 
electoral  reform  ;  a  revision  which  would  embody  two  of 
the  essential  principles  of  the  American  Constitution — and 
yet  the  United  States  is  a  Republic  ! — to  wit :  the  guarantee 
of  the  necessary  rights  and  liberties  of  the  citizen,  and  a  re- 
sponsible President  who  would  choose  his  ministers  outside 
of  Parliament.  M.  Jules  Roche  revived  here  ideas  analogous 
to  those  of  M.  Deroulede.  The  latter  is  one  of  the  most 
honourable  and  sympathetic  of  contemporary  Frenchmen, 
and  if  ever  the  irony  of  fortune  had  lifted  him  to  the 
Elysee,  it  seems  not  improbable  to  many  close  observers 
that  he  would  have  been  a  president  of  the  stamp  of  Mr. 
Roosevelt :  instead  of  which,  France  ostracized  him  as  a 
danger  to  the  State  !  But  France,  as  it  happens,  is  not  yet 
convinced  that  she  wants  a  president  of  that  stamp. 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS      39 

Neither  a  Deroulede  nor  a  Roche  is  ever  likely  to  rule  her, 
and  their  cases  have  been  cited  merely  because  it  is  inter- 
esting to  observe  that  their  ideas,  which  in  the  present  state  of 
the  Republic  in  France  are  bound  to  class  them  among  the 
reactionaries  and  almost  to  appear  subversive,  are  the 
commonplaces  of  Republicanism  in  the  great  democratic 
community  of  the  West. 

The  fact  would  really  seem  to  imply  a  curious  anomaly. 
It  would  suggest,  at  all  events,  that  there  are  more  forms 
and  kinds  of  republics  than  are  usually  supposed  to  exist, 
and  that  there  is  no  obvious  reason  for  using  the  word  in 
description  of  two  communities  governed  in  ways  so  radi- 
cally disparate  as  are  the  United  States  and  France. 

Of  course  M.  Jules  Roche,  for  his  own  political  pur- 
poses, put  his  finger  on  one  of  the  essential  differences  be- 
tween France  and  the  United  States.  As  he  has  observed 
with  admiration,  in  the  United  States  a  responsible  man  is 
placed  at  the  head  of  the  State,  whereas  in  France  the  fear 
of  a  "  man  "  has  for  forty  years  been  the  beginning  of  poli- 
tical wisdom.  The  fear  of  a  "  man  "  has  been  an  inevitable 
state  of  mind  of  the  French  republicans,  since  the  Republic 
in  its  development  has  had  to  fight  for  its  life  amid  a  world 
of  enemies  surviving  from  the  old  regimes.  The  Con- 
stitution of  1875,  under  which  France  is  now  vegetating,  was 
adopted  by  a  majority  of  but  one  vote,1  and  that  Constitution 
was  only  a  step — a  moment  of  repose  when  the  nation  seemed 
to  be  marking  time — in  the  century-long  effort,  which  has 
by  no  means  yet  been  realized,  to  organize  the  sovereignty  of 
the  people  in  a  free  country,  with  a  responsible  government 
that  should  be  controlled  by  the  nation.  The  spirit  of  unity, 
inoculated  in  the  French  soul  by  the  monarchy,  has  above 

1  See  p.  121.  The  Wallon  amendment :  "  Le  President  de  la 
Republique  est  elu  pour  sept  ans  .  .  .  ,"  was  passed  by  353  votes 
to  352.  "  By  the  irony  of  things  the  most  convinced  monarchists 
had  said  some  time  before  :  nous  ferons  la  monarchic,  fut-ce  d  une 
voix  de  ntajorite."  (Souvenirs  1848-1878.  By  C.  de  Freycinet, 
P-  3I7-) 


40  PROBLEMS   OF   POWER 

all  been  imposed  by  the  geographical  position  of  France. 
In  the  United  States,  on  the  contrary,  the  political  ten- 
dencies were  all  centrifugal,  and  the  natural  principle  was 
that  of  federalism  until  the  unity  of  the  nation  was  achieved 
— perhaps  provisionally — by  the  enormous  sacrifice  of  blood 
during  the  Civil  War.  In  France  the  fear  of  a  "  man  " 
was  the  form  assumed  by  dread  memories  :  the  two  experi- 
ments of  the  monarchy  and  of  the  empire,  two  foreign  in- 
vasions (1814-1815  and  1870-1871),  and  three  revolutions 
(1789, 1830  and  1848).  As  the  historian  of  the  Third  Republic, 
M.  Hanotaux,  puts  it :  "  Les  esprits  eclair es  qui  dirigeaient 
I'Assemblee  Nationale  avaient  la  honte,  la  haine,  I'horreur 
du  pouvoir  personnel,  du  despotisms  et  de  la  dictature.  Done 
la  volonte  nationale  etait  unitaire  tandis  que  la  prudence 
nationale  etait  liber taire."  The  Constitution  of  1875,  there- 
fore, maintained  national  unity,  and  preserved  the  admir- 
able scaffolding  of  government  known  as  the  administra- 
tion, but  did  everything  in  its  power  to  discourage  personal 
ambition  and  to  enfeeble  such  ideas  of  citizenship  as  were 
bound  to  be  extolled  by  Theodore  Roosevelt,  the  most 
authoritative  exponent  of  the  traditionally  American 
political  philosophy  to  whom  France  was  ever  likely  to  listen. 
"  Rarely,"  says  M.  Hanotaux,  speaking  of  the  Constitution 
of  1875,  "  has  a  more  complicated  pagoda  been  constructed 
to  shelter  a  more  diminutive  god."  And  he  is  right.  All 
that  Republican  France  desired  was  a  visible  figure-head 
at  the  summit  of  the  monument.  The  type  of  chef  d'etat 
represented  by  a  President  of  the  United  States  is  a  monster 
from  the  point  of  view  of  the  Constitution  of  the  Parliamen- 
tary Republic  of  France.  "  Every  act  of  the  president  of 
the  Republic,"  says  Clause  3  of  that  Constitution,  "  must  be 
countersigned  by  a  minister,"  and  these  ministers  are  re- 
sponsible not  to  the  head  of  the  State,  but  to  the  Chamber 
of  Deputies,  upon  whom  they  depend.  In  the  France  of  the 
Third  Republic  superiority  of  every  kind  has  been  damned 
in  the  name  of  equality,  and  suppressed  in  the  name  of  la  rai- 


A  STUDY  OF   INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS       41 

sow  d'etat.  Nothing  resembling  an  organized  democracy  has 
ever  existed  in  France,  where  the  ship  of  state  is  still  sailed 
by  a  small  crew — the  "  Government  of  the  ten  thousand," 
to  use  Bismarck's  phrase — who  have  seized  and  manned 
the  Napoleonic  administration  and  the  political  machinery. 
The  role  of  the  head  of  the  State,  as  it  has  worked  out  in 
practice  under  the  Third  Republic,  has  shrunk  to  an  even 
narrower  compass  than  the  delimitation  fixed  by  the  Con- 
stitution of  1875.  Discipline,  inter-subordination,  beginning 
with  the  president,  are  the  marks  of  French  citizenship. 
There  is  no  recognized  place  for  individual  initiative. 
French  youths  have  uniformly  aspired  to  become  "  func- 
tionaries," civil  servants,  a  part,  however  subordinate,  of  the 
vast  machine  ;  few  have  dreamed  of  becoming  leaders  of 
men,  and  of  "  serving  "  the  body-politic  in  the  American 
way.  All  this  has  produced  an  automatic  civic  life  in  which 
the  Chambers  and  the  administration  have  directed  the  acts 
of  committees  known  as  governments.  It  is  a  state  of 
things  radically  the  opposite  of  that  resulting  from  the 
American  Constitution.  A  career  like  that  of  Mr.  Roose- 
velt would  be  impossible  for  a  public  man  in  France,  and 
were  a  Frenchman  to  try  to  test  the  elasticity  of  the  French 
Constitution,  and  seek  to  secure  the  personal  authority  and 
prestige  of  a  Roosevelt,  he  would  quickly  become  the  in- 
carnation of  all  the  reactionary  aspirations  in  the  country, 
and  might,  ultimately,  as  has  been  said,  be  impeached  before 
the  Haute-Cour. 

France,  even  Republican  France,  suffers,  as  will  be  seen 
later  on,1  from  the  monotony  of  the  bureaucratic  auto- 
matism of  its  civic  life,  in  which  the  form  of  ballot  known 
as/e  scrutin  d'arrondissement  prevents  the  education  of  the 
elector  on  any  question  of  general  policy  and  renders  the 
deputy  the  creature  of  the  State  official.  Yet  the  nation 
longs  for  a  franker  party  organization,  for  the  opportunity 
to  discuss  great  national  questions,  for  the  thrill  of  a  really 

1  See  Book  II,  Ch.  4. 


42  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

democratic  existence.  There  is  no  doubt  that  its  citizens  are 
eager  to  escape  from  the  individual  veulerie  which  tends  to 
be  the  political  fate  of  men  who  have  not  even,  as  under  the 
Second  Empire,  the  compensation  of  being  able  to  satisfy 
their  liking  for  a  glorious  facade  and  of  cherishing  the  senti- 
ment of  respect.  Now  Mr.  Roosevelt,  in  his  categorical 
way,  gave  utterance,  with  clarion-toned  efficiency,  to  the 
unexpressed  longings  of  the  Republicans,  while  still  seeming 
to  speak  the  language  of  the  liberal,  even  of  the  reactionary, 
opposition.  The  Republicans,  who  one  and  all  agreed  with 
him,  but  dared  not  openly  confess  it,  since  such  confession 
would  have  classed  them  with  the  reactionaries,  tolerated 
Mr.  Roosevelt's  home  truths,  solely  because  they  came  from 
American  and  "  Republican  "  lips  ;  but  from  any  other  per- 
sonality of  his  eminence — crowned  head  or  other — many  of 
the  ideas  to  which  he  gave  expression  would  have  been  held 
to  verge  on  impertinence.  The  conservatives  and  the 
reactionaries,  on  the  other  hand,  are  always  chiding  the  Re- 
public, and  they  welcomed  Mr.  Roosevelt  as  a  timely  visitor 
loaded  with  unexpected  grist  for  their  mills.  "  We  told 
you  so !  "  they  cried  to  their  republican  compatriots. 
"  What  a  lesson  !  "  But  the  Republicans  were,  in  reality, 
no  less  delighted,  since  they,  too,  recognize  the  urgent 
necessity  of  reform ;  and  the  reform  has  already  begun  to 
come  in  the  spirit  of  Mr.  Roosevelt's  counsel. 

France  has  entered  upon  a  period  of  unrest,  of  adminis- 
trative and  electoral  reform,  which  is  bound  ultimately  to 
transform  the  very  foundations  of  her  Constitution.  It 
was  not  in  vain  that  in  the  hour  of  crisis  an  ex-president  of 
the  "  Republic  "  of  the  United  States  fearlessly  lectured 
the  "  sister  Republic  "  on  the  duties  of  citizenship,  and 
that  he  said  to  modern  France  such  things  as  these  : 

"  A  good  citizen  will  insist  on  liberty  for  himself,  and  make  it 
his  pride  that  others  should  have  it  as  well  as  he.  Perhaps  the  best 
test  of  the  point  reached  in  any  country  by  the  love  of  liberty  is  the 
way  in  which  minorities  are  treated  there.  Not  only  should  there 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS       43 

be  complete  liberty  in  matters  of  religion  and  opinion,  but  there 
should  be  complete  liberty  for  each  individual  to  lead  the  life  that  suits 
him,  provided  that  in  so  doing  he  does  no  harm  to  his  neighbour.  .  .  . 
In  a  republic  it  is  necessary,  in  order  to  avoid  failure,  to  learn  how 
to  combine  intensity  of  conviction  with  a  large  tolerance  for  differ- 
ences of  conviction.  Vast  divergencies  of  opinion  relative  to  reli- 
gious, political  and  social  beliefs  will  exist  necessarily,  if  the  intelli- 
gence and  the  conscience  are  not  to  be  stifled,  but  to  develop  sanely. 
The  bitter  fratricidal  hatreds  based  on  such  divergencies  are  not  a 
sign  of  ardent  belief,  but  of  that  fanaticism  which,  whether  it  be 
religious  or  anti-religious,  democratic  or  anti-democratic,  is  itself 
merely  the  manifestation  of  sinister  bigotry,  which  is  in  turn  the 
primary  cause  of  the  downfall  of  so  many  nations." 

Since  Mr.  Roosevelt's  departure,  France  has  been  saying 
to  herself,  in  the  words  of  Dante  when  Virgil  chided  : 
"  The  self-same  tongue  first  wounded  and  then  healed  me." 

VII 

"  Bismarck,"  as  has  been  seen,  "  did  more  than  create  an 
approximately  united  Germany  ;  he  destroyed  Europe.  .  .  . 
Bismarck  retarded  the  work  of  the  French  Revolution, 
gagging  France  and  flinging  Europe  back  into  the  old  regime." 
After  the  defeat  of  France,  the  first  steps  towards  the  recon- 
struction of  Europe,  by  the  restoration  of  the  balance  of 
power,  were  taken  by  the  French  Republic  and  the  Tsar. 
That,  however,  is  only  a  brief  portion  of  the  story.  The 
normal  evolution  of  every  nation  in  Europe  has  been  dis- 
turbed, if  not  utterly  deranged,  by  the  action  of  Germany 
in  annexing  Schleswig-Holstein  and  in  seizing  the  French 
provinces  of  Alsace  and  Lorraine.  The  trend  of  European 
history  during  the  last  forty  years  has  been  determined  by 
these  titanic  blunders  ;  and  the  word  determined  should  be 
taken  in  its  scientific  sense.  Few  intellectual  exercises  are 
more  amusing  than  the  examination  of  the  internal  inter- 
play of  European  events  since  the  Franco-German  war. 
It  is  a  constant  spectacle  of  resultants  of  force  revealing  in 
those  events  a  logical,  apparently  fatal,  sequence.  To  enjoy 
this  spectacle  it  is  sufficient  to  group  the  salient,  essential 
facts  round  certain  crucial  dates. 


44  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

The  date  of  the  fall  of  Bismarck,  in  1890,  which  cuts  this 
period  almost  exactly  in  two,  is  more  than  a  convenient 
rallying  point  for  perplexed  observers  of  the  European 
movement.  Bismarck  gone,  responsibility  for  Germany's 
destinies  was  assumed  by  a  young  sovereign  of  exceptionally 
alert  intelligence,  fully  abreast  of  his  time,  and  perfectly 
aware  of  the  deficiencies,  as  well  as  of  the  greatness,  of  the 
work  of  the  Founder  of  the  Empire. 

Bismarck  had  relied  mainly  on  his  political  intuition  to 
insure — yet  he^took  the  precaution  to  re-insure  by  treaty — 
German  prestige.1  He  presided  over  the  beginnings  of 
German  economic  enterprise  without  completely  compre- 
hending the  drift  of  the  time.  An  astute,  daring  and  unscru- 
pulous diplomacy,  varied,  when  necessary,  by  a  policy  of 
intimidation  based  on  an  invincible  military  force,  seemed 
to  him  sufficient  to  maintain  his  country  at  the  point  provi- 
sionally guaranteed  to  her  by  the  Treaty  of  Frankfort.  Too 
practical,  too  realistic  entirely  to  ignore  the  existence  of 
those  subtle  factors  determining  human  action,  which  he 
called  "  the  imponderables,"  he  was  nevertheless  constantly 
led  by  his  superstitious  self-confidence  to  leave  too  many 
of  them  out  of  account.  When  he  had  successfully  managed 
the  Berlin  Congress  which  he  had  organized,  and  during 
which  his  chief  care  was  the  preparation  of  the  Alliance 
between  Austria  and  Germany,  he  fancied  he  had  forced 
Europe  to  guarantee  a  status  quo  based  on  the  stipulations 
of  the  Treaty  of  Frankfort,  on  the  concrete  reality  of  a 
crushed  and  dismembered  France.  He  proceeded  to  take 

1  "  A  visitor  of  Bismarck's  once  reminded  him  that  Schopenhauer 
used  to  sit  with  him  at  dinner  every  day  in  the  hotel  at  Frankfort. 
'  I  had  no  business  with  him ;  I  had  neither  time  nor  inclination  for 
philosophy/  said  Bismarck,  '  and  I  know  nothing  of  Schopenhauer's 
system.'  It  was  summarily  explained  to  him  as  vesting  the  primacy 
of  the  will  in  self -consciousness.  '  I  daresay  that  may  be  all  right,' 
he  said,  '  for  myself,  at  least,  I  have  often  noticed  that  my  will  had 
decided  before  my  thinking  was  finished.'  Improvisation  has  more  to 
do  in  politics  than  people  think."  Anecdote  quoted  by  Lord  Morley, 
in  his  speech  as  Chancellor  of  Manchester  University,  June  28,  1912. 


A  STUDY  OF   INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS       45 

the  obviouslyjiecessary  precautions.  He  came  to  an  arrange- 
ment with  Austria  in  1879,  and  simultaneously — with  a 
show  of  magnanimity  that  imperfectly  concealed  his  real 
plan  to  keep  France  busy  outside  of  Europe — he  favoured 
French  expansion  in  Tunis.  This  was  a  quick  way  of  alienat- 
ing Italian  sympathy  from  the  Power  that  not  so  long 
before  had  helped  Italy  to  achieve  her  independence.1 
1881  is  the  date  of  the  Treaty  of  Bardo,  whereby  Tunis 
was  given  to  France ;  and  in  1882  Italy  joined  Germany 
and  Austria  in  an  alliance  which  was  thus  made  Triple. 
This  Treaty,  although  ostensibly  concluded  "  for  the 
consolidation  of  European  peace,"  was  avowedly  anti- 
Russian  ;  Bismarck  was  aiming  solely  at  European  hege- 
mony ;  the  necessity  of  the  world-policy  that  William  II 
was  to  inaugurate  was  almost,  unsuspected  by  him ;  the 
Eastern  question  seemed  to  him  "  not  worth  the  bones  of  a 
Pomeranian  grenadier  "  ;  what  more  dread  potential  enemy 
had  Germany  than  the  Empire  of  the  Tsars,  one  of  whom, 
Alexander  II,  had  cried  :  "  Hands  off !  "  when,  only  five 
years  after  Sedan  (the  "  French  Scare,"  1875),  Bismarck 
threatened  to  give  a  resilient  France  her  definitive  quietus  ? 
Moreover,  had  not  Russia  come  forth  from  the  Berlin  Con- 
gress even  more  humiliated  than  France  ?  That  Russia 
was  suspicious  of  her  great  western  neighbour,  that  Alexander 
II,  arbitrary  potentate  as  he  was,  still  perceived  that  a 
blighted  France,  even  though  that  France  was  the  France 
of  the  Marseillaise,  deprived  him  of  a  potentially  useful 
friend  in  Europe,  was  shown  by  a  succession  of  little  un- 
mistakable indications,2  all  culminating  in  the  interesting 

1  "  Prince  Bismarck,  twelve  years  after  Sadowa,  had  actually- 
given  territory  to  Austria,   and  ...  he  asked  for  an  alliance  in 
order  to  cover  him  against  Russia."     M.  de  Blowitz  :   "  Prince  Bis- 
marck and  German  Unification,"   The  Times,  August  3,   1898.     If, 
ten  years  after  Sedan,  Bismarck  had  given  European  territory  to 
France,  instead  of  hoarding  the  lands  he  had  stolen  from  her  in  1870, 
the  history  of  Europe  would  have  been  utterly  changed. 

2  See  Ambassaded  Paris  du  Baron  de  Mohr enheim  (1884-1898)  par 
Jules  Hansen.     Flammarion. 


46  PROBLEMS   OF   POWER 

fact  of  the  decision  of  France  to  lend  Russia  500,000,000 
of  francs.  This  was  in  1888. 

Almost  twenty  years  had  passed  since  the  Franco-Ger- 
man war ;  ten  since  the  Treaty  of  Berlin.  That  Treaty, 
which  had  confirmed  German  hegemony,  had  established 
in  South-Eastern  Europe  a  series  of  small  States,  left  by 
Germany  to  shift  for  themselves  under  the  vigilant  guardian- 
ship of  Russia  and  Austria-Hungary,  and  calculated,  in 
the  German  Chancellor's  eyes,  to  absorb  the  entire  attention 
of  those  Powers.  Bismarck  believed  that  he  had  crushed 
and  completely  isolated  France,  and  that  the  Eastern 
Question  had  been  settled  for  a  generation.  What  he  had 
really  done  was  to  render  an  alliance  between  the  Tsar 
and  the  Republic  inevitable,  and  to  alienate  Russia  from 
Austria-Hungary,  while  making  her  the  friend  of  Italy ; 
and  it  was  no  longer  Bismarck,  but  the  spire  of  Strasbourg 
cathedral  and  the  Balkans,  that  dominated  European  politics. 
Les  convenances  de  I' Europe  sont  le  droit,  said  the  Tsar  Alex- 
ander to  Talleyrand  in  1814  at  Vienna.  Bismarck  had 
sought  to  substitute  for  this  famous  formula  another : 
My  will  is  the  law  of  Europe.  In  reality  he  had  prepared 
Agadir  and  Kirk-Kilisse. 

Meanwhile,  France,  which  had  gone  to  Tunis  in  1881, 
was  in  Tongking  in  1885.  England  was  watching  her  with 
jealous  eyes.  At  the  same  tune  her  domestic  difficulties, 
notably  the  anti-republican  coalition  conspiracy  known 
as  Boulangism,  paralysed  her  energy,  and  compromised 
her  authority  in  Europe.  Bismarck  saw  no  reason 
to  complain  of  the  situation.  Now  and  then — as  in  the 
Schnoebele  affair  of  April  1887,  when  he  imprisoned 
the  police-commissioner  of  Pagny,  releasing  him  only  after 
eight  days — he  invented  a  frontier  incident  calculated  to 
remind  France  that  Germany  was  on  her  guard.  Simul- 
taneously, the  same  Bismarck  who  had  signed  an  anti- 
Russian  alliance  with  Austria  and  Italy  arranged  a  re- 
insurance pact  with  Russia.  The  tendency  of  Russia  to 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS      47 

draw  nearer  to  France  doubtless  interfered  with  the  complete 
realization  of  the  Bismarckian  plan.  But  Bismarck  never 
considered  it  beyond  his  capacity  to  solve  a  problem  of  that 
kind.  He  was  engaged  upon  it  when  his  new  master, 
William  II,  abruptly  requested  him  to  resign,  and  with  his 
resignation  a  new  period  in  European  history  begins. 

All  that  was  before  1890.  The  Zeitgeist  was  to  grant 
William  II  less  than  ten  years  in  which  to  justify  his  drop- 
ping his  pilot.  The  year  1898  is  the  third  critical  date 
since  the  close  of  the  Franco-German  War.  The  German 
Emperor  had  broken  the  career  of  Bismarck,  but  he  had 
inherited  the  Bismarckian  policy.  That  he  might  pursue 
that  policy  in  his  own  way,  it  was  necessary  that  the  Tsar 
Alexander  should  disappear.  Alexander  died  only  in 
1894,  after  having  signed  a  defensive  military  alliance  with 
France  in  1892.  That  is  to  say,  the  fall  of  Bismarck  had 
unquestionably  hastened  the  completion  of  the  negotiations 
that  had  been  proceeding  for  some  five  years  between  France 
and  Russia.  But  the  young  Emperor,  on  taking  office,  was 
too  buoyantly  optimistic,  and  too  keen-sighted,  to  concern 
himself  over  the  conclusion  of  an  alliance,  as  to  the  pacific 
character  of  which  he  had  received  the  most  reassuring  in- 
formation. While  France  was  interpreting  that  pact  as  an 
earnest  of  the  recovery  of  Alsace-Lorraine,  William  II  well 
knew  that  it  confirmed  once  again  the  European  status  quo. 
Relieved  of  all  anxiety  on  that  score,  the  new  Master 
looked  out  upon  a  new  Germany :  a  Germany  increasing 
in  wealth,  industry  and  foreign  trade,  a  Germany  which, 
under  the  protectionist  system  applied  from  1880  to  1891, 
had  grown  so  rapidly,  so  miraculously  even,  that  Bismarck 
had  hardly  understood  the  first  syllable  of  the  new  economic 
gospel  which  he  had  himself  inspired.  Surveying  this 
exhilarating  spectacle,  and  beholding  the  German  acquisi- 
tions in  the  Cameroons  and  at  Samoa,  William  II  inaugur- 
ated a  new  era  for  which  he  was  to  find  the  formula  a  few 
years  later  in  his  famous  appeal  delivered  from  the  steps 


48  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

of  the  Bismarck  monument  at  Hamburg :  "  Our  future 
is  on  the  water.  The  more  the  Germans  go  upon  the 
water  the  better  will  it  be  for  us."  This  was  in  1901,  but 
the  date  of  the  first  German  naval  programme  is  1893.  In 
the  following  year  it  happened  that  a  mystical  youth  became 
Tsar  of  all  the  Russias,  and  in  1895,  at  the  opening  of  the 
Kiel  Canal,  a  ceremony  symbolizing  the  aspirations  of  the 
new  Germany,  French  ironclads  were  anchored  by  the  side 
of  Russian  men-of-war  in  German  waters.  The  significance 
of  this  demonstration  was  clear.  With  the  accession  of 
the  new  Tsar,  Nicholas  II,  the  pacific  character  of  the  Franco- 
Russian  Alliance  was  so  emphasized  that  its  political  raison 
d'etre,  from  the  point  of  view  of  European  balance  of  power, 
was  stultified.  Nicholas  II,  not  less  pacific,  humanitarian 
even,  than  his  father,  quickly  fell  under  the  commanding 
personality  of  his  plausible  and  fascinating  German  cousin. 
The  Tsar  became  the  creature  of  the  German  Emperor. 
William  II,  adroitly  using  the  Franco-Russian  Alliance 
for  his  own  imperial  German  ends,  was  for  a  time  the  silent 
partner  in  a  combination  including  the  French  Foreign 
Minister,  M.  Hanotaux,1  who  was  daily  multiplying  diffi- 
culties with  England  in  Africa  and  in  Asia.  The  French 
Colonial  Office  Jiad  been  created  in  1894.  Vast  schemes 
were  broached  in  favour  of  a  Franco-Germano-Russian 
entente  calculated  to  isolate  England.  In  the  Far  East, 
after  the  Chino- Japanese  War,  the  strange  alliance  was, 
for  the  moment,  successful.  Under  the  pressure  of  the 
three  Powers,  Japan  was  constrained  to  tear  up  the  Treaty 
of  Shimonoseke  ;  she  began  to  perceive  the  advantages  of 
flinging  herself  into  the  arms  of  England.  After  the  Jame- 

1  The  reader  will  recall  (p.  27)  the  consternation  caused  in  France  by 
Count  Muravieff's  Circular  to  the  Powers  inviting  them  to  meet  in  a 
Congress  for  the  study  of  the  means  of  securing  to  the  world  the 
benefits  of  a  lasting  peace.  In  August  1898  La  Gazette  de  France, 
in  an  article  entitled  "  From  Kiel  to  Disarmament,"  remarked  that 
the  Republic  had  become  "  the  miserable  maidservant  of  the  Euro- 
pean Monarchies."  See  p.  53. 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS      49 

son  Raid  (New  Year's  Day,  1896)  William  II  despatched 
to  President  Kruger  the  famous  telegram  which  was  as 
much  intended  to  lead  to  an  understanding  with  France  as 
satisfy  the  imperialistic  instincts  of  nascent  Pan-Germanism. 
Strasburg  and  Metz  seemed  to  have  been  utterly  forgotten. 
Thus,  with  the  resignation  of  Bismarck  and  the  death 
of  Alexander  III,  a  new  movement  began  in  Europe.  That 
movement  was  to  culminate  in  the  removal  of  Russia  from 
her  European  spheres  of  influence,  and  her  exile  during  a 
protracted  period  in  Manchuria,  where  her  military  power 
was  eventually  to  be  shattered  at  Mukden.  Italy,  contin- 
ually instigated  to  enter  upon  colonial  enterprises  wherever 
she  might  risk  colliding  with  England  or  with  France, 
found  herself  in  1896  deploring  the  slaughter  of  her  legions 
at  Adowa.  France,  left  unmolested  to  pursue  her  African 
adventure,  was  being  driven  daily,  almost  hourly,  along 
the  fatal  path  leading  to  war  with  England.  She  awoke 
in  July  1898  to  the  tragic  moment  of  Fashoda,  when  Kit- 
chener and  Marchand  stood  suddenly  at  bay  in  the  desert. 
Great  Britain  had  just  beheld  Manchuria  and  Port  Arthur 
in  the  hands  of  her  secular  enemy.  Thus,  by  1898,  Germany, 
Bismarck  and  William  II  had  manoeuvred  so  admirably 
that,  while  maintaining  intact  the  alliance  with  Austria  and 
Italy,  they  had  all  but  paralysed  the  Franco-Russian  Alliance, 
infuriated  Italy  against  France,  and  nearly  brought  on  a 
war  between  France  and  England.  These  results  had  been 
symbolized  in  three  events  of  world-wide  significance,  which, 
though  they  had  taken  place  in  succession,  may  be  regarded, 
from  the  point  of  view  of  historic  psychology,  as  simultaneous. 
The  results  of  German  policy  from  1890  to  1898  were 
Adowa,  Port  Arthur-Manchuria  and  Fashoda.  But,  mean- 
while, beyond  the  boundaries  of  Europe,  events  had  been 
taking  place  that  did  not  escape  the  notice  of  the  German 
Emperor.  1898  was  also  the  year  of  the  close  of  that 
Spanish-American  war  which  first  reminded  William  II 
that  pan-Germanism  had  other  rivals  in  the  world  than  the 

s 


50  PROBLEMS  OF   POWER 

"  Yellow  Peril "  ;  the  year  of  the  annexation  of  Hawaii  by 
the  United  States  and  the  year  of  the  May  Day  of  Manila. 
That  is  why  1898  is  a  critical  year. 

Finally,  1898,  the  year  of  the  Austro-Russian  Agreement 
concerning  the  Balkans  (when  the  Powers  recognized  the 
"  superior  interest  "  of  Austria  and  Russia  in  the  provinces 
of  European  Turkey)  marks  the  moment  when  Russia 
first  began  to  realize  the  inconvenience  of  her  Far-Eastern 
policy,  and  to  doubt  the  disinterestedness  of  her  German 
friends.  Dreaming  of  victories  in  Manchuria,  she  was  forced 
to  neglect  the  pursuit  of  her  traditional  Panslavist  policy 
in  the  Balkans.  She  was  obliged  to  adopt  the  policy  of  the 
pan-Germans.  Partially  paralysed  in  Europe,  Russia  could 
neither  actively  favour,  nor  effectually  arrest,  the  ambitions 
of  the  Balkan  States  to  fling  the  Turks  across  the  Sea  of 
Marmara,  and  to  extend  their  boundaries  in  Macedonia  and 
Thrace.  She  was  constrained  to  a  policy  of  marking  time. 
Meanwhile  Germany,  impelled  by  the  ever-increasing 
momentum  of  her  drang  nach  Osten,  was  assuring,  through  her 
Austro-Hungarian  allies,  her  economic  preponderance  in  the 
Balkan  States  ;  while,  benefiting  by  the  persistent  antago- 
nism of  Russia  and  England,  she  became  the  protector  of 
the  Turkish  Empire,  and  the  concessionaire  of  that  Baghdad 
Railway  which  was  intended  to  be  the  instrument  of  the 
establishment  of  her  protectorate  over  Asiatic  Turkey. 
Thus,  owing  to  Russia's  policy  in  the  Far-East,  and  owing 
to  the  reciprocal  jealousies  and  apprehensions  of  the  Powers, 
all  hope  of  settling  the  Eastern  Question  was  indefinitely 
postponed.  Bulgaria,  Servia  and  Montenegro  were  left  to 
work  out  their  national  salvation  alone,  and  the  Macedonians 
were  exposed  to  periodic  massacre.  Just  as  Alsace-Lorraine 
appeared  to  have  been  forgotten  by  France,  so  the  small 
Slav  States  seemed  to  have  been  abandoned  by  the  Tsar. 
Germany  had  apparently  contrived  to  stifle  the  Eastern 
Question,  and  to  suppress  every  influence,  direct  or  indirect, 
likely  to  thwart  her  main  objects  :  the  maintenance  of  her 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS       51 

political  preponderance  in  Western  Europe,  and  absorption 
of  the  markets  of  the  Middle  East.  But  throughout  this 
period  the  Balkan  nationalities  were  slowly  awakening  to 
self-knowledge.  Liberty,  national  rancour,  and  a  sense  of 
responsibility  were  transforming  them  into  self-reliant 
Powers.  The  evolution  did  not  escape  the  notice  of  good 
observers ; l  but  who  could  foresee  that  within  a  period  of 
only  fourteen  years  the  sovereigns  of  Bulgaria,  Servia, 
Greece  and  Montenegro  were  to  cross  their  several  frontiers 
at  the  head  of  their  allied  armies,  "  imploring  the  benediction 
of  the  Almighty  on  their  New  Crusade  "  2  against  the  Turk  ? 
But  it  is  not  easy  to  have  done  with  1898.  1898  meant 
more  even  than  this,  more  even  than  all  this.  Already 
the  period  of  civil  war  known  as  the  "  Dreyfus  Affair  "  had 
begun  in  France. 

1  The  most  remarkable  of  these  observers  was  the  author  of  a  book 
published  in  1905  :    "  Une  Confederation  Orientale  comme  Solution 
de  la  Question  d'Orient  "    (Plon).     This  writer,  signing  himself  "  A 
Latin,"  began  by  laying  down  the  principle  that  the  policy  of  im- 
posing reforms  upon  the  Turkish  Government  was,  at  its  best,  merely 
a  palliative,  capable  of  prolonging  for  only  a  brief  period  the  agony 
of  the  Ottoman  regime.     At  a  moment  when  the  Servians,  the  Greeks 
and  the  Bulgarians  were  insidiously  intriguing,  or  savagely  fighting, 
for  the  mastery  in  Macedonia,  when,  moreover,  the  attitude  of  the 
Great  Powers,  assembled  round  the  bed  of  the  Homtne  Malade,  was 
that  of  rival  heirs  waiting  to  rifle  the  treasures  of  a  dying  relative, 
this  astonishing  observer  argued  that  a  Balkan  League  (to  include 
Rumania  and  Greece),  in  which  the  several  States  should  sink  their 
differences  to  achieve  their  higher  hopes,  was  feasible.     He  pro- 
posed that  the  new  Federation  should  be  placed  under  the  Presi- 
dency of  Italy,  and  he  published  a  map  indicating  the  necessary 
territorial  changes.     Read  in  November,  1912,  when  the  Servians 
had  already  entered  Uskub,  when  Greece  and  Bulgaria  were  at  Salo- 
nica,  and  when  the  Bulgarians  were  all  but  in  sight  of  St.  Sophia — 
after  a  war  which  was,  to  be  sure,  a  Russian  revenge  for  Austria's 
seizure  of  Bosnia-Herzegovina,  but  which  was,  at  the  same  time, 
part  of  the  Italian  combinazione  of  the  Tripolitan  Expedition — this 
book  stood  forth,  among  the  studies  of  the  last  twenty  years  on  the 
Eastern  Question,  as  the  work  of  a  veritable  prophet  and  seer. 

2  Telegram  of  the  King  of  Greece,  October  20,  1912,  to  the  Allied 
Sovereigns  of  the  Balkan  League. 


52  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

"  We  recall  an  evening  in  January  1898,  at  the  Aurora.  Sud- 
denly towards  eleven  o'clock  some  anarchists  rushed  in  with  an  im- 
probable piece  of  news.  They  had  just  invaded  a  public  meeting 
held  by  the  nationalists  and  had  captured  the  platform,  tearing 
down  the  decorations  of  the  tricolour  flags.  They  were  young  men, 
who  laughed  as  they  told  the  story  of  the  assault,  and  we  laughed 
too,  little  dreaming  that  one  day,  twelve  years  later,  partially  be- 
cause of  this  exploit  regarded  by  us  as  a  triumph,  and  because  of 
our  laughter,  a  French  soldier  would  fling  the  flag  of  his  regiment 
into  the  latrines.  What  were  our  thoughts  ?  Merely  this  :  So 
the  nationalist  mob  oppressing  us  can  be  beaten  into  shape  ;  it  can 
be  hustled  and  dispersed.  Action  was  then  the  great  thing  !  Cle- 
menceau,  who  had  been  sent  for ;  Clemenceau,  perfect  leader  of  the 
band  and  always  gay,  laughed  with  the  rest  of  us,  and  his  laughter 
was  even  more  wonderful  than  ours."  x 

Confronting  thus  a  triumphant  and  optimistic  Germany 
were  three  Powers  which,  in  1898,  had  just  publicly  under- 
gone national  humiliation.  Russia  and  Germany  alone 
seemed  to  be  happy  nations  ;  but  Russia,  lured  eastward  out 
of  Europe,  partially  by  German  wiles,  was  already  doomed, 
and  Germany  alone  seemed  likely  to  reap  the  fruit  of  her 
intelligent  diplomatic  action.  In  reality  she  had  overstepped 
the  mark. 

Italy,  England  and  France,  colonial  rivals,  almost  bitter 
foes,  had  nevertheless  one  thing  in  common  :  all  three 
had  been  unfortunate  ;  all  three  were  in  need  of  friends. 
With  the  departure  from  the  Quai  d'Orsay  of  M.  Hanotaux, 
who  had  practically  paralysed  the  Dual  Alliance  by  his 
compliance  with  the  schemes  suggested  by  the  German 
Emperor  to  the  Tsar,  the  new  minister  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
the  Pyrenean  M.  Delcasse,  was  free  to  adopt  a  new  policy. 
M.  Cambon,  who  had  been  appointed  ambassador  in  London 

1  "  Apologie  pour  notre  passe,"  in  Luttes  et  ProbUmes,  by  Daniel 
Haldvy,  pp.  59-60.  M.  Halevy  suggests  plausibly  that  even  the 
Affaire  was  ingeniously  created  by  Germany  in  order  to  compromise 
the  French  general-staff.  (See  pp.  32-35  of  his  book.)  The  reasons 
he  gives  are  not  conclusive,  but  they  are  impressive.  They  are 
impressive,  above  all,  to  one  who,  like  the  present  writer,  was  an  eye 
and  ear  witness  of  every  episode  of  the  affair  from  the  trial  of  Zola 
to  the  tragic  August  at  Rennes. 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS      53 

in  September  1898,  was  to  treat  with  Lord  Salisbury  in  the 
name  of  M.  Delcasse  for  the  settlement  of  the  Fashoda 
crisis.  M.  Barrere,  meanwhile,  in  December  1897,  had 
arrived  as  French  ambassador  in  Rome.  In  November 
1898,  he  succeeded  in  arranging  a  treaty  of  commerce,  which 
indicated  that  the  two  "  Latin  sisters  "  were  awakening  to 
the  fact  that  the  Bismarckian  policy  of  the  galliphobe 
Italian  statesman  Crispi  was  not  necessarily  in  the  interests 
of  either  Power  ;  and  this  treaty  was  the  first  step  in  that 
magnificent  Mediterranean  policy  pursued  by  M.  Delcasse, 
out  of  which  was  to  come  the  Anglo-French  Entente, 
England's  definitive  establishment  in  Egypt,  the  French 
Protectorate  over  Morocco,  the  Italian  seizure  of  Tripoli 
(which  France  had  acquiesced  in  in  1901),  and  the  Europe 
of  1910,  1911  and  1912. 

"  I  should  be  sorry  to  leave  office,"  said  M.  Delcasse 
to  M.  Victor  Berard,  early  in  November  1898,  "before  I 
had  established  a  good  understanding  with  England."  1 
M.  Cambon,  moreover,  went  to  London  resolved  to 
negotiate.2  Just  before  the  departure  of  M.  Hanotaux 
from  office,  Germany  had  made  a  last  desperate  effort 
to  come  to  terms  with  France  for  a  kind  of  defensive 
colonial  and  commercial  alliance,  implying  reciprocal  ex- 
change of  territory,  the  whole  arrangement  being  directed 
against  England.  This  plot  had  failed  owing  to  the  double 
crisis  of  Fashoda  and  the  Dreyfus  Affair.8  TheWilhelmstrasse, 

1  Revue  de  Paris,  July  i,  1905. 

1  M.  de  Blowitz,  Times  Correspondence,  November  16,  1898  : 
"  I  consider  him  ...  a  man  who  is  desirous  of  putting  an  end  to 
the  tension  now  existing  between  the  two  nations  which  border  on 
the  Channel.  .  .  .  He  will  go  to  his  post  with  his  eyes  open,  and 
...  he  will  begin  in  a  liberal  spirit  the  pourparlers  intended  to 
bring  about  satisfactory  solutions." 

3  On  this  critical  episode  of  Germany's  proposal  to  M.  Hanotaux 
to  enter  on  negotiations  with  regard  to  Africa  directed  against 
England,  see  Fachoda,  by  M.  G.  Hanotaux  (Flammarion)  ;  France 
et  Allemagne  by  M.  Rene  Pinon  (Perrin)  ;  De  la  Paix  de  Francfort 
a  la  Conference  d'Algesiras,  by  M.  Andre  M6vil  (Plon) ;  Le  Coup 


54  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

M.  Hanotaux  gone,  perceived,  with  its  usual  celerity,  the 
signs  of  the  change  in  the  European  situation.  Lord  Salis- 
bury still  remained  pro-German,  anti-French.  England  was 
one  of  the  Powers  in  need  of  friends.  There  was  public 
proof  of  it.  Mr.  Chamberlain  was  acclaiming  the  idea  of 
an  Anglo-Saxon  Alliance  (Birmingham  Speech,  May  13, 1898). 
Italy  might,  for  the  moment,  be  left  on  one  side,  to  be  dealt 
with  later  on,  and  Russia  could  be  counted  on  blindly  to 
continue  her  fatal  march  towards  the  abysmal  Orient. 
"  Seizing  the  event,"  Germany  induced  England,  at  this 
juncture,  to  renounce  secretly  and  tentatively  her  policy 
of  "  splendid  isolation,"  and  to  sign  that  mysterious  arrange- 
ment with  regard  to  the  future  of  the  Portuguese  possessions 
in  Africa,  which  subsequent,  and  equally  secret,  treaties, 
signed  in  Lisbon  in  1904,  were  to  nullify.1 

Thus,  while  Russia  was  dragging  France  towards  the  disaster 
of  Mukden,  Germany  turned  with  a  candid  face  to  the  people 
whose  sea-power  her  own  growing  navy  was  already  begin- 
ning to  menace,  and  sought  to  convince  them  of  her  unalloyed 
sincerity.  So  long  as  Lord  Salisbury  remained  at  the  head 
of  the  Foreign  Office,  France  would  strive  in  vain  to  thwart 
Germany's  action.  For  that  statesman,  even  for  his  august 
Queen,  France  and  Russia  were  the  hereditary  enemies. 
German  policy,  in  driving  Russia  into  the  East,  had  en- 
hanced England's  suspicion  of  Russia.  England  regarded 
opting  for  Germany  as  a  less  dangerous  choice  than  making 
up  with  Russia  ;  moreover,  she  was  the  deadly  foe  of  Russia's 

d'Agadir,by  M.  Pierre  Albin  (Alcan),  and  Kiel  et  T anger,  byM.  Charles 
Maurras  (Nouvelle  LibrairieNationale).  As  a  matter  of  fact,  Count 
Miinster's  diplomacy  in  Paris  was  thwarted  by  the  revelations  of 
M.  de  Blowitz,  who  rendered  England  and  France  in  1898  hardly  less 
effective  service  than  during  the  famous  "  French  scare  "  of  1875.' 

1  Already  in  December  1900,  King  Charles  of  Portugal  had  been 
formally  received  on  board  Admiral  Rawson's  flagship,  and  had 
drunk  the  health  of  the  "  friendly  and  allied  nation."  This  was  one 
of  the  first  events  that  revealed  to  Europe  the  new  spirit  animating 
the  British  Foreign  Office. 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS       55 

ally.  And  thus  it  was  that  Germany  could  still  continue 
to  develop  to  their  logical  limits  all  the  ramifications  of 
the  Bismarckian  policy ;  she  could  still  play  to  her  heart's 
content  the  part  of  the  honest  broker,  while,  under  another 
disguise,  she  was  actively  planting  her  flag  throughout  the 
world.1  But  in  October,  1899,  the  Transvaal  War 
broke  out,  and  for  two  and  a  half  years  England's  sinews 
were  wrung  in  the  heroic  duel.  Now  at  last  she  opened  her 
eyes  to  those  perils  of  isolation  as  to  which  Mr.  Chamberlain 
had  warned  her  in  1898  ;  for  her  enemies  might,  for  argu- 
ment's sake,  almost  class  her  among  the  "  dying  nations  " 
on  whose  territory,  in  the  words  of  her  ironic  prime-minister, 
Lord  Salisbury  (May  4, 1898),  the  living  nations  were  bound 
to  encroach.  To  China,  Turkey,  Spain,  the  France  of  the 
Panama  Scandals,  the  Dreyfus  Case  and  Fashoda,  was 
now  added  the  England  of  Ladysmith.  Lord  Salisbury 
disappeared  from  the  Foreign  Office,  being  succeeded  by 
Lord  Lansdowne,  in  October,  1900.  A  few  days  later  Queen 
Victoria  died  and  was  succeeded  by  King  Edward,2  who 

1  Prince  Radziwill,  who  represented  the  German  Emperor  at 
the  funeral  of  M.  F£lix  Faure,  was  interviewed  on  February  26,  1899, 
by  the  Paris  Liberte,  and  made  the  following  amusing,  but  suggestive, 
statement  on  the  Anglo-German  arrangement  just  concluded : 
"  Nothing  in  this  arrangement  is  in  opposition  to  a  rapprochement 
between  my  country  and  yours,  a  rapprochement  desired  by  all  minds 
free  from  passion.  As  for  England,  it  does  not  seem  to  me  that, 
now  that  Germany  has  become  one  of  her  greatest  commercial  rivals, 
a  complete  agreement  can  ever  be  secured  between  two  countries 
whose  interests  are  so  different.  But  there  is  another  country  against 
which  the  Continental  Powers  should  indeed  come  to  an  under- 
standing for  the  organization  of  their  economic  defence.  There  is  the 
United  States,  whose  pretensions  and  riches  are  becoming  a  danger 
for  us  all." 

8  "  King  Edward,"  said  Mr.  Balfour  in  the  House  of  Commons 
on  May  n,  1910,  "was  a  great  monarch.  He  did  that  which  no 
Minister,  no  Cabinet,  no  Ambassadors,  neither  treaties,  nor  protocols, 
nor  understandings,  which  no  debates,  no  banquets,  no  speeches, 
were  able  to  perform.  He,  by  his  personality  alone,  brought  home 
to  the  minds  of  millions  on  the  Continent,  as  nothing  that  we  could 
have  done  could  have  brought  it  home  to  them,  the  friendly  feelings 
of  the  country  over  which  King  Edward  ruled." 


56  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

was  immediately  greeted  by  French  public  opinion  as  a 
sovereign  "  capable  of  doing  much  to  better  the  relations 
between  the  two  countries."  *  At  all  events  the  tension 
between  France  and  England  could  last  no  longer  without  a 
war.  Something  had  to  be  done.  For  both  England  and 
France  the  hour  was  ripe  for  meditation  over  their  individual 
national  problems.  They  stood,  for  an  instant,  silent  and 
face  to  face,  blinking  in  the  glare  of  the  new  light  that  illu- 
minated the  dread  cross-roads  of  Fashoda  and  Ladysmith.2 

1  Let  the  reader  recall  (p.  53)  M.  Delcasse's  words  in  1898.  Here  is 
what  he  said  a  few  weeks  later  publicly  (January  23,  1899),  in  the  course 
of  a  debate  on  Foreign  Affairs  :  "  My  reason,  my  patriotism,  tells 
me  that  if  in  the  last  few  months  I  have  been  able  to  render  any 
service  .  .  .  the  service  which  I  consider  the  greatest  is  the  preven- 
tion of  a  conflict  which  would  be  a  calamity  for  the  world.  .  .  .  Now 
as  ever,  calm  and  dignified,  governed  by  her  essential  interests, 
France  is  ready  to  consider  and  discuss  everything  with  the  resolution 
to  claim  nothing  but  her  rights,  and  the  hope  that  those  rights  will  be 
recognized,  but  with  the  conviction  that  she  is  under  nobody's  orders, 
...  I  am  no  pessimist.  It  is  impossible  to  be  so,  when  one  knows 
what  France  is,  and  that,  under  the  scum  which  certain  persons  find 
an  abominable  pleasure  in  agitating  (the  Dreyfus  Affair),  there  lives 
and  labours  a  people  pre-eminently  honest  and  sane,  as  thrifty  as  it 
is  hard-working,  which  is  alive  to  the  fact  that  its  destiny  is  not  ful- 
filled, which  is  amenable  to  noble  sentiments,  and  of  which  you  can 
expect  anything  if  you  take  care  to  keep  its  vision  lifted  towards  an 
ideal  of  justice  and  high  civilization.  It  is,  nevertheless,  true  that 
profound  transformations  are  in  preparation  from  one  end  of  the 
world  to  the  other,  and  France  must  not  be  weakened.  Hence  the 
need  of  a  vigilant  and  thoughtful  policy  which  distinguishes  between 
our  interests  and  classifies  them  according  to  their  importance,  which 
leaves  nothing  to  chance,  and  does  not  squander  its  efforts.  To  this 
policy  I  ask  for  the  reflecting  adhesion  of  the  country."  These  grave 
words,  luminous  with  prophetic  fire,  read  to-day,  after  the  coup 
d'Agadir,  assume  a  singular  significance. 

1  England's  situation  at  the  beginning  of  1900  was  analysed  in  a 
telegram  to  The  Times  by  M.  de  Blowitz,  who  reminded  his  readers 
that  "  pourparlers  w 'ere  then  going  on  between  at  least  three  of  the 
Continental  Powers  to  force  England  to  enter  into  negotiations  for 
the  settlement  of  the  questions  still  pending  by  taking  advantage  of  her 
present  embarrassments."  In  that  prophetic  article  M.  de  Blowitz 
forestalled  the  necessity  of  just  such  a  general  liquidation  of  Franco- 
British  differences  as  was  destined  to  be  achieved  four  years  later, 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS      57 

Simultaneously  they  saw  the  sardonic  grin,  and  heard  the 
triumphal  chuckle,  of  Germany.  France  and  England 
were  face  to  face  like  birds  in  a  cockpit,  while  Europe, 
under  German  leadership,  was  fastening  their  spurs,  and 
impatient  to  see  them  fight  to  the  death.  Then  suddenly 
they  both  raised  their  heads  and  moved  back  to  the  fence. 
They  had  decided  not  to  fight,  and  the  face  of  European 
things  was  transformed. 

On  February  2,  1903,  The  Times  published  from  the  pen 
of  the  present  writer  (who  was  then  one  of  its  European 
correspondents)  the  following  telegram  dated  Madrid, 
February  i.  This  message,  printed  a  year  before  the 
conclusion  of  the  Anglo-French  Agreement  of  1904,  was  the 
first  public  mention  in  Europe  of  negotiations  which,  when 
thus  revealed,  were  regarded  as  utterly  incredible  and 
ridiculed  for  several  months  by  the  whole  European  press. 

"  The  prudent  reserve  of  the  Spanish  Government  during  the 
present  crisis  in  Morocco  has  been  noted  by  attentive  observers,  to 
whom  it  has  caused  some  surprise.  .  .  .  When  Senor  Abarzuza 
became  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  in  the  Silvela  Cabinet,  he  lost 
no  time  in  seeking  to  obtain  assurances  from  France  and  England 
to  the  effect  that  for  the  present  no  intervention  was  contemplated. 
He  was  given  to  understand  that  an  agreement  had  been  come  to 
between  these  two  Powers  for  the  maintenance,  at  all  events  for  the 
present,  of  the  status  quo  in  Morocco.  This  tranquillizing  assurance, 
strictly  warranted,  so  far  as  it  went,  by  what  had  taken  place  between 
the  two  Powers,  told,  however,  only  half  the  truth.  The  real  facts 
are  such  that  the  Spanish  Government  can  hardly  look  upon  them 
with  unalloyed  satisfaction. 

"  What  the  Spanish  Government  had  not  entirely  understood  is 
that,  in  spite  of  the  assurances  given  to  Spain  as  regards  her  North 
African  possessions  and  the  neutralization  of  Tangiers,  France  and 
England  had  thought  of  solving  the  whole  question  of  Morocco  with- 
out necessarily  waiting  for  her  good  offices.  Towards  the  end  of  last 
summer  M.  Delcasse,  through  his  ambassador  in  London,  made  over- 
tures to  Lord  Lansdowne  for  the  complete  and  detailed  settlement  of  the 
whole  Moroccan  question.  At  that  time  M.  Delcasse  presented  to  Lord 

but  which  seemed  at  the  time  to  be  beyond  the  limits  of  the  wildest 
divination.  The  article  passed  unnoticed  by  the  great  public.  It 
remains,  however,  one  of  the  most  astonishing  instances  which  the 
columns  of  The  Times  can  show  of  this  great  journalist's  perspicacity. 


58  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

Lansdowne,  with  a  loyalty  which  would  appear  to  have  been  appreciated 
by  the  British  Government,  certain  complete,  decisive  and  business- 
like proposals  (des  propositions  fermes]  which  if  accepted  at  the  time 
would  have  had,  if  I  may  say  so,  not  merely  North  African,  but  Euro- 
pean consequences.  The  essential  characteristic  of  these  proposals 
was  that  France  and  England  should  settle  the  Moroccan  question  in 
connexion  with  the  question  of  Egypt.  In  compensation  for  French 
official  recognition  of  the  British  occupation  of  Egypt,  France  was  to  be 
allowed  a  free  hand  in  dealing  with  Moroccan  territory  save  on  the  North 
African  coast  line.  If  I  am  correctly  informed  this  highly  interesting 
bargain  was  not  unfavourably  received  by  Lord  Lansdowne.  But, 
occupied  at  the  time  by  South  African  affairs,  and  (when  reminded 
later  on)  by  Venezuela,  the  British  Government  requested  to  be 
allowed  to  postpone  serious  and  consecutive  pourparlers  on  Morocco 
until  after  the  definitive  arrangement  of  these  two  affairs.  .  .  .  M. 
Delcass&'s  scheme,  which  still  remains  virtually  unanswered,  was 
nothing  more  nor  less  than  a  proposal  to  England  to  leave  France  alone 
to  secure  the  suzerainty  of  Morocco  when  and  how  she  cared  to  do  so  by 
pacific  penetration.  It  was  part  and  parcel  of  the  whole  Mediterranean 
policy  of  France,  the  corollary  of  the  Franco-Italian  arrangement  con- 
cerning Tripoli.  And  the  most  ardent  partisans  of  French  hegemony 
in  the  f  Latin  '  sea  really  need  not  have  complained." 

VIII 

This  grouping  of  the  salient  and  essential  facts  of  the 
period  between  the  Franco-German  War  and  the  Anglo- 
French  Entente  of  1904  "  round  the  critical  dates  "  of 
that  period  will  have  justified  the  statement  that  "  the 
examination  of  the  international  play  of  European  events," 
during  those  thirty  odd  years,  "  reveals,  in  those  events, 
a  logical,  apparently  fatal  sequence."  It  gives,  moreover, 
new  significance  to  the  utterances  of  Count  Berchtold  when 
he  so  suggestively  summed  up  the  present  political  aspect 
of  the  world-situation: — 

"  Until  the  close  of  the  nineteenth  century  (the  critical  date  of 
1898)  the  grouping  of  the  Powers  inaugurated  by  the  Triplice  merely 
appeared  to  be  a  clearly  defined  pattern.  Since  then  ...  a  closely 
woven  network  of  agreements  and  ententes  has  been  formed  between 
the  Powers  belonging  to  the  same  groups  or  to  different  groups,  a  fact 
which  profoundly  complicates  the  international  situation." 

This  is  a  truth  which  the  foregoing  pages  have  amply  illus- 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS      59 

trated.  The  demonstration  will  be  indirectly,  and^less 
systematically,  enforced  by  the  detailed  consideration  of 
the  events  that  have  taken  place  since  the  opening  of  the 
new  era  marked  by  the  Entente  between  France  and  England, 
the  veritable  significance  of  which  was  speedily  defined 
by  the  organization  of  the  Triple  Entente.  Meanwhile,  it  is 
evident  that  one  can  no  longer  chronicle  the  doings  of  any 
individual  nation  without  writing,  at  the  same  time,  the 
history  of  all  the  other  peoples.  Such  is  the  modern 
dovetailing  of  the  nations  that  national  interests  have 
become  matters  of  international  concern :  national  facts 
and  events  have  become  international  facts  and  events ; 
"  nationalities  "  have  been  transformed  into  "  interna- 
tionalities." 

Obviously  the  word  "  nationalities "  is  here  used  in 
a  special  arbitrary  sense.  It  means  something  very  different 
from  what  it  meant  fifty  years  ago  on  the  lips  of  a  Louis 
Napoleon,  and  from  what  it  means  to-day  to  the 
Macedonians.  It  seemed,  indeed,  to  Napoleon  III  that 
"  national  interests  "  had  become  "  matters  of  international 
concern,"  but  he  gave  to  his  own  formula  a  dangerous 
philosophic  sense ;  and  Louis  Napoleon's  case  is  typical. 

It  should  never  be  forgotten  that  the  defeat  of  France 
in  1870  was  less  the  consequence  of  the  inefficiency  of  her 
military  power  than  the  logical  conclusion  of  the  perilous 
foreign  policy  of  Napoleon  III.  The  Emperor  was  a  gener- 
ous ideologue,  and  his  foreign  policy  was  in  sublime  and 
absurd  opposition  to  the  best  French  national  precedents 
and  traditions.  His  passionate  longing  to  substitute  for 
the  modus  vivendi  of  the  treaties  of  1813  a  more  scientific 
and  more  logical  state  of  international  relations,  to  revise, 
in  a  word,  the  map  of  Europe  by  grouping  peoples  according 
to  racial  or  linguistic  affinities,  was  one  of  the  most  character- 
istically doctrinaire  notions  that  ever  clouded  a  clear  French 
brain.  It  was  at  the  same  time  an  absurdly  pedantic  and 
impracticable  principle  of  diplomatic  action,  which  put  its 


60  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

author  in  the  light  of  an  international  meddler,  who,  even 
when  most  disinterested,  laid  himself  open  to  the  charge 
of  double-dealing.  It  was  also  un-French,  in  the  sense  of 
being,  from  the  point  of  view  of  French  interests,  an  anti- 
national  policy.  It  was  lacking  in  realism.  The  substance 
of  Napoleon  Ill's  policy  was  metaphysic  fiction,  not  the 
tangible  stuff  of  contemporary  European  fact  and  cir- 
cumstance. And  thus,  fanatically  devoted  as  he  was 
to  the  principle  of  nationalities,  the  upshot  of  his  policy 
was  the  ironic  reductio  ad  absurdum  that  the  one  "  na- 
tionality "  whose  interests  he  left  unsafeguarded  was 
France  itself.  He  was  too  keenly  alive  to  the  woes  of  the 
Poles,  the  Italians,  the  Hungarians,  to  have  time  to  con- 
sider the  positive  interests  of  the  French.  The  result  was 
Sedan  !  It  was  left  to  the  Third  Republic  to  restore  the 
French  tradition,  to  re-establish  French  authority  in  Europe, 
and  to  reaffirm  a  national  policy  which  could  be  linked  with 
the  national  policy  of  the  Old  Regime,  from  Henri  IV  and 
Richelieu  to  the  Republican  armies  of  Napoleon  I.1 


1  "  The  Third  Republic,  after  the  war  of  1870  and  the  Commune 
of  1871,  found  the  3  per  cent,  rente  between  50  and  51.  It  had  to 
repair  disasters  such  as  had  never  befallen  any  nation.  It  had  to 
pay  a  ransom,  the  enormous  amount  of  which  astounded  even  those 
who  had  imposed  it.  It  had  to  contract  colossal  loans  to  defray  the 
costs  of  the  war,  and  to  re-establish  the  country,  for,  after  1870, 
France,  la  noble  blessee,  as  she  was  called  by  M.  Thiers  (whose  memory 
should  be  imperishable,  for  he  was  literally  the  '  liberator  of  the 
territory  '),  was  altogether  ruined.  It  had  to  borrow  both  for  war  and 
for  peace,  for  public  works  and  for  the  colonies.  It  had  to  establish 
heavy  taxes,  and  in  spite  of  all  these  burdens  it  raised  the  credit 
of  the  State  to  a  point  that  had  been  unknown  under  the  Restoration, 
under  the  July  Monarchy,  or  under  the  Second  Empire.  The  present 
quotations  of  the  3  per  cent,  rentes,  92  fr.  50,  may  be  contrasted 
with  the  highest  points  86 -10,  quoted  under  the  Restoration,  the 
highest,  86-65,  quoted  under  the  July  Monarchy,  the  highest  86, 
quoted  under  the  Second  Empire.  The  Third  Republic  can  say  and 
show  that  our  3  per  cent,  rente,  in  spite  of  the  disasters  of  1870,  is 
now  negotiated  at  from  12  to  13  francs  higher  than  German  and 
Russian  rente,  and  that  the  credit  of  the  conquered  country  is  superior 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS      61 

Difficult  as  the  task  was  bound  to  be,  it  did  not  dismay 
those  to  whose  lot  it  first  fell ;  and  the  restoration  under 
the  Third  Republic  of  the  authority  of  France  in  the  counsels 
of  Europe — notwithstanding  the  dangerous  lapses  of  certain 
of  its  leaders  acting  in  the  humanitarian  spirit  of  Napoleon 
III — is  one  of  the  most  impressive  accidents  that  history 
can  show. 

Napoleon  Ill's  pathetic  blunder  sprang,  no  doubt,  from 
an  ideal  no  less  magnanimous  than  that  of  the  Emperor 
Marcus  Aurelius,  who  dreamed  of  "  a  polity  in  which  there 
is  the  same  law  for  all,  a  polity  administered  with  regard 
to  the  equal  rights  and  equal  freedom  of  a  people."  But 
Napoleon  III,  Marcus  Aurelius,  Mr.  Gladstone,  even  Mr.  Hay, 
who  declared  that  American  diplomacy  had  but  two  con- 
trolling maxims,  the  Golden  Rule  and  the  Open  Door, 
were  rather  mystics  and  philosophers  in  office  than  practical 
statesmen.  They  had  what  President  Butler  of  Columbia 
University  has  recently  called  "  the  international  mind  "  : 
"  that  habit  of  thinking  of  foreign  relations  and  business, 
and  that  habit  of  dealing  with  them,  which  regard  the  several 
nations  of  the  civilized  world  as  friendly  and  co-operating 
equals  in  aiding  the  progress  of  civilization,  in  developing 
commerce  and  industry,  and  in  spreading  enlightenment 
and  culture  through  the  world."  *  Such  a  habit  as  this 
may  look  desirable  on  paper,  but  it  is  pernicious  in  prac- 
tice. It  seems  to  be  an  idiosyncrasy  of  the  "  international 
mind  "  to  take  an  altruistic  pleasure  in  sacrificing  its  own 
patriotic  impulses  to  the  prejudices  of  its  neighbours.  Its 
principle  of  action  is  that  of  the  Golden  Rule,  and  its  notion 

to  that  of  its  victorious  foe.  ...  La  rente  Franfaise,  c'est  la  signa- 
ture de  la  France  qui  circule." 

Alfred  Neyraarck :  "  Les  119  Ans  de  la  Rente  Fran9aise " 
(L' Information,  Aug.  21,  1912). 

1  Address  of  Nicholas  Murray  Butler,  as  President  of  the  Lake 
Mohonk  Conference  on  International  Arbitration,  May  15,  1912. 
President  Butler  has  outdone  Cardinal  Newman,  who  invented  the 
phrase,  "  the  European  mind." 


62  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

of  duty  may  be  summed  up  in  the  famous  exclamation  of 
Professor  Freeman :  "  Perish  the  interests  of  England, 
perish  our  dominion  in  India,  rather  than  that  we  should 
strike  one  blow  or  speak  one  word  on  behalf  of  the  wrong 
against  the  right."  The  folly  of  the  man  who  would  apply 
an  "  international  mind  "  to  the  problems  of  diplomacy 
has  been  indicated  by  Spinoza.  He  too  was  a  philosopher, 
but  he  was  well  aware  that  to  the  historian  human  passions, 
love,  hate,  anger,  envy,  vanity,  pity,  and  all  the  other 
"  movements  of  the  soul,"  are  not  virtues  or  vices,  but  merely 
"  properties,"  as  heat  and  cold  are  properties  of  the  air. 

"  Little  stable  (minime  stabile),"  says  the  author  of  the  Ethics,  "  will 
be  that  State  whose  safety  depends  on  individual  honesty,  and  whose 
business  can  be  carried  on  solely  on  condition  of  its  being  entrusted 
to  honest  hands.  For  a  State  to  last,  public  business  must  be  so 
arranged  that  those  who  are  responsible,  whether  they  be  actuated 
by  reason  or  by  passion,  cannot  be  tempted  to  act  from  bad  motives 
or  to  do  wrong.  For  it  matters  little,  as  regards  the  security  of  the 
State,  what  the  motives  of  rulers  may  be  in  the  successful  adminis- 
tration of  affairs.  Liberty  or  strength  of  soul  are  the  virtue  of  private 
persons  ;  the  virtue  of  the  State  is  security.  Finally,  inasmuch  as 
men,  whether  barbarian  or  civilized,  unite  everywhere  in  some  form 
of  civil  society,  it  follows  that  we  must  not  seek  for  the  principles 
and  natural  foundations  of  the  State  in  the  maxims  of  reason,  but 
that  we  must  deduce  them  from  the  common  characteristics  and 
condition  of  human  nature  as  a  whole  (ex  homimum  communi  natura 
seu  conditione] ."  1 

The  successful  reappearance  of  France  in  the  counsels 
of  Europe  was  partially  due  to  the  fact  that,  after  Sedan, 
she  ceased  for  a  time  to  cultivate  an  "  international  mind," 
and  that  her  reappearance  coincided  with  the  opening  of 
the  modern  era  of  "  international  dovetailing  "  to  which 
allusion  has  been  made.  England,  one  of  the  greatest 
of  the  Powers,  sought  for  a  long  period  to  ignore  the  be- 
ginnings of  this  epoch,  but  was  finally  forced  to  recognize  the 
altered  conditions  of  the  times. 

1  Tractatus  Politicus.  Cap.  I,  6,  7.  Spinoza,  Opera  Posthuma  1667, 
pp.  269,  270. 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS      63 

Up  to  the  Franco-German  War,  up  to  forty  years  ago,1 
England  possessed  the  monopoly  of  trade  and  commerce 
throughout  the  world.  She  could  afford  to  indulge  her- 
self spasmodically  in  unrealistic,  even  in  sentimental  and 
humanitarian  policies.  She  was  free  to  bide  her  time  for 
action,  to  conform  her  foreign  policy  to  "  Liberal " 
ideas,  even  to  the  Golden  Rule  if  she  liked,  while  she 
was  filling  the  coffers  of  Lombard  Street.  She  could 
intervene  or  not  in  Continental  affairs,  as  a  disinterested 
idealism,  or  an  interested  Protestant  propagandism, 
might  impel  her,2  and,  having  eased  her  conscience,  she 
could  retire  in  splendid  isolation  into  her  island  fastness, 
with  the  proud  sense  of  accumulated  and  accumulating 
wealth,  and  of  duty  done.  Premonitory  rumblings  from 
the  nether  world  which  had  been  formed  of  the  new  social 
and  economic  layers  deposited  by  her  own  unmolested 
unrivalled  industrial  activity  had  not  yet  reached  her 
ears.  For  British  statesmen  the  problem  of  foreign  policy 
was  still  comparatively  simple :  while  her  world-wide 
hegemony  went  unchallenged,  England  had  solely  to  con- 
cern herself  with  the  maintenance  of  the  European  balance 
of  power.  This  had  uniformly  been  her  object,  and  it  is  an 
ideal  that  had  hitherto  implied  meddling,  or  non-meddling, 
as  the  case  might  be.  Henri  IV  had  backed  her  against  Philip 
II ;  the  German  States  and  Spain  were  her  allies  against 
Louis  XIV ;  all  Europe  aided,  abetted  and  applauded  her 
at  Waterloo.  If  Napoleon  III  had  accepted  her  assistance, 
Prussia  would  never  have  constructed  a  Kiel  Canal  on 
Danish  soil ;  Germany  would  not  have  fatally  discovered 
that  her  future  was  on  the  water,  and  the  dream  of  Bis- 
marck to  render  German  unity  (Einheit)  as  real  as  German 

1  It  may,  however,  be  admitted  with  Gen.  Homer  Lea  that  Prus- 
sia's seizure  of  Schleswig-Holstein  "  ended  the  period  when  England 
gave  down  the  law  to  Europe."  The  Day  of  the  Saxon,  p.  160. 

*  John  Stuart  Mill  would  have  said,  "  A  concern  for  her  own 
security."  See  his  essay,  1857,  A  Few  Words  on  Non-intervention, 


64  PROBLEMS  OF   POWER 

union  (Einigung)  would  not  now  be  approximately  realized. 
Finally,  it  should  not  be  forgotten  that  in  1875  an  opportune 
hint  from  Queen  Victoria  and  the  Tsar  had  sent  Bismarck 
back  growling  to  his  kennel. 

The  two  apparently  opposed  policies  which  commanded 
the  allegiance  of  England  in  the  nineteenth  century — that  of 
Sir  Robert  Peel's  last  speech  in  1850  arguing  in  favour  of 
complete  indifference  to  Continental  complications,  and 
that  of  Mr.  Gladstone  in  his  speech  of  1877,  when  the 
great  ideologue  exclaimed :  "  Sir,  there  were  other  days 
when  England  was  the  hope  of  freedom  "  1 — these  policies 
were  not,  after  all,  as  reciprocally  hostile  as  they  might 
seem  ;  for,  as  long  as  the  sea-girt  imperial  island,  master  of 
the  trade-routes,  remained  unassailable,  as  long  as  England 
continued  to  be  without  a  rival  among  the  world-carriers,  so 
long  could  she  offer  herself  the  luxury  of  choosing  between 
action  or  spectatorship,  between  intervention  or  non- 
intervention, according  to  her  mood  of  the  moment.  If 
this  aristocratic  privilege  is  now  lost  to  her,  probably  for 
ever  ;  if,  as  Lord  Rosebery  said,  in  his  speech  at  the  Univer- 
sity of  Glasgow  (January  12, 1912),  "  For  good  or  for  evil,  we 
are  now  embraced  in  the  midst  of  the  Continental  system, 
and  that  I  regard  as  perhaps  the  gravest  fact  in  the  later 
portion  of  my  life  "  ;  if ,  in  a  word,  England,  the  champion  of 
freedom,  is  no  longer  herself  free  to  choose,  if  she  is  de- 
prived of  the  faculty  of  will,  the  right  of  decision ;  if  she 
is  so  entangled  in  the  network  of  European  forces  that  she 
is  living  deterministically  under  a  regime  of  vague  liabilities, 
she  must,  of  course,  draw  the  necessary  conclusions,  and 
stoically  bear  the  consequences.  But  she  must  first,  and 
above  all,  face  the  fact — the  facts  ! — and  not  hypocritically 
ignore  it — or  them. 

Fourteen  years  before  Lord  Rosebery,  on  May  13,  1898, 
Mr.  Chamberlain  had  stated  with  frankness,  in  a  remarkable 

1  See  The  Future  of  England,  by  Hon.  George  Peel,  p.  114. 


A  STUDY   OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS      65 

speech  extolling  an  Anglo-Saxon  Alliance,  the  exact  situa- 
tion of  England. 

"  Since  the  Crimean  War,"  he  said,  "  nearly  fifty  years  ago,  the 
policy  of  this  country  has  been  a  policy  of  strict  isolation.  We  have 
had  no  allies — I  am  afraid  we  have  had  no  friends.  ...  A  new 
situation  has  arisen.  All  the  powerful  States  of  Europe  have  made 
alliances  and  .  .  .  we  are  liable  to  be  confronted  at  any  moment 
with  a  combination  of  Great  Powers  so  powerful  that  not  even  the 
most  extreme  politician  would  be  able  to  contemplate  it  without  a 
certain  sense  of  uneasiness.  We  stand  alone." 

In  1898,  however,  the  British  Government  was  think- 
ing, not  of  Germany — with  whom  she  was  signing  secret 
agreements — nor  yet  of  France,  but  of  Russia,  who  had 
already  seized  Port  Arthur.  It  seems  like  the  most 
ancient  of  "  ancient  history  "  to  read  the  terms  in  which 
Mr.  Goschen,  speaking  on  July  22,  1898,  on  the  Navy 
Estimates,  justified  his  remarks  for  supplemental  credits. 
"It  is  impossible,"  he  said, "  to  conceal  the  fact  that  it  is 
the  action  of  Russia,  and  the  programme  on  which  she  has 
entered,  which  is  the  cause  of  our  strengthening  our  fleet 
and  taking  parallel  action  with  her." 

It  is  not  unimportant  to  note  that  France  was  sceptical 
as  to  the  pretext  put  forward  by  Mr.  Goschen  for  increasing 
the  strength  of  the  British  Navy.  The  United  States  had 
recently  become  an  oceanic  power  by  the  annexation  of 
Hawaii,  and  the  Spanish- American  War  had  been  fertile  in 
lessons  for  the  admiralties  of  all  countries.  The  Journal 
des  Debats  raised  the  question  whether  Mr,  Goschen's 
haste  was  not  to  be  explained  by  his  prudent  desire  to 
forestall  a  morrow  of  international  complications  in  which 
the  United  States  might  feel  called  on  to  take  an  aggressive 
part.  At  all  events,  Mr.  Goschen's  initiative  marks  a  date 
in  the  British  policy  of  steady  progression  in  naval  outlay. 
It  was  not  long  before  the  menace  of  German  naval  ex- 
pansion rendered  the  movement  chronic,  and  sooner  still 
the  destruction  of  the  Russian  Navy  was  to  leave  Great 


66  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

Britain  to  face  but  one  hostile  fleet  in  the  North  Sea.  On 
March  r8,  1912,  the  First  Lord  of  the  Admiralty,  Mr. 
Churchill,  made  to  Germany  a  perfectly  frank  though 
irritatingly  ingenious  proposal  for  arresting  the  keen  and 
costly  naval  rivalry  between  the  two  countries.  He  showed 
Germany  how  she  might  co-operate  with  England  in  a  plan 
involving  more  than  a  merely  platonic  demonstration  in 
favour  of  disarmament.  "  If  you  will  slow  down  in  1913," 
he  said  to  Germany,  "  we  will  slow  down  too  ;  if  you  decide 
not  to  build  the  three  ships  now  contemplated  you  will 
automatically  wipe  out  no  fewer  than  five  British  potential 
super-Dreadnoughts ! "  Germany  retorted  by  passing  a 
Navy  Bill  increasing  the  naval  force  cruising  in  the  North 
Sea  from  seventeen  fully-manned  battleships  to  twenty-five, 
with  sixteen  in  reserve.  Consequently  Mr.  Churchill  took 
the  immediate  action  expected  of  him.  Speaking  on  May 
15,  at  a  dinner  of  the  Worshipful  Company  of  Shipwrights,  he 
said,  amid  loud  cheers  :  "It  will  be  my  duty  to  come  again 
to  Parliament  this  year  for  men,  money  and  material." 
And  the  First  Lord  thereupon  expounded  the  consequences 
of  the  policy  of  the  "  concentration  of  the  British  fleet  in 
decisive  theatres  "  (necessitated  by  the  stubborn  efforts  of 
Germany  to  shatter  British  sea-power),  namely,  the  growth, 
in  the  great  Dominions  over  sea,  of  an  effective  naval  force 
capable  of  guarding  and  patrolling  the  British  Empire  while 
England  herself  maintains  a  sea-supremacy  against  all 
comers  at  the  decisive  point. 

These  developments  shed  a  new  light  on  the  inconveni- 
ences of  that  policy  of  altruistically  indiscriminate  inter- 
ference in  world  affairs  which  doctrinaire  liberalism  has 
always  inspired.  These  inconveniences  were  clearly  stated 
in  January  1912,  in  a  speech  by  Sir  Edward  Grey  at  the 
village  of  North  Sunderland.  He  said  : — 


"  Let  me  put  you  on  your  guard  against  people  who,  as  I  think, 
are  very  bad  advisers  with  regard  to  foreign  policy.    There  is  a  cer- 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS       67 

tain  section,  I  have  no  doubt,  in  the  Liberal  Party  which  think 
we  do  not  interfere  nearly  enough,  especially  in  certain  parts  of  the 
world,  in  Asia.  Mongolia,  I  think,  was  the  last  selected  as  a  part 
in  which  we  should  take  an  active  interest.  Believe  me  if  you  are 
going  to  pursue  a  foreign  policy  of  that  kind,  and  this  country  is 
going  to  interfere  actively  in  Central  Asian  questions  far  beyond 
our  own  Indian  frontier,  you  are  going  to  incur,  not  only  the  very 
heavy  naval  expenditure  which  we  have  already,  but  a  vastly  in- 
creased military  expenditure  as  well ;  and  the  people  who  press  upon 
me  a  different  foreign  policy  to  that  which  is  now  being  pursued  are, 
it  seems  to  me,  people  who  are  really  advocating  as  a  foreign  policy 
the  maximum  of  interference  in  the  affairs  of  the  world  at  large  and 
the  minimum  of  friendship ;  because  the  policy,  if  it  were  carried 
out,  would  soon  leave  us  without  a  friend  in  Europe.  (Cheers.) 
Now,  believe  me,  that  is  the  most  futile  and  expensive  policy  that 
this  country  could  adopt,  and  I  consider  it  from  every  point  of  view, 
whether  it  be  the  point  of  view  of  the  party  or  the  point  of  view  of 
national  interest — I  consider  it  the  duty,  I  would  say,  of  any  Govern- 
ment, whether  Liberal  or  Conservative,  to  resist  a  policy  of  that 
kind." 


On  the  other  hand,  both  the  Secretary  for  War  and  the 
Marquis  of  Crewe  acknowledged,  in  a  debate  on  Foreign  and 
Military  Policy  in  the  House  of  Lords  on  May  15,  1912, 
that  "  the  policy  of  splendid  isolation  was  over" ;  but  they 
demurred  to  the  idea  of  a  "  close  alliance  with  great 
European  Powers,"  they  repudiated  the  principle  of  "  en- 
tangling military  alliances."  British  ministers  have  still, 
perhaps,  a  few  months  ahead  of  them  in  which  to  continue 
to  affirm  their  scepticism  as  to  the  utility  of  a  military  con- 
vention with  France.  But  the  time  is  not  far  distant  when, 
in  spite  of  the  aid  given  by  the  Dominions,  they  will  have 
to  eat  their  words,  and  when  the  English  people — realizing, 
at  last,  that  the  Territorial  Force  is  merely  a  make-believe 
army 1 — will  bring  them  to  book  on  the  charge  of  neglect  of 
duty. 

1  "  The  Territorial  Force  is  a  failure  in  discipline,  a  failure  in 
numbers,  a  failure  in  equipment,  and  a  failure  in  energy."  Speech 
of  Lord  Roberts,  November  27,  1912,  at  the  annual  dinner  of  the 
Association  of  Men  of  Kent  and  Kentish  Men.  Admiral  Tirpitz's 


68  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

IX 

"1870,"  "  1878,  ""  1890,"  "  1898,"  "1904,"  "1911," 
"1912." 

The  Dismemberment  of  France  ;  the  Berlin  Congress  ; 
the  Fall  of  Bismarck ;  Adowa,  Port  Arthur,  Fashoda ; 
the  Dreyfus  Affair  ;  the  Anglo-French  Entente  ;  Agadir  ; 
Kirk-Kilisse :  these  are  the  dates  and  names  on  the  links 
of  the  fatal  chain  which  Bismarck  forged  and  which,  at  the 
present  hour,  has  been  stretched  almost  to  the  breaking 
point.  Eight  years  after  Bismarck's  resignation,  his 
successor,  William  II,  could  legitimately  believe  that  he 
was  about  to  found  an  Imperial  Germany  greater  than 
the  Empire  of  the  First  Napoleon.  Less  than  five  years 
later  all  his  hopes  were  dashed.  By  the  Anglo-French  Entente 
a  new  period  was  opened  in  Europe.  Without  losing  a 
minute  Germany  began  the  assault  of  that  Entente.  The 
Agreement  had  been  signed  on  the  eighth  of  April,  1904. 
On  the  eve  of  April  Fool's  Day,  just  a  year  later,  the  German 
Emperor  landed  at  Tangiers.  Yet  in  May  1902,  when  the 
possibility  of  an  Anglo-French  Entente  appeared  to  be 
the  dream  of  a  madman,  the  Chancellor  of  the  German 
Empire,  Count  von  Billow,  had  said  to  M.  Andre  Tardieu 
in  Berlin  : — 

"  Peace  is  assured  ;  we  have  the  benefit  of  it,  and  we  shall  always 
be  with  those  who  defend  it,  against  those  who  trouble  it.  ...  As 
regards  Morocco,  where  our  interests  are  less  than  in  China,  I  do  not 
consider  that  question  as  one  likely  so  very  soon  to  interest  our  dip- 
lomacy. We  have  no  bay- window  frontage  on  the  Mediterranean.  .  .  . 
We  pursue  no  personal  policy  there."  x 

alleged  declaration  on  February  7,  1913,  that  Germany  could  safely 
accept  the  relative  proportion  (i6to  10)  between  British  and  German 
Dreadnoughts  proposed  by  Mr.  Churchill  in  March  1912  was  made 
simultaneously  with  the  proposal  for  the  increase  of  the  German 
aerial  fleet  (cf.  pp.  271,  272),  and  just  before  the  announcement  of 
the  plan  for  the  augmentation  of  the  German  army  until  it  numbers 
865,000  men  !  The  reply  of  France  was  immediate,  yet  England 
still  hesitates  to  look  facts  in  the  face.  Cf.  pp.  207,  208. 
1  Le  Figaro,  May  30,  1902. 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS       69 

From  1905  to  the  present  hour  Germany  has  had  but  one 
dream,  one  aim.  Prince  Billow,  indeed,  stated  publicly  in 
1896,  with  a  Bismarckian  frankness,  that  the  sole  object  of 
German  policy  was  to  supplement  the  Entente  Cordiale  by 
an  equally  cordial  understanding  between  Germany  and 
England.  The  Deutsche  Revue  published,  in  September  of 
that  year,  just  after  the  German  Emperor  and  King  Edward 
had  met  at  Friedrichshof,  an  article  unquestionably  in- 
spired by  the  Imperial  Chancellor,  in  which,  after  resus- 
citating the  legend  that  "  the  traditions  of  the  Delcasse 
policy  were  still  at  work  with  undiminished  force  in  French 
diplomacy — a  policy  of  which  the  object  is  to  hem  in  Ger- 
many diplomatically,  with  the  help  of  England,  Russia 
and  other  States,"  the  writer  gave  the  following  menacing 
description  of  England's  alternatives  :  "  Towards  Germany 
England  has  only  the  choice  between  the  policy  which 
might  easily  become  disastrous,  of  an  Anglo-French 
counterpoise,  and  that  of  including  Germany  within 
the  circle  of  her  friendship."  When  Sir  Edward  Grey 
failed  to  take  the  hint,  when  England  refused  to  modify 
its  relations  with  France,  "whether  by  addition  or  sub- 
traction," as  The  Times  put  it,1  Prince  Biilow  drew  the 
logical  conclusion  :  he  stuck  to  the  programme  that  he  had 
published  in  the  Deutsche  Revue,  and  strove  more  fanatically 
than  ever  to  destroy  the  Entente  Cordiale  by  a  policy  of 
alternating  intimidation  and  blandishment.  Germany,  ever 
since,  has  been  butting  about  the  European  corrida  like  a 
maddened  bull,  seeking  in  vain  to  reach  and  to  toss  the 
French  toreador  who  waves  before  her  the  Union  Jack.  It 
is  superfluous  to  recall  the  vicissitudes  of  a  sport  marked 
by  such  "  events  "  as  the  fall  of  M.  Delcasse,  the  Con- 
ference of  Algeciras,  Casablanca.  The  consequences  of 
Germany's  action  are  alone  important. 

What  has  become  patent  to  every  one  to-day  was  obvious 

1  Leading  article,  September  5,  1906. 


70  PROBLEMS   OF  POWER 

to  professional  observers  in  1906  :  the  fall  of  M.  Delcasse". 
the  sacrifice  of  the  French  Foreign  Minister  by  his  colleagues 
to  the  German  Moloch,  was  an  event  bound  to  bring  home 
to  the  most  indifferent  of  Frenchmen  certain  realities  of 
their  international  situation ;  and  consequent  prolonged 
reflection  on  those  realities,  coupled  with  the  growing  dis- 
satisfaction aroused  by  the  tyranny  of  the  radical  regime, 
could  not  fail  to  determine  a  revival  of  the  French  national 
spirit.  In  1906  it  was  clear  that  however  mobile  the  French 
temperament  was,  however  pusillanimously  reluctant  the 
Republican  Government  might  be  to  allow  diplomatic 
incidents  to  degenerate  into  war,  however  profoundly  the 
French  people  seemed  to  have  forgotten  Alsace-Lorraine, 
however  scandalously  the  quarrels  of  the  agora,  the 
squabbles  of  the  political  sects,  the  backbiting  and  vitupera- 
tion of  the  press,  were  preoccupying  Frenchmen  to  the 
neglect  of  so  many  of  their  great  national  interests,  there 
were  certain  things  that  French  national  pride  could  not  be 
expected  to  tolerate.  A  period  of  what  the  French  call 
recueillement,  of  silent  meditation  that  quickly  became 
articulate,  assuming  the  sanest  forms  of  self-criticism, 
marked  the  inevitable  conversion'of  the  French  soul.  While 
foreign  observers  beheld  only  a  France  torn  by  domestic 
factions,  quarrelling  over  the  expulsion  of  monks  and  nuns, 
and  over  the  separation  of  the  Church  and  the  State ;  a 
Republic  in  which  the  rebellion  of  5,000  civil  servants  (the 
Postmen's  Strike)  seemed  to  be  menacing  the  very  existence 
of  the  Republican  regime ;  a  society  in  which  whole  com- 
munities of  peaceful  wine-growers  seemed  to  have  gone 
suddenly  as  mad  as  Dionysiac  revellers  ;  France  was  recover- 
ing the  sense  of  her  national  integrity.  She  was  beginning 
to  float  on  the  high  tide  of  one  of  those  miraculous  moral 
"  resurgences  "  peculiar  to  the  soil  that  has  given  birth  to 
Vercingetorix,  St.  Louis,  Joan  of  Arc  and  Gambetta 


BOOK  II 


BOOK  II 

THE  French  domestic  crises,  the  ensuing  National 
Reaction,1  and  the  more  recent  British  crisis,  the 
solution  of  which  the  world  is  now  witnessing,  have  been 
the  necessary  condition  of  Germany's  agitation — of  her 
peculiar  aggressive  policy,  and  now  of  her  provisionally 
more  prudent,  but  not  less  dangerous,  manifestations — 
during  the  period  extending  from  Boulangism  to  the  fall  of 
M.  Delcasse  and  the  arrival  of  the  "  Panther  "  at  Agadir ; 
and  from  the  Franco-German  Convention  of  November  4, 
1911,  to  the  present  ambiguous  hour. 

I 

During  more  than  a  quarter  of  a  century  after  the  Franco- 
German  War  it  was  taken  for  granted  by  European  states- 
men, whether  British,  German,  Russian  or  Italian,  that  the 
French  Republic  was  an  unstable  Government.  The  con- 
viction that  anarchy  was  a  parasite  of  French  Republican- 
ism became  what  the  mathematicians  call  a  function  of  the 
foreign  policy  of  all  the  Great  Powers. 

The  influence  of  French  home  politics  on  French  policy 
from  Jules  Ferry  to  M.  Caillaux  has  been  frequently  noted, 
and  often  contested.  The  proofs  of  that  influence  are, 
however,  innumerable.  These  proofs  are  so  genuine  that 
it  is  impossible  to  interpret  the  last  forty  years  of  European 
history  without  a  preliminary  effort  to  understand  the 

1  The  idea  expressed  in  the  phrase,  "  The  moral  resurgence  of 
contemporary  France,"  has  been  formulated  by  M.  Etienne  Rey 
perhaps  even  more  accurately  in  the  title  of  his  book  :  La  Renaissance 
de  I'Orgueil  Franfais  " — "  The  Revival  of  French  Self- Respect." 

73 


74  PROBLEMS  OF   POWER 

nature  of  the  more  important  questions  which,  during  that 
period,  have  occupied  the  attention  of  French  politi- 
cians and  the  French  public.  Even  Lord  Salisbury  might 
have  come  to  terms  with  France  and  Russia  in  1887-1888 
— and  England  would  thereby  have  chosen  of  her  own  free 
will,  and  for  purely  political,  diplomatic  motives,  a  path 
into  which  vital  necessity  drove  her  fifteen  years  later — 
if  it  had  not  been  for  the  perils  and  uncertainty  of  the  moment 
in  Paris.  In  October  1887  (the  date  of  the  first  Russian 
entente  being  August  1891)  Baron  de  Mohrenheim,  Russian 
ambassador  in  Paris,  wrote  to  his  friend,  M.  Jules  Hansen  : 
"  I  have  reminded  you  a  thousand  times  that  without 
greater  governmental  stability  all  the  present  plans  would 
be  compromised.  Take  it  definitely  to  heart,  once  for  all : 
il  y  a  France  et  France.  I  have  never  ceased  saying  this 
everywhere,  so  that  my  conscience,  at  all  events,  is  clear."  * 
The  fall  of  Jules  Ferry,  the  fall  of  M.  Delcasse,  the  fall  of 
M.  Pichon,  are  examples  of  events,  the  sole  interest  of  which 
is  that  they  illustrate  the  singular  incapacity  of  the  French 
politician  to  subordinate  party  passions  to  the  general  in- 
terests of  his  country.  That  France,  the  Third  Republic, 
in  spite  of  the  pretension  of  the  foreigner  to  meddle  in  French 
affairs,  and  in  spite  of  the  complaisance  with  which  certain 
Frenchmen  have  now  and  then  abetted  him  in  his  incredible 
machinations,  should  not  only  have  survived  longer  than 
any  of  the  regimes  immediately  preceding  it,  but  should 
have  become  perhaps  the  most  stable  and  conservative 
State  in  Europe,  is  one  of  the  happiest  accidents  of  history. 
From  Boulangism  through  the  Panama  Scandal  to  the 
Dreyfus  Case,  the  Republic  has  repeatedly  appeared  to 
outsiders  to  be  doomed  to  a  speedy  end.  The  Real  France a 
has  almost  invariably  escaped  the  notice  of  the  average 

1  Ambassade  A  Paris  du  Baron  de  Mohrenheim  (1884-1898).     By 
Jules  Hansen.     p.  68. 

2  Title  of  a  remarkable  book  by  Mr.  Laurence  Jerrold  (Methuen, 
1911). 


A  STUDY  OF   INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS      75 

well-informed  German,  Englishman  or  American.  The 
world-wide  misconception  with  regard  to  the  significance 
of  French  domestic  policy,  and  the  singular  influence  of 
French  home  policy  upon  French  foreign  policy,  make  it 
necessary  to  study  in  some  detail  the  political  development 
of  the  Third  Republic ;  to  survey  the  ground  as  it  was 
before  the  continual  blows  of  the  Nibelungen  picks  finally 
released  the  subterranean  current  of  French  patriotism. 

II 

Among  the  domestic  problems  that  dominated  French 
political  life  for  almost  an  entire  generation,  and  often 
diverted  the  attention  of  French  politicians  from  foreign 
questions,  that  of  the  relations  between  the  State  and  the 
Catholic  Church  was,  perhaps,  the  most  inveterately  absorb- 
ing. During  the  crisis  of  the  Dreyfus  Case  this  problem 
became  for  the  Republic  a  matter  of  vital  interest. 

The  events  that  occurred  in  France  from  1903  to  1907 
in  connexion  with  the  dissolution  of  the  religious  orders, 
the  expulsion  of  monks  and  nuns,  the  abolition  of  the 
Concordat  established  in  1801,  and  the  readjustment  of 
the  relations  between  Catholicism  and  the  State  were  a 
matter  of  astonishment  to  the  rest  of  the  world.  Yet  these 
events,  culminating  in  the  separation  of  the  Churches  and 
the  State,  were  produced  by  no  sudden  outburst  of  anti- 
clerical passion  :  they  were  a  logical  incident  in  the  develop- 
ment of  French  society.  Instead  of  being  a  sign  of  moral 
decadence  and  social  ruin,  they  were  a  proof  not  only  of 
the  stability  of  Republican  institutions,  but  also  of  the 
Republic's  right  to  claim  legitimate  heirship  to  the  great 
regimes  preceding  it :  the  whole  history  of  France  has  been 
a  steady  effort  of  secularization. 

The  Republic  was,  in  a  sense,  an  accident,  but  it  was  a 
necessary  and  inevitable  one.  After  the  fall  of  the  Empire 
a  Republican  governmental  form  was  alone  possible.  But 
its  durability  was  problematic.  The  survivors  of  the  older 


76  PROBLEMS  OF   POWER 

regimes  thronged  political  life ;  pretenders  and  "  saviours 
of  society  "  abounded.  The  old  political  parties  were  all 
eager  for  office,  and  each  had  its  special  nostrum  for  the 
cure  of  the  alleged  maladies  of  the  body-politic.  Their 
agents  still  held  high  and  responsible  positions  in  the  French 
Administration.  The  bench,  for  instance,  was  honey- 
combed with  them.  The  Army  was  crowded  with  officers 
who  had  served  another  regime  too  loyally  to  feel  them- 
selves at  home  in  a  Republic.  After  the  debacle  the  respon- 
sibility for  the  re-organization  of  French  society  fell 
upon  a  handful  of  disinterested  patriots  convinced  that  a 
Republican  form  was  the  least  distasteful  to  the  nation, 
and  the  only  one  practical,  given  the  mutually  warring 
interests  of  the  rival  political  parties.  Thiers  was  a  Re- 
publican President  not  from  conviction,  but  by  the  force  of 
things  and  of  his  political  sense.  Round  him,  in  spite  of 
their  suspicion  of  him,  rallied  the  Republicans  by  convic- 
tion. Politically,  no  other  coalition  was  possible.  But 
the  Republic,  which  had  thus  managed  to  escape  strangling 
in  its  cradle,  was  beset  throughout  its  infancy  by  the  same 
quarrelsome  foes  whose  reciprocal  envy  and  ambitions  had 
been  the  sole  reason  of  its  surviving.  To  the  Republican 
bodyguard  that  watched  over  the  child  fell  the  duty  of 
re-organizing  the  whole  of  French  society.  The  political 
part  of  their  task  was  achieved — inadequately — in  the 
Constitution  of  1875,  under  which  Frenchmen  are  still 
living,  and  which  preserved  the  old  Napoleonic  social  scaf- 
folding, although  it  added  fresh  beams  to  fortify  and  unite 
the  political  and  administrative  functions.1  So  admirable 

1  The  "  origins  of  contemporary  France  "  are  really  buried  in  the 
Old  Regime.  The  historian  of  the  Political  and  Administrative 
Institutions  of  France,  M.  Paul  Viollet,  says  admirably  :  "  Notre 
notion  de  1'etat  omnipotent,  est,  a  bien  prendre,  1'instinct  dirigeant 
de  1'ancien  regime  erige  en  systeme.  L'etat  moderne  n'est  autre 
chose  que  le  roi  des  derniers  siecles  qui  continue  triomphalement  son 
labeur  acharne,  etouffant  toutes  h'bertes  locales,  nivelant  sans 
rel  aches." 


A   STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS      77 

was  the  new  machine  that  a  mere  handful  of  officials 
could  run  it.  But  this  task  accomplished,  it  remained  first 
to  choose  the  handful ;  secondly,  to  organize  national 
nurseries  of  functionaries  knowing  their  Republican  busi- 
ness. The  real  history  of  France  and  the  line  of  its  growth 
during  the  last  thirty-five  years  of  Republican  government 
has  been  that  of  the  squabble  between  the  Republican  crew 
in  office  and  the  Royalist,  Imperialist  or  other  gangs  out 
of  office. 

Now,  the  effort  to  man  the  French  administrative  machine 
with  trusty  Republicans  could  not  go  on  without  friction. 
It  meant  both  cashiering  of  upright  old  officials,  as  in  the 
operation  known  as  "  the  purification  of  the  magistracy," 
and  the  creating,  by  school  legislation,  of  a  Republican 
youth  and  electorate,  free  from  the  bias  of  the  loyalties  of 
the  former  generations.  The  Catholic  Church  could  either 
immensely  facilitate  or  seriously  hamper  this  process.  What 
part  did  it  choose  to  play  ? 

By  the  Concordat,  and  by  the  Organic  Articles  which 
the  First  Consul  regarded  as  merely  the  application  of  his 
convention  with  the  Pope,  the  Central  Administration  held 
the  French  clergy  in  leash.  They  were  functionaries  of  the 
State.  The  high  officials  (the  Bishops)  could  virtually  be 
chosen  by  the  State,  the  Pope  merely  conferring  canonical 
authority  on  the  elect  of  the  Civil  Power ;  and  although 
the  Bishops  chose  the  parish  priests,  the  choice  had  to  be 
confirmed  by  the  State.  The  Bishops  were  obliged 
to  swear  obedience  and  fidelity  to  the  Government,  and  to 
promise  "  to  have  no  intelligence,  to  assist  at  no  council, 
to  have  nothing  to  do  with  any  league,  either  in  France  or 
abroad,  contrary  to  the  public  peace."  Furthermore, 
they  were  pledged  to  inform  the  central  authority  if  they 
learned  of  any  scheme  concocted  to  its  prejudice.  This 
oath,  imposed  upon  the  minor  clergy,  absorbed  them  also 
into  the  magnificent  system  of  officialdom  with  which  the 
First  Consul  thought  effectively  to  police  French  society. 


78  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

In  return  for  the  extraordinary  services  thus  conceded  by 
the  Vatican,  France  agreed  to  ensure  her  ecclesiastical 
agents  "  a  proper  stipend."  The  Organic  Articles  tightened 
the  Church's  bonds,  interdicting  all  publication  of  Papal 
brief  or  encyclical  in  France  without  Government  authority  ; 
forbidding  the  Bishops  to  meet  in  general  assembly ; 
forcing  them  to  obtain  Government  permission  if  they  desired 
to  leave  their  dioceses.  On  the  slightest  pretext  of  rebellion 
the  State  could  bring  the  Bishops  to  book  and  punish 
them.  In  a  word,  it  was  a  state  of  servility  that  was  in 
reality  an  humiliation  for  the  Church,  though  not  honestly 
regretted  by  it,  since  it  was  a  step  on  the  way  leading  to 
complete  absorption  of  the  civil  authority. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  Concordat,  at  the  outset,  put  the 
French  Administration  on  a  solid  basis.  In  fact,  when  the 
Third  Republic  was  founded  the  Concordat  was  the  chief 
trump  it  held,  if  not  an  absolutely  necessary  condition  of 
success.  Republican  statesmen  knew  this,  and  one  after 
another  the  Opportunist  leaders,  from  Ferry  and  Gambetta 
to  Freycinet  and  Rouvier,  rejected  the  impolitic  proposals 
of  the  radicals  for  abrogation  of  the  Concordat,  and  the 
suppression  of  the  Embassy  at  the  Vatican.  They  were 
well  aware  that  such  a  policy  would  deprive  the  Government 
of  all  police  authority  over  an  army  of  Churchmen  to  a 
large  extent  hostile  to  Republicanism  by  definition,  and 
taking  their  cue  from  a  foreign  Power  which  was  always 
claiming  the  right  to  govern.  These  Republican  statesmen 
felt  that  to  break  all  ties  between  the  State  and  the  Catholic 
forces  would  leave  the  latter  free  to  follow  their  natural 
anti-Republican  allegiances,  and  to  continue  in  the  open 
certain  manoeuvres  they  had  all  along  been  secretly  con- 
ducting behind  the  scenes.  Political  prudence  seemed  to 
the  Opportunists,  from  Ferry  to  Waldeck-Rousseau,  and  even 
to  M.  Combes,  to  require  the  maintenance  of  the  Concordat. 

In  proportion,  however,  as  the  work  of  laying  the  founda- 
tions of  the  Republic  approached  completion,  the  utility  of 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS       79 

the  Concordat  for  the  State  became  less  and  less  evident. 
There  came  a  time  when  the  advantages  of  the  pact  were 
largely  on  the  side  of  the  Catholics.  It  should  not  be  for- 
gotten that,  owing  to  the  changed  conditions  of  modern 
life,  most  of  the  guarantees  demanded  by  Napoleon  were 
rapidly  ceasing  to  have  any  real  applicability  under  the 
Republic.  They  were  counterbalanced  by  the  new  laws  of 
liberty  enacted  by  the  Republic,  laws  benefiting  the  clergy 
and  the  Church  as  much  as  the  other  citizens — the  liberty 
to  teach,  liberty  of  the  Press,  liberty  of  association — so 
that,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  in  spite  of  the  Concordat,  the 
Church  had  recovered  her  territorial  power  and  her  political 
power,  and  the  State  was  actually  in  a  position  of  inferiority 
with  regard  to  her.  The  State  assured  the  Church  a  privi- 
lege and  paid  its  ministers  a  living  stipend  which  made  it 
possible  for  them  to  use  their  other  resources  for  political 
ends.  Nothing  is  more  characteristic  of  the  way  the  Con- 
cordat was  finally  ceasing  to  be  of  any  positive  political 
utility  to  the  State,  than  the  argument  used  in  a  letter  written 
by  Mgr.  Fuzet,  the  Archbishop  of  Rouen,  to  the  senatorial 
reporter  of  the  Separation  Bill,  with  the  purpose  of  proving 
that  Separation  would  be  a  blunder. 

"  Do  not  Republican  politicians  understand,"  said  the  Archbishop, 
"  that  it  is  to  their  advantage  to  keep  the  religious  question  always 
under  discussion  ?  For  the  advanced  parties  clericalism  is  not 
only  the  enemy,  it  is  their  daily  bread.  It  is  the  big  drum  used  to 
unite  the  victorious  majorities  when  division  seems  impending. 
Are  you  going  to  burst  that  magic  drum  ?  .  .  .  Every  good  Re- 
publican is  bound  to  be  in  favour  of  the  Concordat.  To  be  in  favour 
of  the  Concordat  is  not  to  be  clerical,  it  is  to  be  far-sighted." 

To  the  disinterested  critic  this  naive  appeal  to  the  senti- 
ment of  middle-class  Republican  camaraderie  is  of  an  incom- 
parable humour.  Yet  it  was  not  wanting  in  perspicacity. 
The  important  thing  is  that  the  Concordat  had  come  to 
this  :  it  had  the  value  of  a  tom-tom  !  And  yet  .  .  . 
reflecting  Republican  statesmen,  while  fully  aware  of  the 
fact,  still  hesitated ;  and  who  can  wonder  ?  Even  M. 


8o  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

Combes  did  not  wish  to  hear  of  Separation.  He  recalled, 
perhaps,  the  wise  warning  of  Jules  Ferry  to  his  electors  of 
the  Vosges  in  1881  : 

"  This  formula  of  separation,  just  because  it  is  a  simple  formula, 
is  a  deceptive  one.  .  .  .  The  first  fact  that  completely  enlightened 
me  was  .  .  .  the  religious  revolution  introduced  by  the  Vatican  into 
the  doctrines  and  the  general  affairs  of  the  Catholic  Church.  .  .  . 
That  is  for  me  a  decisive  reason  for  preserving  the  Concordat,  inas- 
much as  the  more  ecclesiastical  authority  is  concentrated,  centra- 
lized, the  more  it  takes  on  the  semblance  of  a  veritable  Cesarism.  .  . 
The  more  the  Government  of  the  Catholic  world  resembles  absolute 
authority,  the  more  the  national  churches  are  disciplined  in  a  com- 
mon obedience — and  the  more  important  it  is  for  a  Government  like 
our  own  to  have  with  it  a  good  contract." 

There  can  be  little  doubt  that,  even  now,  Separation 
would  not  be  the  accomplished,  though  bastard,  fact  it  is 
but  for  the  diplomatic  inexperience  of  the  present  Pope, 
whose  blundering  policy  forced  upon  the  State — and,  against 
their  will,  upon  the  majority  of  the  French  clergy — the 
events  leading  up  to  Separation. 

But  what  part  did  the  French  clergy  play  throughout 
the  entire  period  when  the  Republic  was  literally  fighting 
for  its  life — the  period  extending  from  the  Government  of 
National  Defence  down  almost  to  1905  ? 

In  the  first  place,  the  Syllabus  of  Pius  IX,  which  was 
known  to  define  the  attitude  of  the  reigning  Pope  up  to 
the  accession  of  Leo  XIII  in  1878,  had  more  than  awakened 
the  distrust  of  the  Republican  statesmen  :  it  was  a  pillar 
of  cloud  by  day  and  of  fire  by  night  to  the  members  of  the 
Republican  Masonic  Lodges.  By  the  blast  of  the  Syllabus, 
as  from  an  archangel's  trumpet,  society  was  informed,  urbi 
et  orbi,  that  the  forces  of  Vaticanism  were  out  to  all  the 
points  of  the  compass,  feeling  for  their  prey,  namely,  for 
every  manifestation  of  the  "  modern  spirit  "  and  of  laic  1 

1  "  Laic  ?  The  word  is  French  rather  than  English  ;  and,  as  yet, 
in  communities  of  people  who  speak  English,  the  term  has  no  force, 
because  no  vogue.  On  the  continent  of  Europe,  however,  laic  has 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS      81 

society.  The  Vatican  thereby  declared  its  hostility,  not 
merely  against  the  scientific  method  of  thought,  but  against 
the  right  of  the  individual  to  choose  his  own  religion.  It 
declared  the  supremacy  of  the  Church  over  the  civil  author- 
ity, the  infallibility  of  the  Pope,  the  natural  right  of  the 
Church  to  acquire  and  possess  property,  and  to  ignore  the 
civil  tribunals,  and  the  right  of  ecclesiastics  to  claim  ex- 
emption from  military  service.  It  affirmed,  notably,  the 
criminal  character  of  all  legislation  placing  public  schools 
under  State  supervision,  making  them  neutral  as  regards 
religious  instruction,  and  freeing  them  from  the  authority 
of  the  Church.  It  reproved  the  doctrine  of  the  separation 
of  Church  and  State.  It  anathematized  the  "  error " 
according  to  which  "  it  was  permissible  to  refuse  obedience 
to  legitimate  princes,  and  even  to  revolt  against  them," 
thus  lending  the  support  of  the  Church  to  pretenders  like 
the  Comte  de  Chambord.  It  condemned  divorce  laws,  and, 
in  fact,  the  whole  of  the  French  legislation  on  marriage. 
In  a  word,  while  this  famous  document  (it  matters  little 
whether  or  no  it  be  taken  as  ex  cathedra}  constituted  a  chal- 
lenge to  many  of  the  ideals  of  modern  civilizations,  and 
ignored  the  seemingly  inveterate  tendency  to  an  increasing 
separation  of  the  spiritual  and  temporal  powers,  the  State 
and  the  country  which  Pius  IX  appeared  to  be  singling  out 

for  a  long  time  now  been  growing  in  familiarity  as  a  name  for  all  the 
impulses  that  mark  the  temper  of  persons  resentful  of  authority ; 
it  is  less  exact  to  say,  but  briefer  and  more  intelligible,  a  name  for  all 
the  impulses  of  the '  people.'  Science  has  not  to  approve  or  condemn 
the  thing  thus  named.  Its  sole  business  is  to  draw  attention  to  the 
fact.  ...  A  fresh  spirit  is  growing  on  our  planet  ...  a  spirit  which, 
having  at  first  its  origin  in  a  feeling  of  reaction  against  ecclesias- 
tical authority  alone,  is  rapidly  broadening,  so  as  to  include  the  entire 
series  of  feelings  of  suspicion  of  all  authority  whatsoever,  of  dislike 
of  whatsoever  institutions,  and  compact  monopolizing  organisms  ; 
and  it  is  this  feeling,  binding  together  the  '  people  '  in  every  country 
east  and  west,  which  deserves  a  name,  and  which,  in  want  of  a  bet- 
ter, I  have  called  laic.  .  .  ."  Patriotism  and  Science,  by  the  Author, 
p.  149,  Boston,  1893. 

G 


82  PROBLEMS  OF   POWER 

for  special  reprobation  was  the  France  of  the  Revolution 
and  of  the  "  rights  of  man  "  :  Republican  France,  whose 
ideas  of  liberty  of  conscience  he  condemned  as  iniquitous, 
and  whose  efforts  for  the  emancipation  of  the  State  from 
religious  authority  he  described  as  impious. 

Wherever  French  Republican  statesmen  looked,  they 
saw  the  standard  of  reactionary  conservatism,  which  the 
Vatican  had  raised,  intertwined  with  the  flags  of  the  forces 
enlisted  against  the  Republic.  On  the  morrow  of  the  con- 
spiracy of  May  16,  and  of  the  elections  of  1877,  the  hands 
of  the  clergy  were  everywhere  visible  in  the  coups  de  theatre 
of  those  episodes.  The  historian  Rambaud  points  out  that 
the  "  clerical  party  had  been  the  cement  that  had  held 
together  the  various  political  parties  "  during  that  assault ; 
and  he  recalls  the  fact  that,  in  1877,  the  counsels  given  by 
the  Vatican  under  Pius  IX's  pontificate  were  by  no  means 
those  that  arrived  from  Rome  later  on  under  the  pontificate 
of  Leo  XIII.  Jules  Ferry  was  not  exaggerating  when, 
addressing  his  Vosgian  constituents  in  1879,  ne  sa^  :  "  Ten 
years  of  such  laisser-aller  as  the  present,  of  such  blindness, 
and  you  will  see  all  this  fine  system  of  free  schools,  inde- 
pendent of  state  control,  .  .  .  crowned  by  a  final  liberty, 
that  of  civil  war."  Not  that  all  Catholics  were  reactionary 
and  anti-republican  ;  but  all  anti-Republicans  and  Reac- 
tionaries were  Catholic.  The  Syllabus  of  Pius  IX  was  a 
warning.  It  suggested  the  necessity  of  a  programme  of 
Republican,  therefore  national,  defence.  In  the  minds  of 
the  Republican  leaders  it  justified  distrust  of  the  Church. 
It  speedily  inspired  an  energetic  response  to  her  declara- 
tions and  acts  of  war.  Gambetta's  le  clericalisme,  voild  I'en- 
nemi  was  the  plastic  form  assumed  by  this  pervasive  senti- 
ment of  fear.  The  Republicans  congratulated  themselves 
that,  after  all,  they  had  the  instrument  of  the  Concordat 
by  which  to  maintain  a  certain  discipline  in  at  least  one  of 
the  potential  armies  of  its  enemies. 

But,  after  all,  the  French  Catholics  could  not  be  held 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS      83 

responsible  for  the  Syllabus,  as  long  as  they  kept  their  oath 
of  allegiance  to  the  State  and  obeyed  its  laws.  How  did 
they  undertake  to  dissipate  the  distrust  which  their  depen- 
dency upon  Rome  excited  ?  Above  all,  what  was  the  posi- 
tive role  of  the  French  bishops  and  clergy,  and  of  the  French 
Catholics,  placed,  as  they  were,  in  a  position  so  immensely 
to  facilitate,  or  so  seriously  to  hamper,  the  establishment  of 
Republican  Government  in  France  ?  It  may  be  summed 
up  in  a  single  word  :  persecution  of  the  Republic.  And 
when  they  were  refused  the  right  to  persecute,  they  them- 
selves cried  out  that  they  were  being  persecuted.  Those 
who  accuse  the  "  eldest  daughter  of  the  Church  "  of  occa- 
sionally unfilial  sentiment  towards  her  spiritual  parent 
forget  that  that  parent  has  often  acted  the  part  of  a  step- 
mother. The  Church  seemed  often  to  be  attacking  all 
that  the  Republic  held  dear.  It  appeared  to  be  a  vast 
syndicate  opposed  to  every  ideal  and  conquest  of  Republi- 
can legislation.  It  is  impossible,  within  the  limits  of  the 
present  book,  to  give  any  but  an  inadequate  account  of 
the  dangerous  and  systematic  war  waged  against  the 
Republic  by  the  occult  Catholic  Party  in  France ;  but  a 
few  instances  will  suffice  to  account  for  the  attitude  of 
Republican  statesmen  and  Republican  citizens  in  their 
resistance  to  the  unpatriotic  work  of  the  clerical  power. 
The  cases  and  the  methods  here  cited  will  show  how 
inevitable  it  was  that  such  persecution  should  give 
birth,  in  certain  fanatical  portions  of  the  Republican 
party,  to  a  spirit  of  counter-persecution  :  witness  the  out- 
rageous delation  scandals  of  the  War  Office  under  General 
Andre*.  A  la  guerre  comme  a  la  guerre.  But  these  facts, 
by  contrast,  will  render  all  the  more  surprising  the  self- 
possession  of  the  French  Parliament  when  it  was  finally 
called  upon  to  solve  the  problem  of  Separation,  and  when, 
instead  of  passing  a  Bill  inspired  by  anti-clerical  animosity, 
it  prepared  and  enacted,  under  the  guidance  of  M.  Briand, 
and  in  a  spirit  of  judicial  calm,  a  measure  of  adequate 


84  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

liberty  for  the  Church,  consonant,  not  only  with  the  French, 
but  even  with  the  Anglo-Saxon,  ideal  of  justice,  and  in 
harmony  with  the  other  conquests  of  French  idealism 
during  the  nineteenth  century. 

The  supreme  "  error  "  of  France,  that  which,  in  the  opinion 
of  the  Vatican,  required  the  mobilization  of  all  its  agents 
to  combat  it,  was  the  effort  of  French  statesmen  to  establish 
a  national  school  system  free  from  clerical  domination. 
The  task  is  not  yet  accomplished,  but  the  Republic  has 
little  by  little  substituted  the  principle  of  independent  and 
methodical  research  for  that  of  authority  and  tradition,  the 
scientific  impulse  for  the  religious  ;  and  this  achievement 
the  Catholics  still  find  it  difficult  to  forgive.  The  freedom 
of  thought  and  the  spirit  of  tolerance  manifested  during 
the  debate  on  the  Separation  Bill  of  1905,  were  the  social 
fruits  of  an  intellectual  education  of  this  sort.  The  Re- 
public has  aimed  at  reaping  a  harvest  of  those  civic  virtues 
which  characterize  a  self-respecting  democracy.  A  State 
School  was  regarded  as  the  most  efficient  method  of  Republi- 
can action.  The  Church  protested.  It  described  as  per- 
secution the  limitation  of  one  of  its  monopolies.  The  con- 
scious effort  of  Republican  and  Democratic  France  to 
organize  society  according  to  the  dominant  principles  of 
our  laic  time,  was  a  movement  which  was  bound  to  meet 
with  resistance  from  theocratic  vested  interests.  By  means 
of  the  primary  schools  founded  by  the  Republic,  which  were 
the  greatest  work  of  Ferry,  the  Republican  statesmen  wit- 
tingly sought  to  wrest  the  boys  and  girls  of  France  from 
exclusive  clerical  training,  and  to  educate  them  for  their 
duty  as  responsible  Republican  citizens.  This  steady,  in- 
evitable and  characteristic  work  of  the  Republic  to  assure 
the  existence  of  a  neutral  laic  school  seemed,  to  the  Church, 
a  work  of  irreligion,  of  impiety.  And  when  the  French 
State  is  accused  of  persecution,  one  of  the  motives  of  the 
charge  may  be  confidently  ascribed  to  the  poignant  regret 
with  which  the  Catholics  have  seen  the  Republic  rooting 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS       85 

itself  steadily  in  the  hearts  of  the  people  by  the  device  of 
a  national  school  system. 

Nothing  would  be  easier  than  to  cite  passages  from  the 
pastoral  letters  and  the  minutes  of  Church  Congresses,  or 
to  adduce  typical  instances  of  active  ecclesiastical  pressure, 
condemning  and  combating  the  school  laws  of  successive 
Republican  governments.  When  Mgr.  Freppel,  Bishop  of 
Angers,  was  not  addressing  circulars  to  his  flock  character- 
izing the  French  National  Fete  of  July  14  as  the  "  anniver- 
sary of  one  of  the  most  odious  massacres  of  which  French 
history  preserves  the  memory,"  he  was  contesting  inch  by 
inch  in  the  Chamber  the  ground  on  which  the  Republic 
was  seeking  to  rear  the  national  free  school.  Referring  to 
the  law  on  primary  instruction,  another  prelate,  this  time 
an  Archbishop,  Mgr.  de  Cambrai,  described  that  measure 
as  having  been  "  more  dangerous  for  France  than  the  war 
of  1870  and  than  the  loss  of  her  two  provinces,"  adding 
that  if  the  system  lasted  ten  years  France  would  be  "  rotten 
to  the  core,  struck  from  the  rank  of  civilized  nations." 
M.  de  Cambrai's  prophecy  has  not  yet  been  fulfilled.  He 
went  on  to  "  preach  a  new  crusade  against  the  barbarians, 
who  had  made  a  pedestal  of  the  word  liberty,  and  who  were 
now  confiscating  every  liberty.  Let  the  Catholics  hold 
themselves  hi  readiness,  let  all  Conservatives  band  them- 
selves together  to  the  cry  of  '  Dieuleveut.' '  Still  another 
prelate,  in  his  pastoral  letter,  said  :  "  In  all  the  districts 
where  the  pernicious  scheme  of  removing  the  schools  from 
the  influence  of  the  Church  may  be  formed  and  carried  out, 
it  will  be  rigorously  incumbent  upon  the  Church  to  inform 
the  faithful  that  they  cannot  conscientiously  allow  their 
children  to  frequent  those  schools."  In  1885  the  Interna- 
tional Catholic  Congress  of  Lyons  declared  :  "It  would 
be  in  vain  to  seek  in  the  State  the  right,  the  competence, 
or  the  mission,  without  which  no  one  should  be  allowed  to 
teach.  Hence  the  practical  impossibility  of  admitting 
the  organization  of  a  corps  of  teachers  deriving  its  mission, 


86  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

its  competence  and  its  right,  from  the  State,  which  does  not 
possess  these  qualifications." 

These  are  typical  utterances  of  the  monotonous  diapason 
that  rang  in  the  ears  of  the  Republican  rulers  for  more  than 
a  quarter  of  a  century,  and  amid  which  they  calmly  went 
on  forging  that  admirable  instrument,  the  public  school 
system  of  France.  Nor  are  these  utterances  mere  out- 
bursts of  petulance.  The  Church  suited  the  action  to  the 
word.  It  organized  all  over  France  political  associations 
under  episcopal  authority,  the  consequence  of  a  mot  d'ordre 
of  the  sovereign  pontiff,  admirable  machines  of  political 
warfare  against  which  the  Republican  government  had  to 
fight,  with  rare  moments  of  truce,  from  May  16  down  to  the 
time  of  the  Dreyfus  case.  Evidently  the  advantages  of 
the  Concordat  for  the  State,  in  spite  of  Ferry's  striking 
argument,  were  no  longer  what  they  were  when  that  instru- 
ment was  signed  by  the  First  Consul.  As  M.  Jules  Roche 
said  in  a  speech  in  the  French  Chamber,  the  French  pre- 
lates and  priests  were  organized  in  a  "  permanent  and  mul- 
tiple conspiracy  against  the  Republic,  against  modern 
society,  and  against  universal  suffrage,  in  order  to  alter  it, 
corrupt  it,  and  oppress  it." 

in  this  rapid  survey  no  mention  has  been  made  of  the 
constant  breaches  of  the  Concordat  on  the  part  of  French 
Bishops,  their  reckless  readiness  to  create  compromising 
incidents,  the  irreconcilable  attitude  of  the  Freppels  and 
the  Gouthe-Soulards.1  The  persecution  of  the  State  by 
the  Church  during  the  period  previous  to  the  accession  of 
Pope  Leo  XIII  is  a  fact  of  history,  and  a  fact  of  which  the 
Church  is  proud.  When  Leo  XIII  took  office  in  1878, 
France  was  entering  upon  the  throes  of  the  war  on  behalf 
of  laic  instruction.  The  Pope,  cautious  diplomatist,  seemed 
to  be  studying  the  map  of  Europe.  France,  under  the 
leadership  of  Ferry,  appeared  to  be  forgetting  the  dangers 

1  See  the  present  writer's  Patriotism  and  Science,  pp.  24-38. 


A  STUDY  OF   INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS       87 

at  home  in  the  effort  which  Bismarck  seconded,  for  his  own 
ends,  to  re-establish  in  Europe  the  prestige  jeopardized  by 
the  Treaty  of  Frankfort.  She  began  and  continued  the 
policy  of  Colonial  expansion,  which  has  finally  resulted  in 
her  recovering  her  place  among  the  great  powers.  But 
the  old  parties  remained  inveterately  hostile.  They  con- 
tinued then:  systematic  opposition.  It  is  noteworthy  that 
Mgr.  Freppel,  no  doubt  acting  in  obedience  to  the  Pope, 
sought  to  deter  them  from  their  anti-French  tactics  of  abdi- 
cation in  the  Colonies.  There  was  a  lull  in  the  war  between 
Church  and  State,  for  although  Leo  XIII's  first  encyclical 
had  declared  that  the  policy  of  Pius  IX  was  to  be  continued, 
the  new  Pope's  manner  was  obviously  conciliatory,  and  the 
counsels  that  emanated  from  the  Vatican  were  no  longer 
those  of  Pius  IX.  But  if  the  Vatican  seemed  quiet,  the 
French  Pretenders  were  still  on  the  alert.  The  famous 
affair  of  Boulangism  was  a  fresh  and  desperate  assault.  Let 
one  of  the  leading  Republican  Catholics  in  France  enlighten 
the  reader  as  to  the  way  the  Church  was  once  more  com- 
promised by  that  affair.  In  Les  Catholiques  Republicains  ; 
Histoire  et  Souvenirs,  1890-190",  the  Abbe  Pierre  Dabry 
says  :  "  Just  as  the  Conservatives  did  not  mean  to  let  the 
country  have  peace,  so  likewise  they  were  equally  averse  to 
giving  peace  to  the  Church.  The  Catholics  had  committed 
the  blunder  of  enlisting  in  the  monarchical  army,  and  of  fight- 
ing at  the  side  of  the  Conservatives  in  every  battle.  They 
were  their  prisoners."  The  "  Conservatives  "  had  but  one 
object,  namely,  to  upset  the  Republic ;  and  in  the  "  shame- 
less "  Boulangist  episode,  as  this  priest  does  not  hesitate  to 
call  it,  they  obliged  the  honest  Catholics,  whom  they  duped 
with  effrontery,  to  accept  once  again  an  alliance  which 
would  have  compromised  them  irremediably  if  it  had  not 
been  for  the  political  sense  of  the  Pope. 

This  "  shameless  "  episode  of  Boulangism  opened  the 
eyes  of  Leo  XIII.  After  it  the  Republic  seemed  definitively 
established.  "  Ne  trouvez-vous  pas  qu'en  voild  assez?" 


88  PROBLEMS  OF   POWER 

said  the  Pope  one  day  to  the  Archbishop  of  Algiers,  with 
reference  to  the  way  the  affairs  of  the  Church  were  being 
conducted  in  France.  His  meaning  was  clear.  A  few 
weeks  later  the  famous  toast  of  Cardinal  Lavigerie  at  Algiers, 
calling  upon  the  Catholics  to  defend  the  Republic  and  to 
adhere  to  it  sans  arriere  pensee,  heralded  the  encyclical  of 
1892,  urging  on  all  French  Catholics  submission  to  the 
Government ;  an  instrument  shortly  followed  up  by  a  brief 
enforcing  obedience.  This  pronouncement  opened  a  new 
era.  It  seemed  a  harbinger  of  peace  and  of  reconciliation. 
It  was  welcomed  by  the  Republican  rulers  in  a  spirit 
of  genuine  deference  for  the  Pope  and  of  confidence  in  his 
sincerity.  Who  can  pierce  the  mystery  of  a  man's  real 
motives  ?  They  are  as  secret  as  the  movements  of  the 
Pleiades.  At  all  events  Leo  XIII's  act  was  not  only  one 
of  supreme  political  perspicacity,  but  also  one  of  genuine 
loyalty.  That,  moreover,  was  the  impression  of  the  Gam- 
bettists,  who  had  never  forgotten  the  terms  in  which  their 
chief  had  greeted  the  accession  of  Cardinal  Pecci.  It  was 
the  opinion  of  M.  de  Blowitz,  to  whom  Leo  XIII,  speaking 
of  the  Royalist  and  Conservative  parties,  said,  "  L'eglise 
du  Christ  ne  s' attache  qu'd  un  seul  cadavre,  a  celui  qui  est  lui- 
meme  attache  sur  la  croix  " — a  stupendous  utterance,  which 
takes  its  place  among  the  finest  that  history  preserves. 
It  is  the  testimony,  moreover,  of  a  score  of  eminent  Catholic 
authorities,  among  whom  the  latest  is  Mr.  Wilfred  Ward : 
"  I  well  remember  Cardinal  Rampolla's  unquenchable 
hopefulness,  in  conversation,  that  if  only  the  conciliatory 
policy  was  continued  long  enough  it  would  bear  fruit  at 
last." 

The  Republican  statesmen  took  the  Pope  at  his  word. 
They  believed  in  his  sincerity  and  rejoiced  in  the  oppor- 
tunity of  sheathing  the  swords  they  had  had  to  use  for 
twenty  years  to  defend  themselves  against  the  Catholic 
assault.  No  eye-witness  can  ever  forget  the  strange  inspira- 
tion, as  by  a  sort  of  Pentacostal  influence,  that  filled  the 


A  STUDY  OF   INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS      89 

Chamber  of  Deputies  in  that  famous  sitting  of  March  3, 
1894,  when  M.  Spuller,  Minister  of  public  worship,  the 
confidant  and  inspirer  of  Gambetta,  delivered  the  great 
speech  which  marks  an  epoch  in  the  history  of  the  Third 
Republic.  Developing  the  religious  policy  of  the  Govern- 
ment, M.  Spuller  explained  the  new  spirit  of  tolerance 
and  charity  which  the  Republican  State  henceforth  intended 
to  apply.  A  wave  of  genuine  enthusiasm  overswept  the 
country.  Leo  XIII,  who  had  put  himself  at  the  head  of 
the  Democracy,  and  abandoned  the  "  corpse  "  of  the  Con- 
servative party,  was  regarded  as  the  benefactor  of  the 
State.  The  Republican  Government,  eager  to  lay  down 
their  arms,  responded  loyally  to  the  papal  overtures.  All 
along  it  had  been  their  dream  to  open  wide  the  doors  of 
the  Republic.  Never  for  a  quarter  of  a  century  had  it  been 
possible,  for  outside  had  pressed  a  howling  mob,  led  by  non- 
descript pretenders,  the  immense  Catholic  -army  at  their 
back,  ready  to  invade  and  sack  the  entire  house.  At  last 
a  Pope  of  keen  political  intelligence  had  made  it  possible 
to  realize  the  ideal  of  an  open  and  tolerant  Republic. 

This  state  of  national  union  was  of  short  duration.  There 
was  gnashing  of  teeth  among  the  irreconcilable  survivors  of 
the  old  regimes.  After  a  show  of  submission  they  hardened 
their  hearts  like  Pharaoh.  In  this  way  they  played  into 
the  hands  of  the  Radical  Republicans,  whose  anti-clerical- 
ism they  revived.  Little  by  little  the  old  battle  began 
afresh,  but,  as  before,  the  first  blows  were  dealt  by  the 
clerico-conservative  coalition,  and  it  became  obvious  that, 
whatever  the  sincerity  of  the  Pope's  motives,  the  conse- 
quences of  his  policy  were  likely  to  be  the  opposite  of  his 
intentions.  The  order  to  the  Catholics  to  rally  to  the  Re- 
public was  without  ulterior  motive.  Its  results  went  to 
justify  the  scepticism  of  the  Brissons  and  the  Clemenceaus 
who,  from  the  very  first,  regarded  it  as  a  deep-laid  scheme 
for  laying  hold  of  the  Republic,  in  a  word  as  the  classic 
policy  of  the  Trojan  horse.  Frenchmen  rapidly  lost  their 


go  PROBLEMS   OF  POWER 

illusions  as  to  the  sincerity  of  the  Conservative  Catholic 
parties,  and  the  Republicans  found  themselves  compelled 
to  attack  the  Catholics  on  the  same  old  battlefield.  The 
history  is  familiar  to  all  observers  of  France  during  the 
period  from  1895  to  1905.  As  an  immediate  result,  how- 
ever, of  the  encyclical  of  1892,  and  of  the  "  new  spirit  " 
in  the  Republican  Government,  France  for  five  years  had  a 
series  of  moderate  ministries.  Down  to  1898  anti-clerical 
legislation  was  banished  from  Parliament,  no  words  of  hos- 
tility to  religious  liberty  were  uttered  at  the  tribune.  But 
what  was  the  consequence  ?  Let  a  Catholic  writer  reply, 
although  when  he  wrote  he  was  hardly  aware  that  he  was 
giving  a  response  to  that  question  :  — 


"  Between  1894  an^  I9°°  tne  Catholics  were  free  to  extend  and 
to  develop  their  ceuvres.  Their  schools  and  their  colleges  were 
filled.  The  religious  orders,  victims  of  the  expulsion  of  1880,  com- 
pleted the  reconstitution  of  their  establishments,  the  reopening  of 
their  chapels,  and  openly  resumed  direction  of  educational  institu- 
tions. Religious  activity,  in  a  word,  assumed  a  development  to 
which  we  were  too  much  in  a  hurry,  perhaps,  to  draw  attention." 

This  statement  of  the  advantages  of  the  golden  age  of 
the  Meline  and  other  administrations  is  taken  from  a  re- 
markable anonymous  study  due.,  it  is  believed,  to  a  well- 
known  Jesuit  :  La  Grande  Faute  des  Catholiques  (Perrin)  .  The 
author  might  have  added  that  the  bureaux  of  the  War  Office 
had  been  sedulously  packed  by  reactionary  youth  educated  in 
Church  schools,  and  that  the  invasion  of  laic  society  by  the 
Church  had  been  all  but  completed,  so  far,  at  all  events,  as 
the  Army  and  Navy  were  concerned.  The  justification 
of  this  statement  is  unnecessary  for  those  who  recall  the 
Dreyfus  Case.  The  Catholic  witness  forgets  to  note,  further- 
more, among  the  consequences  of  what  he  calls  the  souffle 
liberal,  the  extension  of  the  "  good  press,"  and  the  marvellous 
and  pernicious  politico-religious  part  played  by  the  news- 
paper La  Croix  during  the  Dreyfus  Affair.  Boulangism 
had  opened  the  eyes  of  the  Pope  to  the  perils  of  the  Church's 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS      91 

policy  of  persecution  of  the  Republic.  The  Dreyfus  Affair 
showed  the  entire  country  that  even  the  sovereign  pontiff 
had  not  succeeded  in  convincing  all  French  Catholics  that 
the  Republic  was  the  only  possible  form  of  government  for 
the  French  democracy ;  and  that,  after  the  first  loyal  im- 
pulses to  obey  him,  they  had  allowed  themselves  to  be 
drawn  with  the  enemies  of  the  regime  (the  "  Nationalists  ") 
into  a  fresh  campaign  of  assault  against  the  State.  In  1901, 
after  the  Dreyfus  case,  France  was  on  the  morrow  of  an 
ardent  battle,  in  which  the  very  existence  of  the  Republic 
had  been  at  stake.  The  campaign  of  the  "  Nationalists  " 
and  of  the  "  Patrie  Fran9aise  "  had  been  more  terrible  than 
that  of  Boulangism.  Republican  discipline  under  M.  Waldeck- 
Rousseau  saved  the  State.  But  it  had  not  been  the  fault 
of  the  religious  orders — the  Jesuits  and  Assumptionists — 
nor  of  the  religious  newspapers,  if  the  Republic  did  not  go 
to  the  wall.  Politically  there  was  no  time  to  be  lost.  The 
danger  had  been  conjured,  but  it  had  been  immense.  No 
government  could  defer  taking  legitimate  precautions.  M. 
Waldeck-Rousseau  took  them.  The  form  that  those  pre- 
cautions assumed  was  inevitable.  It  is  known  as  the  Associ- 
ations Law  of  July  rgor,  and  it  resulted  in  the  expulsion 
from  France,  pell-mell  with  some  of  the  worst  ecclesiastical 
conspirators  that  have  ever  troubled  the  public  peace  in 
any  country,  of  a  large  number  of  innocent  persons  whom 
reactionary  political  wire-pullers  had  duped  into  complicity 
with  the  anti-Republican  monks  and  bishops.  The  esprit 
nouveau  had  failed  owing  to  the  disloyalty  and  the  lack  of 
political  sense  of  certain  of  the  French  Catholic  leaders.  The 
Republican  State  once  more  unsheathed  its  sword  and 
assumed  its  former  attitude  of  defence.  Leo  XIII  died  in 
1903  broken-hearted. 

What  Gallicanism  and  Catholicism  thereby  lost,  Vatican- 
ism— and,  it  should  be  said,  the  Triple  Alliance — was  to 
win.  Three  years  before  his  death  Leo  XIII  had  written 
a  firm  and  eloquent  letter  to  the  Archbishop  of  Bourges, 


92  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

renewing  in  accents  of  bitter,  although  restrained,  indigna- 
tion his  protests  against  the  indiscipline  of  certain  French 
Catholics  in  their  incorrigible  resistance  to  the  Republic, 
and  their  refusal  to  accept  the  principle  of  Democracy.  An 
immense  Catholic  organization  known  as  the  Action  Liberate 
resolutely  set  its  face  against  the  counsels  of  the  Vatican, 
and  its  Catholic  Republican  attitude  towards  the  Christian 
democracy  once  more  compromised  Catholicism  in  the  eyes 
of  the  Republicans.  M.  Combes,  who  succeeded  M.  Wal- 
deck-Rousseau,  largely  actuated  by  the  manoeuvres  of  the 
clergy  and  of  the  religious  orders  in  the  elections,  applied 
the  Associations  Law  in  a  spirit  which,  if  not  that  of  the  pro- 
moters of  the  law,  was  generally  recognized  by  Parliament 
as  necessitated  by  the  renewed  rebellious  activity  of  the 
anti-Republican  prelates  in  resisting  the  law.  M.  Waldeck- 
Rousseau,  however,  protested  violently  against  the  dis- 
tortion, not  only  of  his  intentions  as  promoter  of  the 
law,  but  also  of  the  spirit  of  that  measure,  a  distortion 
which  resulted  in  the  closing  of  at  least  15,000  Catholic 
schools  and  the  illegal  persecution  of  many  thousands 
of  inoffensive  monks  and  nuns.  The  last  speech  he 
delivered  was  an  eloquent  appeal  in  favour  of  the  right  of 
"  authorized "  religious  orders  to  teach.  He  reaffirmed 
the  obligation  of  Parliament  to  consider  on  their  merits 
all  requests  for  authorization.  He  was  not  heeded.  The 
result  was  that  the  Associations  Law,  which  was  meant 
to  be  a  measure  of  State  control,  became  one  of  virtually 
wholesale  exclusion.  This  was  a  breach  of  faith  as  well  as  a 
grave  political  blunder.  It  resulted  in  "  persecution," 
recalling  the  most  characteristic  acts  of  hostility  of  the 
Church  towards  the  State.  But,  what  was  worse,  it  gave 
the  Vatican  legitimate  ground  for  protest,  and  created  that 
atmosphere  of  mistrust  which  later  on  was  to  warp  the  Papal 
judgment  in  connexion  with  the  acceptance  of  the  Separa- 
tion Law.  The  Republic  was  bound  to  suffer  for  this  mis- 
construction of  the  Associations  Law,  through  the  effect 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS       93 

which  the  inevitable  manoeuvres  of  resentful  monks  pro- 
duced upon  the  new  Pope.  It  is  noteworthy,  however,  that 
Leo  XIII  did  not  retaliate,  and  it  is  certain  that  the  so-called 
"  expulsion  "  of  the  monks  was  an  event  that  had  no  rela- 
tion whatever  with  the  subsequent  measure  of  Separation, 
which  was  largely  due  to  the  difficulties  raised  by  Pius  X 
in  connexion  with  the  Concordat  and  M.  Loubet's  visit 
to  Rome. 

With  the  accession  of  the  new  Pope  the  partisans  of  the 
old  regime  recovered  their  liberty  and  their  audacity.  Pius 
X,  the  dupe  of  the  insinuations  of  exiled  monks,  and  the 
victim  of  anti-French  influences  in  the  Triple  Alliance,  and 
of  his  own  doctrinaire  piety,  abandoned  the  prudent  tem- 
porizations  of  his  predecessor,  and  indulged  in  act  after  act 
(such  as  sending  his  benediction  to  the  League  of  French 
Women,  a  dangerous  engine  of  war  against  the  Republic) 
which  renewed  the  old  and  dangerous  policy  of  the  Pope 
of  the  Syllabus.  When  M.  Loubet  visited  the  King  of  Italy 
Pius  X  addressed  to  the  European  Powers  a  protest  against 
that  visit,  couched  in  terms  offensive  to  France.  The  insult 
to  France  was  aggravated  by  the  fact  that  certain  phrases 
relating  to  an  eventual  recall  of  the  papal  nuncio  did  not 
figure  in  the  copy  sent  to  the  French  Government.  For  the 
Vatican  the  visit  of  the  President  of  the  Republic  to  the  King 
of  Italy  was  that  of  a  Catholic  sovereign  to  the  heir  of  the 
State  that  had  despoiled  the  head  of  the  Church  of  his 
temporal  authority.  That  temporal  power  is  regarded  by 
the  Vatican  as  the  keystone  of  law  and  justice  throughout 
the  planet.  By  the  destruction  of  that  keystone  in  1870  all 
the  stones  of  the  arch,  one  after  another,  necessarily  fell. 
From  the  point  of  view  of  the  Vatican  the  visit  of  M.  Loubet 
was  an  affront.  The  policy  of  the  Vatican  has  been  to  pit 
France  against  Italy,  compromising  the  "  Eldest  Daughter 
of  the  Church,"  by  the  affirmation  of  a  persistent  and  naive 
confidence  in  her  intention  to  intervene  sooner  or  later  for 
the  restoration  of  the  temporal  power.  Were  the  Vatican 


94  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

to  abandon  the  dream  of  recovering  its  territorial  sovereignty 
it  would  be  more  than  the  loss  of  a  hope,  it  would  be  positive 
abdication.  As  the  French  Deputy,  the  late  Abb6  Gayraud, 
has  said :  "It  was  of  profound  political  wisdom  and  of 
far-reaching  social  significance  that  the  Pope  should  appear 
before  the  whole  world,  not  as  the  citizen  of  any  nation,  nor 
as  the  subject  of  any  State,  but  amid  the  complete  radiance 
of  his  apostolic  independence." 

The  French  Government  held  that  it  was  not  its  business 
to  contribute  to  the  consolidation  of  the  papal  "  royalty." 
Its  retort  to  the  protest  of  the  Vatican  was  immediate  and 
logical.  It  recalled  its  ambassador  lest  his  further  presence 
at  the  Vatican  be  interpreted  by  the  Holy  See  in  a  sense 
favourable  to  its  pretensions  to  the  temporal  power,  and  also 
as  a  protest  against  the  Vatican's  claim  to  meddle  in  French 
foreign  affairs.  Four  hundred  and  twenty-seven  deputies 
against  ninety-five  approved  this  act  of  the  Government. 
Until  then  M.  Combes  had  been  opposed  to  the  separation 
of  Church  and  State.  The  Pope,  by  his  ill-advised  but 
obviously  responsible  policy,  and  by  his  anti-concordatory 
acts,  rendered  that  separation  logical.  The  cup  of  Republican 
indignation  ran  over  when,  contrary  to  the  terms  of  the 
Concordat,  the  Pope  refused  canonical  investiture  to  priests 
whom  the  Government  promoted  to  the  episcopate.  Later  on, 
without  co-operation  with  the  State,  the  Vatican  deprived  two 
French  Bishops  of  their  rights  ;  and  this  also  was  a  breach 
of  the  Concordat.  Wantonly,  one  would  say — and  later 
events,  in  fact,  showed  that  it  was  the  application  of  a  deep- 
laid  plot  of  hostility  to  France — the  Vatican  was  seeking  a 
quarrel  with  the  French  State.  There  had  not  yet,  however, 
been  complete  rupture  between  the  two,  since,  after  all,  it 
depended  on  the  French  Parliament  to  decide  whether  the 
Concordat  should  be  abrogated.  But  finally,  when  one  of 
the  Bishops  appointed  by  the  State  had  been  suspended  from 
his  functions  by  the  Pope,  this  new  affront  was  so  excessive 
that  M.  Combes  no  longer  hesitated.  The  honour  of  France 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS      95 

was  at  stake.  He  gave  the  Pope  twenty-four  hours  to 
withdraw  the  letters  written  to  the  Bishops,  under  penalty 
of  the  immediate  rupture  of  diplomatic  relations.  Not 
having  obtained  satisfaction  he  recalled  from  Rome  what 
remained  of  the  Embassy. 

The  door  was  wide  open  for  the  great  reform  of  a  free 
Church  in  a  free  State.  But  meanwhile  French  foreign 
policy  was  bound  to  suffer  by  the  rupture  of  relations  be- 
tween the  Quai  d'Orsay  and  the  Vatican.  In  Syria,  in  the 
islands  of  the  Pacific,  and  finally  in  Morocco,  France  learned 
the  inconvenience  of  not  possessing  normal  facilities  for 
diplomatic  conversation  with  a  Power  which,  after  the 
Powers  of  Money  and  Democracy,  is  still  the  greatest  in  the 
world.  Whenever  a  French  Government  begins  negotia- 
tions with  the  Pope  for  the  re-establishment  of  an  Embassy 
at  the  Vatican  the  measure  will  not  only  consolidate  the 
authority  of  France  and  the  effective  influence  of  the  Triple 
Entente,  but  will  meet  with  the  approval  of  the  immense 
majority  of  French  citizens.  To  use  the  words  of  M.  Poin- 
care,  the  French  Prime  Minister,  on  his  return  from  Russia 
(August  1912),  it  will  "  preserve  and  enhance  cette  conscience 
collective  et  cette  unite  de  sentiment  national  qui  font  la  gran- 
deur, la  gloire  et  I'immortalite  des  -peuples." 

Ill 

The  adjustment  of  the  relations  between  the  Churches 
and  the  State  has  been  only  one  of  the  problems  absorbing 
the  attention  of  political  parties  in  France.  The  politico- 
religious  character  of  the  Dreyfus  Case  was  unmistakable. 
The  Dreyfus  Case  was  in  reality  a  revival  of  the  Wars  of  the 
League  during  the  reign  of  Henri  IV.  What  Dr.  Gustave 
Lebon  calls  the  "  pyschology  of  revolutions  "  will  class  these 
two  episodes  as  events  of  the  same  general  order.  The 
Dreyfus  Case  was  a  ten  years'  period  of  civil  war  which 
seemed  to  be  interrupting  the  steady  advance  of  French 
society,  but  which,  when  all  was  over,  was  seen  to  have 


96  PROBLEMS  OF   POWER 

precipitated  that  advance,  and  to  have  transformed  the 
nation  and  the  State. 

The  political  and  social  consequences  of  the  Dreyfus  Case 
were  immense  and  are  not  yet  spent.1  In  that  great  religious 
war  two  conflicting  French  ideals  fought  almost  to  the  death  ; 
the  ideal  of  the  raison  d'etat  and  the  ideal  of  les  droits  de 
I'homme ;  the  ideal  of  a  sovereign  centralized  State,  repres- 
sive of  individual  privilege,  and  the  ideal  of  individual  right 
chafing  against  laws  and  conventions  that  subordinate  the 
individual  to  the  interests  of  the  community  ;  the  ideal  of  a 
justice  based  on  national  expediency,  and  of  a  justice 
rooted  in  the  conviction  peculiar  to  every  human  conscious- 
ness, that  the  right  to  life,  liberty  and  the  pursuit  of 
happiness  is  no  illusion. 

The  significance  of  this  ten  years'  civil  war  in  France  rarely 
appealed  to  the  foreigner.  When,  in  1898,  the  late  M.  Brune- 
tiere  harped,  in  articles  in  the  Revue  des  deux  Mondes,  and 
in  a  series  of  vigorous  pamphlets,  on  the  single  string  that 

1  The  virus  secreted  by  the  Dreyfus  Affair  still  remains  singularly 
potent  whenever  it  touches  certain  vulnerable  organs  of  the  body- 
politic.  On  January  n,  1913,  M.  Millerand,  the  ablest  minister 
of  War  that  France  has  had  for  many  years,  was  led,  under  pressure 
of  the  Extreme  Radical  deputies,  to  resign,  because  he  had  rein- 
tegrated in  the  territorial  force,"  Lt.-Col.  du  Paty  de  Clam,  one  of  the 
staff-officers  who  had  played  a  predominant  part  in  the  incrimina- 
tion  of  Captain  Dreyfus  for  high  treason.  The  Minister's  resignation 
took  place  at  the  critical  moment  when  Rumanian  blackmail  of  the 
Balkan  League,  synchronizing  with  a  deadlock  in  London,  between 
the  Balkan  and  Turkish  peace-plenipotentiaries,  appeared  to  be 
placing  Europe  within  grave  danger  of  a  general  war.  It  would 
not  be  easy  to  find  in  the  annals  of  French  domestic  policy  a  finer 
instance  of  the  tyranny  and  caprice  of  the  Legislative  Authority, 
nor  a  more  sinister  proof  of  the  crying  need  in  France  of  a  reinforce- 
ment of  the  principle  of  the  Separation  of  Powers.  The  occasion 
was  one  to  recall  the  remark  of  Dr.  Woodrow  Wilson  (The  State, 
p.  232) :  "  Almost  every  public  man  of  experience  and  ability  in 
France  has  now  been  in  one  way  or  another  discredited  by  the  action 
of  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  ;  and  France  is  staggering  under  that 
most  burdensome,  that  most  intolerable,  of  all  forms  of  government, 
government  by  mass-meeting — by  an  inorganic  popular  assembly." 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS       97 

"  individualism  "  was  the  great  danger  for  his  countrymen  ; 
when  the  State  Attorney,  in  the  trial  of  Emile  Zola,  at 
Versailles,  accused   that  novelist    of  "  not    understanding 
the    genius   of   France,"    public    opinion   throughout   the 
Anglo-Saxon  world  failed  completely  to  seize  the  drift  of 
these  sayings.     No  Englishman,  no  German,  no  American, 
seemed  to  be  aware,  or  they  had  all  forgotten,  that   the 
age-long   endeavour    of    France    had    been,   wittingly    or 
unwittingly,    the    construction    of    a    strongly    centralized 
power,  a  machine  in  which  all  the  separate  parts,  all  the 
members  of  the  body-politic,  should  be  mute  accessories, 
simple  functionaries — anonymous  fulfillers  of  a  function — 
without    individual   rights    or  privileges.     The  Revocation 
of  the  Edict  of  Nantes  had  ejected  certain  elements  that 
clogged  the  machine  and  were  a  cause  of  friction.     Their 
absence  rendered  the  problem  of  the  construction  of  a  really 
national  unity  much  easier  to  solve.     No  such  State  as  the 
French  was  ever  before   formed  on  so   vast  a  scale.     The 
maintenance  of  such  a  State  implies  the  sacrifice  of  the 
individual  citizen  to  the  glory  and  beauty  of  the  whole. 
It  creates  an  excellent  soil  for  the  cultivation  of  such  weeds 
as  Antisemitism,  and  it  demands  the  enactment  of  excessive 
repressive  legislation,  like  that  of  1894  against  the  anarchists, 
measures  that  were  rushed  through  the  Chamber  of  Deputies 
without  debate,  and  that  were  of  easy  application  to  "  crimes 
of  opinion,"  to  differences  of  view  on  social  problems  and 
social  duties.     But,  at  the  same  time,  in  such  a  State,  the 
faults  of  the  individuals  composing  it  will  almost  all  belong 
to  the   category   of   amiable   defects,  in   contradistinction 
to  the  odious  merits  produced  among  a  people  that  have 
evolved  according  to  an  opposite  ideal  of  justice  and  national 
duty.     The  faults  will  be  the  defects  of  children  scheming 
for  place  and  advancement,  for  ribbons  and  for  honours, 
in  a  word  for  recognition  by  the  community,  for  some  form 
of  national  sanction  of  their  conduct.     In  such  a  State  the 
word  honour  will  have  a  double  sense. 

H 


98  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

The  qualities,  therefore,  which  in  France  are  to  shine  in 
the  individual,  are  not  those  that  make  the  glory  of  the 
citizen  in  the  lands  where  Protestantism  has  triumphed, 
and  where  the  notions  of  social  and  civic  justice  have  not 
grown  out  of  a  tendency  to  centralization :  self-assertive- 
ness,  self-reliance,  moral  and  civic  courage — but,  on  the 
contrary,  the  qualities  that  are  most  effective  in  an  organic 
community :  all  the  social  qualities,  in  a  word,  ranging 
from  an  ideal  of  discipline  like  that  of  the  Japanese  Bushido, 
with  its  reflection  in  the  Japanese  smile,  to  the  most  agree- 
able forms  of  French  urbanity,  and  to  the  French  gift  for 
festal  demonstrations.  Society  in  such  a  State  becomes 
organized  politeness.  Literature  and  art  are  pre-eminently 
expected  to  show  symptoms  of  gout ;  that  is  to  say,  of 
codified  taste.  Thought  must,  at  all  costs,  be  made 
intelligible  ;  and  if  possible  its  expression  must  be  rendered 
average.  Renan's  confession,  in  the  preface  of  his  L'Avenir 
de  la  Science,  as  to  his  intentional  effort  to  alter  his  literary 
style  in  order  to  please  his  compatriots,  is  only  the  echo  of 
the  principles  of  a  Vaugelas.  In  such  a  State  we  shall  find 
the  clear,  correct,  straightforward  style  of  prose  recognized 
as  useful.  And  as  a  consequence  of  the  genius  of  France, 
patriotism  in  France  is  arguably  another  thing  than  in 
England,  or  Holland,  or  the  United  States,  where  the  genius  of 
the  inhabitants  makes  for  the  aggrandizement  of  the  indivi- 
dual rather  than  for  the  development  of  man  in  society,  or 
for  the  completer  perfecting  of  the  social  organism.  French- 
men have  always  preferred  the  latter  form  of  civilization, 
and  in  spite  of  Democracy  they  prefer  it  still.  Napoleon 
came  and,  completing  the  work  of  Richelieu  and  Louis  XIV, 
constructed  the  scaffolding — patented  over  and  over  again 
by  successive  governments,  even  by  the  Third  Republic 
— with  which  the  French  are  still  building  their  great  sample 
nation.  It  ought  not  to  have  caused  any  surprise,  there- 
fore, in  1898,  during  the  Dreyfus  case — at  that  critical 
moment  when  the  idea  of  abstract  justice  seemed  likely  to 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS      99 

throw  the  whole  machine  out  of  gear — that  many  a  French- 
man, keenly  alive  to,  or  at  least  sub-consciously  divining, 
what  is  unquestionably  the  genius  of  French  history,  should 
have  rallied  to  the  side  of  the  Anti-Dreyfusists  with  Brune- 
tiere  and  M.  Jules  Lemaitre,  with  M.  Bourget,  M.  Barres 
and  M.  Charles  Maurras  and  with  ninety-nine  per  cent,  of 
the  French  army.  Moreover,  all  that  has  just  been  said, 
not  only  explains  the  feeling  of  persistent  hostility  to 
aggressive  minorities,  to  the  Protestants,  for  instance,  and 
the  Free-Masons,  but  even  partially  justifies  that  feeling. 
Patriotic  duty  in  France,  from  1895  to  1905,  was  conceivably 
quite  another  thing  than  what  it  is  to-day,  or  than  it  ever 
has  been,  for  instance,  in  England.  And  this  touches  the 
essential  point.  If  French  history  is  so  absorbingly  interesting, 
in  a  philosophic  sense,  it  is  because  of  the  age-long  struggle 
in  France  between  two  opposite  theories  of  human  develop- 
ment, the  Protestant  and  the  Catholic,  between  Indivi- 
dualism and  Solidarity,  between  Free  Thought  and  Author- 
ity. The  ideal  of  the  Michelets  and  the  Quinets  was  that 
of  the  founders  of  New  England  :  "A  Church  without  a 
Bishop  and  a  State  without  a  King."  The  Dreyfus  Affair 
was  the  revenge  of  the  Edict  of  Nantes.  But  even  this 
patent  fact  escaped  the  perspicacity  of  foreign  observers,  who 
regarded  the  glorious  "  Affair  "  as  a  monstrous  scandal  render- 
ing France  a  by-word  among  the  nations.  They  did  not 
know  that  in  France  there  are  two  forms  of  patriotism,  that 
of  the  men  who  either  protest  as  idealists,  or  who  sulk  as 
envious  outsiders  ;  and  that  of  the  men  who  either  acquiesce 
as  conservatives,  or  sell  their  birthright  for  a  place  at  the 
budgetary  board.  French  history  is  the  record  of  the  duel 
between  these  two  patriotisms.  Whenever  Frenchmen  have 
forgotten  that  they  belong  to  a  national  community  that 
forms  part  of  Europe,  the  clash  between  their  two  patriotisms 
has  resulted  in  civil  war,  and  the  enemies  of  France  have 
rubbed  their  hands  in  glee.  Whenever  France  has  been 
hard-pressed  by  the  foreigner,  these  two  patriotisms  have 


ioo  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

sunk  their  differences,  and  France,  recovering  her  national 
self-consciousness,  has  presented  to  the  world  an  impregnable 
battle-front. 

IV 

The  foregoing  pages  show  the  obvious  absurdity  of  using 
for  the  interpretation  of  French  events  the  same  general 
ideas  which  serve  to  explain  events  occurring  among  peoples 
who  live  according  to  another  social  system,  and  are  there- 
fore the  product  of  quite  another  historic  evolution.  The 
struggle  in  France  between  the  Catholic  Church  and 
the  Republican  State,  as  well  as  the  Dreyfus  Affair,  are 
excellent  illustrations  of  this  truth.  The  record  of  the 
purely  political  and  constitutional  development  of  France, 
as  affected  by  its  social  and  economic  evolution,  is  no  less 
conclusive  proof  that  the  only  absolute  fact  in  the  world  is 
that  all  things  are  relative. 

During  an  entire  week  in  March  1909  some  five  or  six 
thousand  Parisian  postmen  and  telegraph  clerks,  assisted  by 
their  comrades  in  the  provinces,  remained  absent  from  their 
posts  and  imposed  their  will  on  nearly  forty  millions  of  their 
fellow-citizens.  Startled  spectators  in  other  countries  im- 
mediately concluded  that  France  was  in  revolution.  The 
event  in  question  was  called  a  "  strike,"  but  it  was  a  strike 
of  a  new  kind,  in  reality  an  interesting  symptom  of  the 
evolution  of  French  society  under  the  influence  of  De- 
mocratic principles.  It  was  the  revolt  of  a  considerable 
group  of  one  privileged  class  of  the  French  nation  against 
the  national  Parliament ;  and  the  executive  authority 
in  the  nation  was,  for  a  tune,  so  paralysed  that  none 
of  the  numerous  acts  of  insubordination  connected  with 
the  event  was  punished,  while,  in  order  to  restore  the  normal 
life  of  the  community,  the  Prime  Minister  was  obliged  to 
parley  directly  with  the  representatives  of  the  group  of 
State  officials,  as  Roman  Emperors  negotiated  with  the 
pretorians. 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     101 

Small  wonder  if  an  incident  of  so  peculiar  a  character 
imposed  attention.  The  enemies  of  the  Republic  were 
sure  to  seize  upon  it  as  reinforcing  their  theory  of  the 
essential  anarchy  inherent  in  a  Republican  State.  They 
interpreted  the  strike  as  the  beginning  of  the  end  of 
the  present  political  system  in  France.  The  authority 
of  the  French  Parliament,  they  said,  had  become  in- 
ferior even  to  that  of  the  Russian  Duma.  "  Pronuncia- 
miento  Syndical,"  "  Fin  de  Regime,"  "  La  Trahison  des 
Employes  de  1'Etat  " — such  were  some  of  the  formulas  in 
which  public  opinion,  in  France  and  abroad,  crystallized  its 
astonishment  and  its  apprehensions.  A  French  historian 
and  professor,  M.  Aulard,  described  the  strike  as  "  nothing 
more  or  less  than  the  most  considerable  event  which  has 
occurred  since  the  French  Revolution."  No  apology  is 
required  for  the  attempt  to  analyse  curiously,  and  some- 
what more  scientifically  than  would  hitherto  appear  to 
have  been  done,  the  nature  of  an  event  which  aroused  such 
exceptional  comment.  One  preliminary  observation,  more- 
over, must  be  made  in  definition  of  the  event  taken  in  and 
by  itself,  without  reference  to  its  origin  or  consequences. 
That  observation  is  this  :  the  biologic  law  of  specialization 
of  function  seems  to  have  its  analogy  in  the  departments 
of  political  and  social  science,  the  number  of  vital  points  in 
any  given  society  becoming  more  and  more  numerous  as  the 
community  becomes  more  organic,  more  highly  developed — 
what  we  call  more  "  civilized."  In  most  modern  States 
a  minority  can  overrule  the  will  of  the  vast  majority,  and 
easily  effect  the  provisional  disruption  of  the  social 
organism.  In  March  1909,  in  France  the  syndical  energy 
of  some  eight  thousand  individuals,  grouped  for  common 
action,  annihilated  for  a  considerable  period  the  united 
force  of  the  national  sovereignty.  The  interests  of  a  single 
syndicate  outweighed  those  of  the  syndicate  of  consumers, 
of  the  whole  mass  of  tax-payers — the  syndicate  of  the 
nation. 


PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

Two  years  later,  in  the  summer  of  1911,  another  series  of 
incidents  in  another  part  of  France,  gave  rise  to  similar 
apprehensions.  Again  startled  spectators,  both  at  home  and 
in  other  countries,  exclaimed  that  France  was  in  revolution. 
Fortunately  the  student  of  political  science  has  an  advan- 
tage which  not  all  scientists  enjoy.  His  experiments  are 
prepared  for  him  by  other  people  ;  he  has  only  to  sit  quietly, 
like  the  astronomer,  and  watch  the  changing  phenomena. 
In  France,  owing  to  the  Frenchman's  repugnance  for  blurred 
edges,  his  logical,  systematizing  intelligence,  political  facts  uni- 
formly assume  an  exceptional  neatness  of  outline  which  tends 
to  enhance  their  apparent  importance.  They  loom  larger 
than  life.  Events  there  isolate  themselves  automatically, 
as  if  for  the  more  convenient  investigation  of  the  observer. 

Thus  in  1911  in  France  certain  of  the  Eastern  provinces 
became  the  scene  of  what  can  only  be  described  as  a 
revival  of  the  Dionysiac  orgies.  It  was  an  impressive 
spectacle.  As  the  bands  of  Bacchic  and  Maenad  revellers 
reeled,  burning  and  pillaging,  through  the  vineyards  of 
Champagne,  the  torch-lit  terror  of  the  Thracian  nights 
seemed  no  longer  a  poet's  dream.  But  the  scene  was 
not  merely  an  interesting  occasion  for  aesthetic  pleasure, 
not  merely  even  a  happy  opportunity  for  the  kine- 
matographer.  It  was  also  a  fresh  symptom,  after  so 
many  others,  of  a  certain  state  of  the  French  body- 
politic,  and  it  was  no  doubt  what  is  called  a  prodrome 
of  a  possible  change  in  the  French  political  and  social 
organism.  The  terrifying  events  in  Champagne  occurred 
under  the  eye  of  a  Government  apparently  powerless  to 
arrest  them,  and  of  a  Parliament  incompetent  to  suggest 
a  solution.  The  Prime  Minister  of  France  sat  like  Bel- 
shazzar  at  the  feast,  gazing  with  dismay  at  the  awful  letter- 
ing on  the  midnight  sky,  while  the  Deputies  wrung  their 
hands  like  a  Greek  chorus.  The  lettering  on  the  wall  was 
Greek  to  the  Prime  Minister.  What  may  have  been  the 
reflections  of  the  President  of  the  Republic,  who  had 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     103 

chosen  the  stalwart  Radical  Senator,  Monsieur  Moms,  to 
govern  France,  is  not  known :  the  Head  of  the  State  in' 
France  is,  by  the  real,  if  not  by  the  legal,  constitution,1 
a  mute  idol  in  a  pagoda,  without  responsibility  or  initiative. 
The  reflections  of  the  public  were  not  so  inarticulate. 

These  two  startling  manifestations  of  an  unrest  which 
the  superficial  foreign  observer  may  be  excused  for  having 
regarded  as  revolutionary,  in  the  legendary  French  sense 
of  the  word,  may  be  studied  from  various  points  of  view ; 
but  it  would  be  a  mistake  not  to  class  them  together 
as  typical  instances  illustrating  what  may,  without  exag- 
geration, be  called  the  crisis  of  the  State  in  France.  An 
effort  has  been  made,  in  the  earlier  pages  of  this  book,2  to 
compare  certain  aspects  of  the  French  and  American  Con- 
stitutions. It  is  useful  to  continue  the  investigation  thus 
begun  by  a  somewhat  more  detailed  scrutiny  of  the  political 
and  administrative  organization  of  France.  The  situation  in 
that  country  is  not  entirely  without  its  suggestion  for  other 
countries  ;  yet,  at  this  juncture,  it  is  more  important  than 
ever  to  insist  on  the  absurdity  of  hoping  to  determine  the 
effects  of  socio-political  phenomena  in  a  given  society  by 
comparing  those  effects  with  the  consequences  of  apparently 
similar  phenomena  in  communities  differently  organized, 
or  hardly  organized  at  all. 

Michelet  remarked,  for  instance,  that  the  whole  of  Eng- 
lish history  could  be  summed  up  in  the  single  sentence : 
"  England  is  an  island."  When,  in  her  characteristically 
brutal  fashion  Germany  sought,  by  the  despatch  of  a 
gunboat  to  the  ideally  strategic  point  of  Agadir,  on  one 
of  the  world-routes  of  the  Atlantic,  to  separate  England  and 
France,  and  to  imperil  the  efficacy  of  their  entente,  while  tear- 
ing up  two  diplomatic  conventions,  the  Algeciras  agreement 
and  her  own  agreement  with  France  concerning  Morocco, 
the  immediate  consequences  of  her  action  merely  illustrated 
once  again  the  profound  truth  of  Michelet 's  axiom. 
1  See  notes,  p.  34  and  p.  40.  2  See  pp.  39-41. 


104  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

But  if  the  formula  of  Michelet,  intelligently  interpreted, 
is  the  sum  and  substance  of  British  history,  it  is  no  less  easy, 
no  less  pertinent  and  suggestive,  to  sum  up  French  history 
by  a  parallel  formula,  based  on  considerations  drawn  from  the 
geographical  position  of  France  in  relation  to  other  con- 
tinental European  Powers.  Continental  Europe  is  in  reality 
the  western  promontory  of  Asia,  and  France  is  merely  an 
isthmus,  all  but  converting  that  promontory  into  a  peninsula, 
an  isthmus  linking  the  Mediterranean  to  the  Atlantic  and 
the  North  Sea.  French  soil  is  the  central  historic  road  of 
civilization  during  at  least  the  last  three  thousand  years. 
All  the  Pisgah  heights  look  down  upon  her.1  A  great  nation 
has  been  evolved  in  so  exposed  and  coveted  a  corner  of  the 
Continent  solely  by  the  adoption  of  relentlessly  centralizing 
methods,  which  have  determined  the  manners,  the  tem- 
perament, the  character — and  the  lack  of  character — of  its 
members.  It  is  because  Frenchmen  have  had  to  live  and 
move  and  have  their  secular  being  at  this  particular  spot  of 
the  globe  that  their  ideals  and  their  problems,  their  history, 
in  a  word,  has  differed  from  that  of  any  other  national  com- 
munity. 

The  attempt  to  account  for  events  of  the  originality  and 
magnitude  of  the  Postmen's  Strike  and  of  the  Jacquerie 
in  the  vineyards  of  Champagne  implies  an  effort  to  unravel, 
in  the  tangle  of  causes,  those  that  are  general  and  those  that 
are  specific  and  immediate ;  to  distinguish  between  what 
Taine  called  the  "  great  acting  and  permanent  forces  "  and 

1  In  a  map  of  the  world  of  about  1050,  known  as  the  map  of 
Saint  Severin  (Gascony),  in  which  Rome  is  figured  as  the  virtual 
centre  of  the  oval  universe,  and  in  which  the  lacustrine  sources  of 
the  Nile  are  lavishly  affirmed,  Gallia  occupies  almost  a  full  quarter 
of  the  space,  and  she  is  crowded  with  great  cities  ;  while  Germany, 
the  vague  Regia  Germania,  is  but  a  meagre  cone-shaped  area  crushed 
between  a  distorted  Danube  and  an  extravagant  Rhine,  and  seemingly 
in  danger  of  being  utterly  squeezed  out  into  the  German  Ocean. 
France  preserves  much  the  same  proportions  in  the  Hereford  map 
of  about  1280. 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     105 

"  the  donnees  that  are  more  or  less  accidental  and  deter- 
minant of  change."  1 

The  general  cause  of  the  crisis  of  the  State  in  France  is  the 
inability  to  co-ordinate,  in  the  machinery  of  government  in 
that  country,  two  parts  of  the  machine  which  ought  to  have 
remained  reciprocally  independent :  the  administrative 
and  bureaucratic,  which  is  an  inheritance  of  the  Napoleonic 
regime,  and  the  Parliamentary,  to  which,  in  conditions  that 
must  be  explained,  an  excessive  importance  has  been  given. 
In  France  two  governmental  systems  have  become  entangled, 
creating  a  state  of  friction  which,  if  it  were  to  continue,  would 
ruin  the  entire  machine.  The  antinomy  between  the 
Napoleonic  regime  maintained  by  the  Third  Republic  and 
the  system  of  Parliamentarism  established  by  the  Con- 
stitution of  1875  would  of  itself  in  the  course  of  time  have 
entailed  a  revision  of  the  Constitution.  But  the  need  for 
reform  has  been  precipitated  by  the  introduction  of  a  new 
factor  in  the  problem,  the  Syndical  Movement. 

It  has  been  seen,2  in  connexion  with  the  problem  of  the 
separation  of  Church  and  State  in  France,  that  the  founders 
of  the  Third  Republic,  in  their  effort  to  re-organize  French 
society,  achieved  the  political  part  of  their  task  but  inade- 
quately, by  framing  a  Constitution  which  preserved  the  old 
Napoleonic  social  scaffolding,  and  even  by  adding  fresh 
beams  that  rendered  the  political  and  administrative  func- 
tions more  organic  and  more  centralized.  A  mere  handful 
of  officials  sufficed  to  run  the  machine.  But  it  was  necessary 
not  only  to  choose  a  select  and  trusty  personnel  whose  busi- 
ness it  should  be  to  tend  the  machine,  but  also  to  organize 
national  nurseries  of  civil  servants  knowing  their  Republican 
business.  If  the  Government  of  France  had  consisted 
merely  of  the  bureaux  and  the  Cabinet,  this  operation  of 
manning  the  French  Administration  with  trusty  Republicans 
might  have  proceeded  without  excessive  friction.  But  the 

1  See  letter  of  January  -2,  1882,  to  M.  A.  Leroy-Beaulieu  :  Revue 
des  deux  Mondes,  April  15,  1907.  2  See  pp.  76,  77. 


106  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

Constitution  had  concentrated  the  national  sovereignty 
in  a  Chamber  of  Deputies,  and  made  the  Cabinet  dependent 
on  that  all  but  autocratic  assembly.  The  real  work  of 
France  was  done  by  the  bureaux,  and  the  Chamber  held 
the  Cabinet  responsible  for  its  being  well  done.  But  to 
get  that  work  well  done,  from  the  point  of  view  of  the 
"  representatives  of  the  people  "  it  was  imperative  that  it 
should  be  done  by  persons  on  whom  they  themselves  could 
count.  Moreover,  no  deputy  in  any  country  in  the  world 
but  is  convinced  that  the  interests  of  the  community  re- 
quire his  election  and  re-election.  In  a  country  of  universal 
suffrage,  where  the  power  of  Number  is  predominant,  the 
sheer  numerical  value  of  the  mass-vote  of  vast  groups  of 
civil  servants  is  an  essential  factor  of  the  problem  of  election. 
The  phenomenon  has  been  excellently  illustrated  on  a  vast 
scale  in  the  United  States  under  the  name  of  the  "  spoils 
system  "  ;  and  the  Pension  system  of  the  United  States, 
where  nearly  200,000,000  dollars  J  are  paid  out  annually, 
is  an  equally  pretty  instance  of  the  same  phenomenon. 
Hence  the  tendency  both  to  ingratiate  oneself  with  the 
functionaries  and  to  increase  then-  number.  The  pro- 
cesses of  seduction  are  varied,  ranging  from  the  classical 
method  of  the  sop  to  Cerberus — the  Income  Tax  Bill 
in  France  is  a  misplaced  effort  of  the  kind — to  out- 
right intimidation,  or  even  blackmail,  as  was  seen  in 
the  delation  scandals  under  M.  Combes'  Ministry.  With 
Bills  of  demagogic  appeal  the  French  democracy  has  been 

1  The  Outlook,  May  25,  1912.  The  case  of  England  is  worth  citing 
in  comparison.  In  the  last  25  years  the  Civil  Service  Estimates 
have  risen  from  £15,700,000  to  £46,787,873  (exclusive  of  the  Revenue 
Departments).  No  fewer  than  2,700  new  offices  for  the  service  of 
the  State  have  been  created  since  1906.  Under  the  Insurance  Act 
large  numbers  of  similar  appointments  have  been  made,  most  of  them 
without  public  competition.  A  Royal  Commission  on  the  Civil  Ser- 
vice was  appointed  in  March  1912,  but  it  remains  to  be  seen  how  far 
it  will  succeed  in  clearing  the  steady  growth  of  official  appointments 
from  all  suspicion  of  jobbery  or  party  preference.  Cf .  leading  article 
in  The  Times,  March  15,  1912. 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     107 

drawn  steadily^on  to  the  point  of  liberty  it  has  reached  to- 
day ;  it  has  been  given  the  right  of  free  speech,  the  right  of 
public  meeting,  the  right  of  combination.  But  at  the  same 
time  the  Cabinets  responsible  for  order  and  discipline  have 
striven  strenuously  to  reconcile  these  liberties  with  the 
principle  of  authority  of  which  they  are  constitutionally 
the  guardian.  Some  900,000  servants  of  the  State,  em- 
ployeVof  the  nation,  many  of  whom  owe  their  appointments 
—that  is  to  say,  their  privileged  existence — to  the  favour 
of  a  Minister  or  the  intervention  of  a  politician,'are  expected 
to  repay  their  benefactors  by  ensuring  the  election  or  the 
re-election  of  the  individuals  designated  by  the  Republican 
leaders.  That  is,  in  France,  an  essential  part  of  the  mechan- 
ism of  government,  and  until  within  the  last  few  years  it  had 
never  occurred  to  any  French  politician  that  another  system 
was  conceivable. 

In  a  letter  written  in  1881  to  M.  Georges  Saint-Rene 
Taillandier,  Taine  said  :  "  Under  the  name  of  sovereignty 
of  the  people  we  possess  an  excessive  centralization,  the 
intervention  of  the  State  in  private  life,  a  system  of  universal 
bureaucracy,  with  all  its  consequences.  Centralization 
and  universal  suffrage,  these  are  the  two  main  characteristics 
of  contemporary  France,  and  they  have  given  it  an  organi- 
zation which  is  both  apoplectic  and  anaemic."  What  Taine 
meant,  and  what  no  close  observer  could  fail  to  note,  was 
indeed  the  whole  set  of  "consequences"  involved  in  the 
simple  fact  that  there  are  some  eight  millions  of  voters  in 
France,  and  that  at  least  900,000  of  them  are  civil  servants, 
employes  of  the  State.  The  French  expression  I'assiette 
au  beurre,  which  refers  simply  to  the  desire  of  all  French 
citizens  to  be  given  a  place  at  the  Budgetary  buffet,  and 
to  be  allowed  to  "  put  their  fingers  in  the  pie  "  as  often 
and  as  conveniently  as  they  like,  sums  up  picturesquely 
the  Gargantuan  spectacle  organized  by  the  Republican 
caterers  since  the  downfall  of  the  Empire.  In  the  earlier 
period,  as  has  been  seen,  the  primary-school  teachers  were 


io8  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

enlisted    as    a    disciplined    Republican    army    throughout 
the  French  communes,   and  were  made  electoral  agents. 
The  letter-carriers  were  converted  into  emissaries  of  the 
Republican  general  staff.     The  mayors,  sub-prefects  and 
prefects    were   the    officers     of    this    immense    army    of 
functionaries,  dependent  on  the  Minister  of  the  Interior,  and 
enabling  him  to   "  make   the   elections."    That   operation 
consisted  in  the  exclusion   from   all   participation   in   the 
banquet,  and  from  the  distribution  of  plums,  of  citizens 
who  sulked  or  openly  sought  to  seize  the  whole  cake  for 
themselves.     The  process  of  government  which  it  implied 
was  in  principle  of  an  extreme  simplicity,  but  in  practice 
it    was    astonishingly    and    amusingly    complicated.      The 
main  occupation  of  the  rulers  of  France  was,  and  still  is, 
to  procure  for  their  clients  as  many  posts  and  advantages 
of  every  kind  as  possible.    This  has  resulted  in  the  multi- 
plication of  sinecures,  until  to-day,  as  has  been  pointed  out, 
an  eighth  at  least  of  the  electorate  owe  their  social  con- 
sideration, and  the  majority  their  economic  well-being,  to 
the  successive  Governments    of  the  last  thirty-five    years. 
Favours  of  the  most  varied  description — the  offer  of  tobacco 
shops,  newspaper  kiosques,  red,  yellow  and  blue  ribbons, 
and  exemptions  from  military    service — are    extended  to 
Frenchmen  who  promise  to  vote  for  the  orthodox  candidate. 
And  to  this  magnificent  system  of  national  bribery  has 
been  added,  in  the  interests  of  Republican  administrative 
discipline,  the  power  of  intimidation.     If  the  mayor  of  a 
village  shows  signs  of  reactionary  independence — and    all 
independence  tends  to  be  classed  as  reactionary — the  interests 
of  his  commune  are  systematically  ignored  by  his  chiefs. 
The  inhabitants  of  the  township  or  hamlet  are  made  to 
realize  that  the  installation  of  a  telegraph  line  or  the  con- 
struction of  a  road  are  matters  not  essentially  of  social  or 
economic  importance,  but  of  political  interest.1    The  habit 

1  See  La  Republique  et  les  Politiciens,  by  M.  Henry  Leyret. 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     109 

has  become  deep-rooted  of  appealing  to  the  authorities 
for  all  those  improvements  which  in  less  centralized  com- 
munities are  left  to  private  enterprise.  Individual  enthu- 
siasms, private  initiative,  are  at  a  discount.  France,  in 
fact,  has  advanced  steadily  towards  that  "  apoplectic " 
state  to  which  Taine  alluded ;  and  the  role  of  Parliament 
has  been  to  facilitate  rather  than  to  retard  the  dangerous 
moment  of  utter  congestion.  The  deputy  has  become  per- 
force the  ambulant  intermediary  between  the  central  Govern- 
ment and  the  electorate.  It  is  through  his  intervention  that 
the  office-seekers,  tuft-hunters,  or  the  mere  snobs,  ambitious 
to  inscribe  their  official  dignities  on  their  visiting  cards, 
are  able  to  get  at  the  paid  organizers  of  the  banquet,  the 
Ministers  in  office.  The  deputy  is  tempted  to  become  a 
travelling  salesman  of  political  or  social  favours  and  gim- 
cracks,  in  return  for  votes  or  local  influence.  The  illusion  of 
his  omnipotence  has  grown  apace,  until  the  clients  to  whom 
he  had  promised  the  moon  have  become  disillusioned  as  to 
his  ability  to  procure  it  for  them.  The  Government  has 
thus  little  by  little  been  reduced  to  the  undignified  role 
of  catering  to  the  clients  of  its  majority,  and  replying  to 
the  sarcasms  and  repelling  the  assaults  of  the  party  not 
invited  to  the  banquet.  Their  entire  time  is  occupied  in 
this  double  task. 

Happily  the  real  government  of  France  is  in  the  bureaux, 
the  great  State  administrations.1  For  a  number  of  years 

1  When  I  first  gave  utterance  to  these  ideas  in  the  National  Review 
of  May,  1909, 1  was  taxed  with  exaggeration.  Two  years  later,  even 
the  Republican  press  was  ringing  with  them  ;  they  formed  the  staple 
of  one  of  the  most  brilliant  books  of  political  criticism — Les  Tyrans 
Ridicules,  by  M.  Henry  Leyret — that  has  investigated  the  state  of 
the  French  body-politic  since  Prevost  Paradol.  And  still  a  year 
later,  on  June  25,  1912,  the  Prime  Minister  of  France,  M.  Poincare, 
in  a  speech  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  on  the  reform  of  the  electoral 
law,  used  language  no  less  vigorous  than  my  own,  to  describe  the 
plight  of  the  representative  of  the  people,  who  is  merely  the  creature 
of  a  local  "  boss  "  indifferent  to  all  the  general  interests  of  France, 
so  long  as  the  petty  interets  de  clocher  are  zealously  protected.  M. 


no  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

all  seemed  to  be  going  as  well  as  possible  behind  the 
scenes.  Conservative  by  tradition,  addicted  to  the  bour- 
geois virtues,  animated  by  a  real  spirit  of  strenuous  and 
continuous  labour,  the  great  administrations  would  have 
remained  disciplined  had  it  not  been  for  the  interplay 
of  the  reciprocally  antagonistic  factors  of  French  social 
and  political  evolution :  the  extension  to  the  democracy 
of  the  various  liberties  that  seem  inseparable  from  our 
time,  and  the  effort  to  maintain  a  centralized  mon- 
archical administration.  There  is  an  immanent  logic  as 
there  is  an  immanent  justice.  The  radical  inconsistency 
of  the  two  conceptions  was  bound  one  day  to  result  in  that 
state  of  general  unrest  which  has  characterized  the  French 
body-politic  and  French  society  during  the  last  seven  or 
eight  years,  and  which  finally,  by  the  happy  accident  of 
the  postmen's  "  strike,"  was  so  localized  that  the  real  nature 
of  the  disorder  could  be  diagnosed  as  an  acute  attack  of 
articular  rheumatism  in  one  of  the  great  arms  of  the  French 
administration,  the  result  of  long-protracted  and  silent 


Poincare  said :  "La  refonne  electorate  n'est  pas  seulement  la 
representation  sincere  et  juste  des  partis  politiques,  c'est  surtout  la 
renovation  de  certaines  moeurs  electorates  et  administratives  et  le 
changement  d'habitudes  dont  nous  avons  etc  et  sommes  tous  les 
jours,  tous  plus  ou  moins  victimes.  .  .  .  L'etroitesse  des  circon- 
scriptions  electorates  met  forcement  les  elus  a  la  merci  des  influences 
locales.  Vous  le  savez  aussi  bien  que  moi.  M.  Andrieux  annon9ait 
hier  que  les  senateurs  auraient  tot  ou  tard  le  sort  des  deputes  ;  mais 
j'ai  ete  assez  longtemps  depute  pour  connaitre  les  conditions  dans 
lesquelles,  le  plus  sou  vent,  nous  sommes  amenes  a  exercer  ce  mandat. 
Nous  sommes  obliges  d' employer  la  plus  grande  partie  de  notre  activite 
a  des  besognesfastidieuses,  d  des  demarches  ingrates,  et  nous  en  arrivons, 
sous  la  pression  des  influences  locales,  a  consider er  comme  une  necessite 
vitale,  pour  conserver  notre  mandat,  notre  ingerence  quotidienne  dans 
toutes  les  questions  administratives.  Et  toutes  les  responsabilites  se 
trouvent  ainsi  deplacees  :  les  chefs  des  administrations,  debordes 
par  les  sollicitations,  ont  toutes  les  peines  du  monde  a  defendre  leur 
propre  impartialite.  C'est  ainsi  que  les  mecontentements  se  multi- 
plient.  Je  ne  fais,  en  ce  moment,  que  repeter  tout  haut  ce  que  tout 
le  monde  dit  tout  bas." 


A  STUDY  OF   INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     in 

secretions  of  a  gouty  or  arthritic  character,  which  must  be 
ruthlessly  combated  at  whatever  cost. 

Now,  in  a  nation  as  completely  organic  as  that  of  France, 
an  organism  so  compact,  so  highly  developed  as  regards 
specialization  of  function,  where  everyone  is  either  a  part  of 
the  machinery  of  administration  or  of  government,  or  a  candi- 
date for  participation  in  administrative  responsibilities,  a 
nation  which  topological  causes  have  made  more  homo- 
geneous than  any  other  modern  people — in  such  a  nation, 
where  almost  all  the  quarrels  are  only  family  feuds,  the 
introduction  of  the  right  to  combine  was  the  introduction 
of  a  subtle  poison  bound  to  transform  the  whole  internal 
economy ;  and  Parliament,  instead  of  finding  the  necessary 
antidotes  for  the  secret  ravages  produced,  seemed  to  be 
blindly,  perversely  perfecting  an  ideal  bouillon  de  culture. 

How  did  it  set  about  the  concoction  of  this  dangerous 
mixture  ?  How  did  it  manage  to  create  so  favourable  a 
milieu  for  the  rapid  evolution  of  the  malady  ?  The  answers 
to  these  questions  will  give  the  efficient  cause  of  the  present 
crisis. 

In  the  first  place,  the  deputies  representing  the  Republic 
were  obliged  by  the  attitude  of  the  Catholics,  and  of  the 
parties  loyal  to  successive  Pretenders,  to  defend  their  inter- 
ests and  those  of  the  new  regime  against  the  Church  and 
against  Reaction.  This  contest  absorbed  the  attention  of 
the  Republic  so  long  and  so  completely  that  relatively  little 
time  was  left  for  the  consideration  of  that  prudent  policy 
of  social  reform  which  figures  seductively  on  Radical  pro- 
grammes down  even  to  that  of  M.  Clemenceau  in  November 
1906.  Hypnotized  by  these  grave  questions  of  self-preser- 
vation— and  the  organization  of  secular  education  was  an 
integral  part  of  the  struggle  against  influences  hostile  to  the 
Republic — the  Republican  Cabinets  were  too  strongly  tempt- 
ed to  ignore  the  fundamental  changes  which  were  taking 
place  in  what  Gambetta  called  the  nouvelles  couches  sociales, 
and  in  the  economic  relations  between  the  bourgeoisie  and 


H2  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

the  people,  as  a  result  of  the  new  liberties  which  the  Re- 
publican party  had  bestowed  on  the  democracy.  There 
had  not  been  wanting  prophets,  however,  Republican  leaders 
of  great  distinction  and  political  sense,  like  Waldeck-Rous- 
seau,  who  foresaw  the  vast  development  to  which  the  Syndical 
Movement  was  predestined.  These  men,  who  perceived 
that  the  law  of  1884  on  professional  trade  unions  created 
an  alien  influence,  destructive  of  almost  all  the  traditional 
notions  on  which  French  society  and  the  French  adminis- 
tration had  subsisted  for  a  century,  nevertheless  recognized 
that  thus,  and  thus  only,  could  that  society  evolve  amid 
the  new  economic  conditions.  And  the  greatest  of  them, 
the  statesman  responsible  for  the  law  of  1884,  Waldeck- 
Rousseau  himself,  sought  untiringly  to  convince  his  country- 
men that,  to  prevent  the  syndicates  from  becoming  a  State 
within  a  State,  supplementary  legislation  was  required. 
In  a  speech  delivered  at  Roubaix  in  1898,  before  six  thousand 
working  men,  Waldeck-Rousseau  referred  to  the  law  of  1884 
(of  which  more  recent  legislation  tolerating  associations 
and  combination  in  the  Government  offices  is  but  the  dan- 
gerous logical  development)  as  "  un  des  meilleurs  chapitres 
de  ma  vie."  And  he  remarked,  in  a  note  of  philosophy 
echoed  over  and  over  again  in  La  Melee  Sociale  of  M. 
Clemenceau : — 

"If  it  be  believed,  as  I  believe,  that  it  is  with  society  as  with 
individuals,  in  that  they  obey  a  positive  law  of  growth,  that  they 
inevitably  advance  in  the  path  of  progress,  then  it  will  be  seen  that 
we  were  well  inspired  in  sweeping  away  the  obstacles  in  the  path  of 
the  labouring  classes  and  in  releasing  them  from  the  dilemma  of 
resignation  or  revolt." 

But  he  went  on  to  point  out  that  the  professional  syndicates 
must  be  allowed  to  acquire  property,  that,  within  the  im- 
mediate future,  "  il  faudrait  que  le  capital  travaille  et,  par 
une  reciprocite  certaine,  que  le  travail  possede,"  in  order 
that  the  new  trade  unions  might  bring  about  what  he  regarded 
as  the  necessary  solution,  namely,  "  the  participation  of  the 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     113 

wage-earning  class  in  industrial  and  commercial  property." 
How  was  this  great  Republican  leader  heeded  ?  The 
French  Parliament  frivolously  shut  its  eyes  to  the  danger, 
and  refused  to  look  the  facts  in  the  face.  Yet  these  facts 
were  numerous  and  startling  enough  to  arouse  the  most 
indifferent. 

The  details  of  the  rapid  progress  of  the  trade  union  move- 
ment in  France  since  1884,  a  progress  leading  up  to  the  feder- 
ation in  1895  of  the  various  unions  in  a  vast  Confeder- 
ation du  Travail,  with  the  "  general  strike  "  and  "  direct 
action  "  (in  distinction  from  Parliamentary  action)  as  their 
tactics  of  battle — these  details  have  no  place  in  a  study 
dealing  with  the  general  aspects  of  a  crisis  which,  as  has 
already  been  seen,  is  political  and  social  rather  than  econo- 
mic. The  facts  so  unwisely  neglected  by  the  French  Par- 
liament were  the  signs  of  revolt  in  the  great  army  of  civil 
servants  of  whom  the  deputies  were  themselves  the  creatures 
— indications  which  a  prudent  statesmanship  would  have 
scrutinized  with  the  utmost  concern.  First  there  was 
the  congress  of  school  teachers,  opened  to  the  strains  of 
the  Internationale, *  and  conducted  in  a  spirit  of  menacing 
independence.  Then  the  personnel  in  the  naval  arsenals 
began  to  agitate.  At  Lyons  there  was  a  strike  of  policemen. 
In  Bordeaux  and  Paris  the  hospital  assistants  demanded 
less  work  and  higher  wages.  A  kind  of  epidemic  of  "  syn- 
dicomania  "  began  to  rage  in  France  among  the  civil  ser- 
vants, who,  by  a  law  voted  in  1901,  were  granted  the  right 
to  combine  without  being  expressly  given  the  right  to  strike. 
At  present  there  are  in  France  at  least  488  "  Professional 
Associations  of  State  Employes  "  in  the  big  central  Govern- 
ment offices,  and  202  unions  representing  the  State  employes 
in  the  match  factories,  the  tobacco  factories,  the  Mint, 
the  State  railways,  etc.,,  etc.  These  various  unions  are 
united  in  a  general  federation,  and  it  is  this  colossal  new 
force,  which  has  been  encouraged  by  the  State,  that  was 

1  See  p.  197, 


ii4  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

suddenly  brought  to  the  notice  of  the  public  by  the  Post- 
men's Strike  of  March  1909. 

This  grouping  of  State  employes  took  place  so  rapidly 
that  the  vigilance  of  even  the  professional  politicians  was 
surprised.  When  M.  Clemenceau  took  office  his  programme 
contained  the  following  passage : — 

"  As  regards  professional  trade  unions,  the  Government  will  pro- 
pose to  you  to  introduce  into  the  law  of  March  21,  1884,  the  improve- 
ments which  past  experience  has  shown  to  be  necessary.  The  time 
appears  to  the  Government  to  have  arrived  for  increasing  the  civil 
capacity  of  the  trade  unions.  ...  At  the  same  time  the  Govern- 
ment will  submit  to  you  a  Bill  determining  the  status  of  civil  ser- 
vants. This  Bill,  while  granting  them  liberty  of  combination,  and 
guaranteeing  them  against  arbitrary  action,  will  ensure  the  steady 
accomplishment  of  their  duty  to  the  State,  which  is  responsible  for 
the  public  administrative  services." 

That  is  to  say,  M.  Clemenceau  showed  himself  alive  to  the 
disquieting  character  of  the  movement  among  the  State 
employes  :  he  announced  his  intention  of  legislating  in  the 
spirit  of  the  warning  of  his  predecessor  Waldeck-Rousseau, 
and  he  promised  the  servants  of  the  State  that  their  long- 
ignored  demand  to  possess  a  definite  charter  "guaranteeing 
them  against  arbitrary  action  "  should  at  last  be  granted. 
That  was  seven  years  ago.  Since  then  nothing  has  been 
done  to  realize  this  promise.  The  familiar  methods  of 
favouritism,  due  to  the  necessity  of  satisfying  the  claims 
of  some  eight  hundred  deputies  and  senators,  still  continue. 
In  more  than  one  speech  M.  Clemenceau  fulminated  against 
the  shameless  intervention  of  the  politicians  and  their 
outrageous  demands  ;  his  protests  and  those  of  his  successors 
were  necessarily  vain.  In  order  to  live  they  had  to  do  as 
their  predecessors  had  done — to  satisfy  the  "  majority  "  ; 
while  that  majority,  to  be  re-elected,  has  to  distribute 
ribbons  and  crosses,  baubles  and  places.  The  Cabinet  is 
the  dispenser  of  these  things,  and  it  has  no  choice  but 
to  turn,  with  the  other  wheels  and  cogwheels,  in  the 
same  set  of  vicious  circles,  until  the  whole  machine  breaks 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     115 

down.  The  machine,  however,  has  now  become  clogged 
and  sadly  requires  cleaning.  One  of  the  abuses  that 
has  most  irritated  the  State  employes  of  all  ranks  is  the 
scandalous  way  in  which  each  new  Minister  has  intro- 
duced into  the  service,  under  the  guise  of  attaches  to  his 
Cabinet,  a  little  band  of  parasites  who  block  the  path  of 
normal  promotion  to  all  the  functionaries  of  that  branch  of 
the  administration.  Fifteen  years  ago  a  Minister's  Cabinet 
included  at  most  but  two  or  three  functionaries.  Nowadays 
a  Minister  is  supposed  to  be  protected  against  the  importunate 
by  a  directeur  de  Cabinet,  a  chef  de  Cabinet,  two  or  three 
chefs-adjoints,  a  few  sous-chefs,  a  chef  du  secretariat  -particu- 
lier,  a  certain  number  of  chefs-adjoints  au  secretariat 
particulier,  one  or  more  private  secretaries,  and  a  score 
of  attaches.  This  phalanx  of  officials,  who  are  mere  political 
parasites,  usually  destitute  of  technical  knowledge  and 
training,  are  rightly  regarded  by  the  trained  servants  of 
the  administration  as  interlopers  standing  in  the  way  of 
their  automatic  promotion.  Instead  of  protecting  the 
Minister  againt  the  machinations  of  the  deputies  they  provide 
fresh  channels  of  access  to  the  powers  that  be.  There 
results  from  this  state  of  things  a  scandalous  injustice, 
which  can  be  redressed  by  appeal  to  the  Conseil  d'Etat 1 — if 
the  civil  servant  chooses  to  risk  calling  down  upon  himself 
the  indignation  of  his  superiors.  But  such  audacity  is  rare, 
and  the  world  of  functionaries  has  finally  invented  a  more 
effective  way  of  abolishing  these  iniquities  by  uniting  for 
common  action  in  the  syndicates,  or  professional  unions, 
some  of  which  are  claiming  the  right  to  strike,  but  the 
majority  of  which  are  agitating  solely  with  a  view  to  thrusting 
the  politicians  back  into  their  own  domain,  and  to  obtaining 
some  form  of  charter  which  will  protect  civil  servants  against 
arbitrary  authority,  nepotism  and  favouritism. 

Such  are  the  general  causes  that  have  brought  about  the 
grave  crisis  in  the  French  State.    The  malady  from  which 

1  See  p.  128. 


116  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

it  suffers  is  a  confusion  of  powers  leading  to  incoherency 
in  the  function  of  government.  Representative  government 
in  France  has  become  unworthy  of  the  name,  owing  to  its 
having  developed  in  conjunction  with  a  bureaucratic 
Napoleonic  administration.  The  keystone  of  the  system 
is  a  Cabinet  chosen  from  the  little  oligarchy  of  Parliamen- 
tarians, who  themselves  depend  for  their  existence  on  the 
very  functionaries  they  originally  created.  The  executive 
authority  has  slowly  but  steadily  lost  all  prestige.  The 
remedy  for  this  situation  has  not  yet  been  found.  But 
not  for  twenty  years  have  problems  of  statecraft  and  politics 
aroused  such  curiosity  in  France  as  they  are  arousing  to-day. 
The  entire  nation  is  alive  to  the  real  nature  of  the  crisis, 
and  resolved  to  find  a  solution  for  it.  The  solutions  pro- 
posed are  being  discussed  not  merely  at  the  Ecole  des  Sciences 
Politiques  and  in  the  Press,  but  by  all  French  citizens.  France 
has  already  entered  on  an  era  of  active  political  and  economic 
reform.  They  who  interpreted  the  pronunciamiento  of 
the  Post  Office  employes  as  the  forerunner  of  revolution 
betrayed  their  ignorance  of  the  real  factors  which  have  gone 
to  the  making  of  contemporary  France  and  are  to  determine 
the  trend  of  that  country's  evolution.  That  strike  was  a 
phenomenon  of  reorganization,  or,  as  Proudhon  would  say, 
of  recomposition,  not  of  decomposition. 

The  same  is  true  of  the  scenes  of  civil  war  in  Champagne, 
although  those  events,  again,  flattered  the  ineradicable  con- 
viction of  foreigners  x  that  France  was  going  to  the  legend- 
ary dogs  ;  that  the  tricolour  was  already  flying  from  the 

1  The  foreigner  most  prone  to  such  illusions  is  the  German.  Dr. 
Gustave  Lebon  cites,  in  the  Revue  Bleue  of  May  26,1906,  a  significant 
utterance  of  a  German  professor  :  "  We  shall  perhaps  think  of  making 
war  on  you  when  your  pacifists,  your  internationalists,  your  anti- 
militarists,  and  other  imbeciles  of  that  sort,  will  have  sufficiently 
weakened  you,  and  destroyed  in  your  souls  the  idea  of  patrie  which 
makes  us  so  strong.  .  .  .  We  shall  merely  wait — and  we  shall  not 
have  to  wait  long — until  your  divisions  and  your  anarchy  have 
made  you  incapable  of  self-defence." 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     117 

stern  of  Charon's  bark,  and  the  Republic  shortly  to  be  judged 
and  found  wanting.  The  civil  war  in  the  Eastern  depart- 
ments was  but  one  of  a  rapidly  accumulating  series  of  unto- 
ward events,  signs  of  an  apparent  national  disintegration 
which  again  led  the  Royalist  and  Imperialist  pretenders — 
those  saviours  of  society  always  ready  to  start  up  in  their 
absurd  jack-in-the-box  fashion  on  any  and  every  pretext — 
to  sign  manifestos  and  galvanize  their  apathetic  followers 
into  active  opposition.  Even  certain  leaders  of  the  Re- 
public caught  the  contagion  and  talked  openly  of  the  possi- 
bility of  a  real  revolution,  while  more  than  one  French  journal 
raised  the  question  :  "  Whither  are  we  going  ?  To  the 
King  ?  To  the  Emperor  ?  Or  towards  the  Fourth  Re- 
public ?  " 

The  unrest  now  pervading  French  Society,  the  outspoken 
dissatisfaction  with  the  present  political  and  social  regime, 
is  a  new  phase  of  French  life ;  a  new  phase,  that  is,  under 
the  Third  Republic,  for  nothing  like  it  has  been  witnessed 
in  France  during  the  last  forty  years.  Not  Boulangism, 
nor  the  Panama  and  Dreyfus  scandals,  can  be  cited  to  the 
contrary.  The  pessimism  and  unrest  of  France  have,  how- 
ever, contemporary  parallels.1  As  a  social  and  political 

1  Unrest,  social  disorder,  is,  of  course,  a  general  phenomenon. 
It  is  becoming  manifest  throughout  the  world  in  proportion  as  that 
social  order,  which  it  is  the  business  of  the  State  to  preserve,  and 
which  is  the  necessary  condition  of  the  normal  working  of  the  laws 
that  have  hitherto  determined  the  economic  organism  of  our  modern 
civilization,  is  being  imperilled  both  by  the  weakness  of  Governments 
(sentimentalism,  humanitarianism,  indiscipline,  revolutionary  ideal- 
ism), and  by  the  tyranny  of  Governments  (state  intervention  and 
state  socialism,  demagogic  legislation,  inspired  by  mystical  notions 
of  solidarity,  privileges  accorded  to  syndicalism).  A  French  con- 
seiller  d'£tat  and  member  of  the  Institute,  M.  Colson,  has  admirably 
developed  in  a  recent  book,  Organisme  Economique  et  Dfcordre 
Social  (Flammarion,  1912),  the  ideas  and  principles  to  which  the 
present  writer  gave  expression,  nineteen  years  ago,  in  the  chapter 
entitled  "  Democracy  "  in  his  book  Patriotism  and  Science.  In 
presence  of  the  forms  assumed  by  social  disorder  during  the  last 
ten  years  in  England,  France,  Germany  and  the  United  States,  it 


n8  PROBLEMS   OF  POWER 

phenomenon  it  is,  for  instance,  if  not  exactly  of  the  same 
nature  as  the  unrest  and  pessimism  of  the  United  States, 
yet  potentially  to  be  compared  with  it.  In  both  countries 
at  this  hour  the  same  moral  hypochondria  is  engendering  the 
same  malarial  visions.  When  a  senator  from  Iowa,  an 
ex-Governor  of  his  State,  says  in  an  address  to  the  students 
of  the  Washington  College  of  Law,  "  We  are  living  in  a 
period  of  revolution  ;  our  institutions  at  this  day  are  in  the 
balance,"  his  voice  is  pitched  in  the  same  key  as  those  of  a 
Millevoye,  a  Drumont,  a  Henri  Beranger,  a  Poincare,  a 
Maurras  and  a  Jaures.  Yet  all  these  utterances  (since  they 
are  not  isolated,  nor  confined  to  any  political  party,  but 
characteristic  of  the  feeling  of  the  several  audiences  to 
which  they  appeal)  are  the  most  fertile  ground  for  optimism. 
In  France,  at  this  moment,  there  is  a  widespread  craving 
for  positive  reform ;  a  growing  insistence  that  something 
must  be  done  to  purify  French  political  and  administrative 
life ;  a  resolve  to  effect  certain  radical  changes,  however 
drastic,  and  at  whatever  sacrifice  of  persons,  in  the  relations 
of  the  several  parts  of  the  great  political  and  administrative 
machine ;  a  repudiation  of  French  ideology  and  a  revival 
of  idealism  in  the  English  sense  of  the  word ;  a  spirit 
of  relentless  and  vigilant  criticism,  and  a  moral  purpose 
which  may  be  described  as  the  forerunner  of  a  French  Re- 
naissance. But  in  seeking  to  comprehend  this  new  state  of 
things,  foreign  observers  easily  go  wrong.  They  should 
always  begin  by  understanding  that  the  "  pretenders " 
who  would  fain  profit  by  the  dissatisfaction  of  France  with 
many  of  her  existing  institutions  to  substitute  for  the  Re- 
public a  Monarchy  or  an  Empire,  are  following,  in  their 

may  be  claimed  that  this  book  was  in  many  respects  a  forecast. 
Such  is  the  complexity  of  the  social  and  economic  movements  of  the 
present  moment,  that  one  must  ride  upon  a  cherub  to  secure  any 
real  perspective  of  the  Present ;  but  twenty  years  ago  a  seed  could 
serve  the  seer — and  the  seeds  of  the  future  unrest  were  visible 
enough  to  any  one  who  took  the  trouble  merely  to  light  a  candle. 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     119 

familiar  way,  evanescent  will-o'-the-wisps.  The  reforms 
which  are  destined  to  come  will  be  of  the  nature  of  a  read- 
justment of  the  Republican  Constitution  to  modern  con- 
ditions, not  of  the  upsetting  of  the  Republic.  The  dried 
fruit  of  the  Old  Regime  is  no  longer  succulent  to  the  French 
palate.  In  spite  of  its  occasional  mephitic  iridescence,  it  is 
the  deadest  of  the  dead  fruits  of  a  Dead  Sea.  No  one  has 
any  real  hope  of  restoring  what  Andre  Ch6nier  was  wont  to 
call  "  Gothic  institutions." 

It  is  impossible,  however,  to  exaggerate  the  admirable 
and  useful  role  of  certain  leaders  of  the  anti-Republican 
opposition  in  helping  to  create  discontent  in  France  and  to 
transmute  that  discontent  into  a  force  capable  of  destroying 
grave  abuses.  The  services  rendered  to  French  society, 
and  even  to  the  Republic,  by  M.  Charles  Maurras,  the 
Royalist  leader,  are  invaluable. 

It  has  been  seen  that  Government  in  France  is  the  tyran- 
nical monopoly  of  a  minority.  For  a  great  many  years  one 
of  the  classical  methods  of  the  Republican  system  of  govern- 
ment was  to  maintain  a  state  of  war  in  France.  The  Republi- 
cans found  ready  to  their  hands  an  incomparably  compact 
and  centralized  Administration,  and  their  main  object  was 
to  hold  the  citadel  of  that  Administration,  and  to  man  all 
its  bastions  and  outworks  by  sworn  members  of  their  party. 
They  treated  the  rank  and  file  of  the  nation  as  enemies  who 
could  not  be  trusted.  To  consolidate  their  troops  the 
Republican  leaders  invented  the  useful  bug-a-boo  of  an 
anti-Republican  and  anti-Constitutional  opposition.  Not 
that  the  nucleus  of  such  an  opposition  did  not  really  exist, 
but  the  utility  of  preserving  it,  the  advisability  of  exasper- 
ating it  by  methods  of  persecution,  in  order  to  cultivate  the 
illusion  in  the  country  that  Republican  order  was  being 
chronically  menaced,  was  the  accepted  device  for  the  pre- 
servation of  Republican  power.  The  disinterested  sporadic 
efforts  of  this  or  that  leader — Gambetta,  Spuller,  Meline, 
Briand — to  dismantle  the  Republican  donjon,  to  substitute 


120  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

Republican  for  Feudal  rule,  to  make  the  Republic  a  real 
Republic,  in  which  all  France  should  have  the  same  rights 
as  the  compact  little  garrison  in  the  citadel  to  life,  liberty 
and  the  pursuit  of  happiness,  have  been  systematically 
misunderstood,  not  to  say  regarded  as  treason,  by  the  pro- 
fessional politicians ;  and  meanwhile,  behind  the  scenes, 
the  privileged  troops  manning  the  battlements  have  battened 
off  the  assiette  au  beurre,  corrupted  French  character  by 
the  distribution  of  "  places  "  to  idle  functionaries,  bought, 
thus  indirectly,  the  votes  of  their  clients,  and  made  the  Re- 
public no  longer  worthy  of  the  name.  Fear  of  the  foreigner 
is  the  great  force  that  instantly  assured  to  the  Poincare 
Ministry  a  national  popularity  and  authority  which  none  of  its 
predecessors,  not  even  the  Clemenceau  Ministry,  had  pos- 
sessed since  the  early  days  of  the  Republic.  It  was,  more- 
over, because  M.  Poincare,  by  his  insistence  on  a  policy  of 
electoral  reform,  and  by  his  prudent  and  firm  defence  of 
French  interests  during  the  Balkan  war,  had  come  to  per- 
sonify French  national  aspirations,  that,  on  the  eve  of 
the  anniversary  (January  18,  1871)  of  tthe  foundation  of 
the  German  Empire  in  the  Galerie  des  Glaces  at  Versailles, 
he  was  chosen  President  of  the  Republic  by  an  Assembly 
finally  respectful  of  the  national  will. 

There  is  no  such  thing  in  France  as  a  constitutional  oppo- 
sition, because  French  "  parliamentarism  "  is  in  no  particu- 
lar such  a  method  of  democratic  government  as  is  connoted 
by  the  words  "  parliamentary  government."  In  view  of  the 
fact  that  France  is  not  a  Monarchy,  it  may  be  technically 
correct,  as  it  is  certainly  convenient,  to  call  it  a  Republic ; 
but  its  government  is  obviously  not  that  of  a  democratic  Re- 
public. Its  government  is  not,  as  in  England,  a  parliamentary 
government  by  the  device  of  well-defined  parties  appealing 
directly  to  the  Democracy,  nor  yet,  as  in  the  United  States, 
is  it  the  government  of  the  people,  by  the  people,  and  for 
the  people,  of  the  Consular  Republican  form.  Yet  it  was 
undoubtedly  the  object  of  the  Constitution  of  1875  to  es- 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL   POLITICS    121 

tablish  Parliamentary  Government.     How  happens  it  that 
that  object  has  never  been  attained  ? 

The  Constitution  of  1875  was  a  concoction  of  the  Orleanist 
party.  That  party  hoped  by  easy  stages  to  restore  the 
Monarchy,  and  it  counted  on  election  by  the  Congress  of  a 
Comte  de  Paris  or  a  Due  d'Aumale  as  President  of  the 
"  Republic,"  in  succession  to  Marshal  McMahon.  As  an 
independent  critic  of  singular  perspicacity,  Monsieur  Georges 
Thiebaud,  has  pointed  out  in  his  instructive  book,  Les  Secrets 
du  Regne,  there  were  precedents  for  this  method,  notably 
the  expedient  used  in  1830  for  the  choice  of  Louis  Philippe, 
after  Lafayette,  on  the  balcony  of  the  Hotel-de-Ville,  had 
baptized  him  La  Meilleure  des  Republiques.  Once  the 
majority  in  the  two  Chambers  were  rendered  unmistakably 
monarchical,  it  was  held  that  it  would  not  be  difficult  to 
utilize  the  clause  of  the  Constitution  which  permits  revision,1 
in  order  to  restore  the  Old  Regime  in  favour  of  the  younger 
branch  of  the  French  Bourbons.  The  Orleanist  project 
failed.  But  the  Royalist  Constitution  remained ;  and  most 
of  the  woes  from  which  France  is  suffering  to-day  are  due 
to  two  facts :  first,  the  fact  that  she  is  still  living  under  a 
Constitution  which,  while  it  is  admirably  adapted  to  thwarting 
the  possible  rise  of  a  dictator  of  the  Napoleonic  type,  is 
utterly  inadequate  for  the  realization  of  the  democratic 
dream  of  Representative  Government,  according  to  an 
ideal  of  liberty  and  of  social  and  economic  progress  by  free 
discussion  under  the  party  system ;  secondly,  the  fact  that 
while  her  political  Constitution  is  Royalist  her  Administra- 
tive machinery  is  centralized  and  Napoleonic.  It  is  a 
psychological  impossibility  to  reconcile  for  purposes  of 
human  government  systems  so  disparate  as  this  Royalist 
Constitution  of  1875  and  the  Republico-Napoleonic  Admin- 

1  This  point  has  been  clearly  brought  out  by  Dr.  Woodrow  Wilson, 
President  of  the  United  States,  in  his  remarkable  study  in  compara- 
tive politics,  The  State  (D.  C.  Heath  &  Co.)  pp.  216-218. 


122  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

istration.  The  friction  caused  by  the  effort  to  make  the 
Constitution  and  that  Administration  work  in  harmony  has 
now  assumed  the  dimensions  of  a  scandal.  It  accounts  for 
the  present  unrest  throughout  French  society.  It  has,  in 
fact,  brought  about  a  Constitutional  crisis. 

French  official  historians  hesitate  frankly  to  acknow- 
ledge the  fact — which  is  as  little  familiar  to  the  average 
Frenchman  as  to  the  foreigner — that  the  Constitution  of  the 
Third  Republic  was  never  intended  to  serve  any  other  end 
than  the  re-establishment  of  the  Monarchy.  Yet  such  is 
the  case,  and  it  would  be  difficult  to  devise  a  system  of 
government  less  well  adapted  to  the  organization  of  a  modern 
democracy.  The  civic  and  social  irresponsibility  which 
their  Administrative  regime  has  been  creating  among 
Frenchmen  ever  since  the  First  Empire  (vide,  among  a  score 
of  testimonies,  the  recent  books  of  Monsieur  Faguet :  Le 
Culte  de  V Incompetence  and  .  .  .  el  I'Horreur  des  Respon- 
sabilites)  has  been  enhanced  by  the  political  Constitution 
under  which  they  have  been  living. 

During  the  last  thirty  years  public  opinion  in  civilized 
communities  has  demanded,  at  all  events,  two  things  of  a 
government :  Stability  and  Authority ;  and,  of  the  two, 
Authority  is  the  more  necessary  and  the  more  useful.  For 
some  time  now  in  France — save  during  the  briefest  of  inter- 
vals— there  has  existed  neither  the  one  nor  the  other. 
During  what  one  of  the  most  original  of  modern  French 
writers,  M.  Charles  Peguy,  has  called  the  "  mystical  period  " 
of  the  Republic  (by  which  is  meant  the  period  of  disin- 
terested Republican  idealism  preceding  the  modern  political 
period  of  caucus  bickerings),  the  solid  conservatism  and  in- 
grained loyalty  of  the  French  nation  engendered  respect 
for  the  Republican  rulers  and  surrounded  them  with  a  halo 
of  Authority.  Gradually,  however,  the  inadequacy  of  the 
governmental  machinery  in  France,  its  incapacity  to  pro- 
vide the  taxpayer  with  the  kinds  of  product  which  any 
political  and  administrative  machinery  worthy  of  the  name 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     123 

is  reasonably  expected  to  turn  out,  has  been  revealed  to 
the  entire  reflecting  nation.  In  the  United  States,  Authority 
is  to  a  certain  extent  secured  by  the  very  terms  of  the  Con- 
stitution, since  the  Head  of  the  State,  who  is  the  elect 
of  the  nation,  and  who  represents  the  nation  as  a  whole,  is 
held  responsible  for  the  management  of  affairs.  In  France, 
on  the  other  hand,  the  subtle  aim  of  the  Constitution  of  1875 
was,  as  has  been  seen,  to  provide  a  means  of  transition  from 
the  Republican  form  of  government  to  a  regime  of  Con- 
stitutional Monarchy  with  Parliamentary  Government.  But 
the  device  by  which  this  evolution  was  to  take  place,  the 
election  of  the  Head  of  the  State  by  a  Congress  composed 
of  Senators  and  Deputies,  has  become  the  regular  method 
of  the  election  of  the  President  of  the  Republic.  The  conse- 
quence, as  has  already  been  pointed  out,  is  that  the  French 
President,  instead  of  representing  the  nation,  is  the  creature  of 
Parliamentary  groups.  He  is  irresponsible,  and  he  plays  no 
known  active  or  essential  role  in  the  government  of  his 
country.  There  is  in  France,  therefore,  no  supreme  arbiter 
of  parties.  Nor  are  there  any  parties,  for  the  simple  and 
curious  reason  that  the  opposition  is  anti-constitutional — 
that  is,  unconstitutional.  The  Republican  politicians  have 
managed,  little  by  little,  to  oust  their  Orleanist  accomplices 
and  to  assume  the  direction,  which  they  undertake  by  relays, 
of  the  French  Administration.  A  party  in  office  which 
regards  as  unconstitutional  any  organized  legal  resistance  to 
its  party  programme  necessarily  becomes  tyrannical.  A 
regime  in  which  there  is  no  constitutional  opposition  is 
anything  that  one  may  like  to  call  it,  but  is,  at  all  events, 
just  the  opposite  of  a  regime  of  party  government,  and  bears 
no  resemblance  to  "  parliamentary  government." 

The  old  Republicans  of  the  idealistic  Republican  period, 
a  period  when  Republicanism  was  a  religious  ideal  and  not 
merely  a  cant  catchword  of  politics,1  cherished  a  faith  in 

1  "  La  R6publique,  en  tant  qu'idee  politique,  en  tant  qu'idee 
'  force'  est  finie"  (Charles  Maurras,  L' Action  Franfaise,  May  17, 


124  PROBLEMS  OF   POWER 

Universal  Suffrage  which  may  almost  be  described  as  sublime  ; 
and  it  was  they,  and  not  the  reactionaries,  who  extolled  an 
electoral  system  based  on  the  Scrutin  de  Liste.  "  If  you 
are  living  under  a  Republic,"  said  Gambetta  in  1881,  "  you 
owe  the  fact  to  the  system  of  Scrutin  de  Liste,"  and  he  went 
on  to  say,  "  the  Scrutin  d'arrondissement  is  a  weapon  forged 
by  your  enemies,  a  weapon  which  was  used  to  destroy  you 
together  with  the  Republic."  Thus  when,  in  connexion 
with  the  reform  of  French  institutions  inscribed  in  the  Con- 
stitution of  1875,  the  electoral  law  was  discussed,  and  when 
357  members  of  the  National  Assembly  voted  against  the 
maintenance  of  the  Scrutin  de  Liste,  and  326  voted  in  favour 
of  that  system,  an  analysis  of  the  division  showed  that  the 
majority  was  composed  of  Bonapartists  and  Royalists  and 
that  the  Republicans  were  in  the  minority.  Why  did  the 
reactionary  political  forces  wish  to  re-establish  the  Scrutin 
d'arrondissement  ?  Solely  because  it  seemed  to  them  the 
only  way  to  maintain  the  supremacy  of  individual  influence 
and  of  personal  prestige  in  the  constituencies.  The  Scrutin 
d'arrondissement  left  the  door  open  to  all  the  classical  forms 
of  political,  social  and  financial  corruption.  It  was  the  only 
method  enabling  the  central  authority  to  act  directly  upon 
the  electorate  by  means  of  the  local  functionaries.  It  would  be 
easy  to  prove — and  M.  Henry  Leyret,  has  already  drawn 
attention  to  this  fact x — that  although  the  Republicans 
were  victorious  at  the  Seize  Mai  and  during  the  Boulangist 
episode,  their  victory  was  achieved  not  because,  but  in  spite 
of,  the  Scrutin  d'arrondissement.  -The  famous  phalanx  of 
the  363,  who  were  opposed  by  the  Elysee,  the  Government, 
the  Administration,  the  upper  middle  class  and  the  leading 
business  interests,  had  the  country  behind  them.  In  1877 
the  very  existence  of  the  Republic  was  at  stake,  and  what 


1912).     This  is  a  royalist  verdict,  justifiable,  I  believe,  if  taken  in  the 

sense  which  M.  Peguy  and  the  present  writer  have  given  to  the  idea. 

1  Le  Temps.  June  7,  1911.  See  his  book,  Les  Tyrans  Ridicules. 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS    125 

happened  was  that  its  existence  was  made  the  object  of  a 
national  plebiscite.  In  fact,  for  Napoleon  III,  as  for  the 
Orleanist  party  of  1875,  the  Scnitin  d'arrondissement  was  in 
favour  because  it  was  an  excellent  system  of  corruption  and 
a  perfect  device  for  oppression.  It  is  for  this  reason,  and 
not  for  any  other — it  is  because,  owing  to  the  predomin- 
ance thereby  given  to  parochial  over  national  interests, 
all  French  deputies  tend  to  be  the  delegates  of  local  wire- 
pullers and  are  expected  to  obey  the  orders  of  their  party 
leaders  and  their  party  caucuses  1 — that  the  Radical  Republi- 
cans, who  have  been  governing  France  for  the  last  ten  years, 
and  have  little  by  little  made  the  constituencies  into  "  rotten 
boroughs "  that  are  poisoning  France  (mares  stagnantes, 
to  quote  M.  Briand) ,  have  fought  so  strenuously  the  project 
of  electoral  reform  for  the  re-establishment  of  the  Scrutin  de 
Liste  with  the  representation  of  minorities. 

The  so-called  "  Republican  majority "  in  the  French 
Chamber  is  probably  the  most  "  unrepresentative  "  Parlia- 
mentary "  majority  "  in  the  world  this  side  of  Constantinople. 
Owing  to  the  existing  electoral  system  the  entire  Chamber, 
in  fact,  "  represents  "  only  forty-six  per  cent,  of  the  electoral 
body,  so  that  the  "  majority  "  speaks  and  acts  in  the  name 
of  only  three  million  electors  in  a  country  where  there  are 
perhaps  nearer  a  million  than  nine  hundred  thousand  State 
functionaries.  And  if  that  majority,  deep-rooted  in  the 
electoral  districts  by  means  of  the  ingenious  mechanism  of 
the  local  committees  (which  M.  Faguet  is  no  doubt  right  in 
regarding  as  the  institution  essentielle  of  the  Third  Republic) , 
presumes  to  govern  the  Government,  as  it  does  to-day ; 
if,  forgetting  its  sole  raison  d'etre,  that  of  sober  legislative 
action  in  co-operation  with  the  Senate,  that  "  majority  " 
presumes  to  meddle,  as  it  meddles  to-day,  in  matters  that 
concern  only  the  Executive  ;  if,  worse  still,  that  "  majority  " 
unhesitatingly  dictates  to  the  Judicial  Authority,  to  such 

1  Cf.  the  period  of  the  Jacksonian  Democracy  in  America. 


126  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

an  extent  that  the  Magistracy  is  no  longer  as  free  as  it  was 
under  the  pre-revolutionary  regime,  and  that  no  French 
citizen  can  feel  sure  of  justice  being  done  in  any  affair  where- 
in politics  can  possibly  play  a  part — if  this  be  the  case, 
it  is^obvious  that  the  words  :  "  Government  in  France  is 
the  tyrannical  monopoly  of  a  minority,"  serve  but  inade- 
quately to  paint  the  real  consequences  of  the  effort  to  "  work  " 
the  Constitution  of  1875  in  connexion  with  the  Administra- 
tion of  1913.  Nor  is  it  surprising  that  in  proportion  as  facts 
of  this  nature  become  known,  French  public  opinion  should 
display  a  steady  evolution  towards  a  more  realistic  attitude 
as  regards  public  affairs.  As  a  particularly  keen  observer 
of  French  facts,  Mr.  Laurence  Jerrold,  has  recently  put  it, 
"  the  Third  Republic  is  perhaps  at  the  beginning  of  a  great 
revolution ;  it  may  be  making  up  its  mind  to  inoculate 
the  idealism  of  its  politics  with  the  realism  of  its  life."  At 
present  in  France  the  Deputies  are  more  omnipotent  than 
was  any  sovereign  of  the  Old  Regime,1  and  may  say  of 
themselves  more  truly  than  Louis  XIV  ever  said  :  "  L'etat 
c'est  moi."  The  central  power  having  set  the  example  of 
the  abdication  of  Authority,  the  prefects  and  the  sub- 
prefects  also  have  bent  the  knee  before  the  local  Deputy. 
There  was  a  time  during  the  early  days  of  the  Republic 
when  the  average  citizen  was  enchanted  at  the  idea  of 
humiliating  the  agents  of  the  Central  Authority.  Those 
were  the  mystical  days  to  which  allusion  has  been  made,  the 
days  of  faith  in  the  virtues  of  Universal  Suffrage,  the  days 
when  the  dilatory  methods,  the  tyrannously  vexatious  red- 
tapism,  the  insolence,  even,  of  the  Administration  had  irri- 
tated the  country  beyond  endurance.  When  the  Republi- 
cans obtained  office  France  counted  on  them  to  help  her  to 
thrust  this  unsympathetic  guardian  of  their  liberties  back 
into  her  place.  The  intervention  of  the  Deputies  was 


1  -They  themselves,  however,  are  the  slaves  of  the  local  committees 
in  the  constituencies.  See  the  passage  cited  from  M.  Poincare,  p.  no. 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     127 

everywhere  sought  against  the  arbitrary  action  of  the  agents 
of  the  Central  Government.  The  Representatives  of  the 
People  posed  as  the  avengers  of  wrong,  the  defenders  of 
liberty  and  justice.  Those  were  the  halcyon  Republican 
days  when  the  Deputy  was  popular  and  respected.  But  the 
"  Representatives  of  the  People  "  contracted  a  dangerous 
habit.  They  fancied  themselves,  almost  by  virtue  of 
the  Constitution,  to  be  the  indispensable  intermediaries  be- 
tween the  Administration  and  the  Public.  They  had  attacked 
Administrative  oppression.  They  have  now  merely  sub- 
stituted themselves  for  the  Administration,  and  they  have 
become  in  turn  the  oppressor. 

Authority,  Constitutional  Order,  can  therefore  be  restored 
in  France  solely  by  the  re-establishment  of  the  principle  of 
Separation  of  Powers. 

This  implies,  first  and  above  all,  emancipation  of  the 
Government  from  the  despotism  of  the  Chamber  of  Deputies. 
But  that  ideal  is  to  be  achieved  only  through  the  creation 
of  real  Parliamentary  Government  by  means  [of  the  party 
system,  a  condition  itself  unattainable  without  a  reform 
of  that  Electoral  Law  which  has  produced  in  France  a 
tyrannical  boss-system.1 

The  re-establishment  of  the  principle  of  the  Separation  of 
Powers,  and  consequently tthe  ^restoration  of  Authority,  im- 
plies, furthermore,  certain  forms  of  decentralization,  at  all 
events  of  deconcentration,  among  which  perhaps  the  most 
urgent  is  the  establishment  of  an  independent  Magistracy, 
a  Judicial  authority  unshackled  by  the  Executive  power,  and 
beyond  the  reach  of  Legislative  influence.  As  things  now 
are  in  France,  there  is  no  power  on  French  soil  capable  of 

1  "  The  Chamber  treats  the  ministers  as  if  they  were  still  the  agents 
and  the  appointees  of  a  monarch,  instead  of  its  own  representatives, 
and  is  jealous  and  suspicious  of  them  at  every  turn.  The  system 
no  doubt  waits  for  its  successful  operation  the  formation  of  two 
coherent  national  parties,  capable  of  organizing  for  government, 
instead  of  merely  for  rivalry."  Dr.  Woodrow  Wilson,  The  State, 
p.  230, 


128  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

thwarting  the  arbitrary  action  of  the  Government * ;  and 

1  There  are  signs,  however,  that  the  Conseil  d'Etat  may  gradually 
assume  a  position  rendering  it,  as  a  Constitutional  organ,  extraordin- 
arily like  the  famous  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  ;  a  Court, 
that  is,  of  almost  Olympian  appeal,  judging  in  entire  independence, 
and  entrusted  even  with  the  grave  obligation  of  "  interpreting  "  the 
very  Constitution,  as  if  it  were  a  kind  of  executive  emanation  of  the 
sage  ruminations  of  the  National  Conscience.  It  is,  at  all  events, 
significant  that  on  various  contemporary  occasions  of  national  crisis, 
when  neither  Chamber  nor  Government,  nor  yet  even  the  President, 
dared  take  a  decision  which  would  engage  their  responsibility,  the  only 
possible  solution  to  the  crises  which  either  Cabinet  or  Chamber  could 
suggest,  was  appeal  to  the  Conseil  d'Etat.  One  need  only  recall  the 
attitude  of  that "  High  Assembly  "  in  annulling  political  appointments 
made  by  the  Executive  contrary  to  good  administrative  regulations, 
and  in  overthrowing  the  bungling  work  of  Parliament  with  regard  to 
the  delimitations  of  the  wine-growing  regions.  The  Conseil  d'Etat,  in 
fact,  is  an  aristocratic  body,  absolutely  independent  of  the  Democracy. 
The  impartial  analysis  of  its  function  will  justify  the  conclusions  of 
the  brilliant  critic,  Francis  Delaisi  in  his  La  Democratic  et  les  Finan- 
ciers. (Editions  de  la  Guerre  Sociale,  pp.  115,  116).  He  points  out 
that  its  members  possess,  in  reality,  the  legislative,  executive,  and 
judicial  authority  in  France.  "  C'est  le  haut  et  inaccessible  donjon 
ou  le  grand  capitalisme  conservateur  a  enferme  ses  supremes  res- 
sources." 

In  this  connexion,  it  is  pertinent  to  note  that,  while  the  system  of 
Government  by  "  checks  and  balances  "  almost  peculiar  to  the  Con- 
stitution of  the  United  States  appears  to  be  meeting  with  growing 
favour  in  France,  the  evolution  is  almost  universally  the  other  way 
in  other  countries.  During  the  last  few  years  in  England  there 
has  been  a  rapid  advance  in  the  realization  of  the  pure  democratic 
ideal  of  "  government  of  the  people,  by  the  people,  and  for  the 
people,"  by  recognition  of  the  legitimacy  of  the  rule  of  the  majority. 
Likewise  in  the  United  States  most  of  the  reform  proposals  made  by 
the  "  Progressives,"  and  notably  by  Mr.  Roosevelt,  are  inspired  by  a 
faith  in  the  divine  right  of  sheer  Number,  and  tend  to  shatter  the 
devices  invented  by  the  framers  of  the  Constitution  in  order  to  check 
hasty  legislation,  or  what  Prof.  J.  Allen  Smith  calls,  in  his  Spirit  of 
American  Government,  "  Democratic  Innovation."  Thus  Mr.  Roose- 
velt's bitterly  criticized  proposal  known  as  "  the  recall  of  decisions  " — 
in  virtue  of  which  the  people  in  any  state  should  be  allowed  to  give 
their  opinion  by  referendum  on  the  action  of  a  Court  in  declaring  to 
be  un-constitutional  this  or  that  law  duly  passed  by  a  State  Legisla- 
ture and  signed  by  a  Governor — is,  no  doubt,  revolutionary  from 
the  point  of  view  of  American  Hamiltonian  traditions,  but,  as  com- 
pared with  British,  and  most  European  methods,  it  is  an  anodine 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     129 

inasmuch  as  the  Executive  has  little  by  little  allowed  its 
normal  authority  to  be  transferred  to,  and  disseminated 
among,  the  members  of  the  Chamber,  Frenchmen  are  in 
reality  the  prey  of  a  Despotic  regime. 

Thirdly,  the  re-establishment  of  the  principle  of  the 
Separation  of  Powers,  and  consequently  the  restoration  of 
Authority,  implies  the  definitive  organization  of  the  status 
of  the  three-quarters  of  a  million  of  functionaries,  in  such 
a  manner  as  to  protect  them  against  favouritism ;  to  protect, 
as  well,  the  Legislative  power  against  the  temptation  to 
utilize  the  functionary  system  for  base  demagogic  ends ;  to 
complete  the  isolation  of  the  Government  within  the  sphere 
of  its  normal  Executive  role ;  and  (finally)  to  render  rebellion 
impossible.  One  of  the  main  elements  of  this  reform  ought 
to  be  the  abolition  of  the  privilege  of  State  pensions  to  func- 
tionaries, an  institution  which  costs  France  one  hundred 
millions  of  francs  annually,  and  which  has  done  more  to 
emasculate  French  character,  to  destroy  French  initiative, 
and  to  arrest  the  normal  evolution  of  French  individualism, 
than  any  of  the  causes  growing  out  of  the  Napoleonic  scheme 
for  the  government  of  Frenchmen. 

The  resurrection  of  Authority,  the  restoration  of  Con- 
stitutional order,  are  thus  the  crying  needs  of  France  at  the 
present  hour.  Chronic  German  aggression,1  and  the  exist- 


and  almost  conservative  proposal.  That  important  attribute  of 
sovereignty,  known  as  the  right  of  Parliaments  to  interpret  the  Con- 
stitution, belongs,  in  the  United  States,  to  the  Federal  judiciary,  an 
unheard  of  state  of  things  from  the  point  of  view  of  most  other  civi- 
lized states.  Government  in  the  United  States  may  really  be  said, 
as  Mr.  S.  S.  McClure  has  put  it,  to  be  Government  by  Courts.  (Mc- 
Clure's  Magazine,  May  1912).  The  proposal  of  Mr.  Roosevelt  may, 
or  may  not,  be  prudent.  That  proposal,  at  all  events,  is  one  which 
does  not  justify  the  anathema  of  the  convinced  partisans  of  Demo- 
cratic Government. 

1  Prince  Bismarck  once  said  of  the  French  :  "  Leave  them  alone. 
If  you  leave  them  alone,  they  will  devour  each  other.  If  you  attack 
them  from  abroad,  they  will  gather  together  to  face  the  foreigner." 
See  Paris  correspondence  of  the  Times,  December  20,  1898. 

K 


I3o  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

ence  at  home  of  a  Democracy  as  yet  not  wholly  nationalized 
— Herve'ism,  Anti-Militarism,  Revolutionary  Syndicalism — 
must  be  regarded,  no  doubt,  as  indispensable  factors  in  the 
maintenance  of  sane,  stable  and  efficient  Government  in 
France.  But  something  else,  and  something  more  legiti- 
mate, is  needed,  and  that  something  has  been  clearly  seen  by 
the  author  of  one  of  the  remarkable  books  of  recent  years, 
The  Promise  of  American  Life.  The  author,  Mr.  Croly,  says 
with  discernment :  "  The  French  have  not  yet  come  to 
realize  that  the  success  of  their  whole  Democratic  experi- 
ment depends  upon  their  ability  to  reach  a  good  under- 
standing with  then-  fellow-countrymen,  and  that  just  in 
so  far  as  their  Democracy  fails  to  be  nationally  constructive, 
it  is  ignoring  the  most  essential  conditions  of  its  own  vitality 
and  perpetuity."  The  organization  of  Democracy  in 
France  implies  a  policy  of  constructive  nationalism.  At 
the  same  time,  France  must  learn,  in  the  words  of  Nietzsche, 
to  "  live  dangerously  "  ;  and  that  ideal  is  impossible  until 
she  wakes  from  her  petit-bourgeois  dreams,  and  develops,  for 
internal  national  constructive  ends,  an  alert  and  active 
national  self-consciousness.  Frenchmen  must  learn  not  to 
be  afraid  to  assume  responsibility.  They  must  take  to 
heart  the  patriotic  and  pregnant  political  philosophy  of  the 
most  suggestive,  and  one  of  the  most  intelligent,  of  their 
contemporary  thinkers  :  La  vitalite  des  democraties  se  mesure 
a  la  force  genitrice  d' aristocraties  qu'elles  portent  en  elles.1 

But  no  friend  of  France  need  feel  discouraged  as  to  the 
capacity  of  Frenchmen  eventually  to  learn  these  truths,  or  as 
to  their  ability  to  put  their  house  in  order.  It  is  noticeable, 
as  one  of  the  most  hopeful  of  the  signs  of  the  undiminished 
vitality  of  France,  that,  in  proportion  as,  under  the  action 
of  the  wind  and  rain,  the  three  mystical  words,  Libert^, 
Egalite',  Fraternite,  fade  from  the  fa9ades  of  her  public 
buildings,  no  one  thinks  of  restoring  them  to  their  pristine 

1  ....  et  I'Horreur  des  Responsabilitts.  By  Emile  Faguet. 
p.  200, 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     131 

glitter ;  and  that,  though  there  are  still  Frenchmen  who 
believe  in  Fraternity,  and  others  who  long  for  Liberty,  none, 
from  Normandy  to  Aquitaine,  and  from  the  two  Burgundies 
to  Poitou,  but  knows  that  Equality  is  an  absurd  and  a 
dangerous  lie. 

V 

Before  submitting  the  question  of  the  British  internal 
crisis  to  the  careful  scrutiny  that  has  been  applied  to  the 
problem  of  unrest  in  France,  it  seems  useful,  at  this  stage, 
first  briefly  to  summarize — in  connexion  with  a  rapid  survey 
of  the  question  of  the  Balkans — the  foregoing  detailed  narra- 
tive of  the  political  development  of  Europe  as  determined  by 
the  peculiar  method  chosen  by  Prussian  statesmen  for  the 
formation  of  a  united  Germany ;  and  secondly,  to  analyse  the 
relations  existing  between  the  members  of  the  Triple  Entente 
during  the  three  or  four  years  that  preceded  the  revival  by 
Germany  in  July  1911  of  an  aggressively  imperialist  policy. 

.If  Germany  once  again  ventured,  at  that  date,  to  risk  dis- 
turbing the  peace  of  Europe  by  the  dispatch  of  a  gunboat 
to  Agadir,  it  was  largely  because  the  absorption  of  each  of  the 
partners  of  the  Triple  Entente  in  its  own  domestic  concerns 
had  distracted  the  attention  of  those  Powers  from  matters 
affecting  their  common  interests,  and  had  suggested  to 
Germany  that  the  time  was  favourable  for  furthering  her  own 
interests  at  the  expense  of  her  rivals.  Germany  had,  mean- 
while, taken  all  the  necessary  precautions  to  prevent  her  pro- 
jects in  Africa  and  in  Western  Europe  from  being  disturbed  by 
any  untoward  event  elsewhere.  She  had  frankly  decided  to 
help  the  Sultan  to  keep  the  peace  in  an  intangible  Ottoman 
Empire.  The  "  Eastern  Question  "  remained  in  abeyance. 
Europe,  still  shirking  its  responsibilities,  continued  to  find 
it  convenient  hypocritically  to  confide  the  question  of 
Macedonian  Reform  to  the  two  Powers  "  more  particularly 
interested  "  (Agreement  of  Muertzsteg,  1903).  How  could 
France  and  England  keep  a  vigilant  eye  on  Yildiz  Kiosque 


132  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

and  the  Balkans  while  Germany  absorbed  every  moment  of 
their  attention  which  was  not  given  to  their  own  domestic 
difficulties  ?  The  Macedonian  sore  was  accordingly  allowed 
to  fester,  for  at  all  costs  the  "  integrity  of  the  Ottoman 
Empire  "  had  to  be  maintained.  The  Balkan  States  were 
told  to  watch  and  pray,  but  to  keep  the  peace.  They 
obeyed  ;  but  meanwhile  they  borrowed  money  in  Paris 
and  London  and  Berlin  ;  they  bought  Creusot  guns  ;  they 
kept  the  peace,  but  kept,  at  the  same  time,  their  powder  dry. 
The  tune  was  at  hand  when  they  were  to  flout  the  cynical  and 
craven  nations  to  which  they  owed  their  very  existence. 
But  for  the  moment  the  leading  signatories  of  the  Treaty 
of  Berlin  were  free  to  ignore  the  Eastern  Question,  and  Ger- 
many could  continue  to  carry  out  the  Bismarckian  dream  : 
"  Russia  in  the  Far-East,  Austria  in  the  East,  France 
n'importe  ou."  1 

The  motives  of  the  Wilhelmstrasse  after  1904  may  be 
divined.  German  policy  hi  regard  to  Morocco  was  a  pro- 
longed bluff,  but  it  was  not  that  alone.  It  was  above  all,  no 
doubt,  a  rationally  conceived  experiment  to  test  the  solidity 
of  the  Anglo-French  Entente ;  but  it  was  also  a  feint,  en- 
abling Germany  to  make  a  series  of  embarrassing  surprise 
attacks  at  another  point  of  the  diplomatic  ring.  The 
Moroccan  Question  tended  to  absorb  the  entire  attention  of 
France  and  even  of  England,  and  to  leave  Germany  free  to 
pursue,  more  or  less  secretly,  her  policy  of  pacific  penetration 
in  the  Middle  East,  from  Macedonia  to  Constantinople  and 
from  Smyrna  to  the  Persian  Gulf.  Viewed  in  this  light, 
German  policy  becomes  a  rational  effort  to  further  German 
Imperial  ends. 

In  order  to  keep  an  open  market  in  the  Middle  East  for 
her  expanding  trade,  Germany  acquiesced  in  the  tyrannical 
and  arbitrary  methods  of  Abdul  Hamid.  She  combated 
British  and  French  influence  by  exciting  that  monarch's 

1  Speech  on  Foreign  Policy,  by  M.  Paul  Deschanel,  November  19, 
1903,  in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies. 


A  STUDY  OF   INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     133 

dread  of  "  liberal  ideas."  The  "  Young  Turks  "  were,  to  a 
large  degree,  the  product  of  French  "  philosophy  "  from 
Condorcet  to  Comte,  or  of  French  culture  disseminated  in 
the  numerous  schools  founded  by  French  monks.  Modern 
ideas  in  the  Ottoman  Empire  were,  at  all  events,  expressed  in 
French,  and  Marshal  von  der  Goltz  often  complained  of 
this.  Nowhere  were  the  [mystic  watchwords  of  the  French 
Revolution,  "  Liberty  "  "  Equality,"  "  Fraternity,"  taken 
more  touchingly  to  the  letter  than  among  the  young 
Ottoman  reformists.  Exiled  in  Paris,  London  or  Geneva, 
they  propagated,  from  those  safe  vantage-points,  in  their 
caustic  little  newspapers  and  pamphlets,  the  principles 
of  Western  civilization.1  The  Sultan  was  master  on  the 
Golden  Horn,  but  in  Macedonia,  where  the  "  honour " 
of  the  Christian  Powers  occasionally  required  Europe  to  in- 
tervene with  a  programme  of  reforms,  Abdul  Hamid  found 
it  less  easy  to  "  make  a  solitude  and  call  it  peace." 

It  was  at  Salonica  and  Monastir,  on  Ottoman  soil,  in  con- 
tact with  the  Greek,  the  Bulgarian,  and  the  Servian,  that 
the  Young  Turks  first  managed  to  co-ordinate  their  efforts, 
and  to  form  the  famous  secret  committee  known  as  "  the 
Committee  of  Union  and  Progress."  Ottoman  pride,  even 
Turkish  pariotism,  was  humiliated  by  the  arrival  in  1904  of 
the  foreign  officers  imposed  on  Turkey  by  Europe  to  reor- 
ganize the  Macedonian  gendarmerie.  The  number  of  these 
officers  was  doubled  in  1905,  and  in  1906  Europe  obliged  the 

1  During  more  than  ten  years  the  present  writer  remained  in  con- 
tact, in  Paris,  with  many  of  the  conspirators  who  were  destined  to 
play  a  leading  part  in  the  Revolution  of  1908.  The  genuineness  of 
the  idealism  of  the  great  majority  recalled  the  doctrinaire  rigour 
of  a  Calvin,  ready  to  sacrifice  Servetus  on  an  altar  raised  to  the 
Moloch  of  Exegesis,  or  of  a  Robespierre  sending  to  the  knife  political 
enemies  condemned  in  the  name  of  Liberty.  He  had  no  illusions  as 
to  the  folly  of  the  Foreign  Offices  of  Europe  in  welcoming  so  effu- 
sively these  sinister  logicians,  and  on  more  than  one  occasion,  in  pub- 
lished utterances,  expressed  the  opinion  that  they  would  wreck  their 
country.  He  gave  them  three  years  in  which  to  prove  their  incom- 
petence. The  prophecy  was  fulfilled  in  four. 


134  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

Sultan  to  accept  financial  control  in  Macedonia  and  a  further 
increase  of  the  gendarmerie.  As  one  of  the  foreign  officers 
has  testified/  the  Macedonian  Turks  and  the  "  Young 
Turk  "  officers  held  the  Sultan  responsible  for  the  humilia- 
tion which  they  felt  as  Ottomans,  but,  far  from  bearing  any 
grudge  against  the  European  officers,  they  did  their  best  to 
help  these  officers  in  their  task.  At  all  events  Macedonia 
became  the  only  part  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  where  the 
Turks  developed  sufficient  national  self-respect  to  perceive 
that  reform  alone  could  save  their  country  ;  but  they  could 
not  tolerate  the  thought  that  Islamism  was  to  owe  its 
salvation  to  the  foreigner. 

In  intimate  contact  with  European  ideas,  the  Turkish 
civilian  officials  and  officers  in  Macedonia  resolved  to 
dethrone  the  sovereign  who  was  selling  the  Ottoman 
birthright  to  the  Infidel  Powers.  The  revolutionary 
"  Committee  of  Union  and  Progress  "  was  thus  formed 
and  developed,  not  merely  against  the  Hamidian  regime 
but  against  a  meddlesome  Europe.  Turkey,  it  was  held, 
must  have  a  Constitution,  providing  guarantees  of  liberty 
and  establishing  her  as  an  independent  Power.  Good 
government  must  begin  in  Macedonia.  Only  thus  could 
the  foreigner  be  evicted.  When,  in  July  1908,  the  con- 
stitution of  Midhat  Pasha  was  revived,  the  "hero  of  the 
Revolution,"  Enver  Bey,  exclaimed,  before  ten  thousand 
people  assembled  in  Liberty  Square  at  Salonica  :  "  To-day 
Aribitrary  Government  has  disappeared.  We  are  all  brothers. 
There  are  no  longer  in  Turkey  Bulgarians,  Greeks,  Servians, 
Rumanians,  Mussulmans,  Jews.  Under  the  same  blue  sky 
we  are  all  proud  to  be  Ottomans."  The  European  Consuls 
at  Salonica  were  duped  by  this  eloquence  and  their  enthusi- 
asm duped  their  Governments.  On  July  30  the  Journal  de 
Salonique  referred  as  follows  to  the  scheme  of  a  Balkan 
Confederation  :  "I  have  every  confidence  that  the  Turkish 

1  Major  Sarrou,  in  La  Jeune  Turquie  et  la  Revolution,  p.  n. 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     135 

army  .  .  .  will  bring  about  fraternity  among  the  Balkan 
Peoples.  Thus  will  finally  be  realized,  for  the  happiness  of 
all  the  nations  of  the  Peninsula,  that  Oriental  Confederation 
which  has  so  long  been  the  object  of  our  hopes  and  dreams." 
Never,  indeed,  had  there  been  such  an  opportunity.  The 
Bulgarian,  Servian,  Rumanian  and  Greek  Press  applauded. 
It  is  probable  that  if,  just  at  this  moment,  the  Foreign 
Ministers  of  the  Great  Powers  had  not  publicly  acclaimed, 
in  their  several  Parliaments,  the  work  of  the  Committee,  the 
Young  Turks  might  have  been  checked  on  the  headlong 
path  of  presumptuous  nationalism  which,  four  years  later, 
was  to  precipitate  them,  together  with  the  Empire  for  which 
they  had  become  responsible,  into  one  of  the  greatest  dis- 
asters of  history.  Yet,  for  the  time  being,  the  Balkan 
States  were  ready  to  unite  with  the  Young  Turks  in  common 
hatred  of  the  Tyrant.  Unfortunately,  the  Young  Turks 
were  vain-glorious  and  inexperienced.  Although  fed  on  the 
crude  pastry  of  revolutionary  formulas,  the  leaders  repudi- 
ated, at  their  very  first  success,  the  idealism  which  had  con- 
ciliated the  sympathy  of  the  Balkan  nationalities.  On 
Monday,  October  5,  1908,  Austria-Hungary,  backed  by 
Germany,  annexed  Bosnia-Herzegovina,  and  Bulgaria, 
proclaiming  its  independence,  annexed  Eastern  Rumelia. 
The  Committee  might  have  seized  this  opportunity  to  place 
itself  at  the  head  of  a  Balkan  League.1  It  preferred, 
instead,  to  take  a  futile  revenge  by  boycotting  Austrian  and 


1  Dr.  Kleanthes  Nicolaides,  who  played  an  interesting  part  in  the 
negotiations  resulting  in  the  conclusion  of  the  Balkan  League,  con- 
tributed in  November  1912,  three  valuable  articles  to  the  Echo  de 
Paris  on  "  La  Gen6se  de  1'Union  Balkanique."  He  showed  notably 
that,  throughout  the  preliminary  discussions  for  the  establishment 
of  their  Union,  the  Balkan  States  always  expressed  the  wish  that 
Turkey  should  form  part  of  it.  "  It  remained  possible  for  Turkey 
to  enter  the  League,  hi  fact,  up  to  the  beginning  of  August  1912. 
If  Turkey  had  seized  the  opportunity  thus  offered  her,  she  might 
be  to-day  at  the  head  of  the  Union.  .  .  She  owes  the  present  disaster 
solely  to  the  lack  of  judgment  and  good- will  of  her  rulers." 


136  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

Bulgarian  trade.  A  Young  Turk  Mission,  sent  to  Western 
Europe,  to  arouse  the  sympathy  and  to  secure  the  diplo- 
matic and  financial  support  of  France  and  England,  re- 
turned to  Salonica  crest-fallen,  and  convinced  that  Europe 
was  jealous  of  the  Committee's  success.  In  their  exaspera- 
tion, the  Revolution  leaders  decided  to  adopt  a  policy  of 
militarism,  while  the  Committee  simultaneously  prepared  a 
scheme  for  submerging  the  Christian  peoples  of  Macedonia 
under  a  flood  of  Mussulman  immigrants. 

The  chiefs  of  the  Bulgarian,  Greek,  Servian  and  Al- 
banian Committees  and  Bands  had  hitherto  honestly  be- 
lieved in  the  protestations  as  to  Ottoman  fraternity. 
Even  in  March  1909,  at  the  moment  of  the  reactionary 
coup  d'etat  at  Constantinople,  the  Macedonian  Christians 
remained  loyal  to  the  Revolution.  Race  quarrels,  domes- 
tic rivalries,  disappeared,  says  Mr.  Sam  Levy  x  (perhaps  the 
most  competent  authority  on  the  spot),  in  presence  of 
the  danger  incurred  by  the  new  regime.  Even  the 
Governments  of  the  Balkan  States  still  manifested  their 
readiness  to  co-operate  in  the  work  of  Macedonian  reform. 
Thus  seconded,  the  Committee  of  Union  and  Progress 
recovered  its  power,  and  deposed  the  Sultan.  But  its  point 
of  view  had  now  completely  changed.  It  had  become  the 
counterpart  of  the  sinister  Committee  of  Public  Safety  of  the 
French  Revolution.  Forgetting  its  promises  of  Liberty, 
Equality,  Fraternity  and  Justice,  it  pursued  now  a  purely 
Islamic  policy.  Its  aim  henceforth  was  to  crush  out  all  the 
Christian  Nationalities  in  the  Empire,  and  notably  in 
Macedonia.  Yet,  long-suffering  still,  the  Balkan  States 
remained  almost  quixotically  friendly.  Official  declara- 
ations  in  Sofia  and  Belgrade  left  no  doubt  as  to  the  sincerity 
of  the  desire  of  these  two  Balkan  Powers  to  settle  the  pro- 
blems of  Macedonia  in  co-operation  with  the  New  Turkey, 
and  without  a  war.  The  Tsar  Ferdinand  went  to  Con- 

1  Les  Mifaits  du  Comite  Union  et  Progr&s  ;  Sam  Levy  :  Mecherou- 
tiette,  October,  1912. 


A  STUDY   OF   INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     137 

stantinople  on  an  official  visit,  and  Pierre  Karageorgewitch 
was  welcomed  officially  at  Salonica.  What  was  the  result  of 
these  advances  to  Turkey  ?  Turkish  psychology  is  not  as 
that  of  the  Western  nations.  The  attitude  of  the  Christian 
peoples  of  the  Balkans  was  interpreted  as  an  indication  of 
their  inferiority.  Bulgaria  and  Servia  were  believed  to 
be  afraid  of  the  neo-Ottoman  Power.  The  Committee 
of  Union  and  Progress  accordingly  proceeded  to  persecute 
the  Bulgarian  clubs  in  Macedonia,  and  to  promulgate 
the  Associations  Law  (August  1909)  l  interdicting  all 
nationalist  or  religious  meetings.  By  1910,  in  fact,  Macedonia 
had  once  again  become  a  pandemonium  of  fratricidal  pas- 
sions. Anarchy  was  more  rampant  there  than  under  the 
reign  of  Abdul  Hamid.  On  January  23,  1910,  the  Salonica 
newspaper  already  quoted,  printed  in  large  type  the  following 
note  : — 

"  We  learn  that  serious  pourparlers  are  now  going  on  between  the 
most  influential  members  of  the  Greek  and  Bulgarian  communities 
to  arrive  at  a  rapprochement.  It  would  even  appear  that  an  under- 
standing is  already  under  way." 

The  Crown  Prince  of  Servia  arrived  at  Sofia  on  the  same 
day.  The  Balkan  League  was  in  being.  Young  Turk 
presumption  and  incapacity  had  worked  this  miracle. 
The  Committee  of  Union  and  Progress  had  opened,  between 
the  Balkan  Nationalities  and  the  Turkish  Empire,  the  gulf, 
deeper  than  the  Sea  of  Marmara,  into  which  they  were  to  be 
hurled  headlong  only  two  years  later. 

The  connexion  of  the  episode  of  the  Turkish  Revolution 

1  Clause  four  of  this  law  was  as  follows  :  "  The  establishment 
of  Political  Associations  on  the  basis,  or  under  the  denomination  of 
nationality,  is  prohibited."  This  was  a  fatal  blunder.  It  entailed 
the  immediate  dissolution  of  the  various  nationalist  clubs  in  Mace- 
donia, which  were,  nevertheless,  loyally  devoted  to  the  Young  Turk 
Movement  and  to  the  Constitution.  The  immediate  consequence 
was  a  revival  of  the  old-time  suspicion  of  the  Turk  throughout 
Macedonia,  and  a  rapidly  growing  distrust  of  the  "  Committee  of 
Union  and  Progress." 


138  PROBLEMS  OF   POWER 

and  of  the  Balkan  war  with  the  immediate  theme  is  suffi- 
ciently obvious.  The  Berlin  Treaty  was  a  bungling  artifice 
for  stifling  the  cries  of  the  youthful  Balkan  nations  created 
by  the  Treaty  of  San  Stefano.  San  Stefano  had  given  the 
Balkan  peoples  the  hope  that  they  were  about  to  enjoy  a 
national  existence.  Three  cynical  surgeons,  Bismarck,  Bea- 
consfield  and  Andrassy,  suddenly  seized  the  infant  Powers, 
gagged  them,  and — without  even  bandaging  their  wounds- 
handed  them  over  to  the  Turkish  task-master.  During 
nearly  thirty  years  the  Turk  was  suffered  to  brutalize  his 
wards,  with  only  occasional  inspection  or  reproach  on  the  part 
of  the  "  interested  "  and  "  disinterested  "  Powers.  Finally, 
in  1908,  came  the  Revolution.  After  1908  for  a  wonderful 
period  of  eighteen  months  the  Turkish  task-master  seemed 
to  have  been  transformed  into  a  comrade.  In  this  new  role, 
however,  the  Turk  made  but  a  fleeting  appearance.  He  van- 
ished into  the  wings  and  came  forth  in  the  garb  of  an  exe- 
cutioner. But,  in  spite  of  the  implication  of  the  Treaty  of 
Frankfort  and  of  the  Treaty  of  Berlin,  the  substance  of  human 
nature  is  not  quite  of  the  same  malleable  and  senseless  stuff 
as  that  of  the  elements  composing  a  chemical  compound. 
The  vile  Slav  worm  had  become  a  chrysalis  and  was  destined 
to  break  the  cocoon  so  ingeniously  and  artificially  elaborated 
at  the  Berlin  Congress.  If  the  Treaty  of  San  Stefano  had 
been  suffered  to  remain  the  law  of  Europe,  the  world  would 
have  been  spared  the  horrors  of  October  and  November 
1912 ;  but,  at  the  same  time,  it  would  have  been  deprived  of  a 
singularly  interesting  object-lesson.  It  would  not  have  had 
this  fresh  illustration  of  the  short-sightedness  of  the  Founder 
of  the  German  Empire.  Indeed,  what  were  to  become, 
after  Bismarck's  death,  the  vital  Imperial  interests  of  the 
New  Germany,  have  all  along  been  hampered  in  their  evo- 
lution by  the  very  influences  that  Germany  herself  set  in 
motion  when  she  forced  upon  the  world  the  two  arbitrary 
solutions  of  the  Treaties  of  1870  and  1878. 
The  relations  between  the  members  of  the  Triple  Entente 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     139 

during  the  period  just  analysed,  from  1904  to  the  formation 
of  the  Balkan  League  and  to  the  famous  coup  d'Agadir, 
seem,  however,  to  mark  a  partial  and  temporary  success  of 
German  policy.  Nothing  is  more  curious  than  the  way  the 
harmonious  working  of  the  Triple  Entente  was  for  a  long  time 
endangered  by  the  friction  which  the  domestic  problems  of 
its  several  members  generated.  What  M.  Andre  Tardieu 
accurately  described  in  1910  and  1911  as  "  Anglo-Franco- 
Russian  ataxy  "  found  therein  one  of  its  main  causes.  Of 
the  three  partners  to  this  pact,  France,  in  spite  of  the  crises 
of  rebellion  among  her  civil  servants,  has  perhaps  of  late 
suffered  the  least  embarrassment.  More  than  either  Eng- 
land or  Russia  she  has  been  at  liberty  to  seek  to  adjust  her 
own  private  interests  to  the  vital  common  interests  of  the 
Triple  Entente.  Her  friends  were  for  some  years  less  free 
than  she  to  play  their  part  according  to  the  rules  of  the  game. 
After  the  death  of  King  Edward  the  very  foundations  of 
British  Society  and  of  England's  Imperial  greatness  were 
jeopardized,  and  they  remained  in  peril,  as  will  be  seen,1  until 
the  defeat  of  Canadian  reciprocity  with  the  United  States. 
England's  absorption  in  her  own  grave  private  matters 
resulted  in  the  dangerous  indifference  and  irresolution  (as  if 
she  had  eaten  curare  and  all  her  motor  nerves  were  paralysed) 
which,  for  many  months  prior  to  Agadir,  caused  her  to 
withhold  from  France  all  but  the  most  spasmodic  assist- 
ance. And  what  the  Temps  said  of  the  Entente  Cordiale, 
that  its  members  had  "  pratique  parallelement,  dans  la 
solidarite  des  sentiments,  et  I'mcoherence  des  actes,  la 
politique  du  laisser  faire,"  might,  with  even  greater  force, 
have  been  applied  to  the  relations  between  France  and 
Russia,  until  M.  Poincare,  at  the  head  of  a  really  "  national  " 
ministry,  decided  to  substitute  for  the  policy  of  laisser  oiler 
a  policy  of  strenuous  and  concerted  action.2  Ever  since  the 

1  See  pp.  175-191. 

8  The  first  executive  act  of  M.  Poincare,  as  President  of  the  Re- 
public, was  the  appointment  (Feb.  20,  1913)  of  M.  Delcasse  as  Am- 


140  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

Russo-Japanese  War,  Russia  had,  in  fact,  been  trying  to  run 
with  the  hare  and  hunt  with  the  hounds.  The  new  Russia, 
the  Russia  of  the  Duma,  under  the  guidance  of  M.  Stolypin, 
undertook  to  reconcile  the  dangerous  ideas  that  have  invaded 
it  from  the  West  and  its  own  native  traditions ;  to  create 
a  Parliament  on  Russian  soil  without  infringing  the  prero- 
gatives of  the  Autocrat  of  All-the-Russias  ;  but,  above  all, 
as  M.  Victor  Berard  has  put  it,  to  honour  its  signature  as 
partner  in  the  Triple  Entente  without  breaking  with  its  old 
friends  and  allies,  the  Hohenzollerns  and  the  Hapsburgs. 
In  this  duel  between  Constitutionalism  and  Nationalism, 
the  wonder  was  that  the  Triple  Entente  should  have  survived 
even  up  to  Potsdam. 

Frenchmen  cherished  for  ten  years  and  more  the  illusion 
that  the  Alliance  with  Russia  was  an  earnest  of  the  ultimate 
recovery  of  Alsace-Lorraine.  As  has  been  seen,  it  took  that 
length  of  time  for  them  to  comprehend  that  the  armies  of  the 
Dual  Alliance  were  the  armies  of  the  Hague  ;  that  neither  the 
Tsar  nor  their  own  rulers  had  contemplated  by  the  Alliance 
any  other  aim  than  that  of  defence  ;  that  the  sole  positive 
good  which  the  Alliance  was  intended  to  secure  was  the  main- 
tenance of  European  equilibrium,  and  that  they  who  had 
looked  to  it  as  a  potential  instrument  of  the  revanche  had 
been  tragically  duped. 

When  France  realized  that  the  Russian  Alliance  meant  not 
only  that  things  must  be  as  they  had  been,  but  that  all  hope 
of  better  days  was  gone,  the  plight  of  the  nation  was  one  that 
might  have  given  rise  to  a  certain  sullen  resentment.  Such 
resentment  did,  in  fact,  exist  to  a  certain  degree  among  the 
generations  that  remembered  the  war  of  1870.  Upon  the 

bassador  at  St.  Petersburg.  No  diplomatic  service  in  the  world  to- 
day can  boast  of  such  unity  of  views  as  is  thus  ensured  in  the  Quai 
d'Orsay  by  the  simultaneous  presence  of  the  two  Cambons  in  London 
and  Berlin  respectively,  of  M.  Barrere  in  Rome,  and  of  M.  Delcasse 
in  St.  Petersburg.  Let  the  reader  meditate  on  this  remark  in  the 
light  of  pp.  52-58. 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     141 

younger  generation,  on  the  contrary,  the  consequence  of  their 
slow  perception  of  the  real  significance,  in  its  European 
bearings,  of  the  pact  with  Russia  was  strangely  different. 
Little  by  little  the  notion  of  revanche  faded  from  the  fore- 
ground of  the  French  consciousness  and  gave  way  to  a  kind 
of  supine  satisfaction  with  the  idea  of  security  implied  in  the 
existence  of  the  Alliance.  If  the  Alliance  was  to  be  no  longer 
interpreted  as  a  means  of  realizing  French  dreams,  it  meant, 
at  all  events,  the  inexpressible  boon  of  peace.  The  French 
soul  tended  to  become  relaxed.  Humanitarianism,  "  paci- 
fism," anti-militarism,  began  to  flourish.  France  had  been 
cocardier  up  to  1890.  The  Russian  Alliance  gradually 
calmed  her  nerves,  dissipated  her  fears,  lulled  her  to 
sleep.  A  Dreyfus  Case  became  possible.  Strong  in  their 
faith  in  the  loyalty  of  Russia  to  keep  strict  watch  over  the 
German  dogs  of  war,  in  case  they  seemed  to  be  preparing  to 
leap  across  her  eastern  frontier,  the  Republicans  fancied 
themselves  at  liberty  to  indulge  in  idealistic  experiment,  and 
free  to  respond,  for  instance,  without  loss  of  dignity,  or  dread 
of  the  consequences,  to  the  cajoleries  and  flatteries  of  the 
German  Kaiser.  If  he  had  continued  to  cajole  instead 
of  beginning  to  menace,  humanitarianism  might  have 
gangrened  the  whole  of  France. 

One  public  man  of  eminence  in  France,  and  one  public 
man  alone,  President  Grevy,  had  a  foreign  policy  which 
might  have  saved  his  country  from  some  of  the  psycholo- 
gical consequences,  and  from  the  positive  sequence,  of  the 
events  that  ensued.  President  Grevy  never  tired  of  preach- 
ing the  gospel  of  isolation,  the  danger  of  entangling  alliances. 
But  he  was  over-ruled,  and  successive  Ministers  in  France 
who  extolled  the  Russian  Alliance  hoped  not  merely  to  assure 
European  equilibrium,  but  to  maintain  European  peace  by 
holding  Germany  hi  check.  They  were  also  aiming  in- 
directly at  the  great  century-old  rival  of  their  country,  Great 
Britain.  Notwithstanding  Bismarck's  efforts  to  thwart 
the  inception  of  the  Franco-Russian  Alliance,  the  heirs  of  his 


142  PROBLEMS  OF   POWER 

policy  found  in  the  Franco-Russian  Alliance  one  of  their 
most  magnificent  opportunities.  What  the  Germans  rapidly 
perceived  was  that  in  the  Dual  Alliance,  by  the  nature  of 
things,  German  hegemony  was  in  being.  By  that  Alliance 
the  traditional  bellicose  France  was  paralysed.  With  a 
splendid  and  almost  diabolic  ingenuity  Germany  evolved  a 
scheme  for  utilizing  the  Alliance  in  her  own  interest.  She 
did  all  in  her  power  to  fan  the  embers  of  Anglo-French  dis- 
cord by  favouring  French  colonial  expansion.  She  was  aware 
that  the  first  result  would  be  to  pit  France  against  England 
under  every  clime  and  on  every  sea  ;  the  second  that  young 
ambitious  Italy  would  become  the  deadly  foe  of  France  ; 
and  the  third,  that  she  herself  would  ultimately  be  able  to 
dictate  to  a  divided  Europe  the  direction  of  European  policy. 
For  long  years  German  foresight  was  confirmed  to  the 
letter.  The  daring  plan  for  keeping  down  French  resiliency 
was  for  a  time  completely  successful.  France  and  England 
came  into  dangerous  collision  everywhere.  Italy  and 
France  glared  at  each  other  in  Tunis  and  over  the  Dauphine 
passes,  while  the  Triple  Alliance  was  being  slowly  consoli- 
dated. Successive  German  Chancellors  rubbed  their  hands 
in  glee,  and  German  hegemony  assumed  the  aspect  of  a 
pillar  of  cloud  by  day  and  almost  of  fire  by  night. 

But  the  German  plan  succeeded  too  admirably.  The 
Greeks,  who  were  practical  psychologists,  noted  that  a 
Nemesis  dogs  the  steps  of  a  man  or  nation  addicted  to 
the  unpardonable  sin  of  pride.  There  came  a  time, 
amid  the  multiple  shocks  which  harassed  the  nerves  of 
British  and  French  Foreign  Ministers,  as  the  lines  of  British 
and  French  Colonial  expansion  dovetailed  throughout  the 
world,  when  the  chances  of  peace  or  war  between  France 
and  England  seemed  to  hang  by  a  thread.  Both  Powers, 
after  Fashoda,  awoke  to  the  idea  that  they  had  been  playing 
the  German  game  ;  that  while  they  had  been  irritating  one 
another  by  constant  pin-pricks,  Germany  had  been  looming 
more  and  more  menacingly  on  the  horizon.  The  scales 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     143 

seemed  to  drop  simultaneously  from  their  eyes.  They 
saw — with  the  clearness  presented  by  one  of  those 
superb  comic  situations  staged  by  Fate — that  either 
they  must  go  to  war  for  the  benefit  of  Germany  or 
must  come  to  an  understanding  with  her,  in  their  common 
interest,  to  the  discomfiture  of  a  common  rival.  Fashoda 
was  the  fork  on  their  Damascus  road.  The  revelation  they 
received  there  flung  into  dazzling  light  the  whole  malicious-' 
ness  of  the  German  scheme,  of  which  they  had  been  for 
years  the  dupes.  Such  was  the  beautifully  logical  birth  of 
that  Entente  Cordiale  which  shattered  as  by  a  thunderbolt  a 
German  policy  that  had  lasted,  and  succeeded,  for  nearly 
twenty  years. 

For  some  months  Germany  lay  stunned  and  prone.  The 
incredible  had  happened.  There  had  been  long  years  in 
the  nineties  when  the  Wilhelmstrasse  must  have  known 
as  well  as  the  Quai  d'Orsay,  or  any  Parisian,  that  England 
was  even  more  hated  in  France  than  the  Power  which  had 
dismembered  that  country  in  the  Galerie  des  Glaces  at 
Versailles.  The  possibility  that  England  and  France  could 
ever  come  to  terms  was  not  taken  in  Germany  as  even  a 
remote  contingency.  It  was  regarded  as  a  political  ab- 
surdity. Yet  the  incredible  thing  had  happened.  And, 
irony  of  ironies,  it  had  occurred  simply  as  a  consequence 
of  the  overweening  success  of  the  Bismarckian  plan. 

After  the  first  discountenancing  blow  it  was  not  surpris- 
ing that  the  German  Chancery  was  a  long  time  pulling 
itself  together.  Germany's  uncouth  movements  and  ges- 
tures in  seeking  to  wreck  the  new  combination  of  the 
Entente  Cordiale ;  her  futile  efforts  in  Spain,  before  the 
accession  of  the  young  Sovereign,  to  balk  the  Mediterranean 
policy  of  M.  Delcasse,  and  to  sweep  that  Power  into  the 
orbit  of  the  Triple  Alliance  ;  her  invention  of  a  Moroccan 
Question  as  a  means  of  cleaving  in  two  the  Franco-British 
block  which  had  only  just  been  welded ;  her  nervous,  vio- 
lently aggressive  manner,  so  cousue  de  fil  blanc,  as  the  French 


144  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

say — all  these  are  facts  fresh  in  the  memory  not  only  of  the 
professional  politician  but  of  the  ordinary  observer.  And 
the  more  Germany  wriggled,  contrived,  meddled  and 
stormed,  the  more  rooted  became  the  Entente  Cordiale 
in  the  hearts  of  Frenchmen  and  of  Englishmen,  the  more 
natural  seemed  the  miracle,  the  more  real  the  joy  of  the 
two  Chanceries  and  of  the  two  peoples.  Only  a  few 
keen-sighted  observers  in  either  country  appeared  to  per- 
ceive, amid  the  strains  of  optimistic  jubilation  in  which 
England  and  France  welcomed  the  reconciliation  and 
the  now  "  definitive  "  establishment  of  European  equili- 
brium, that  Germany,  by  the  Titanic  blunder  of  her  old 
Bismarckian  non-colonial  policy,  had  closed  to  herself 
— politically — almost  every  habitable  corner  of  the  globe ; 
yet  that  she  had  developed  a  great  material  civilization, 
with  instincts  of  economic  and  commercial  expansion 
which  must  find  an  outlet  or  burst.  Only  a  few  ap- 
peared to  perceive  that  she  was  not  likely  to  accept  the 
new  status  quo  created  by  the  Triple  Entente,  and  that  every 
practical  device  which  an  astute  Real  Politik,  unshackled 
by  scruple,  unpoisoned  by  the  sophistications  of  a  fanatical 
idealism,  and  inspired  by  patriotism,  could  suggest  or 
invent,  would  be  utilized  for  the  destruction  of  that  pact 
which  seemed  to  have  established  the  balance  of  power  in 
Europe. 

If  it  had  not  been  for  the  issue  of  the  Russo-Japanese 
War — a  result  utterly  unforeseen  by  the  Quai  d'Orsay, 
and  the  perilous  consequences  of  which,  from  the  point  of 
view  of  French  interests,  had  never  been  taken  into  account 
in  France — the  French  nation  might  have  continued,  like 
the  English,  to  remain,  as  a  whole,  blandly  ignorant  of 
strategic  conditions  and  of  international  relations  on  the 
Continent  of  Europe.  To  be  sure,  the  Algeciras  Conference 
and  the  Casablanca  incident  were  yet  to  intervene  as  object- 
lessons  for  the  most  indifferent ;  but  the  defeat  of  the  Rus- 
sian ally,  Russian  paralysis  as  a  military  power  for  some 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     145 

years  to  come,  was  an  event  which,  at  the  time,  opened  the 
eyes  of  even  the  least  discerning  of  French  observers.  While 
it  enabled  them  to  divine,  perhaps  better  than  they  other- 
wise might  have  done,  the  causes  of  the  audacity  of  Ger- 
many in  her  Moroccan  policy,  it  also  enhanced  for  them 
the  value  of  the  Entente  with  England,  and  made  them 
all  the  more  vigilant  as  to  the  preservation  of  that  Entente, 
according  to  the  conception  of  its  promoters.  British  poli- 
tics, both  domestic  and  foreign,  were  bound  to  be  watched 
by  Frenchmen  as  jealously  as  they  watched  their  own, 
and  even  more  carefully  and  jealously  than  they  watched 
those  of  Russia.  England  had  partially  taken  the  place 
of  Russia  in  French  affections.  In  the  same  breath  in 
which  Frenchmen  repudiated,  and  sincerely  repudiated, 
the  notion  that  the  Entente  was  dear  to  them  because  it 
meant  a  possible  revanche,  and  insisted,  and  sincerely  in- 
sisted, that  they  longed  above  all  for  European  peace,  they 
acknowledged  that  the  Entente  was  possible  only  because 
it  satisfied  the  common  interest  of  France  and  England 
in  thwarting  the  manoeuvres  of  a  common  foe.  That  foe 
was  Germany,  who  was  imperilling  British  sea-power  after 
having  torn  great  strips  of  flesh  from  the  side  of  France. 

France  has  never  desired  war,  but  she  has  never  wished 
for  a  peace  which  is  a  "  peace  at  any  price."  During  the 
past  few  years,  for  the  first  time,  perhaps,  in  history  since 
the  Dukes  of  Normandy  ceased  to  govern  both  at  Caen  and 
London,  Frenchmen  have  honestly,  even  cordially,  desired 
the  well-being  of  England.  Every  event  which  can  con- 
tribute to  England's  greatness  has  been  a  sincere  joy  to 
them.  Every  incident  tending  to  diminish  England's 
standing,  alter  her  traditions,  weaken  her  as  a  world-power, 
has  been  regarded  in  France  with  surprise  and  with  some- 
thing like  dismay.  These  words  apply  to  the  rank  and 
file  of  the  French  nation.  The  pervasive  genuine  goodwill 
of  Frenchmen  towards  England  after  1905  has  been,  and 
is,  a  fact  which  stands  for  all  it  is  worth,  all  it  is  possible  to 

L 


146  PROBLEMS  OF   POWER 

make  out  of  it  for  diplomatic  ends,  even  in  face  of  minor 
differences  between  the  two  Governments.  But  the  one 
thing  that  Frenchmen  saw  in  1910  and  1911,  with  an  almost 
supernatural  clearness,  after  the  ominous  events  in  Central 
Europe  and  the  Middle  East,  was  that  for  France  to  remain 
France,  England  must  not  cease  to  be  England.  When 
even  a  Lord  Curzon  expressed  the  hope  of  settling  such  a 
question  as  that  of  Muscat  by  an  appeal  to  sentiment,  the 
French  wondered  if  the  businesslike  and  level-headed  Eng- 
land against  which  they  had  fought  on  a  hundred  battle- 
fields, the  England  with  which  they  fancied  they  had  come 
to  terms,  had  suddenly  vanished  from  the  map.  They 
saw  in  such  a  fact  as  this,  as  they  saw  in  the  rhythm  of  the 
humanitarian  Sabbat  to  which  in  1911  all  England  seemed 
to  be  dancing,  the  evidence  of  British  insularity,  the 
sign  of  England's  ignorance  as  to  the  strategic  condi- 
tions governing  European  politics,  the  apparently  hope- 
less confirmation  of  the  phrase  which  George  Meredith 
often  used  to  the  present  writer  :  "  England's  political 
intelligence  runs  to  horns."  And  when  the  Secretary 
for  War  sought  to  drive  Field-Marshal  Lord  Roberts 
into  a  corner,  by  his  witty  but  futile  assertion  that  Lord 
Roberts  was  insisting  upon  preparing  for  the  "  logically 
possible  "  instead  of  for  the  "  reasonably  probable,"  French- 
men asked  themselves  in  what  Teutonic  world  of  mediaeval 
scholasticism  that  Minister  had  acquired  his  dialectics.1 


1  Some  months  later,  in  November  1912,  Viscount  Haldane,  then 
Lord  Chancellor,  rebuked  Lord  Roberts  for  being  ignorant  of  stra- 
tegy, accusing  him  of  overlooking  the  fact  that  England's  safety 
depended  on  command  of  the  sea.  This  rebuke  fell  from  the  lips 
of  the  man  who,  some  years  before,  had  spoken  of  a  "  whole  nation 
springing  to  arms  on  war  being  declared  and  nobly  preparing  to 
submit  itself  to  six  months'  training  in  order  to  meet  the  invading 
foe."  The  date  chosen  by  Lord  Haldane  for  his  rebuke  was  the  eve 
of  the  day  when  Turkey  agreed  to  begin  negotiations  for  peace  after 
a  war  that  had  lasted  only  six  weeks,  and  had  driven  her  troops  under 
the  walls  of  Constantinople. 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     147 

Adversity,  in  a  word,  has  made  the  French  of  the  Third 
Republic  a  more  suspicious  people  than  the  nation  which 
fell  into  the  snare  of  the  mendacious  telegram  of  Ems- 
France  has  been  bruised  and  buffeted  by  England,  humili- 
ated and  flouted  by  Germany.  Even  a  race  less  eminently 
intelligent  could  not  fail  to  learn  something  from  so  harsh 
an  experience.  When  one  has  been  the  dupe  of  one's 
generous  sentiments  and  of  one's  doctrinaire  notions  of 
right,  only  two  refuges  are  left,  sainthood  or  common 
sense.  French  foreign  politics  have  begun  to  become  prac- 
tical, after  having  been  as  sublimely  and  as  dangerously 
disinterested  as  were  those  of  the  ideologue  Gladstone. 
Europe  still  seems  to  find  it  difficult  to  understand  that 
business  methods  and  prudent  self-interest  can  ever  pre- 
vail at  the  Quai  d'Orsay :  it  still  thinks  France  amenable 
to  blandishment  and  ready  to  follow  the  marsh-lights 
of  idealism.  Her  friends  and  allies  have  at  last  learned 
that  she  realizes  as  keenly  as  Herr  von  Bethmann  Hollweg 
that  Europe  is  Europe,  that  Continental  politics  are  not 
politics  in  a  Ley  den  jar,  and  that  the  old  saying  still  holds 
good  :  "  The  weak  will  be  the  prey  of  the  strong  "  ;  but  in 
1909,  1910  and  1911  they  were  still  unaware  of  the  change, 
and  the  sterility  of  the  Triple  Entente  was  then  the  main 
characteristic  of  that  pact. 

The  feeling  in  France  in  1910  and  1911  was  that  the  Triple 
Entente  might  not  be  an  Alliance  in  the  technical  sense  of 
the  word,  but  that  if  it  were  not  an  Alliance,  for  all  practical 
Purposes,  it  were  better  broken.  No  Frenchman  was  in- 
clined to  quarrel  over  the  choice  of  a  word  to  describe  the 
relations  between  France  and  England  :  modern  politics 
are  not  a  branch  of  semantics,  and  French  experience  of 
the  connotation  of  the  word  "  Alliance,"  as  employed  in 
description  of  the  Franco-Russian  pact,  had  not  been 
calculated  to  arrest  the  growth  of  a  salutary  scepticism 
as  to  the  utility  of  "  alliances."  But  if  the  relations  be- 
tween England  and  France,  if  the  words  "  Entente  Cordiale  " 


148  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

and  "  Triple  Entente  "  mean  anything,  they  mean  at  all 
events  a  common  sense  of  the  common  interests  uniting 
the  three  Powers,  England,  France  and  Russia  ;  and  it 
was  obvious  even  before  Agadir  that  they  ought  to  mean, 
above  all  (as  even  The  Times  and  the  Temps  agreed  in 
acknowledging),  that  these  three  Powers  had  one  vital 
interest :  the  maintenance  of  the  European  equilibrium. 
What  every  Frenchman  wanted  to  know  was  whether 
Englishmen  had  as  keen  a  sense  as  they  of  the  reality  of 
this  vital  interest.  In  France,  gratitude  for  the  inestim- 
able services  which  England  had  rendered  her  whenever 
the  Moroccan  difficulty  menaced  the  peace  of  Europe,  was 
still,  in  June  1911,  just  before  Agadir,  a  living  sentiment. 
But  if  the  French  Parliament,  if  the  French  public,  had 
drawn  any  lesson  from  that  long-protracted  and  anxious 
period,  it  was  that  humanitarian  aspirations  were  a  dan- 
ous  luxury ;  and  the  Moroccan  difficulty  was  not  the  only 
question  that  might  lead  to  war.  Of  the  two  great  blun- 
ders committed  by  the  otherwise  irreproachable  statesman, 
M.  Delcasse — his  blindness  to  the  fact  that,  in  allowing 
Russia  to  go  to  war  with  Japan,  France  suffered  her  ally 
to  paralyse  her  efficiency  in  Europe,  and  his  neglect  to  secure 
for  France  the  army  and  the  navy  of  his  policy — the  French 
perceived  that  the  latter  mistake  was  incomparably  the 
more  unpardonable  and  the  more  heinous.  M.  Clemenceau, 
when  Prime  Minister,  left  the  British  Foreign  Office 
no  peace  in  his  constant  iteration  of  the  fact  that  England 
seemed  bent  on  repeating  the  blunder  of  M.  Delcasse.  One 
of  M.  Clemenceau's  main  objects  was  to  convert  the  En- 
tente into  a  military  treaty  of  defensive  alliance.  No  one 
saw  more  clearly  than  he  that  in  the  Europe  of  to-day  "  splen- 
did isolation  "  was  an  impossible  ideal  for  England.  His  views 
became  those  of  his  reflecting  compatriots,  as  they  observed 
that  in  proportion  as  German  energy  became  more  rampant, 
and  the  Balkan  Problem  more  acute,  England  seemed  to 
be  curling  her  antennae  inward,  to  be  losing  her  European 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL   POLITICS     149 

sense  and  becoming  more  and  more  deeply  self-absorbed. 
No  one  in  France,  in  1910  and  1911,  was  ashamed  to 
own  that  France  had  need  of  England.  But  every  one  in 
France  was  astounded  that  Englishmen  did  not  perceive 
that  they  had  an  even  greater  need  of  France.  French 
respect  for  England's  judgment  received  a  blow  when 
Englishmen  were  seen  to  be  allowing  domestic  insular  cares, 
and  even  the  grave  and  beautiful  interests  inspired  by 
the  noble  hieratic  ceremony  of  the  Coronation,  to  exclude 
from  their  thought  all  sense  of  their  relative  position  in  the 
world,  and  of  their  own  Imperial  contacts.  The  French 
wondered  whether  all  England  had  not  fallen  a  victim  to 
the  sleeping  sickness.  Above  a  supine  people  the  all-but- 
isolated  figure  of  Lord  Roberts  loomed  gigantically  for  their 
vision.  They  had  counted  on  England  because  England 
had  taught  them  to  dread  and  to  admire  her.  Yet  at  certain 
moments  England  seemed  to  be  selling  her  birthright  of  prac- 
tical sense  and  world-wide  dominion  for  futile  and  destructive 
domestic  measures,  and  humanitarian  dreams  that  were 
the  negation  of  an  intelligent  foreign  policy.  Even  before  Aga- 
dir  the  one  condition  of  efficiency  for  the  Entente,  as  well 
as  of  European  peace,  was  seen  in  France  to  be  that  England 
should  have  the  Army  and  Navy  of -her  traditional  policy. 
Lord  Curzon  was  applauded  when  he  said  that  in  England 
the  Foreign  Secretary  was  exactly  in  the  position  of  Moses 
in  the  battle  with  the  Amalekites  :  his  two  hands  had  to 
be  held  up  by  the  Ministers  for  the  Army  and  the  Navy. 
From  1910  to  1911  France  could  not — even  at  Constanti- 
nople— fight  the  battles  of  the  English  alone.  Yet  Lord 
Haldane  rejected  the  warnings  of  Lord  Roberts  and  of  the 
Military  Correspondent  of  The  Times  l ;  Sir  Edward  Grey 
called  down  on  his  head  the  crushing  retort  of  the 
German  Chancellor  ;  and  when  Mr.  Jowett  asked  the  Under- 

1  "  The  preservation  of  France  from  an  attack  (by  Germany  before 
the  weight  of  Russia  begins  to  tell)  is  absolutely  vital  for  our  (Eng- 
land's) subsequent  security." — Times,  April  7,  1911. 


150  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

Secretary  of  State  for  Foreign  Affairs  "  if,  during  his  term 
of  office,  any  undertaking,  promise  or  understanding  had 
been  given  to  France,  that  in  certain  eventualities  British 
troops  would  be  sent  to  assist  the  operations  of  the  French 
Army,"  the  answer  was  "  in  the  negative."  The  pretty 
little  German  pocket  atlas  for  1910,  published  by  the  great 
house  of  Justus  Perthes,  described  the  North  Sea  as  the 
"  Deutsche  Meer,"  so  that  (as  the  French  weekly  newspaper 
L' Opinion  recalled  before  Agadir)  Great  Britain  se  trouve 
done  baignee  par  la  mer  allemande  !  Yet  there  were  little 
Englanders  still.  The  abolition  of  the  meridian  of  Paris, 
with  the  substitution  for  it  of  that  of  Greenwich,  had  its 
compensations.  But,, in  France,  at  all  events,  such  events 
were  not  regarded  as  being  in  themselves  a  sufficient  justi- 
fication of  the  raison  d'etre  of  the  Entente  Cordiale  during 
the  eighteen  months  in  which  Germany — after  having, 
in  collusion  with  Count  Aehrenthal,  shuffled  all  the  Balkan 
cards  and  rearranged  the  map  of  Europe — had  been  nego- 
tiating so  effectively  with  Russia  that  a  man  like  M.  Hano- 
taux  could  write,  however  extravagantly  :  Les  entretiens  de 
Potsdam  ont  cree,  de  I'aveu  de  tous,  une  situation  telle  qu'on 
est  bien  oblige  de  se  demander,  maintenant,  si  la  Russie  a 
rompu  le  pacte  de  la  Triple  Entente.  M.  Pichon,  before 
he  fell  from  office,  eloquently  explained  that  Russia  had 
done  nothing  of  the  kind,  and  that  all  was  for  the  best  in 
the  best  of  all  possible  Triple  Ententes.  Sir  Edward  Grey 
echoed  him  in  the  same  key  of  optimism,  forgetting,  like 
his  colleague  of  the  Quai  d'Orsay,  that  although,  from  1909- 
1911,  Constantinople  was  the  diplomatic  centre  where  the 
new  European  equilibrium  must  be  delicately  evolved,  it 
was  the  place  above  all  others  where  France  and  England 
seemed  incapable  of  a  common  action.  M.  Pichon  backed 
The  Times,  or  The  Times  backed  M.  Pichon,  on  the  question 
of  Flushing ;  but  The  Times  was  not  the  British  Govern- 
ment, and  as  little  was  heard  of  M.  Pichon's  protests  in 
defence  of  Belgian  neutrality  as  of  the  fate  of  the  British 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     151 

ultimatum  presented  to  the  Persian  Government  and  ridi- 
culously backed  out  of,  to  the  astonishment  of  the  Quai 
d'Orsay.  But  German  Welt-politik  was  following  then, 
as  it  .follows  to-day,  the  line  linking  the  two  horns  of 
a  crescent  which  might  well  pass  for  the  great  type-dilemma  : 
that  of  Koweit-Flushing.  Every  one  beheld  in  1911  how 
Russia  had  solved  that  dilemma,  what  Russia  thought  of 
the  problem  of  the  Baghdad  Railway.  She  had  gone  to 
Potsdam  and  virtually  left  France  and  England  to  settle 
matters  together — or  apart — as  best  they  could  ;  and  pend- 
ing the  settlement  England  was  arming  an  expedition  in 
the  Persian  Gulf  to  undo  the  anti-British  work  of  anarchy 
and  piracy  complacently  favoured  by  France  at  Muscat. 
When  the  French  public  noted  facts  of  this  nature,  as  they 
did  note  them ;  when  they  beheld,  as  M.  Tardieu,  the 
foreign  editor  of  the  Temps,  soberly  enough  put  it  at  the 
time,  that  il  semble  admis  que  chacun  doit  aller  de  son  cote 
sans  concert,  sans  communication  prealable,  au  petit  bonheur, 
they  concluded  that  chancellerie  was  an  excellent  name  for 
the  rocking-chairs  in  which,  with  discordant  rhythm,  the 
Foreign  Ministers  of  the  Triple  Entente  had  been  agitating, 
ever  since  the  annexation  of  Bosnia-Herzegovina,  the  graver 
questions  of  European  policy. 

In  1911,  in  fact,  after  four  years  of  discordant  action,  in 
the  summer  months  just  preceding  Agadir,  Frenchmen  were 
beginning  to  conclude,  from  their  perception  of  the  hollow- 
ness  of  certain  optimistic  official  assurances  as  to  the  in- 
tegrity and  efficiency  of  the  Triple  Entente,  that  they 
would  perhaps  do  well  to  withdraw  from  a  pact  which 
had  served  its  tune.  Second  thoughts  reminded  them, 
however,  that  it  would  be  unfortunate  for  them,  and  unfor- 
tunate for  England,  if  they  should  take  to  meditating  too 
deeply  on  the  idea  that  had  ^recently  been  put  to  them  by 
an  ex-Foreign  Minister,  M.  Hanotaux,  in  his  sensational 
article,  "  //  Faut  Choisir."  It  was,  after  all,  too  late  then 
to  return  to  the  principle  of  President  Grevy.  Germany 


152  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

was  not  Germany  when  that  statesman  recommended  to 
France  a  policy  of  absolute  isolation ;  but  Germany  was 
Germany  in  1911.  And,  by  the  same  token,  England  was 
England  then,  but  England  was  not,  in  1910  and  1911,  the 
same  England.  That  England  should  once  more  become 
England  was  felt  on  the  Continent,  everywhere  save  in 
Germany,  to  be  the  crying  European  need ;  and  it  was 
the  most  genuine  longing  of  France.  In  the  summer 
of  1911,  more  than  one  disinterested  observer  felt  like  saying, 
'  England  would  be  more  than  shortsighted,  she  would  be 
ignoring  her  own  interests,  and  the  interests  of  European 
peace,  if,  draping  herself  in  her  Coronation  robes,  she  were 
to  allow  France  to  cry  over  the  Channel,  into  her  indifferent 
ears,  the  words  of  Henry  IV  to  Crillon  :  "  We  have  conquered 
at  Arques,  but  you  were  not  there,  my  Crillon  !  " 

Happily  for  the  restoration  of  the  old-time  efficiency  of 
the  Triple  Entente,  Germany  was  at  that  very  hour  medi- 
tating the  action  which  was  to  rouse  England  from  her 
political  lethargy,  to  make  her  contemplate  from  another 
angle  the  naif  proposal  of  the  American  President  for  the 
signing  of  a  treaty  of  unrestricted  arbitration,  and  to  cause 
her  to  rush,  in  her  own  interests,  to  the  rescue  of  France, 
that  the  two  Powers  might  stand  shoulder  to  shoulder  at 
Arques. 

Certain  proposals  of  President  Taft,  relative  to  the  settle- 
ment of  "  matters  of  national  honour  "  by  Courts  of  Arbitra- 
tion, had  already  begun  to  work  havoc  in  England.  They 
had  been  welcomed  on  March  13,  1911,  by  Sir  Edward 
Grey  as  "  bold  and  courageous  words."  England  and  the 
United  States  seemed  to  be  wondering  why  the  President 
of  the  French  Republic  and  the  Tsar  of  Russia  were  so  long 
in  tendering  their  congratulations.  "  It  would  seem  as  if 
France  would  be  the  next  nation  to  come  into  line,"  ex- 
claimed one  of  the  makers  of  opinion  in  the  United  States. 
Foreigners,  however,  overlooked,  as  usual,  the  positive 
conditions  which,  whether  they  liked  it  or  not,  were  bound 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     153 

to  determine  the  attitude  of  present-day  Frenchmen  towards 
such  demonstrations  as  those  of  the  English-speaking  com- 
munities with  regard  to  treaties  for  the  abolition  of  war. 
The  foreigner  easily  falls  a  victim  to  optical  illusions 
when  he  tries  to  penetrate  the  reaches  of  French  idealism. 
What  the  English-speaking  world  chiefly  knows  of  France 
is  her  ideologic  bent :  the  date  of  1789,  the  Contrat  Social 
of  Rousseau  and  the  Declaration  of  the  Rights  of  Man,  the 
Revolution  and  the  Walkyrie  dash  of  the  Republican  armies 
over  the  toppling  thrones  of  Europe,  and  the  mystic  words 
which  "were  the  deeper  undertone  of  the  Marseillaise : 
Liberte,  Egalite,  Fraternite.  With  that  knowledge  it  couples 
the  recollection  of  the  doctrinaire  policies  of  the  Reveur 
Couronne  of  the  Second  Empire,  the  Emperor  who  was 
ever  ready  to  rush  to  the  succour  of  fallen  nationalities 
and  who  professed  to  prolong  thereby  the  democratic  war- 
cry  of  the  volunteers  of  the  Revolution.  And  finally,  the 
English-speaking  world,  face  to  face  with  forty  years  of  the 
Third  Republic,  admires  the  altruism  of  her  political  philo- 
sophy of  "  solidarity  " — in  reality,  a  dream  of  the  Masonic 
inspirers  of  that  Republic — the  magnificent  ten  years' 
battle  between  Individualism  and  the  Raison  d'Etat  in  the 
great  drama  of  the  Dreyfus  Case,  the  constant  urbanity 
of  her  attitude  ("  L' Adaptation  des  Alliances  "),  her  diplo- 
matic intervention  at  moments  of  tension  between  the 
Powers  (the  "  Dogger  Bank  "),  and  her  undeviating  loyalty 
to  the  ideal  that  maintains  the  Tribunal  of  the  Hague.1 

1  At  the  very  moment  when  Louis  Napoleon,  warned  over  and 
over  again  by  his  military  attache  in  Berlin,  Colonel  Stoffel,  and  by 
the  officer  in  command  of  the  place  of  Strasbourg,  General  Ducrot, 
of  the  intentions  of  Prussia  to  attack  France,  undertook  to  reform 
the  French  army  (1867),  the  Republican  party  proceeded  to  organize 
"  pacifist "  associations  and  leagues  in  favour  of  disarmament. 
The  Imperial  bill  was  attacked  before  the  Corps  Legislatif  by  Jules 
Simon,  Magnier,  Pelletan  and  Jules  Favre.  In  the  sitting  of  January 
2,  1868,  Marshall  Niel,  who  defended  the  bill,  was  apostrophized  as 
follows  by  Jules  Favre  :  "  Vous  voulez  done  faire  de  la  France  une 


154  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

This  France — which  is  only  one,  and  not  the  whole  France 
— is  the  France  visible  from  over  the  sea  and  from  over  the 
Channel ;  but  it  is  a  France  of  mirage,  a  mirage  that  has 
often  duped  and  lured  the  "  Anglo-Saxon  "  or  the  Levan- 
tine vision,  but  has  never  deluded  for  long  the  sceptical 
scrutiny  of  the  Powers  of  the  Continent.  There  is  quite 
another  France,  a  much  more  real  France,  the  France  that 
has  evolved  not  on  some  distant  Atlantis,  nor  yet  upon  an 
island  separated  by  an  estranging  sea  from  intimate  Con- 
tinental contacts.  There  is  the  France  that  has  all  along 
formed  an  integral  part  of  Continental  European  soil. 
That  France,  in  order  to  keep  up  with  the  fashion  of  the 
hour,  has  more  than  once  voted  purely  academic  resolu- 
tions in  favour  of  disarmament,  calling  on  the  Govern- 
ment "  to  exert  every  effort  to  place  on  the  programme  of 


caserne  ?  "  and  he  replied  in  words  that  MM.  d'Estournelles  de 
Constant,  Jaures  and  Bourgeois  would  appear  to  have  forgotten  : 
"  Et  vous,  prenez  garde  d'en  faire  un  cimetiere."  Two  years  later 
came  Sedan.  (Cf.  Chuquet :  La  Guerre,  1870-71.)  M.  Goyau  cites 
in  his  admirable  book,  L'ldee  de  Patrie  et  Humanitarisme,  p.  285, 
the  pathetic  words  of  Jules  Ferry  after  the  war.  "  Do  you  remem- 
ber," said  Ferry,  "  that  under  the  Empire  we  had  little  good  to  say 
of  militarism  ?  Do  you  recall  those  vague  aspirations  towards  general 
disarmament  .  .  .  that  characterized  the  democracy  of  the  time  ? 
A  number  of  us  professed  those  ideas  then.  .  .  .  But  is  there 
a  single  one,  I  ask  you,  who  has  not  been  converted  by  events  ? 
This  country  has  seen  the  war  of  1870  ;  it  has  turned  its  back  forever 
on  these  dangerous  and  deceptive  chimaeras."  Few  books  of  con- 
temporary history  are  more  illuminating  than  the  volume  by  M. 
Georges  Goyau,  from  which  the  preceding  passage  is  cited.  It  is, 
in  a  word,  the  record  of  the  brave  and  naive  efforts  of  the  Sociability 
and  Generosity  of  the  French — certain  Frenchmen  ! — to  inoculate 
Europe  with  the  love  of  peace  ;  a  history  that  never  could  have  been 
written  if  the  idealistic  Republicans,  who  had  coagulated  into  a  fixed 
idea  the  revolutionary  imaginations  of  the  Jacobins,  had  not  re- 
mained (until  about  ten  years  ago)  criminally  ignorant  of  geography 
and  of  European  affairs.  Even  they,  however,  have  finally  learned 
that  "  1'humanite  a  besoin,  pour  garder  la  France  comme  lumi£re, 
comme  verbe  et  m6me  comme  parure,  que  la  France  ne  cesse  point 
d'etre  la  patrie  fran9aise." 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     155 

work  at  the  next  Hague  Conference,  in  agreement  with  the 
friendly  and  allied  Powers,  the  question  of  the  simultaneous 
limitation  of  armaments  "  (February  23,  1911).  But  the 
same  France  noted  with  singular  satisfaction  on  April  30, 
1911,  the  cautious  and  lukewarm  terms  in  which  the  British 
Sovereign,  addressing  the  Lord  Mayor  after  the  Guildhall 
Meeting  held  to  consider  the  proposals  of  the  President  of 
the  United  States  of  America,  perfunctorily  affirmed  his 
"  gratification  "  at  receiving  "  these  records  of  opinions, 
unanimously  expressed,  upon  a  question  of  such  supreme 
and  far-reaching  importance,  by  an  assemblage  so  repre- 
sentative of  the  various  lines  of  thought  in  our  religious, 
political  and  social  life." 

Late  in  the  evening  of  May  9, 1911,  the  news  reached  Paris 
and  Berlin  that  the  Provincial  Committee  of  the  Reichsland, 
the  Delegation  of  Alsace-Lorraine,  had  that  afternoon 
been  prorogued.  The  Imperial  Cabinet  order  dissolving 
this  Assembly  was  dated  May  6,  the  first  day  of  the  Em- 
peror's visit  to  Alsace,  and  was  issued  from  Strasbourg. 
Forty-eight  hours  later  the  Alsace-Lorraine  Constitution 
and  Finance  Bills  were  rejected  by  the  Committee 
of  the  Reichstag.  Commenting  on  the  confusion  that 
reigned  in  the  Committee  previous  to  the  rejection  of  these 
measures,  the  Berlin  correspondent  of  The  Times  observed : 
"  Now,  as  so  often,  one  is  tempted  to  believe  that  most 
people  in  Berlin  and  throughout  the  greater  part  of  the 
German  Empire  know  no  more  about  Alsace-Lorraine  than 
about  the  German  colonies,  if  they  indeed  know  as  much." 
Paris,  France  in  general,  were  fortunately  better  informed. 

There  is  a  certain  historical  document  which  may  have 
been  forgotten  in  Berlin,  which,  no  doubt,  is  little  known  in 
London  and  in  Washington,  but  which,  if  it  does  not  yet 
figure,  as  it  ought  to  figure,  on  the  walls  of  every  French 
school,  is  still  fresh  in  the  memories  of  most  French  men. 
It  is  the  unanimous  Declaration  of  the  Deputies  of  the 
French  Departments  of  the  Bas-Rhin,  the  Haut-Rhin,  the 


156  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

Moselle,  the  Meurthe,  and  the  Vosges,  protesting  against 
the  alienation  of  Alsace-Lorraine,  and  affirming  the  im- 
mutable determination  of  the  population  of  these  two  Pro- 
vinces to  remain  Frenchmen.  One  hundred  and  seven 
members  of  the  National  Assembly — among  whom  were 
M.  Brisson,  the  late  President  of  the  French  Chamber  of 
Deputies,  and  M.  Clemenceau,  who  avenged  M.  Delcasse 
at  Casablanca — voted  against  the  preliminaries  of  peace 
ceding  Alsace  and  a  portion  of  Lorraine  to  Germany.  They 
had  assumed  this  sublime  responsibility  after  perusal  of 
such  passages  as  follow — and  it  would  be  a  crime  not  to  pre- 
serve the  original  language  of  the  Declaration  : — 

"  Europe  ne  peut  permettre  ni  ratifier  1'abandon  d' Alsace  et  de 
la  Lorraine.  Gardiennes  des  regies  de  la  justice  et  du  droit  des  gens, 
les  nations  civilisees  ne  sauraient  rester  plus  longtemps  insensibles 
au  sort  de  leur  voisine,  sous  peine  d'etre  a  leur  tour  victimes  des 
attentats  qu'elles  auraient  toleres.  L'Europe  moderne  ne  peut 
laisser  saisir  un  peuple  comme  un  vil  troupeau  ;  elle  ne  peut  rester 
sourde  aux  protestations  repetees  des  populations  menacees ;  elle 
doit  a  sa  propre  conservation  d'interdire  de  pareils  abus  de  force. 
Elle  salt  d'ailleurs  que  1'unite  de  la  France  est  aujourd'hui,  comme 
dans  le  passe,  une  garantie  de  1'ordre  general  du  monde,  une  bar- 
riere  centre  1'esprit  de  conquete  et  d'invasion.  La  paix  faite  au 
prix  d'une  cession  de  territoire  ne  serait  qu'une  treve  ruineuse  et 
non  une  paix  definitive.  Elle  serait  pour  tous  une  cause  d'agitations 
intestines,  une  provocation  legitime  et  permanente  a  la  guerre. 

"  En  resume,  1' Alsace  et  la  Lorraine  protestent  hautement  centre 
toute  cession ;  la  France  ne  peut  la  consentir,  1'Europe  ne  peut  la 
sanctionner. 

"  En  foi  de  quoi  nous  prenons  nos  concitoyens  de  France,  les 
gouvernements  et  les  peuples  du  monde  entier,  a  temoins  que  nous 
tenons  d'avance  pour  nuls  et  non  avenus  tous  actes  et  traites,  vote 
ou  plebiscite,  qui  consentiraient  abandon,  en  faveur  de  1'etranger,  de 
toute  ou  partie  de  nos  provinces  de  1' Alsace  et  de  la  Lorraine." 

This  protest  was  drawn  up  by  Gambetta  at  Bordeaux. 
That  great  patriot,  who  was  to  become  the  Tyrtaeus  of  la 
revanche  had  shown  himself  a  seer  :  "La  paix  au  prix  d'une 
cession  de  territoire  ne  sera  qu'une  treve  ruineuse  et  non  une 
paix  definitive.  Elle  serait  pour  tous  une  cause  d'agita- 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     157 

tions  intestines,  une  provocation  16gitime  et  permanente." 
Napoleon  III  was  no  less  prophetic.  In  a  letter,  written 
to  the  Countess  de  Mercy- Argenteau  just  after  the  treaty 
of  peace  closing  the  Franco-German  war,  he  said : — 

"  How  can  one  not  be  discouraged  in  presence  of  the  conditions 
of  peace  imposed  upon  France  ?  I  admit  we  were  the  aggressors ;  I 
admit  we  have  been  beaten,  and  that  we  were  obliged  therefore  to 
pay  the  costs  of  the  war  or  abandon  a  part  of  our  territory.  But  to 
condemn  us  to  both  at  once  is  very  hard.  ...  In  such  conditions 
it  is  not  a  peace  that  the  German  Emperor  is  concluding,  it  is  tan- 
tamount to  killing  us,  and  instead  of  re-establishing  peace,  it  sows  for 
the  future  hatred  and  distrust.  Is  this  good  policy,  even  for  Germany  ? 
I  do  not  think  so.  The  present  state  of  European  civilization  causes 
the  nations  to  be  bound  up  one  with  another  by  a  host  of  common 
interests  so  that  the  ruin  of  one  reacts  on  all  the  rest.  ...  If  the 
German  Emperor  and  Bismarck  had  profoundly  reflected  on  the 
state  of  Europe,  they  would  have  declared  that  while  France  remained 
deprived  of  a  stable  and  consequently  legitimate  Government  they 
regarded  suspension  of  hostilities  merely  as  a  truce,  giving  them  an 
opportunity  to  take  measures  to  secure  a  military  position  more 
favourable  if  the  struggle  began  again,  but  that  once  there  was  a 
Government  based  on  right,  and  accepted  by  the  nation,  they  would 
be  more  concerned  as  to  peace  for  the  future  than  as  to  the  possession 
of  certain  discontented  departments  detached  from  a  nation  in  dis- 
tress. That  would  have  been  la  grande  politique.  The  hatred  of 
Germany  would  have  disappeared  as  by  enchantment,  peace  would 
have  been  assured  for  many  years,  confidence  would  have  been 
restored,  trade  relations  immediately  resumed,  and  the  German 
Emperor  would  have  obtained  greater  glory  than  he  will  acquire 
by  the  possession  of  Metz  and  Strasbourg." 

Forty  years  of  growing  armaments  are  but  the  confirma- 
tion of  this  melancholy  prophecy.  In  a  proud  and  noble 
letter  on  "  The  Role  of  Bismarck  "  which  Monsieur  Emile 
Ollivier,  author  of  L 'Empire  Liberal  and  Minister  of  Napo- 
leon III,  addressed  to  Professor  Hans  Delbriick,  and  which 
was  published  in  the  Figaro  of  May  14,  1908,  the  following 
passage  occurs  : — 

"  No  one  contests  Bismarck's  glorious  place  among  the  dominators 
of  the  world.  But  political  facts  are  not  to  be  judged  by  their  immediate 
consequences.  There  are  distant  consequences  which  convert  into 
calamities  what  had  seemed  to  be  good  fortune,  and  which  turn 


158  PROBLEMS  OF   POWER 

into  bitterness  victories  that  had  been  received  with  rejoicing.  Tht 
reflecting  observer  already  perceives  the  sombre  morrows  of  the  policy 
which  led,  you  Germans  to  success.  Have  you  gained  anything  in 
conquering  populations  whom  you  torment,  who  hate  you,  curse 
you,  and  are  merely  waiting  for  a  favourable  circumstance  to  rise 
up  against  you  ?  Was  not  the  fact  that  you  have  made  it  impossible 
to  come  to  an  understanding,  without  arriere  pensee,  with  us,  a  heavy 
price  to  pay  for  the  accession  of  territory  which  was  not  needed  for 
your  Unity  ?  Has  your  security  been  augmented  by  the  fact  of 
your  having  afflicted  and  buffetted  a  nation  whose  humiliations 
never  last  for  more  than  a  time,  and  who  suddenly,  on  the  morrow  of 
a  Soubise  or  a  Bazaine,  may  behold  the  advent  of  a  Turenne  or  a 
Pelissier  ?  A  state  of  reciprocal  distrust  between  France  and  Germany 
is  a  permanent  cause  of  tumult  in  Europe." 

Frenchmen  well  knew  why  the  dream  of  unrestricted 
Anglo-American  arbitration  must  always  plausibly  appeal 
to  Englishmen,  and  in  1911,  above  all,  they  under- 
stood why  a  dangerous  proposal  like  that  of  Mr.  Taft 
was  so  seductive  to  the  eyes  both  of  worried  and 
tired  statesmen  and  of  a  people  familiar  with  Isaiah.  French- 
men are  little  given  to  reading  the  Bible,  but  they  have 
their  own  political  sacred  document,  a  Gallic  Table  of  the 
Law,  known  as  Les  Droits  de  I'Homme  ;  and  the  imagina- 
tions of  many  of  them,  fed  therein  on  an  ideal  of  abstract 
Justice,  have  assimilated  the  phraseology  of  all  the  har- 
bingers of  the  Millennium,  from  a  Quinet  and  a  Michelet 
to  a  Jaures  and  a  d'Estournelles  de  Constant.  All  French- 
men, furthermore,  clearly  enough  perceive  how  special  are 
the  cases  of  England  and  the  United  States,  and  they  saw 
in  1911  how  ripe  was  the  hour  in  England  for  the  success 
of  a  meeting  like  that  at  Guildhall,  where  Mr.  Asquith  and 
Mr.  Balfour  (described  by  the  Primate  of  England  as  "  The 
Great  Twin  Brethren  "),  joined  with  the  Archbishop  of  Can- 
terbury, and  with  all  the  prelates  of  all  the  Churches  of 
Christian,  and  even  of  Rabbinical,  England,  in  organizing 
a  Crusade  of  Peace,  to  the  cry  of  Dieu  le  veut — the  same 
cry,  by  the  way,  to  which  the  Prussians  marched  down  the 
Champs  Elysees.  Equally  apparent  to  Frenchmen  at  the 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL   POLITICS     159 

time  was  the  utility  of  such  a  Crusade  as  a  diversion — and 
a  possible  solution — at  a  moment  of  Imperial  crisis,  when 
the  Colonies  were  breaking  away  as  "  Dominions "  from 
their  island  moorings.  The  positive  advantages,  for  Eng- 
land, of  an  arrangement  with  the  United  States,  which  might 
do  even  more  than  diminish  the  possibilities  of  war,  which 
might  conceivably,  in  some  distant  future,  lead  up  to  a  kind 
of  "  Anglo-Saxon  "  Amphictyonic  Council,  were  carefully 
analysed  in  Paris.  But  what  France  also  understood,  and 
what  America  and  England  herself  seemed  less  clearly  to 
see,  was  that  for  her  to  follow  in  the  wake  of  Mr.  Taft,  of 
Sir  Edward  Grey,  of  the  Twin  Parliamentary  Brethren,  and 
of  the  Prelates  of  the  Guildhall  meeting,  would  be  to  succumb 
to  the  form  of  folly  known  in  the  idiom  of  the  Primate  of 
England  as  "  tempting  Providence." 

Never  has  France  been  less  suitably  placed  than  to-day 
for  signing  a  treaty  automatically  submitting  to  The  Hague, 
or  to  any  other  tribunal,  differences  affecting  her  vital 
interests,  independence,  or  honour.  Nor  can  Germany 
adopt  such  a  peace  policy.  Neither  France  nor  Germany 
can.  The  reason  why  disarmament — or  any  measure 
favouring  it — is  impossible  for  France,  is  not  that  Germany 
would  make  war  upon  her.  It  is  said  that  Germany  re- 
quires twenty  years  of  peace,  and  it  is  certain  that  the  ex- 
cessive production  in  modern  industrial  Germany  would 
cause  any  serious  interruption  of  her  commercial  activity 
to  provoke  a  formidable  krach  ;  but  France  would  go  morally 
to  pieces,  she  would  be  gangrened  by  humanitarianism, 
if,  ignoring  political  conditions  throughout  the  world,  poli- 
tical things-as-they-are,  she  were  to  listen,  as  President 
Taft  listened  in  1910  and  1911,  to  the  appeal  of  the  elo- 
quent members  of  the  Committee  of  the  Association  of 
International  Conciliation.  It  has  already  been  seen  that 
one  of  the  consequences  of  the  Russian  Alliance  was  to 
engender  "  pacifism  "  in  France.1 

See  pp.  30,  31,  140,  141.     This  is  also  the  view  of  a  remarkable 


160  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

The  more  cocardier  the  spirit  of  France,  the  more  remote 
becomes  her  hope  of  recovering  Alsace-Lorraine  save  by 
war ;  the  more  she  is  doomed  to  play  into  the  hands  of  Ger- 
many, the  more  she  retards  the  ideal  of  disarmament,  and 
the  more  she  prolongs  the  evil  consequences  of  the  crime 
of  the  framers  of  the  Treaty  of  Frankfort.  Yet,  if  she  be 
not  cocardier,  if  her  rulers  do  not  do  all  in  their  power  to 
preserve  the  mainsprings  of  her  national  pride,  if  they  do 
not  seek  to  arrest  the  progress  of  humanitarianism,  France 
loses  her  self-respect,  sells  her  birthright,  signs  her  death- 
warrant.  No  more  tragic  dilemma  was  ever  presented  to 
a  nation.  As  long  as  the  Alsace-Lorraine  wound  remains 
open,  Europe,  the  world,  cannot  expect  France  to  accept 
the  idea  of  disarmament,  or  of  arbitration  on  points  of 
national  honour.1 

diagnostician,  M.  Andr6  Cheradame.  Ci.La  Crise  Franfaise.pp.  203, 
204.  Note  as  well  a  striking  passage  by  M.  Faguet,  in  his  Introduc- 
tion to  the  Memoirs  of  M.  Arthur  Meyer,  Ce  que  mes  yeux  ont  vu  : — 

"  The  Russian  Alliance  was  certainly  a  good  thing  in  itself  (says 
M.  Faguet),  although  we  have  all  along  rendered  Russia  a  good  many 
more  services  than  she  has  rendered  us.  Still,  it  was  a  good  thing 
in  itself.  But,  nevertheless,  we  must  not  overlook  the  facts  that 
from  a  certain  point  of  view  it  did  us  considerable  harm  ;  I  mean, 
moral  harm.  Until  the  Alliance,  hope  of  reparation  for  the  disasters 
of  1870  was  a  living  sentiment  in  French  hearts.  After  the  Alliance, 
the  terms  of  which  were  unknown,  but  which  every  one  was  aware  to 
be  merely  defensive,  it  was  more  or  less  distinctly  understood  that 
the  Alliance  implied  our  acceptance  of  the  diminution  of  France, 
not  merely  in  presence  of  the  Conqueror,  but  in  the  presence  of  a 
third  party,  and  that  that  diminution  was  consecrated  by  a  diplo- 
matic act  of  European  importance,  so  that,  in  a  way,  the  signature 
of  Russia  was  affixed  to  the  Treaty  of  Frankfort.  ...  I  date  from 
the  Russian  Alliance  le  flechissement,  momentane,  je  Vespere,  du 
patriotisme  en  France." 

1  The  attitude  of  Germany,  at  successive  Peace  Congresses,  con- 
sistently opposing  all  "  peaceful  "  proposals,  has  been  a  more  effec- 
tive lesson  to  France  than  perhaps  to  the  rest  of  the  world.  The 
late  Baron  Marschall  von  Bieberstein,  who  was  sent  to  London  to 
make  a  final  assault  on  the  Entente  Cordiale,  manoeuvred  at  the 
second  Hague  Conference  against  the  policy  of  the  British  delegates 
favouring  the  principle  of  obligatory  arbitration,  in  a  way  that 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     161 

These  are  facts  which  the  author  of  The  Great  Illusion 
does  not  seem  to  have  adequately  taken  into  account. 

Mr.  Norman  Angell  has  written  in  the  interests  of  peace 
a  volume  of  over  three  hundred  pages,  entitled  The  Great 
Illusion.  He  has  blinded  his  eyes,  like  the  legendary 
ostrich,  to  a  whole  series  of  facts,  the  existence  of  which 
radically  disturbs  the  entire  perspective,  and  compromises 
the  practical  value  of  his  argument.  It  is  quite  true,  as 
he  says,1  that  there  is  a  greater  difference  between  the  man 
of  to-day  and  the  man  of  only  two  or  three  generations  ago 
than  between  the  man  of  the  last  three  centuries  and  the 
man  of  three  thousand  years  before.  But  the  normal  con- 
sequences of  that  curious  evolution,  which  Mr.  Norman 
Angell  neatly  calls  the  "  law  of  acceleration,"  have  been 
retarded  during  our  own  time  by  the  results  of  the  short- 
sighted action  which  Germany,  with  the  complicity  of 
Europe,  committed  in  the  seizure  of  Alsace-Lorraine. 

France,  at  least,  has  not  forgotten.  As  the  Paris  correspondent  of 
The  Times  has  written  (Times,  May  n,  1912, — he  was  then  the  special 
representative  of  that  paper  at  The  Hague)  : — 

"  The  most  amazing  thing  was  to  witness  the  way  in  which  Baron 
von  Marschall,  up  till  almost  the  very  end  of  the  Conference,  retained 
the  confidence  of  those,  including  the  French  delegates,  who  were 
striving  to  draw  up  a  list  of  obligatory  subjects  of  arbitration,  while 
he  himself  was  skilfully  helping  to  reduce  their  list  ad  absurdum. 
As  was  remarked  by  an  eminent  delegate  shortly  before  the  final 
sitting  of  the  Conference  all  that  we  have  now  agreed  upon  as  the 
subject  of  obligatory  arbitration  reduces  itself  to  the  effects  of  de- 
ceased seamen.  Among  those  who  were  at  first,  and  indeed  for  a 
long  time,  most  sanguine  as  to  Baron  von  MarschalTs  co-operation 
in  the  policy  of  obligatory  arbitration  was  the  late  Mr.  W.  T.  Stead, 
who,  at  The  Hague,  issued  a  daily  journal  in  French  giving  an  account 
of  the  proceedings  of  the  Conference  and  estimates  of  the  activities 
of  the  different  delegates.  His  disappointment  at  the  close  of  the 
Conference  was  so  great  that  he  published  a  very  humorous  cartoon 
representing  the '  total  eclipse  '  of  the  chief  German  delegate,  whom 
he  had  previously  represented  as  the  '  leading^star  '  in  the  galaxy 
of  diplomatists  assembled  at  The  Hague." 

1  The  present  writer  said  it  himself,  some  twenty  years  ago,  in  a 
book  entitled  Patriotism  and  Science, 


162  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

That  a  thinker  of  Mr.  Norman  AngelTs  probity  should 
discuss  the  possibility  of  the  abolition  of  modern  armaments 
without  dealing  with  the  question  of  Alsace-Lorraine,  is  a 
curious  oversight.  Mr.  Angell  undertakes  to  prove  that "  the 
necessity  of  adopting  defensive  measures  implies,  on  some 
one's  part,  grounds  for  aggression,  and  that  this  motive  is  due 
to  the  present  universal  belief  in  the  economic  advantages  to 
be  derived  from  a  victorious  war."  Now  this  theory,  which 
has  a  show  of  axiomatic  clearness,  is  all  too  clear.  It 
would  seem  so  to  have  dazzled  its  inventor's  eyes  as  to  blind 
him  to  the  immediate  realities  of  contemporary  history. 
It  is  true  that  no  one  will  ever  wish  to  fight  his  neighbour 
unless  he  has  some  good  reason  for  doing  so.  But  among  all 
the  English-speaking  peoples  economic  motives  have, 
perhaps,  been  the  least  persuasive  motives  that  have  driven 
great  nations  to  war.  The  present  condition  of  modern 
Europe,  under  the  crushing  system  of  armaments,  is  in  itself 
the  miserable  consequence  of  a  war  waged  for  any  and 
every  other  motive  but  that  of  economic  advantage,  a  war 
which  was  at  the  time  a  mere  incident  in  the  vast  national 
movement  for  the  formation  of  a  United  Germany.  Like- 
wise, most  of  the  military  activity  of  France  within  the  last 
hundred  years  has  been  prompted  by  an  idealism  untinctured 
by  economics.  This,  and  other  similar  illustrations — such 
as  the  Mobilization  of  the  Balkan  States,  in  October  1912  * 
— might,  it  would  be  imagined,  be  merely  supererogatory 
in  replying  to  Mr.  Norman  Angell,  who,  in  his  less  doctrinaire 
moments,  is  quite  ready  to  acknowledge  the  potential  share 
of  other  than  merely  economic  factors  among  the  causes 
of  war.  All  that  need  be  pointed  out  is  the  hopelessness 
of  expecting  to  settle  the  problem  of  European  armaments 
without  first  removing  one  of  the  primary  causes  of  those 

1  No  one  contests  that  economic  motives  help  to  explain  the 
Balkan  War  (cf.  pp.  250,  251,  287),  but  such  motives  are  insignificant 
in  comparison  with  the  idealistic  "  national  "  aspirations  that  have 
found  their  sanction  at  Kirk-Kilisse. 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL   POLITICS     163 

armaments,  that  obstacle  in  the  path  of  "  pacifism  "  known 
as  Alsace-Lorraine.  That  question  is  an  integral  part 
of  the  whole  question  of  European  peace.  And  as  Mr.  Nor- 
man Angell's  book  has  been  translated  into  many  languages, 
and  has  attracted  wide  attention,  it  is  necessary  to  insist  on 
the  fact  that  it  is  the  work  of  a  clear  and  logical  intelligence, 
somewhat  surprisingly  indifferent  to  certain  of  the  more 
important  among  the  positive  factors  with  which  a  states- 
man has  to  deal.  If  Mr.  Norman  Angell  had  said :  "If 
human  nature  were  logical,  and  if  nations  were  governed  by 
reason,  war  would  be  almost  impossible,  because  war  is 
usually  absurd ;  and  war  is  absurd  because  it  rarely  brings 
any  lasting  good,  and  because  it  is  ridiculous  to  act  on 
absurd  motives,"  everybody  would  undoubtedly  agree  with 
him.  But,  unfortunately,  nations  are  more  frequently 
actuated  by  motives  that  are  "  absurd  "  than  by  motives  that 
are  rational ;  and  it  is  as  irrational  to  expect  to  rationalize 
politics  as  it  is  to  wish  to  rationalize  religion. 

It  was  to  lack  foresight,  and  hence  to  be  irrational,  for 
Germany  to  take  Alsace-Lorraine ;  but  it  would  be  no  less 
imprudent,  and  therefore  irrational,  for  French  leaders  of 
opinion  to  cultivate  in  the  mass  of  the  nation  the  belief 
that,  because  what  Mr.  Norman  Angell  says  is  partially  true, 
they  ought  to  subordinate  to  that  more  remote  ideal  truth 
a  certain  set  of  French  verities  which  are  of  the  essence  of 
their  integrity  as  a  nation.  There  are  French  truths  and 
there  are  British  truths,  and  there  are  truths  that  obtain 
on  the  slopes  of  the  Atlas — and  there  are  abstract  truths. 
Mr.  Norman  Angell's  truth,  in  spite  of  its  specious  inductive 
stability,  is  an  abstract  truth.  And,  just  because  it  ignores 
one  whole  set  of  facts — those  growing  out  of  the  terms 
of  the  Treaty  of  Frankfort,  and  as  yet  unmodified  by  the 
new  conditions  of  modern  progress — it  is  a  truth  which, 
if  it  were  accepted  by  the  French,  would  reduce  them  to  the 
state  of  the  Greeks  after  the  sack  of  Corinth.  It  would 
be  necessary  to  insist  on  this  fact — since  the  French,  as 


164  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

every  one  knows,  are  a  people  peculiarly  amenable  to  the 
seduction  of  clear  thinking,  peculiarly  given  to  general 
ideas  and  to  generous  impulses,  and  peculiarly  exposed  to 
the  ravages  which  such  clear  and  generous  ideas,  when  they 
are  too  clear,  are  bound  to  cause, — if  one  could  not  confi- 
dently count  on  the  action  of  an  aggressive  Germany  to 
maintain  a  sane  tonicity  in  the  French  character.  It  ought 
to  be  for  the  French  a  point  of  "  national  honour,"  in  the  in- 
terests of  their  peculiar  form  of  civilization,  to  raise  relent- 
lessly— and  even  barbarically — every  form  of  dyke  against 
the  inroads  of  that  tide  of  modern  progress  so  magnificently 
symbolized  by  the  industrial  activity  and  the  pervasive 
financial  expansion  of  Germany.1  It  ought  to  be  a  point  of 
"  national  honour  "  with  them  to  refuse  to  allow  German 
stocks  to  be  quoted  on  the  Paris  Bourse,  and  to  maintain 
their  credit  by  methods  which,  as  far  as  possible,  will  prevent 
them  from  feeling  the  impact  of  commercial  crises — in  a 
word,  to  go  back  to  the  soil.2  And  finally,  it  ought  to  be 
a  point  of  "  national  honour  "  with  them  to  gaze  steadily 
into  the  East,  following  the  precept  of  Gambetta  in  his  St. 
Quentin  speech  :  "II  faut  constamment  que  la  France  soit 
penchee  sur  cette  oeuvre  de  reparation.  .  .  .  Soyons 
tres  reserves,  ne  prononsons  jamais  une  parole  temeraire.  .  . 
Soyons  gardiens  de  notre  dignite  de  vaincus,  et  ne  parlons 
jamais  de  1'etranger ;  mais  que  Ton  apprenne  que  nous  y 
pensons  tou jours." 

//  faut  constamment  que  la  France  soit  penchee  sur  cette 
oeuvre  de  reparation.  There  have  been  long  periods  during 
the  last  twenty-five  years  when  France  seemed  to  have 
forgotten ;  when,  in  heeding  too  literally  the  recommenda- 


1  Cf.  pp.  235-238. 

2  Moral,  political,  sociological  reasons  ought  to  suffice  as  an  in- 
centive to  the  French  legislator  for  favouring  agricultural  interests 
and  for  arresting  the  exodus  from  the  country  into  the  towns.     Rein- 
forced by  the  economic  motives  arising  from  the  peculiar  conditions 
of  the  French  corn-market,  these  reasons  become  irrefutable. 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     165 

tion  of  Gambetta,  "  Ne  parlons  jamais  de  1'etranger,"  she 
appeared  positively  to  have  ceased  to  follow  the  great 
tribune's  other  behest,  "  que  Ton  comprenne  que  nous  y 
pensons  toujours."  In  the  making  of  her  North  African 
Empire,  for  instance,  and  indeed  in  the  working  out  of  her 
entire  destiny  as  a  Colonial  power,  she  allowed  to  come  into 
being  an  influential  band  of  politicians,  some  of  whom  might 
perhaps  have  been  induced  in  1910  and  1911  to  come  to 
terms  with  Germany,  even  to  sacrifice  the  Entente  Cordiale, 
and  to  abandon  the  lost  provinces  to  their  fate,  if  they 
could  thereby  have  made  sure  of  obtaining  from  Germany  the 
promise  that,  so  far  as  that  Power  was  concerned,  Morocco 
should  henceforth  be  terre  fmngaise.1  But  at  that  very 
moment  the  mass  of  reflecting  Frenchmen  had  their  gaze 
rivetted  on  the  Vosges.  In  the  spring  of  1911,  only  a  few 
weeks  before  Agadir,  M.  Lavisse,  the  Academician,  Professor 
of  History  at  the  Sorbonne,  addressed  the  Alsace-Lorraine 
students  as  follows  : — 

"  Mes  amis,  je  ne  veux  pas  dire  autre  chose  que  ce  que  je  dis.  Je 
n'ai  pas  d'arriere-pensee.  Je  ne  suis  pas  venu  apporter  ici  des 
paroles  de  haine  ;  il  y  a  longtemps  que  j'ai  ecrit :  '  Puisque  la  haine 
est  aveugle,  ne  la  prenons  pas  pour  guide.'  Encore  moins  je  me 
donnerai  le  ridicule  de  vous  annoncer  une  guerre  liberatrice.  La 
France  est  pacifique  ;  elle  ne  f  era  la  guerre  que  si  elle  y  est  contrainte. 
Mais  considerez  1'etat  de  la  politique  europeenne  et  mondiale,  les 
ligues,  les  contre-ligues  ;  la  France  est  surveillee  en  tous  ses  mouve- 
ments  par  1'Allemagne ;  Allemagne  et  France  sont  deux  armees  en 
presence,  et  les  trompettes  et  clairons  des  avant-gardes  sont  tenus 
a  la  hauteur  des  levres.  Pour  retrouver  la  liber  te  de  ses  mouvements, 
la  France  n'aurait  qu'a  dire  un  tout  petit  mot :  '  J'oublie  !  '  Ce 
tout  petit  mot,  elle  ne  le  dira  pas." 

The  Paris  Review,  Les  Marches  de  I' Est,  which  is  the  organ 
of  French  writers  "  eager  to  protect  the  lucid  genius  of 
their  race  against  the  invasion  of  Germanism,"  has  become 
in  four  years  one  of  the  indispensable  reviews  published 
in  France.  Alsace-Lorraine  is  now  the  theme  of  scores 

1  Cf.  pp.  242-246. 


166  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

of  volumes  which  go  rapidly  into  numerous  editions. 
Events  in  the  lost  provinces  are  followed  by  the  Paris  Press 
with  an  assiduity  which  would  surprise  the  readers  of  that 
Press  of  ten  years  ago.  Germany,  moreover,  seems  to  be 
exhausting  her  resources  in  furnishing  French  journalists 
with  the  most  attractive  matter  for  comment.  When  the 
Metz  Courts  are  not  engaged  in  prosecuting  the  members  of  a 
sporting  club  suspected  of  French  sympathies — and  prosecut- 
ing them  so  blunderingly  that  the  Deputy  for  Colmar,  M. 
Blumenthal,  in  his  interpellation  to  the  Government  at  the 
Provincial  Committee  was  able  to  say,  "  You  need  not  feel 
surprise  if  the  Germanization  of  this  region  has  been  re- 
tarded by  ten  years  " — an  artist  like  Zislin  is  cast  into  prison 
for  harmless  if  ruthless  caricature,  and  the  prosecuting 
magistrate,  in  his  speech  for  the  indictment,  is  obliged  to 
acknowledge  : — 

"  We  are  living  in  a  frontier  region  where  sympathies  for  France, 
after  forty  years  of  annexation,  are  still  a  living  reality  ;  we  are  pass- 
ing through  a  period  more  agitated  even  than  that  of  Boulangism  ; 
an  ardent  nationalism  is  arising,  and  I  do  not  refer  to  that  nationalism 
summed  up  in  the  formula  '  Alsace-Lorraine  aux  Alsaciens-Lor- 
rains.'  No,  I  refer  to  that  blue,  white  and  red  nationalism, 
which  not  only  harks  back  to  the  past,  but  is  cultivating  among  the 
people  of  Alsace-Lorraine  the  hope  of  a  better  future,  to  such  a  de- 
gree, in  fact,  that  some  of  our  Alsace-Lorraine  youths  regard  the 
tricolour  as  their  own  flag." 

Prussia,  in  a  word,  as  was  clearly  perceived  in  France  even 
in  1910,  can  no  longer,  save  by  the  most  drastic  measures, 
defend  the  German  cause  in  the  annexed  territory.  The 
claim  of  many  excellent  French  observers,  from  M.  Maurice 
Barres  to  M.  Georges  Ducrocq,  would  not  seem  to  have 
been  exaggerated  :  although  separated  from  France,  Alsace 
and  Lorraine  are  more  really  united  to  her  in  feeling  to-day 
than  they  were  before  the  war.  The  Reichsland  has  become 
what  M.  Barres  has  called  it,  La  Terre  de  la  Resurrection. 
The  new  hypocritical  solution  offered  by  Germany  for  the 
terrible  problem  put  by  the  Treaty  of  Frankfort,  and  kept 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     167 

open  by  German  incompetency  and  bungling,  will  be  found 
to  be  utterly  inadequate.  The  Constitution  will  solve 
nothing,  and  the  action  of  the  Emperor  in  dissolving  the 
Provincial  Committee  will  not  have  facilitated  the  task  of 
altering  the  mystical  status  of  Alsace-Lorraine  as  the 
Reichsland,  "  Imperial  soil,"  which  is  the  keystone  of 
German  Unity.  The  tension,  in  fact,  has  reached  such  a 
pitch  that  it  is  doubtful  if  a  scheme  of  frank  autonomy 
could  now  settle  the  question  of  Alsace-Lorraine.  In  his 
admirable  pamphlet,  Le  Cauchemar  de  I'Europe,  M.  Albert 
Gobat,  a  Swiss  Conseiller  d'Etat,  returning  from  a  prolonged 
visit  to  Alsace  in  the  autumn  of  1910,  argues  eloquently  that 
if  the  Imperial  Government  would  only  decide  to  place 
Alsace-Lorraine  on  the  same  footing  as  the  Grand  Duchy  of 
Baden,  or  as  the  free  towns  of  Hamburg  and  Lubeck  (that  is 
to  say,  grant  them  autonomy),  such  action,  by  lifting  the 
annexed  Provinces  to  the  dignity  of  a  nation,  well  above 
international  complications,  would  guarantee  the  peace  of 
Europe.  The  Constitution,  at  all  events,  will  simply 
maintain  the  annexed  Provinces  in  the  relation  of  a  fief  to  a 
sovereign  lord.  M.  Gobat's  proposal  is  the  most  obvious 
justice,  but  it  is  doubtful  if  those  who  know  what  the  word 
Reichsland  really  implies,  or  if  those  who  are  best  acquainted 
with  the  present  state  of  Europe,  will  be  as  optimistic  as  he, 
in  believing  that  even  the  inconceivable  granting  of  autonomy 
to  Alsace-Lorraine  would  usher  in  the  era  of  European 
peace.  An  autonomous  Alsace-Lorraine  would  add  one 
more  to  the  series  of  buffer  States  situated  between  France 
and  Germany ;  but  the  buffer  quality  of  all  these  States, 
from  Switzerland  to  Luxembourg  and  Belgium,  is  a  mere 
diplomatic  fiction  which  would  vanish  like  a  wisp  of  straw  in 
the  event  of  a  European  conflagration. 

At  the  present  moment  no  international  Treaty,  no 
diplomatic  instrument  or  convention  is  worth  the  paper  on 
which  it  is  written.  They  might  as  well  have  been  formu- 
lated on  paper  made  of  wood-pulp.  Three  or  four  lunar 


168  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

cycles,  as  every  one  knows,  suffice  to  destroy  most  of  the 
modern  paper  used  for  newspapers  and  books.  But  all  the 
treaties  in  the  world  will  be  a  dead-letter  even  before  most  of 
the  modern  productions  of  art  and  letters  have  turned  to  dust. 
The  only  treaties  that  stand  a  chance  of  a  long  life  are 
those  unwritten  Agreements  which  are  based  on  common 
interests.  When,  in  order  to  prevent  the  construction  of 
the  Nicaragua  Canal,  and  to  save  the  honour  of  France,  a 
great  Frenchman,  M.  Bunau-Varilla,  fomented  a  Revolution 
at  Panama,  and  thus  made  it  possible  for  Mr.  Roosevelt  to 
seize  a  zone  in  Columbian  territory ;  when  Count  d'Aehren- 
thal  tore  up  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  on  Bosnian  soil,  and  the 
pieces  were  finally  burned  to  ashes  in  bonfires  lit  by  the 
Balkan  League ;  when  the  Germans,  indifferent  to  the 
stipulations  of  the  Act  of  Algeciras,  and  their  agreement 
of  desinteressement  with  France  of  1909,  sent  a  gun-boat  to 
Agadir,  the  world  beheld  certain  characteristic  instances  of 
that  prehistoric  principle,  the  spoils-policy,  which  the 
meditations  of  the  international  jurists  have  as  yet  done 
nothing  to  render  obsolete.  The  principle  dates  from  the 
Stone-Age.  It  seems  new  only  because,  owing  to  the 
changed  social  conditions,  its  application  in  the  twentieth 
century,  A.D.,  is  an  altogether  different  problem  from  the 
application  in  B.C.  20000,  when  there  were  few  railways, 
telegraphs,  steamboats,  newspapers  or  crossed  cheques. 
The  prehistoric  spoils-policy  of  the  Cave-Dweller  was 
realized  by  woodland  craft,  by  bludgeon,  or  by  a  swift-speed- 
ing flint.  ^The  same  object,  the  same  principle,  govern 
collective  human  nature  to-day ;  but,  because  in  certain 
other  respects  to-day  is  different  from  yesterday,  the  old 
principle  seems  to  be  tending  to  make  diplomacy  a  branch 
of  physico-chemistry.  It  has  been  neatly  defined,  by  M. 
Victor  Berard,  as  Le  Droit  de  Voisinage,  which  is  French  for 
"  geographic  gravitation."  It  is  the  human,  the  sociological, 
form  of  one  of  these  aspects  of  the  physical  law  of  capillary 
attraction.  The  principle  of  "  neighbourhood  rights  " — 


the  right  which  a  Power  assumes  to  annex  or  administer  the 
States  and  Dependencies  of  a  neighbour  unable  to  defend 
itself,  or  to  establish  justice  within  its  borders — accounts  for 
the  shiftings  in  international  relations,  for  the  kaleidoscopic 
combinations  that  have  taken  place  during  the  last  ten 
years,  from  Morocco  by  way  of  Persia  to  Manchuria,  and — 
who  knows  ? — perhaps  round  the  world  again  to  Mexico 
and  Central  America  ;  and  if  in  the  Far  East  Mr.  Knox  and 
President  Taft  met  in  1910  with  a  comic  rebuff,  it  was 
because  they  had  not  taken  into  adequate  consideration 
the  working  of  this  positive  and  scientific  basis  of  modern 
international  politics.  The  successive  treaties  signed  by 
the  Powers  have  been  merely  a  provisional  record  up-to- 
date  of  the  stage  reached  in  these  chemico-political  com- 
binations. One  of  the  prettiest  cases  under  this  law  is,  of 
course,  the  process  of  "  pacific  penetration  "  of  Morocco  by 
France.  But  an  even  more  elegant  demonstration  was  the 
Anglo-Russian  Agreement  as  to  Persia,  with  its  corollary — 
that  portion  of  the  mysterious  negotiations  of  Potsdam  bear- 
ing on  the  Baghdad  concession. 

Now  the  French,  in  their  quick  clear  way,  have  been 
intelligent  enough  to  apply  this  principle  to  the  immediate 
future.  This  fact  need  surprise  only  those  who  still  forget  that 
France  has  had  to  evolve  a  national  integrity  in  mid-Europe 
by  slow  and  secular  processes,  which  consisted  in  constructing 
for  herself  on  every  side  a  carapace  impervious  to  outside 
influences.  The  French  have  had  to  fight  their  way  to 
national  unity  against  the  inroads  on  their  frontiers  of  the 
Anglo-Norman  and  the  German.  At  no  stage  of  their  national 
history  have  they  been  without  an  Alsace-Lorraine  problem 
in  one  form  or  another — now  in  the  South- West,  now  in  the 
North,  or  now  doubly,  triply,  in  the  East,  where  the  line 
of  the  Vosges,  of  the  Jura,  and  of  the  Savoy  Alps  has 
always  marked  the  central  axis  of  a  border  region  never 
wholly  theirs,  nor  yet  ever  wholly  that  of  the  "  barba- 
rians." "  National  honour/5  in  these  conditions,  is  merely 


i?o  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

the  name  for  a  set  of  unconscious  reactions  of  self-pre- 
servation. It  is  not  at  all,  in  its  essence,  the  hollow, 
but  clarion-tongued,  cocardier  screech  in  praise  of  La  Gloire 
which  Englishmen  and  Germans  fancy  it  to  be,  and 
which  no  doubt  at  times,  for  aesthetic  ends,  it  can  easily 
and  provisionally  become.  From  the  point  of  view  of  the 
making  of  the  nation,  the  evolution  of  French  history  has 
been  an  effort  to  moderate  the  action  of  the  natural  law  of 
"  neighbourhood  rights  "  applied  successfully  and  doggedly 
by  England,  and  clumsily,  though  with  a  show  of  scientific, 
even  philosophic,  method  by  Germany.  And  the  phrase 
"  moderate  the  action,"  seems  exact,  because  the  natural 
and  justifiable  limits  of  French  European  expansion  have 
never  suffered  any  change  in  the  Gallic  mind  since  they 
were  fixed  by  the  Romans,  who  had  worked  with  the  geo- 
graphy of  Strabo  under  their  eyes. 

It  has  thus,  as  it  were,  become  a  second  nature  for  France 
to  possess  a  European  sense  ;  and  this  European  sense  has 
never  suffered  her,  for  any  protracted  period,  to  be  the 
dupe  of  even  her  most  civilized  aspiration,  the  dream  of  one 
day  inhabiting  a  Europe  based  on  Justice  and  Right.  An 
almost  singular  respect  for  the  written  word  in  Treaties  has 
been,  no  doubt,  part  of  the  Frenchman's  noble  Latin  in- 
heritance, but  his  eyes  have  never  been  dimmed,  to  the 
presence,  just  over  his  buffer-State  border,  of  a  Holland 
which — whatever  the  terms  of  the  Treaty  of  London  of 
1839,  guaranteeing  Belgian  independence  and  neutrality,  and 
of  the  clauses  of  the  Treaty  of  Vienna  proclaiming  the  free 
navigation  of  the  Escaut — is  destined  one  day  to  fall  into  the 
hands  of  Germany,  unless  its  integrity  be  maintained  by 
tfte  common  action  of  France  and  England.  It  did  not 
need  the  Dutch  proposal  to  fortify  Flushing  to  justify,  in 
the  eyes  of  French  statesmen,  the  vigilance  with  which  they 
had  been  observing,  since  thejadvent  of  the  Prince  Consort,  the 
extension  of  German  influence  in  the  Low  Countries.  They 
were  well  aware  in  1911  that  the  Belgian  and  British  appeals 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     171 

to  International  Law^  to  refute  the  parallel  juridical  argu- 
ments of  Holland,  were  of  merely  academic  interest  save  in 
so  far  as  public  discussion  arrested  Holland  in  her  German 
policy,  and  gave  her  time  to  reflect  on  the  international 
bearings  of  her  proposed  action.  In  1910  and  1911  nothing 
more  clearly  showed  the  international  authority  of  France 
than  the  facts  that,  unassisted  by  England,  her  Foreign 
Minister  should  ^.have  declared  openly  in  the  Chamber  of  De- 
puties his  readiness  to  causer  with  the  signatories  of  the 
Treaty  of  1839,  and  that,  although  Germany  retorted 
with  tit-for-tat  haste,  that  she  had  no  intention  of  entering 
into  any  conversation  on  the  subject,  the  Dutch  Govern- 
ment after  all  prudently  took  the  French  hint,  and  began  to 
tack  away  diplomatically  from  the  shallows  on  which  her 
heavy  galleons  seemed  about  to  run  aground.  Yet  the 
Flushing  Fortification  Bill  came  up  again  in  1912  before 
the  Dutch  Chamber,  and  this  tune  neither  France  nor 
England  made  the  slightest  sign  that  they  had  evolved  a 
common  policy  for  the  defence  of  Belgian  neutrality.1 
France,  it  should  be  repeated,  cannot  act  alone.  The  Entente 
Cordiale  must  be  converted  into  a  close  Dual  Alliance, 
based  on  common  interests,  in  order  to  forestall  before  the 
close  of  the  next  decade — when  Germany  will  have  her  full 
quota  of  "  Dreadnoughts  "  in  the  North  Sea — the  possibility 
of  the  principle  of  geographical  gravitation  being  applied  to 
Holland.  Where  are  the  "  neighbourhood  rights "  of 

1  The  Belgian  Army  Bill  laid  before  the  Chamber  on  Dec.  5,  1912, 
proposing  to  raise  the  mobilizable  total  of  that  country's  armed 
strength  to  340,000  men,  marks  the  determination  of  Belgium  to 
guarantee,  unaided,  respect  for  her  neutrality,  in  case  of  a  war  between 
France  and  Germany,  or  a  war  in  which  France  and  Germany  .fare 
arrayed  in  opposite  camps.  These  precautions  do  not,  however, 
preclude  the  necessity  for  France  and  England  to  evolve  a  common 
policy  for  the  maintenance  of  the  validity  of  the  treaties  of  1839. 
In  February,  1913,  Baron  de  Broqueville,  the  Belgian  Prime  Minis- 
ter and  Minister  of  War,  stated  to  a  Committee  of  the  Belgian  Cham- 
ber that  the  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs  and  he  himself  were  "  on 
a  volcano."  See  note  i,  p.  208. 


172  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

Germany  more  neatly  applicable  than  to  the  regions  about 
the  Hague  and  Rotterdam  ?  Notwithstanding  the  imme- 
diate results  of  the  victories  of  the  Balkan  League  in  1912, 
every  one  who  knows  the  state  of  Europe  still  recalls  the 
pertinent  question  put  by  the  author  of  Le  Choix  de  Londres 
(Revue  de  Paris,  April  15,  1911)  :  "  When  the  Russians  lay 
hands  on,  or  take  control  of,  Stamboul,  when  the  Austrians 
follow  suit  at  Salonica,  and  the  Italians  at  Avlona,  why 
should  not  the  German  Customs  Officer  or  Admiral  enter 
Rotterdam  ?  " 

At  all  events,  reasons  of  this  kind,  vividly  held  before  the 
French  intelligence,  kept  France,  in  1910  and  1911,  from 
falling  into  the  state  of  beatific  apathy  which  at  that  period 
characterized  England's  attitude  towards  the  problems  of 
world-politics.  The  French  felt,  no  doubt,  as  Bishop 
Butler  said  in  his  Sermons  at  the  Rolls,  that  things  will  be 
as  they  will  be ;  but  it  never  occurred  to  them  that  this 
fact  was  a  reason  for  not  maintaining  constant  vigilance,  or 
for  not  making  a  strenuous  effort  to  avoid  becoming  the 
dupe  of  "things."1 

VI 

On  the  first  of  July  1911  the  First-Secretary  of  the 
German  Embassy  in  Paris  called  on  M.  de  Selves,  the 
French  Foreign  Minister,  to  inform  him  of  Germany's 
decision  to  send  an  armed  vessel  to  the  Moroccan  port  of 
Agadir. 

This  mysterious  coup  d' Agadir,  information  of  which  was 
vouchsafed  at  the  same  moment  to  all  the  other  European 

1  "  No  people  can  maintain  an  effective  peace  policy  without  being 
always  ready  for  war.  A  diminished  France,  a  France  exposed,  by 
its  own  fault,  to  taunts  or  humiliations,  would  no  longer  be  France. 
.  .  .  Our  words  of  peace  and  humanity  will  be  all  the  more  likely 
to  be  heeded,  if  we  are  known  to  be  more  determined  and  better 
armed." — President  Poincare"'s  Message  to  the  French  Parliament, 
February  20,  1913. 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     173 

Governments,  surprised  and  startled  the  world.  A  special 
and  plausible  justification  of  Germany's  conduct,  her  not  un- 
natural irritation  at  France's  procrastination  and  apparent 
ill-will  in  the  application  of  the  Franco-German  Agreement 
of  1909,  was  utterly  unsuspected  at  the  time,  not  only  by  the 
general  public  on  the  Continent  and  in  England,  but  even 
by  well-informed  members  of  the  French  Parliament.  The 
Agreement  of  1909  had  rejoiced  Europe.  It  seemed  to  be 
an  earnest  of  Germany's  honest  intention  to  cease  using 
the  Moroccan  question  as  an  instrument  of  political  and 
diplomatic  pressure  on  France.  All  that  the  public  opinion 
of  the  world  appeared  clearly  to  perceive  in  this  Agreement 
was  that  Germany  had  at  last  recognized  the  predominance 
in  Morocco  of  French  political  rights.  The  fact  that  France, 
in  another  clause  of  the  Agreement,  had  solemnly  promised 
to  share  with  Germany  the  golden  apples  of  the  Hesperides, 
was  generally  overlooked.  Europe  was  ill  prepared,  there- 
fore, to  divine  that  when  Germany  suddenly  dispatched  a 
gun-boat  to  an  Atlantic  port  within  reach  of  the  Hesperi- 
dean  Gardens  it  was  because  France  for  two  years  had  been 
submitting  her  partner  in  the  Agreement  of  1909  to  the 
tortures  of  Tantalus,  by  alternately  offering,  and  juggling 
out  of  sight,  that  and  other  coveted  fruit.  These  operations 
had  gone  on  behind  the  scenes,  and  not  a  dozen  men  in 
Europe,  outside  of  the  official  world  of  the  Quai  d'Orsay 
and  the  Wilhelmstrasse,  were  aware  that  the  apparent 
bolt  from  the  blue  was  an  act  for  which  a  rational  pretext 
could  be  adduced.1 

In  deciding  on  so  sensational  a  method  for  the  solution 
of  a  strained  diplomatic  situation,  Germany  had  miscal- 
culated the  nature  of  the  political  forces,  and  of  the  inter- 
national factors,  then  existing  in  Europe.  Relentlessly 
bent  on  the  realization  of  her  fixed  idea,  destruction  of  the 
Entente  between  France  and  England,  she  had  counted 
on  achieving  that  object  surreptitiously  during  the  working 
1  See  pp.  243-245. 


174  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

out  of  the  ingenious  partnership  concluded  between  herself 
and  France  by  the  Agreement  of  1909.  When  that  dream 
was  blasted,  she  revived  her  other  more  familiar  policy, 
the  policy  of  intimidation.  With  the  hammer  of  Thor  she 
brought  down  a  prodigious  whack  on  the  table  at  which 
she  and  her  new  French  friends  had  been  talking  business 
for  some  eighteen  months.  Convinced  that  Great  Britain 
was  incurably  pacific,  and  that  France  was  hurtling  to  the 
dogs ;  mistaking  the  obvious  predicament  of  England, 
and  the  unrest  in  France,  for  positive  signs  of  a  disinte- 
gration that  was  bound  to  paralyse  the  common  action  of 
those  two  Powers,  Germany  concluded  that  the  moment 
for  aggressive  action  was  at  hand.  Ignorant  of  the  profound 
transformations  of  the  French  soul  during  the  months  follow- 
ing the  fall  of  M.  Delcasse  and  the  Casablanca  incident,  and 
deceived  by  the  "  humanitarianism  "  of  England's  rulers, 
and  the  laisser-aller  of  her  people,  Germany  took  a  hasty 
resultant  of  the  international  forces  visible  to  the  naked  eye, 
and  neglected  all  those  subtler  elements  of  her  problem 
which  less  official,  less  responsible  observers  had  detected 
and  publicly  noted. 

Moreover,  she  had  not  only  to  consider  her  relations  with 
the  powers  of  the  Triple  Entente  ;  but  to  maintain  her  hege- 
mony within  the  narrower  limits  of  her  own  political  system, 
the  Triple  Alliance.  For  the  last  three  or  four  years  it  had 
seemed  as  if  German  leadership  were  being  contested  by 
Austria-Hungary.  When  Count  Aehrenthal  made  up  his 
mind  to  regularize  the  status  of  Bosnia-Herzegovina,  the 
Austro-Hungarian  Minister  had  been  less  dazzled  by  the 
apparition  at  his  side  of  his  German  ally  in  shining  armour, 
than  William  II  might  have  hoped.  The  "  brilliant  second  " 
had  shown  himself  a  possible  first  if  the  allies  should  be 
called  upon  to  run  many  more  races  together.  It  was  true 
that  the  authority  of  the  Triple  Alliance  had  been  enhanced 
in  Europe  by  the  failure  of  the  Triple  Entente  to  force 
Austria-Hungary  to  a  Conference  intended  virtually  as  a 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     175 

High  Court  to  the  bar  of  which  Count  d'Aehrenthal  was  to 
be  summoned.  But  the  watchful  knew  that  Germany  knew 
that  Austria-Hungary  knew  that  if  the  scheme  of  a  High 
Court  had  failed  it  was  owing  less  to  Germany's  support  of 
her  ally  than  to  the  lack  of  a  common  policy  between  France, 
England  and  Russia,  and  most  of  all  to  the  Quai  d'Orsay's 
natural  hesitation  to  take  any  step  that  might  alienate  the 
sympathy  of  Austria-Hungary.  That  Power  had  beautifully 
backed  France  at  Algeciras,  and  the  growth  of  her  authority, 
within  reasonable  limits,  could  not  but  be  to  the  advantage 
of  the  French  policy  for  the  maintenance  of  a  perfectly  bal- 
anced Europe.  In  short,  while — what  with  Bosnia-Herze- 
govina, and  Potsdam,  and  Anglo-Franco-Russian  ataxy — 
the  Triple  Alliance  seemed  to  be  steadily  humiliating  the 
Triple  Entente,  Germany's  special  diplomatic  position, 
relatively  to  that  of  Austria-Hungary,  was  far  less  satis- 
factory than  it  appeared  superficially  to  be.  Some  magni- 
ficent stroke  of  policy  was  really,  as  the  French  say,  "  indi- 
cated." Hot  from  the  secret  disappointment  of  her  dis- 
cussions with  France  for  the  elaboration  of  a  Moroccan 
condominium,  Germany  devised  the  Coup  d'Agadir ;  and  in 
sending  the  Panther  to  an  Atlantic  port  of  Morocco,  she 
counted  on  France's  being  frightened  out  of  her  wits  and 
on  England's  refusal  even  to  notice  what  she  had  done. 
She  counted,  perhaps,  above  all  on  England's  blindness,  and 
even  on  her  incapacity  to  intervene.  That  Germany  should 
have  blundered  so  prodigiously  implies,  after  all,  that  British 
things  were  in  a  perilous  condition.  And  that  was  indeed 
the  case  ! 

England  had  reached  a  crisis  due  to  a  partial  and  startling 
breakdown  in  that  very  machinery  of  representative  par- 
liamentary government  which  she  herself  had  patented. 

It  is  a  radical  defect  of  parliamentary  government  that 
such  government  is  committed  to  stop-gap  initiatives,  a 
process  which  is  the  negation  of  positive  governmental  effi- 
ciency. The  foresight  that  is  an  essential  characteristic 


176  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

of  a  national  policy — the  foresight  which  a  Monarchy  like 
that  of  Germany,  where  the  Emperor  and  Chancellor  are 
independent  of  the  Reichstag,  or  a  Consular  Republic  like 
that  of  the  United  States,  where  the  President  is  largely 
responsible,  can  readily  exercise — such  a  foresight  tends  to 
become  impossible  in  parliamentary  regimes,  like  those  of 
France  and  England,  where  virtually  single  Chambers, 
dependent  on  the  [masses,  readily  sacrifice  national  to  local 
interests,  and  intimidate  the  Government  or  Cabinet  by 
the  constant  menace  of  withdrawing  their  support.  Yet 
without  prevision  a  State  is  doomed.  Under  a  parliamentary 
regime  national  interests  wait  on  the  good  pleasure  of  the 
average  man  (or  on  gelatinous  coagulations  of  the  average 
man),  whose  sole  ambition  to-day,  as  in  the  Roman  epoch 
of  "  bread  and  circuses,"  is  to  satisfy  immediate  demagogic 
claims,  and  the  limit  of  whose  vision  is,  at  the  most,  the 
horizon  of  his  parish.  Thus,  England  finds  herself  to-day 
confronted  with  a  life-and-death  problem  of  maintenance, 
not  merely  of  her  "  prestige,"  but  of  her  national  security 
(though  her  prestige  has  been  for  several  generations  the 
chief  guarantee  of  her  security),  owing  largely  to  the  fact 
that  when  the  German  Emperor  declared  that  "  Germany's 
future  was  on  the  water,"  the  British  Ministry  were  prevented 
by  the  parliamentary  system  of  government  from  assuming 
certain  responsibilities  which,  had  they  been  untrammelled 
by  humanitarian  "  little  Englanders,"  they  would  have 
looked  unhesitatingly  in  the  face.  Again,  France  has  lost  a 
vast  portion  of  the  Congo  because  a  meddlesome  Socialist 
opposition  regularly  scared  her  wisest  statesmen  into  inacti- 
vity. Belated  action  is  an  inevitable  characteristic  of 
public  policy  under  a  parliamentary  regime  ;  and  it  is  rare 
that,  given  the  nature  and  the  speed  of  world-evolution  in 
our  time,  belated  action  is  not  futile  action.  The  coup 
d'epee  dans  Veau  of  the  French  proverb  is  the  most  accurate 
symbol  of  the  eloquent,  but  aimless,  gestures  of  Governments 
that  have  to  give  chronic  account  of  their  deeds  to  parlia- 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     177 

mentary  assemblies.  The  tide  that  Shakespeare  noted  in 
the  affairs  of  men  cannot  be  taken  at  the  flood  when  five 
hundred  "  citizens  "  are  squabbling  as  to  the  boats  to  be 
selected  for  the  voyage  ;  as  to  whether  the  crew  is  to  be 
syndicalist  or  jaune,  native-born  or  "  sarrasin  "  ;  or  as  to 
the  reading  of  the  sextant  at  the  moment  when  the  watch 
is  taking  an  observation.  What  the  five  hundred  will  even- 
tually do  is  to  force  their  officers  to  embark  on  a  cranky 
craft  without  a  sail,  exposed  to  the  mercy  of  the  most  accessi- 
ble current  of  the  moment,  in  the  puerile  hope  that  all  the 
winds  will  be  favourable  and  that  the  current  will  after 
all  set  in  the  nick  of  time  in  the  right  direction. 

It  is  obvious  that  when,  as  to-day,  States  are  busy  with 
problems  of  social  betterment,  occupied,  that  is,  in  the 
practical  realization  of  the  modern  ideal  of  social  solidarity 
by  the  framing  of  demagogic  measures  partially  inspired 
by  the  desire  to  secure  votes,1  a  considerable  proportion 
of  the  public  fortune  is  sure  to  be  diverted  from  the 
channels  through  which  it  might  be  made  to  fill  a  moat 
of  defence  about  the  entire  nation  and  distributed  into  an 
inner  network  of  canals  for  the  alleged  irrigation  of  the 
national  soil.  The  budgets  of  modern  States,  in  spite  of 
the  colossal  expenditure  for  national  defence,  tend  constantly 
to  swell  their  items  of  social  legislation,  and  such  provisions 
as  old-age  pensions,  working  men's  insurance,  subsidies  to 
labour  organizations,  the  nationalization  of  railways,  are 
becoming  characteristic  methods  for  the  spending  of  public 
money,  while  at  the  same  time  they  are  inevitable  obstacles 
to  the  construction  of  dreadnoughts,  the  equipping  of  air- 
fleets,  and  the  formation  of  army  corps.  In  other  words, 
the  clamour  of  the  populace,  or  the  tumult  of  the  mob, 
armed  by  the  humanitarianism  of  our  special  form  of  Chris- 
tian civilization,  possesses,  in  the  devices  of  universal  suffrage 
and  parliamentary  government,  sure  instruments  for  the 

1  The  device  is  classic,  for  the  surenchdre  of  the  French  deputy 
is  only  the  modern  form  of  the  Roman  panem  et  circenses. 

N 


178  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

immediate  and  frequently  selfish  utilization  of  the  wealth 
of  the  community,  and  for  the  satisfaction  of  party  interests 
and  class  appetites  in  injudicious  and  often  anti-national 
ways. 

England  has  been,  for  the  last  few  years,  a  very  beau- 
tiful instance  of  these  truths.  The  accession  to  power  of 
an  humanitarian  doctrinaire  liberalism,  with  radicalistic 
roots  and  demagogic  leanings,  the  surrender  of  England's 
destinies  to  a  Cabinet  dominated  by  public  men  mystically 
inflamed  with  a  "  holy  "  passion  for  the  improvement  of 
the  masses,  and  either  ignorant  or  unmindful  both  of  the 
principles  of  State-craft  and  of  the  conditions  of  British  pres- 
tige, provided  an  excellent  object-lesson  of  the  unadapta- 
bility  to  a  self-respecting  democratic  society  of  the  purely 
representative  form  of  government.  One  of  the  colleagues 
of  Mr.  Lloyd  George  and  Mr.  Asquith,  Lord  Morley,  has 
perfectly  described  the  faults  of  ardent  spirits  who  take  to 
politics  in  a  stirring  age: — 

"  Pierced  by  thoughts  of  the  ills  in  the  world  around  them,  they 
are  overwhelmed  by  a  noble  impatience  to  remove,  to  lessen,  to 
abate.  Before  they  have  set  sail  they  insist  that  they  already  see 
some  new  planet  swimming  into  their  ken,  and  touch  the  promised 
land.  An  abstract,  &  priori  notion,  formed  independently  of  expe- 
rience, independently  of  evidence,  is  straightway  clothed  with  all 
the  sanctity  of  absolute  principle.  Generous  aspiration,  exalted 
enthusiasm,  is  made  to  do  duty  for  reasoned  scrutiny.  They  seize 
every  fact  or  circumstance  that  makes  their  way,  they  are  blind  to 
every  other.  Inflexible  preconceptions  hold  the  helm.  They 
exaggerate,  their  sense  of  proportion  is  bad."  1 

British  policy,  under  the  direction  of  Mr.  Lloyd  George, 
tended  to  lack  proportion  ;  it  became  a  policy  of  parochial- 
ism. The  Imperial  Idea  seemed  to  have  vanished  from 
the  brains  of  British  politicians.  Englishmen  had  had 
forced  upon  them  a  prolonged  constitutional  crisis,  which 
would  have  been  worse  than  futile  if  it  had  not  happily 
served  the  purpose  of  arousing  the  bewilderment  and  the 

1  Address,  June  28,  1912,  as  Chancellor  of  Manchester  University. 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     179 

dismay  of  the  Dominions,  and  thereby  contributing  (together 
with  the  episode  summed  up  by  the  words  Canadian  Reci- 
procity, the  meeting  of  the  Imperial  Conference,  and  later 
on,  the  Coup  of  Agadir)  to  save  England  from  an  insular 
grave. 

The  debate  on  the  Parliament  Bill,  which  for  months 
absorbed  the  entire  attention  of  political  parties,  at  a  time 
when  the  Triple  Alliance  was  strengthening  its  position  in 
the  Middle  East  from  the  Balkans  to  Baghdad,  showed  many 
things,  and  showed  especially  the  weakness,  the  absurdity 
of  party  government  based  on  the  "  rights  of  the  majority  "  ; 
but  above  all  showed  that  England's  primordial  interests 
were  being  neglected. 

That  a  system  of  party  government  based  on  the  "  rights 
of  the  majority  "  is  by  no  means  a  satisfactory  way  of  organiz- 
ing democracy,  is  being  proved  with  reductio  ad  absurdum 
clearness  by  the  experiments  now  making  all  over  the  world. 
It  was  already  sufficiently  indicated  during  the  British  crisis, 
which  resulted  in  the  Parliament  Act — the  measure  abolish- 
ing the  right  of  veto  of  the  Upper  House  while  giving  it  a 
"  suspensive  veto  " — by  the  facility  with  which  the  Prime 
Minister  became  a  "  tyrant  "  in  the  provisional  interests 
of  his  party.  That  crisis  emphasized  the  necessity  of  an 
electoral  reform  ensuring  the  representation  of  minorities 
—and  it  may  be  said,  without  insisting  further,  that  it 
illustrated  the  truth  that  the  French  pre-Revolutionary 
conception  of  popular  rights,  the  socio-political  organization 
of  the  Old  Regime,  on  which  popular  liberties  had  been 
organized  in  syndicates  of  interests  known  as  "  Etats," 
was  a  more  practical  and  more  really  democratic  system 
than  the  English  invention  of  representative  government. 
But  it  must  be  granted  that  no  one  who  accepts  the  tradi- 
tional British  view  of  "  party  government  "  had  a  right 
to  criticize  Mr.  Asquith's  action  on  the  ground  of  its  illogical 
character.  Evidently  the  King,  broad-basing  his  policy 
on  the  English  democratic  theory  of  the  sovereignty  of  the 


i8o  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

people,  and  accepting  the  British  notion  of  party  government 
founded  on  the  majority  system,  regarded  the  General 
Elections  that  renewed  the  Liberal  "  Mandate  "  as  possessing 
all  the  virtue  of  a  referendum.  By  temporarily — and  con- 
stitutionally— becoming  a  radical,  and  resisting  the  appeal 
of  the  irresponsible  Conservative  statesmen  to  cease  to  be  a 
Constitutional  Sovereign,  the  King  showed  himself  more 
conservative  than  the  Conservatives.  He  probably  saved 
his  country  from  Revolution. 

It  was  plausibly  argued  that  the  upshot  of  the  long  debate 
over  the  Parliament  Bill — namely,  Mr.  Asquith's  letter 
(his  "  coup  d'etat "),  menacing  the  House  of  Lords  with  an 
arbitrary  increase  of  the  Liberal  majority  (by  means  of  the 
device  known  as  the  "  Prerogative  of  the  Crown  "  for  the 
creation  of  new  peers),  so  that  the  existing  dominant  majority 
of  Conservatives  might  be  outvoted  and  the  Upper  House 
coerced  into  a  line  of  action  parallel  with  that  of  the  House 
of  Commons — showed  that  Government  in  England  to-day 
is  Single-Chamber  Government  based  on" the  Party  System. 
It  was  pointed  out  that,  for  the  menace  to  have  any  reality, 
its  efficacy  should  not  be  beyond  doubt ;  and  that  its  effi- 
cacy would  be  doubted  if  there  existed  any  known  constitu- 
tional recourse  against  its  realization.  The  fact  that  the 
Prime  Minister  used  the  menace  for  his  party  ends  was  every- 
where interpreted  as  a  proof  that  he  was  the  master  of  the 
King's  Prerogative.  But  the  conclusion  was  not,  in  logic, 
conclusive.  The  fact  that  the  head  of  a  disciplined  majority 
in  the  Lower  House  should  be  in  a  position,  by  using  the 
"  Prerogative  of  the  Crown,"  to  carry  out  his  will  as  to 
legislation  in  the  Upper  House  implies,  not  one  thing,  but 
two  things :  that  either  the  King  is  a  coerced,  or  that  he 
is  a  willing,  accomplice  of  the  Prime  Minister's  action.  In 
the  former  case  the  King  "  rules  "  but  does  not  "  govern," 
which  is,  indeed,  the  British  constitutional  boast,  and,  for 
England,  the  definition  of  a  "  Constitutional  Sovereign  "  ; 
in  the  latter  case,  the  King's  own  responsibility  is  engaged, 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     181 

but  the  theory  of  the  "  Constitutional  Sovereign  "  annihi- 
lated. It  was  of  the  highest  importance,  therefore,  to 
ascertain  (and  Mr.  Balfour  was  intelligent  enough  to  put 
the  question)  when,  and  in  what  conditions,  the  King 
was  ready  to  use  his  Royal  Prerogative  ;  for,  if  he  promised 
the  Prime  Minister  to  create  peers,  provided  the  Prime  Minis- 
ter should  one  day  want  them — the  method  of  the  "  blank 
cheque" ;  that  is  to  say,  if  he  let  the  Prime  Minister  under- 
stand that  he  held  himself  to  be  constitutionally  at  the 
beck  and  call  of  the  Prime  Minister,  irrespective  of  his  own 
feelings  or  views — he  thereby  acquiesced  in  the  traditional 
British  view  of  the  Constitutional  Sovereign,  and  illustrated, 
at  the  same  time,  the  vast  difference  between  the  British 
Constitution  and,  say,  the  American,  as  regards  the  role 
of  the  head  of  the  State.  His  action  showed,  once  again, 
that  in  the  English  system  there  is  no  check,  as  far  as  the 
sovereign's  role  is  concerned,  to  hasty  or  ill-considered  legis- 
lation ;  such  action,  in  a  word,  tended  to  enhance  the  des- 
potism of  the  representative  assembly.  If,  on  the  other 
hand,  the  King  agreed  to  use  his  Prerogative  only  in  response 
to  the  Prime  Minister's  specific  appeal  at  a  specific  crisis, 
he  was  thereby  acting  not  as  a  "  Constitutional  Sovereign" 
of  the  alleged  British  constitutional  form,  but  as  an  inde- 
pendent organ  of  the  machine  of  government,  as,  indeed,  a 
Head-of-the-State,  like  the  President  of  the  United  States, 
who  possesses  the  power  of  veto  and  uses  it  in  virtue  of  his 
normal  constitutional  role. 

The  question  put  by  Mr.  Balfour  as  to  the  date  of  the 
guarantees  given  the  Prime  Minister  by  the  Crown  was  there- 
fore not  merely  a  matter  of  historical  interest,  or  of  curious 
inquiry.  A  clear  answer  to  that  question  was  required  in 
order  to  comprehend  the  real  nature  of  the  political  crisis 
in  England,  or  indeed  whether  that  crisis  was  in  reality  a 
constitutional  crisis.  It  was  imperative  to  know  how  and 
why  the  King's  Prerogative  was  transferred  to  the  Prime 
Minister,  for  use  in  connexion  with  the  Parliament  Bill, 


182  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

before  it  was  possible  positively  to  conclude  that  govern- 
ment to-day  in  England  is  Single-Chamber  government; 
that  is  to  say,  a  reversion  to  the  dangerous  form  of  Assembly 
which  grew  up  during  the  French  Revolution,  and  is  at  the 
antipodes  of  the  forms  evolved,  under  the  inspiration  of 
more  rational  ideas,  to  surround  the  expression  of  the  people's 
will  with  steadying  checks.  Even,  however,  if  the  King  acted 
in  the  spirit  of  an  independent  chef  d'etat — lending  his  Pre- 
rogative for  temporary  application  to  a  special  situation, 
as  an  American  president  in  the  interests  of  the  nation 
exercises  his  veto  for  particular  ends — such  combined  action 
on  the  part  of  Commons  and  King  against  the  Lords  could 
not  but  diminish  the  prestige  of  the  Upper  House,  and  show 
the  need  of  a  readjustment  of  its  "  constitutional "  role — 
while  at  the  same  time  it  exposed  the  institution  of  the  Mon- 
archy, qua  institution,  to  legitimate  discussion  as  regards 
its  role  in  the  British  Constitution. 

What  was  obvious  was  that  Mr.  Asquith's  action  did  not 
at  any  moment  clear  up  the  confusion  reigning  in  men's 
minds  as  to  the  reciprocal  relations  of  the  several  parts  of 
the  British  constitutional  machine.  It  is  more  difficult  to- 
day than  ever  to  feel  sure  what  is  the  role  of  the  King  ;  what 
that  of  the  Commons,  what  that  of  the  Lords  ;  and  these  am- 
biguities show  clearly  for  the  first  time  what  confusion 
exists  in  the  British  Constitution.  They  hint  at  the  advis- 
ability of  defining  the  diverse  functions  of  the  parts  of  the 
State  by  a  paper  constitution  which  shall  both  embalm  old 
precedents  and  prepare  the  nation  for  new  situations. 
In  any  case  the  creation  of  fresh  peers — that  is,  the  sudden 
circumstantial  packing  of  an  Upper  House  with  members 
friendly  to  the  Government,  in  order  to  pass  Government 
measures — would  always  have  to  be  regarded  as  a  bungling 
method  of  representative  government,  even  if  it  were  not 
an  arbitrary  or  possibly  a  revolutionary  measure.  A  Prime 
Minister  and,  indeed,  any  statesman,  will  invariably  be 
excused  for  adopting  revolutionary  methods  if  he  can  prove 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     183 

that  a  Constitution  is  unworkable.  But  he  will  not  be 
approved  for  upsetting  a  Constitution  if  all  he  can  say  is, 
"  It  doesn't  work  as  I  should  like  it  to."  Mr.  Asquith 
argued  that  his  action  was  justifiable  because  the  country 
was  behind  him,  with  two  General  Elections  to  the  good  for 
the  proof  of  his  argument.  But  that  was  not  proved,  since 
only  a  precise  referendum  on  a  definite  question  can  ever 
prove  such  a  point  as  that. 

At  all  events,  the  episode  served  merely  as  an  object- 
lesson  showing  the  flimsiness  and  not-up-to-dateness  of  the 
so-called  British  Constitution.  Mr.  Asquith's  action,  revolu- 
tionary in  its  manner,  was  not  so  clearly  ww-Constitutional 
as  to  be  really  Revolutionary ;  and  it  will  have  served 
the  end  of  hastening  the  necessary  movement  making  for  a 
reform  that  shall  provide  England  with  a  real  Constitution, 
in  harmony  not  only  with  the  social  and  economic  evolution 
of  the  Three  Kingdoms,  but,  above  all,  with  the  new  require- 
ments of  an  Empire  composed  of  five  self-governing  nations 
of  equal  status  and  common  interests* 

Throughout  the  disastrous  period  of  England's  absorption 
in  her  constitutional  crisis,  Germany  was  engaged  in  difficult 
and  secret  negotiations  with  France,  in  pursuance  of  the 
common  efforts  of  the  two  Powers  to  apply  their  Agreement  of 
1909.  As  her  newspapers  showed,  Germany  was  fully  aware 
of  the  germs  making  for  the  disintegration  of  England. 
The  signs  of  national,  as  well  as  of  constitutional,  crises  in 
England  were  indeed  becoming  so  ominous  and  so  abundant 
that  they  were  attracting  the  attention  of  the  entire  world. 

One  of  the  most  startling  of  these  signs  was  the  negotiation 
between  Canada  and  the  United  States  over  the  question 
of  Reciprocity.  Owing  to  the  failure  of  the  British  Govern- 
ment and  Parliament  to  put  into  effect  in  good  tune  the 
Imperial  policy  defended  by  Mr.  Chamberlain,  the  British 
Colonies  had  been  rapidly  moving  towards  a  state  of  all  but 
complete  independence.  For  several  years  they  had  been 
1  See  pp.  266-271. 


184  PROBLEMS  OF   POWER 

insisting  on  the  right  to  be  called  "  Dominions,"  and  Canada, 
notably,  had  concluded  commercial  treatiesjwith  other  States, 
indifferent  as  to  the  possible  consequences  for  British  trade. 
The  so-called  British  Empire  was  falling  asunder.  And 
when,  in  the  latter  half  of  1910,  the  President  of  the  United 
States  proposed  to  the  Prime  Minister  of  Canada  a  reciprocity 
treaty  "  that,"  as  he  himself  put  it  in  a  private  letter  to  Mr. 
Roosevelt  (January  10, 1911),  "  would  make  Canada  only  an 
adjunct  of  the  United  States,"  the  British  Government  had 
so  completely  lost  the  reins  of  sovereignty  that  all  they  could 
devise  to  save  Canada  for  the  "  Empire "  was,  in  Lord 
Haldane's  words,  "  sympathetically  to  watch  "  the  astound- 
ing colloquy  between  Mr.  Taft  and  Sir  W.  Laurier.  With 
deliberate  unconcern,  the  noble  Viscount  said  :  "  We  are 
going  to  leave  the  British  merchant  to  flourish  in  the  future 
as  he  has  done  in  the  past  under  Free  Trade,  and  to  leave 
the  British  Empire  to  hold  together  by  bonds  of  sympathy  " 
(House  of  Lords,  May  18,  1911). 

The  policy  of  the  Cunctators  and  the  Pilates,  the  policy 
of  washing  one's  hands  of  all  responsibility,  is  often  con- 
venient, but  is  not  always  followed  without  risk.  Canadian 
loyalty  was  later  on  to  save  Imperial  honour,  but  the  British 
Government  did  nothing  to  put  themselves  into  a  state 
of  grace  making  England  meet  for  such  salvation  ;  they  did 
nothing  to  prevent  the  sudden  snapping  of  the  ties  linking 
Canada  to  the  Empire.  In  general,  at  this  juncture,  the 
reticence  of  British  island-opinion  was  a  spectacle  that 
seemed,  in  itself,  to  be  less  a  proof  of  tactful  and  dignified 
discretion  than  a  kind  of  stoic  morituri  salutamus  addressed 
to  Britain's  offspring.  Shakespeare  seemed  to  have  fore- 
seen this  hour  when  he  made  Lear  say  : — 

"  Meantime  we  shall  express  our  darker  purpose, 
Give  me  the  map  there. — Know  that  we  have  divided 
In  three  (five)  our  Kingdom  :  and  'tis  our  fast  intent 
To  shake  all  cares  and  business  from  our  age ; 
Conferring  them  on  younger  strengths,  while  we 
Unburthened  crawl  towards  death.  .  .  ." 


A  STUDY  OF   INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     185 

To  be  sure,  when  Lear  was  quite  spent  with  an  intolerable 
despair,  Kent  saw  where  succour  lay,  and  Cordelia  came 
from  France  to  bring  her  father's  spirit  peace : — 

"  But,  true  it  is,  from  France  there  comes  a  power 
Into  this  scattered  Kingdom.  .  .  ." 

France  was  not  Canada ;  France  could  do  nothing  to 
arrest  the  fateful  gravitation  of  the  great  North-American 
Dominion  towards  the  pull  of  its  mighty  neighbour ;  and 
France,  moreover,  was  even  at  tjiat  very  hour  unwittingly 
indulging  in  a  dangerous  experiment.  She  was  fishing  in 
the  troubled  waters  of  the  negotiations  consequent  upon 
the  1909  Agreement  with  Germany,  an  Agreement  which,  if 
it  had  been  really  applicable,  would  have  rendered  the 
Entente  Cordiale  no  more  than  a  matter  of  past  history. 
The  statues  which  surround  the  memorial  monument  to  the 
Great  Queen  in  front  of  Buckingham  Palace  assumed  in 
1911  the  aspect  of  Gonerils  and  Regans  personifying  the 
Daughter  States  ;  and  when  the  noble  Coronation  Procession 
disappeared  through  the  Arch  down  the  perspective  of  the 
Mall,  it  required  no  blending  of  fantasy  with  the  imagination 
to  perceive  the  Venerable  Mother,  as  she  looked  on  her  wilful 
daughters  in  the  dusk  of  evening,  take  on  the  semblance  of  a 
weeping  Niobe. 

The  tragic  spectacle  was  the  finest  comedy  for  Eng- 
land's enemies,  but  it  caused  bewilderment  in  France.  "  It 
is  her  own  soul  that  Canada  risks  to-day,"  telegraphed  1 
England's  Imperial  poet,  the  man  who  had  done  most 
to  render  the  soul  of  the  average  Englishman  articulate. 
"  Once  that  soul  is  pawned  for  any  consideration,  Canada 
must  inevitably  conform  to  the  commercial,  legal,  financial, 
social  and  ethical  standards  which  will  be  imposed  upon 
her  by  the  sheer  admitted  weight  of  the  United  States." 
"  Not  so,"  had  said  President  Taft  publicly,  "  all  talk  of 

1  From  Bateman's,  Burwash,  Sussex,  on  September  6,  to  the 
Montreal  Star. 


186  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

annexation  is  bosh  " — the  same  President  who  had  privately 
solicited  for  his  policy  the  approval  of  the  founder  of  Ameri- 
can Imperialism,  his  predecessor  Mr.  Roosevelt,  with  the 
assurance  that  Reciprocity  would  "  make  Canada  only  an 
adjunct  of  the  United  States."  A  candidate  for  the  Presi- 
dency, with  jubilant  indiscretion,  had  publicly  declared  that 
such  was  indeed  the  case.  And  England's  best  friends  did 
not  doubt  it,  nor  did  they  doubt  that  Canada  was  irrevocably 
lost  to  the  Crown.  Even  so  perspicacious  an  observer  as 
Rear- Admiral  Mahan  did  not  doubt  it.  Writing  in  the 
Century  Magazine  on  "  The  Panama  Canal  and  Sea  Power 
in  the  Pacific,"  he  pointed  out  that  the  military  effect  upon 
Sea  Power  of  the  Panama  Canal  would  be  the  facility  with 
which  the  navy  of  the  United  States  and  "  that  of  the  govern- 
ment controlling  Canada  "  could  pass  from  one  side  to  the 
other,  in  support  of  either  coast,  as  needed ;  and  he  added 
that  he  had  advisedly  used  the  words  "  the  government 
controlling  Canada,"  for,  while  Canada  was  a  part  of  the 
British  Empire,  it  was  "  difficult,  in  view  of  current  political 
discussions  in  Canada,  especially  those  touching  the  question 
of  support  to  the  Empire,  not  to  feel  that  the  preponderant 
tone  there  did  not  in  that  respect  reflect  that  of  Australia, 
New  Zealand,  or  even  of  South  Africa."  Rear- Admiral 
Mahan  concluded — with  all  the  world,  before  the  fall  of 
Sir  W.  Laurier,  in  the  year  of  Agadir,  and  while  the  United 
States  and  England  were  signing  an  Arbitration  Treaty  for 
the  settlement  even  of  questions  of  National  Honour  ! — 
that  there  "  did  not  appear  to  be  between  Canada  and  Great 
Britain  that  strong  dependence  of  mutual  interests  of  defence, 
of  which  the  British  Navy  is  the  symbol  and  the  instrument." 
He  deeply  regretted  the  fact,  but  the  fact  seemed  incontes- 
table ;  there  was  no  gainsaying  it. 

Indeed,  viewed  from  the  United  States,  in  the  late  summer 
of  1911,  England's  plight  seemed  even  more  terrible  than 
when  it  was  contemplated  from  Paris  in  1910  and  before 
July  i  (Agadir),  1911.  It  was  obvious  that  the  effect  of 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     187 

Agadir  on  European  politics  would  be  all  to  the  good,  that 
the  stupid  coup  would  finally  and  definitively  weld  the 
Entente  Cordiale,  galvanize  England,  re-temper  the  French 
national  soul,  and  establish  for  yet  a  few  sure  years  the 
European  balance  of  power.  But  "  Reciprocity,"  and  the 
doubtful  issue  of  the  Imperial  Conference  of  British  Premiers, 
had  bared  to  the  nations  the  misery  and  nakedness  of  Eng- 
land. Her  old-time  Imperial  optimism  appeared  to  have 
migrated  to  the  North-American  Atlantic  States.  From 
Montreal  to  Boston,  from  Boston  to  New  York,  from  New 
York  to  Charleston  and  Atlanta,  the  magic  word  "  Recipro- 
city "  seemed  to  be  a  kind  of  mystic  pass-word  ushering  in 
the  new  era,  the  century  of  the  Panama  Canal,  and  giving 
an  opportunity  for  all  the  admittedly  belated  readjust- 
ments of  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 

In  general,  and  always,  on  the  American  Continent,  the 
air  of  individual  liberty,  of  reciprocal  trust,  of  tolerant  and 
untrammelled  thought,  that  men  breathe  is  lighter,  more 
invigorating,  than  in  Europe ;  and,  as  the  breasts  of  the 
self-reliant  citizens  of  the^ Western  communities  expand,  the 
well-being  that  pervades  their  organisms  is  one  that  the 
long-disciplined  inhabitants  of  an  older  society  have  never 
known  and  find  it  difficult  to  understand.  In  1911  the 
Americans,  those  to  the  north  of  the  Great  Lakes  as  well 
as  those  of  the  United  States,  seemed  to  be  more  than  ever 
keenly  aware  of  the  difference  between  themselves  and  the 
Europeans.  "  Reciprocity  "  appeared  to  them  quite  the 
most  natural  thing  in  the  world.  The  fighting  on  the  Ameri- 
can Continent  during  the  past  three  centuries,  as  ex-President 
Eliot  of  Harvard  has  pointed  out,  has  not  been  of  the  sort 
which  most  imperils  liberty.  The  French  and  English 
wars  furnished  a  school  of  martial  qualities  at  small  cost  to 
liberty  ;  and  the  War  of  Independence  was,  like  the  war  of 
1861,  a  "  Civil  War  "  ;  the  one  was  as  much  a  Rebellion  as 
the  other.  Both  were  waged  in  defence  of  the  British  tra- 
dition of  Free  Institutions,  and  both  resulted  in  a  reinforce- 


188  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

ment  of  the  ideal  of  individual  freedom.  Nothing  is  more 
characteristic  of  the  temper  of  human  nature  on  the  North 
American  Continent  than  the  fact  that  in  1827  the  same 
President  who  was  to  give  his  name  to  that  proud  American 
doubled-edged  policy  known  as  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  signed 
a  Convention  with  Great  Britain  by  which  England  and  the 
United  States  should  maintain  on  the  Great  Lakes  only  a 
few  insignificant  vessels  for  the  policing  of  those  shores. 
No  buffer  state  or  bristling  armament  impeded  the  natural 
advance  into  England's  Canadian  territory  of  the  spirit  of 
individual  American  self-reliance  ;  and  the  new  Reciprocity 
Treaty  of  1910  and  1911  seemed  to  be  but  the  natural, 
the  inevitable,  consequence  of  this  pacific  penetration  of 
Americanism.  It  was  the  contagion  of  "  American  "  ideas 
that  engendered  that  peculiar  Canadian  form  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  to  which  Sir  W.  Laurier  gave  expression  when  he 
reiterated  at  the  Imperial  Conference  the  intention  of  Canada 
never  to  become  embroiled  in  a  British  quarrel  unless  it 
suited  her  to  do  so  ;  and  the  anti-Imperialistic  Anglo-Cana- 
dian Convention  as  to  the  relations  between  the  British 
and  Canadian  navies  was  but  the  formal  confirmation  of  this 
resolve,  and  the  definite  expression  of  the  feeling  behind 
such  utterances. 

Sir  Wilfred  Laurier,  returning  from  the  Imperial  Con- 
ference of  May  23  to  June  20,  had  sailed  triumphantly  up 
the  river  from  Quebec  amid  cheering  crowds  on  the 
wharves,  and  shipping  decked  with  bunting.  He  was 
welcomed  in  Montreal  as  the  champion  of  Canadian 
autonomy.  He  himself  acquiesced,  declaring  that  he  had 
fought  at  the  Conference  "  for  the  equality  of  the  two  races 
and  the  vindication  of  Canada's  rights  as  an  autonomous 
country."  He  added :  "  We  were  asked  to  endorse  a 
proposal  for  the  creation  of  an  Imperial  Council,  which  would 
decide  military  and  naval  policies  and  the  taxation  of  the 
people.  I  opposed  this,  because  it  would  have  been  an 
abrogation  of  our  rights  and  opposed  to  the  doctrine  of  respon- 


A  STUDY  OF   INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     189 

sible  government."  This  proud  affirmation  of  a  policy 
avowedly  in  opposition  to  the  "  imperial  jingoes,"  this  appeal 
to  Canadian  national  sentiment,  was  made  by  the  states- 
man who  had  hurried  home  "  to  renew  the  fight  for  Recipro- 
city," an  idea  which  he  cherished,  not  because  he  loved  the 
United  States,  but  because  he  believed  that  by  its  realization 
he  would  all  but  definitively  secure  Canadian  independence. 
He  had  neither  Mr.  Rudyard  Kipling's  nor  Real-Admiral 
Mahan's  sense  of  the  risks.  His  speech  was  made  on  July  12. 
Just  twelve  days  before,  the  European  Governments  had 
been  informed  by  the  German  Chancellor  that  the  Panther 
was  to  be  sent  to  Agadir.  Nine  days  later,  at  the  Lord 
Mayor's  banquet  in  London,  Mr.  Lloyd  George  made  the 
speech  which,  rattling  round  the  world,  showed  that  at  last 
England  had  awakened.  The  Chancellor  of  the  Exchequer 
reminded  Germany — and  he  reminded  the  Dominions — that 
the  British  Empire  was  still  in  existence  ;  and  that  national 
honour  and  the  security  of  England's  great  international 
trade  were  not  party  questions  ..."  Reciprocity "  was 
doomed  !  Sir  Wilfred  Laurier  had  opposed  a  proposal  for 
the  creation  of  an  Imperial  Council  which  should  decide 
military  and  naval  policy  and  the  taxation  of  the  people. 
He  had  virtually  repudiated  the  Empire  and  affirmed  the 
detachment  of  Canada ;  and  Mr.  Fisher,  at  the  same  Im- 
perial Conference,  had  seriously  suggested  that  the  Con- 
ference should  be  extended  to  include  Foreign  Powers — 
fatuities  that  seemed  to  echo  the  incredible  British  ignorance 
of  world-conditions,  and  be  one  with  the  sublimely  stupid 
efforts  to  avert  the  risks  of  war  by  signing  unrestricted  Arbi- 
tration Treaties.  Less  than  three  weeks  before  Agadir,  the 
Committee  of  the  International  Arbitration  and  Peace 
Association  had  voted  the  following  resolution : — 

"  This  Committee  expresses  its  satisfaction  that  the  Colonial  Con- 
ference has  rejected  a  scheme  for  a  Central  Imperial  Council  which 
would  have  seriously  hampered  the  freedom  both  of  the  United 
Kingdom  and  of  the  Colonial  Governments,  would  have  put  India 


i9o  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

at  an  even  greater  disadvantage  than  at  present  as  compared  with 
the  rest  of  the  Empire,  and  by  emphasizing  unnaturally  the  question 
of  Imperial  Defence  would  have  been  liable  to  increase  the  tendency  to 
military  and  naval  panics." 

Indeed,  when  the  Imperial  Conference  rose,  so  unsatis- 
factory was  the  outlook — notwithstanding  the  fact  that 
the  representatives  of  the  Dominions  had  been  "  admitted 
into  the  interior  of  the  Imperial  household,"  had  been  shown 
the  very  "  arcanae  imperil,  without  any  reservation  or 
qualification "  1 — that  it  really  seemed  as  if  England 
must  make  up  her  mind  to  the  loss  of  her  Dominions,  to 
the  loss  of  the  Empire,  and  as  if  the  only  attitude  left  her, 
in  face  of  the  German  hordes,  was  that  of  the  Roman  sena- 
tors when  the  barbarians  appeared  on  their  thresholds.  A 
doctor  in  political  science,  investigating  England's  plight 
at  this  hour,  would  have  prescribed  as  follows  :  She  must 
learn  to  look  facts  in  the  face ;  abandon  her  dilatory  tac- 
tics; cultivate  the  habit  of  intellectual  probity — tear  the 
scales  from  her  eyes  ;  recognize  that  the  old  game  is  up  ; 
that  the  Colonies  are  not  Dependencies,  but  full-fledged 
Dominions  ;  that  no  cut-and-dried  scheme  of  Union  can  ever 
bind  these  Daughters  to  the  Mother-Country  ;  and,  concen- 
trating all  her  energy  on  the  preservation  of  India,  Egypt, 
and  the  Islands  of  the  Pacific,  awake  to  the  truth  that 
Europe  is  Europe,  and  that  as  long  as  Germany  is  Germany, 
the  Britons  and  the  Gauls  have  a  common  interest  and 
must  hold  together. 

The  British  Imperial  Conference  ended  its  deliberations 
on  June  20.  The  date  of  Agadir  is  July  i.  Almost  exactly 
one  year  later,  July  10,  1912 — Reciprocity  having  been 
buried,  the  Anglo-American  Arbitration  Treaty  paralysed — 
Mr.  Borden,  the  new  Prime  Minister  of  an  awakened  Canada, 
stated  in  London,  whither  he  had  come  to  confer  on  the 
lessons  which  Agadir  had  finally  revealed  even  to  the 

1  Speech  of  Mr.  Asquith,  final  sitting. 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     191 

Anglo-Saxon  world,  that  the  sea  defence  of  the  Empire  could 
best  be  secured  by  one  navy  ;  and  he  added  :  "  The  Cana- 
dian ideal  is  one  king,  one  flag,  one  Empire,  one  navy — 
one  navy  powerful  enough  to  vindicate  the  flag,  and  maintain 
the  integrity  of  the  Empire."  The  crisis  was  over  !  England 
was  to  be  saved  by  the  Dominions  ! 

As  regards  Canada  herself,  what  had  taken  place  was 
quite  simple.  The  Canadians,  who  are  firmly  resolved  at  all 
costs  to  maintain  their  autonomy,  fancied  in  1910  and  1911 
that  Commercial  Reciprocity  with  the  United  States  was 
the  shortest  cut  to  national  independence ;  and  the  same 
people  rejected  Reciprocity  because  they  suddenly  became 
convinced  that  the  only  way,  after  all,  to  save  their  national 
soul  was  to  lose  it,  not  to  the  United  States,  but  to  the 
Empire.  The  ends  sought  by  Sir  Wilfred  Laurier  and  Mr. 
Borden  were  identical.  Their  methods  alone  differed.  In 
the  Canadian  case  it  has  happened  that  second  thoughts  were 
best.  Under  the  Stars  and  Stripes  Canada  would  inevitably 
have  been  absorbed.  Under  the  Union  Jack  she  will  perhaps 
become  what  her  late  Governor-General,  Earl  Grey,  pro- 
phesied of  her  on  July  10,  1912  :  "  The  controlling  part  of 
the  Empire."  Among  the  results  of  the  Coup  d'Agadir 
none  was  more  unexpected,  and  none  obviously  of  more  far- 
reaching  consequence.  England,  moreover,  was  no  longer 
"to  shake  all  cares  and  business  from  her  age,"  and,  "  un- 
burthened,  crawl  towards  death."  To-day  the  lines  ad- 
dressed by  Walt  Whitman  to  "  America  "  seem  to  have 
been  meant  for  the  older  country : — 

Centre  of  equal  daughters,  equal  sons, 

All,  all  alike,  endear'd,  grown,  ungrown,  young  and  old, 

Strong,  ample,  fair,  enduring,  capable,  rich, 

Perennial  with  the  Earth,  with  Freedom,  Law  and  Love, 

A  grand,  sane,  towering,  seated  Mother 

Chair'd  in  the  adamant  of  Time. 


BOOK  III 


BOOK    III 


THE  foregoing  attempt  to  analyse  the  political  history 
and  domestic  crises  of  the  European  Powers,  and  of 
the  two  rival  nations  in  North  America,  will  have  served, 
however  imperfect  it  is,  to  justify  certain  remarks  made  in  the 
earlier  pages  of  this  Essay.  Not  only  will  it  have  shown 
that  "  to  chronicle  the  doings  of  any  individual  nation 
without  writing  at  the  same  time  the  history  of  all  other 
peoples  is  no  longer  possible,"  it  will  also  have  illustrated 
the  more  general  truths  formulated  in  the  statements  that 
"  behind  the  facade  of  Government  two  occult  powers — 
Money  and  Public  Opinion — are  now  determining  the  des- 
tinies of  the  world,"  and  that  "  national  spirit  is  manifested 
only  when  nationality  is  menaced." 

It  is  not  infrequently  held  that  the  time  is  approaching 
when  the  coalition  of  political  passion  and  of  social  hatred 
and  envy  will  completely  dominate  what  still  remains  of 
national  feeling  or  prejudice.  It  is,  at  all  events,  a  fact 
that,  as  M.  Rene  Pinon  says,1  "  A  travers  les  frontieres  tend 
a  s'etablir  rinternationalisme  des  partis."  He  goes  so  far 
afield  as  to  recall  that  Philip  of  Macedon,  Alexander,  and 
later  on  the  Romans — when  they  undertook  to  subjugate 
Greece,  where  a  refined  civilization  veiled  the  mortal  vice 
of  class  war,  and  the  inexorable  antagonism  of  rich  and  poor 
— were  always  able  to  count  on  the  complicity,  either  of  the 
plutocracy  careful  of  its  interests,  or  of  the  demagogue 

1  La  lutte  pour  le  Pacifique,  p.  185. 

195 


196  PROBLEMS   OF  POWER 

whose  tyranny  was  menaced.  Certain  modern  parallels, 
notably  Germany's  choice  of  methods  in  her  efforts  to  sub- 
jugate France,  might  be  more  pertinent.  In  modern  Europe, 
continues  M.  Ren6  Pinon,  "  money  has  been  an  element  of 
universal  corruption,  it  has  upset  the  normal  play  of  the 
governmental  and  administrative  machinery,  it  has  destroyed 
all  idealism."  The  facts,  as  they  have  already  been  pre- 
sented in  these  pages,  hardly  seem  to  warrant  so  sweep- 
ing an  indictment :  idealism,  at  all  events,  seems  still 
to  hold  its  own  in  spite  of  the  "  corrupting  "  power  of 
wealth.  In  agreement  with  the  diagnosis  herein  attempted 
of  the  nature  of  contemporary  unrest,  Signor  Guglielmo 
Ferrero  notes  l  that  the  European  peoples  are  beginning 
again  to  care  for  other  things  than  their  economic  organi- 
zation and  questions  concerning  the  balance  of  trade. 
The  interesting  fact  is  that  modern  peoples  seem  to  crave 
both  ideal  moral  satisfactions  and  economic  well-being  : 
they  want  Reform  as  much  as  they  want  Money.  It  is 
probable  that  this  apparently  curious  inconsistency  is  no 
inconsistency  whatever.  It  is  likely  that  the  growing  love 
of  order,  the  general  desire  for  reform,  and  the  outburst  of 
nationalism,  on  the  one  hand,  and,  on  the  other,  the  recog- 
nition of  the  fact  that  money  is  to-day  the  chief  instrument 
of  rapid  and  successful  action,  are  different  aspects  of  the 
same  state  of  mind.  In  any  case,  it  is  absurd  to  prejudge 
a  question  of  this  kind.  No  answer  to  it  can  be  reasonably 
attempted  before  considering  a  characteristic  collection  of 
those  concrete  economic  factors  that  are  so  fast  tending 
to  cosmopolitanize  the  still  distinctly  differentiated  rival 
nations  and  peoples. 

II 

When,  in  1847,  at  tne  Congress  of  the  Communist  Union 
held  in  London,  Karl  Marx  and  Engels  launched  the  cry: 
"  Proletarians  of  all  countries,  unite  your  forces  !  ";  when  in 

1  "  L'Ideal  et  la  Richesse  "  :    Le  Figaro,  September  10,   1912. 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     197 

1866,  at  Geneva,  working-class  delegates  from  all  over 
Europe  drew  up  the  statutes  of  the  "  International 
Association  of  Working  Men  "  ;  when,  finally,  the  revolu- 
tionary army  organized  by  the  General  Confederations  of 
Labour  of  the  world,  abandoned  the  Marseillaise  for 
the  sinister  battle-song  of  the  Internationale,1  these  bat- 
talions of  the  proletariat  overlooked  the  fact  that  the 
growth  of  the  very  causes  which  had  produced  the  illusion 
of  a  similarity  of  interests  uniting  the  working-classes  in 
all  countries  against  the  employer  and  the  capitalist,  was 
soon  to  shatter  that  illusion,  through  the  action  of  a  new 
factor.  That  new  factor  was  the  world-wide  emigration 
of  the  working-man  in  search  of  better  labour  conditions 
and  a  higher  wage.  The  socialists  or  the  anarchists  of  the 
"  Internationale,"  who  repudiated  so  fiercely  every  form  of 
patriotic  or  national  feeling,  who  condemned  gods,  govern- 
ments and  armies  in  their  humanitarian  anti-militarist 

1  II  n'est  pas  de  sauveur  supreme, 
Ni  Dieu,  ni  Cesar,  ni  tribun. 
Producteurs,  sauvons-nous  nous-memes  ! 
Decretons  le  salut  commun  ! 

*  *  *  * 

Les  rois  nous  soiilaient  de  fumees, 
Paix  entre  nous,  guerre  aux  tyrans  ! 
Appliquons  la  greve  aux  armees, 
Crosse  en  1'air  et  rompons  les  rangs  ! 
S'ils  s'obstinent,  ces  cannibales, 
A  faire  de  nous  des  heros, 
Us  sauront  bientot  que  nos  balles 
Sont  pour  nos  propres  g6neraux  ! 

Refrain. 

Debout !  les  damnes  de  la  terre  ! 
Debout !  les  forgats  de  la  faim  ! 

La  raison  tonne  en  son  cratere, 
C'est  1'eruption  de  la  fin. 
Du  passe  faisons  table  rase, 
Foule  esclave,  debout,  debout ! 
Le  monde  va  changer  de  base  : 
Nous  ne  sommes  rien,  soyons  tout ! 


I98  PROBLEMS  OF   POWER 

frenzy,  found  themselves  face  to  face  with  a  set  of  facts 
which  gave  a  surprisingly  foolish  look  to  their  internation- 
alism. Thus  the  Italian  labourer  is  over-running  the  globe, 
and  becoming  the  rival  of  the  American  in  New  York,  and 
of  the  Frenchman  in  Provence,  in  Lorraine  and  in  the  He  de 
France.  The  German  and  the  Swiss  are  colonizing  Paris, 
the  East  of  France,  South  America,  London.  The  Pole  is 
pullulating  on  both  slopes  of  the  Vosges.  The  Scandinavian, 
the  Russian  Jew,  the  Hungarian,  are  elbowing  the  native- 
born  of  every  country.  So  overwhelming  is  the  mounting 
tide  of  immigration  in  the  United  States  and  certain  of  the 
British  Dominions  that  almost  annually  now  for  a  quarter 
of  a  century  those  countries  have  felt  called  upon  to  raise 
higher  and  higher  dykes  against  the  influx  of  undesirables. 
In  fact,  to  use  the  words  of  an  excellent  observer, 
M.  Henri  Joly,  of  the  French  Academy  of  Moral  and 
Political  Sciences,  "  working  men,  when  they  gaze  from 
afar  across  the  boundaries  of  their  several  countries,  look 
upon  one  another  as  allies,  and  even  as  brothers  ;  but 
when  they  are  brought  face  to  face  they  become  rivals, 
and  they  then  alter  their  policy."  In  every  country  to-day 
the  labour  syndicates — the  very  organizations  that  had  in- 
vented the  notion  of  revolutionary  "  direct  action,"  and 
the  device  of  the  general  strike  in  order  to  manifest  their 
impatience  with  the  policy  of  legality  followed  by  the  so- 
cialist leaders  and  classic  trade  unionists — these  syndicates 
are  calling  on  governments  and  parliaments  to  protect  them 
against  the  alleged  disloyal  competition  of  transient  foreign 
labour.  Who  has  forgotten  the  action  of  the  local  carpenters' 
union  after  the  destruction  of  San  Francisco  ?  The  annals 
of  industry  in  every  country  in  Europe  are  filled  with  the 
record  of  strikes,  labour  riots,  murders  even,  consequent 
solely  upon  the  international  competition  of  the  working 
classes.  In  fact,  the  whole  theory  of  class  war,  with 
its  corollary  of  the  Internationale,  would  thus  seem  to 
have  been  a  very  hasty  generalization.  At  all  events 


A  STUDY  OF   INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     199 

for  the  moment  internationalism  in  the  labour  world  ap- 
pears, in  its  curve  of  evolution,  to  have  taken  a  direction 
parallel  with  that  of  internationalism  in  the  political  world. 
This  is  another  example  of  the  fact  that  nationalism  is 
manifested  only  when  national  integrity  is  menaced. 

The  growing  claim  of  organized  labour  in  the  several 
nations  to  deal  with  the  majestic  phenomenon  of  migration, 
to  demand,  that  is,  state  intervention,  in  the  form  of 
legislative  measures,  against  the  possibility  of  foreign 
competition,  calls  for  even  closer  analysis.  This  peculiarly 
picturesque  socio-economic  movement  has  been  brilliantly 
studied  by  the  Italian  writer,  Signer  Giuseppe  Prato  in  his 
book:  //  Protezionismo  Operaio  (Turin  1910). 1  The  legis- 
lative measures  in  question  assume  the  double  form,  first 
of  protection  against  the  invasion,  the  real  presence,  of 
the  foreign  labourer,  and  secondly  of  customs  protection 
against  the  cheap  products  of  the  foreign  workman.  Under 
the  pretext  of  the  "  protection  of  national  industries," 
the  demand  for  "  tariff  reform "  and  the  interdiction  of 
"  undesirables "  occur  everywhere  simultaneously.  Mr. 
Chamberlain,  as  far  back  as  August  1904,  declared  that 
along  this  path  lay  England's  safety.  "  Where  would  be 
the  logic,"  he  asked  in  the  House  of  Commons,  "  if  the 
foreigners  to  whom  we  wish  to  close  British  territory,  could, 
by  remaining  in  Hamburg  or  in  Poland,  manufacture 
products  with  which  they  could  inundate  our  markets  ?  " 
And  even  the  very  peoples  who,  as  exporters  of  labour, 
ought  to  foster  every  form  of  economic  laisser-faire,  the 
Italians  and  the  Japanese  for  instance,  keep  step  with  the  other 
rival  nations  and  heed  the  demand  of  their  proletariat  for 
a  "  barbaric  "  exclusiveness.  Quite  recently  the  European 
Governments  had  to  protest  against  a  project  of  the  Italian 
Government  to  interdict  in  Italy  the  presence  of  foreign 
insurance  companies, 2  and  Italian  labour  organizations 

1  Translated  into  French  by  M.Georges  Bourgin  :  Le  Protection- 
nisme  Ouvrier.  J  See  pp.  303,  304. 


200  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

have  more  than  once  demanded  arbitrary  measures  of  expul- 
sion against  foreign  employers  established  in  Italy ;  while 
the  same  Japanese  workmen  who  protest  against  American 
restrictions  on  immigration,  have  called  on  their  govern- 
ment to  exclude  Chinese  labourers  from  Japan  ! 

The  spectacle  has  an  ironic,  even  a  fine  comic  quality  ;  but 
irony  and  absurdity  seem  to  characterize  most  manifesta- 
tions of  the  human  mob.  At  all  events,  the  tendency  to 
act  absurdly  is  general ;  and  while  such  action  is  unjustifi- 
able from  the  point  of  view  of  pure  economics,  it  is  natural 
and  inevitable  in  the  light  of  what  we  know  of  human  motives 
and  of  the  psychology  of  crowds,  above  all  those  of  the 
organic  communities,  welded  together  by  common  tradi- 
tions and  common  hopes,  known  as  nations.  The  orthodox 
economist,  the  doctrinaire,  "  scientific "  ideologues,  may 
protest  that  the  protectionist  "  nationalistic  "  movement 
in  question  is  all  wrong.  Their  anguish  does  not  alter  the 
fact  of  its  existence.  Even  so  impartial  an  inquirer  as  Signer 
Prato,  the  first  to  co-ordinate  the  immense  mass  of  facts 
illustrating  what  he  calls  "  working-class  protectionism," 
refuses  to  dwell  on  any  but  the  purely  economic  aspects  of 
this  world-wide  phenomenon,  and  writes  with  the  same 
imperturbable  logic  untempered  by  common  sense  that  Mr. 
Norman  Angell  applies  to  the  problem  of  international  dis- 
armament. 

"  The  truth  is,"  he  says,  "  that  it  really  matters  little  to  humanity 
to  know  what  area  is  to  be  reserved  in  the  future  to  the  expansion 
of  the  various  races.  What  greatly  interests  it  on  the  contrary  is 
to  have  the  assurance  that  none  of  the  natural  sources  of  wealth,  the 
rational  exploitation  of  which  may  bring  about  the  greatest  general 
well-being,  is  to  be  diverted  from  human  uses  by  the  monopolizing 
selfishness  of  little  organized  groups."  1 

The  "  monopolizing  selfishness  of  little  organized  groups  " 
is  "  scientific  "  tautology  for  "  national  interest  "  ;  and 
until  Political  Economy  has  done  its  worst  and  "  Humanity  " 

1  Le  Protectionnisme  Ouvrier,  p.  119. 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     201 

becomes  a  reality — so  long,  that  is,  as  the  word  Humanity 
remains  only  a  metaphysic  fiction — it  will  matter  much  to 
the  several  "  little  organized  groups  " — to  the  Italian  na- 
tion, to  the  French  nation,  to  the  British  nation,  to  the 
Servian  nation,  or  even  to  the  Chinese  nation,  as  the  Boxer 
riots  showed — whether  they  are  suffered  to  expand  or 
simply  to  exist  in  their  own  way,  without  the  friction  of 
alien  elements  tending  to  alter  their  national  character 
and  to  destroy  their  cherished  parochial  prejudices.1  Signor 
Prato  admits  that  influences  of  climate,  traditions,  language, 
the  milieu,  family  affections  and  patriotism, z  may  on  occasion 
be  obstacles  in  the  way  of  that  ideal  mobility  of  human 
merchandise,  that  normal  flow  of  immigration,  which  re- 
joices the  hearts  of  the  economists.  But  these  sentiments 
he  regards(  as  baneful  fictions  with  which  science  not  only 
should,  but  can,  do  away ;  for  him  they  are  barbaric  pre- 
judices, retarding  the  progress  of  civilization. 

Yet  it  does  not  seem  that  the  problems  raised,  for  instance, 
by  contemplation  of  the  socio-economic,  political  conditions 
in  the  mining  regions  of  the  frontiers  between  Prussia,  Alsace- 
Lorraine  and  Luxembourg  can  be  completely  illuminated 
by  the  application  of  so  simplified  a  generalization.  Thus, 
for  it  matters  little  where  the  observer  takes  his  stand,  more 
than  eighty  per  cent,  of  the  houses  in  the  French  portion  of  the 
valley  of  the  Meuse  are  owned  by  their  occupants.  These 
proprietors  are  shrewd  peasant  farmers  who  do  all  that  can 
reasonably  be  expected  of  any  man  to  keep  the  birth-rate 
within  decorous  limits.  In  1904  the  excess  of  births  over 
deaths  was  143.  The  motives  of  the  Meusian  peasant  are 
Malthusian ;  they  are  the  logical  consequence  of  his  desire 

1  How  resist  recommending  to  Signor  Prato's  attention  in  this 
connexion  the  typical  case  of  the  closing  down  of  the  great  steel 
mills  at  Gary,  Indiana,  in  October  1912,  owing  to  the  sudden  departure 
of  some  2,750  workmen  of  the  Slav  races  in  order  to  rejoin  the  colours 
in  the  crusade  of  the  Balkan  States  against  the  Turk  ? 

2  p.  250,  work  quoted. 


202  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

not  to  continue  dividing  up  an  inheritance  of  fields  which 
has  already  suffered  painful  partition.  He  adapts  himself 
as  best  he  can  to  the  provisions  of  the  Napoleonic  code,  and 
what  is  the  result  ?  It  is  noted  by  Captain  Vidal  de  la 
Blache  in  his  monograph  on  The  Lorraine  Valley  of  the 
Meuse  (Armand  Colin,  p.  139)  :  "  les  bras  manqueraient  a 
la  terre  sans  1'emploi  des  machines  agricoles  et  sans  la  main 
d'ceuvre  etr  anger  e  (allemande,  luxembourgeoise,  beige)." 
The  polyglot  speech  of  the  international  nomad  is,  in  fact, 
beginning  to  offend  the  traveller's  ear  all  down  the  gentle 
valley  of  the  Meuse,  and  it  becomes  tolerable — although 
even  then  solely  for  aesthetic  reasons — only  when  heard  be- 
neath the  shadow  of  the  gloomy,  almost  feudal,  fortresses, 
veritable  towers  of  Babel,  the  foundries  and  blast  furnaces 
of  the  valley  of  the  Chiers,  at  Longwy,  or  Mont-Saint 
Martin.  But  more  prolonged  immersion  in  this  cacophony, 
here,  even  here,  above  all  here,  evokes  thoughts  of 
which  the  political  economists  have  wisely  washed  their 
hands.  And  these  thoughts  are  multiplied  a  thousand- 
fold by  more  intimate  acquaintance  with  the  serfs  who 
swarm  in  and  out  of  still  other  feudal  fortresses,  the 
monster  iron  foundries  and  the  gigantic  steel  works,  of 
which  the  gleam  reddens  the  night  sky  of  Luxembourg 
and  Lorraine.  The  observer  will  learn  there,  to  be  sure, 
if  he  has  never  learned  before,  the  impossibility,  the 
futility,  the  absurdity  even,  of  erecting  Chinese  walls  be- 
tween the  nations,  with  the  object  of  preventing  the  recip- 
rocal exchange  of  products  or  of  human  merchandise.  Un- 
questionably such  walls  are  bound  to  be  scaled  by  the  nomad 
labourer.  They  are  doomed  to  be  undermined  by  the 
burrowing  forces — "  pacific  penetration  " — of  international 
trade.  The  "  patriotic "  ideal  of  converting  the  several 
nations  into  water-tight  compartments,  within  which  each 
people  may  work  out  its  salvation  in  sacred  separation  from 
its  neighbours,  obviously  ignores  the  most  characteristic 
material,  and  many  of  the  moral,  forces  of  the  modern 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL   POLITICS     203 

world.  Yet  there  is  still  left  the  main  question  as  to  what 
is  really  becoming  of  nationality  under  the  action  of  these 
forces.  In  this  connexion  it  is  interesting  to  examine  with 
some  detail  the  single  case  of  Luxembourg. 

Within  the  last  twenty-five  years,  in  that  picturesque 
little  Duchy — which  seemed  predestined  to  remain  one  of 
the  tranquil  back-waters  of  civilization — the  discovery  of  a 
rich  subsoil  has  internationalized  industry  and  cosmo- 
politanized  a  rural  population.  All  the  economic  and 
social  conditions  have  been  transformed.  But  what  is 
the  real  nature  of  the  transformation  ?  As  one  of  the  mem- 
bers of  the  Luxembourg  Chamber  said,  during  the  debate 
of  December  1911  on  the  proposed  mining  concessions  : — 

"  When  so  many  foreigners  and  so  much  capital  come  to  our 
country  they  must  inevitably  form  a  State  within  the  State,  and  this 
situation  will  certainly  become  more  serious.  We,  the  people  of 
Luxembourg,  must  take  our  precautions,  lest  we  be  treated  as 
foreigners  in  our  own  country.  The  danger  lies  in  the  fact,  that  we 
are  being  dispossessed  of  our  country,  and,  so  to  speak,  losing  our 
nationality,  owing  to  the  intervention  of  a  foreign  industry." 

Any  observer  on  the  spot  will  understand  these  appre- 
hensions, and  his  briefest  inquiry  will  show  how  firmly  they 
are  rooted  in  fact.  He  will  discover  that  the  members 
of  the  Luxembourg  Chamber  are  besieged  with  applications 
from  the  youth  of  Luxembourg  for  places  in  the  great  metal- 
lurgic  industries  of  the  country,  places  which  it  is  impossible 
to  obtain  because  they  are  occupied  by  foreigners.  At 
Differdange,  out  of  a  population  of  15,000,  there  are  6,000 
Germans  ;  yet,  owing  to  the  German  mining  law,  many 
Luxembourgeois  have  been  obliged  to  leave  Alsace-Lorraine, 
where  they  had  been  employed  as  overseers  by  local  mining 
companies.  The  obligation  which  the  Luxembourg  Govern- 
ment has  imposed  on  the  concessionaires  of  mines  to  con- 
sume the  products  of  their  mines  in  Luxembourg  itself,  by 
the  building  of  forges  and  of  iron  and  steel  works,  is  not  an 
effective  remedy  to  this  "  evil."  The  Minister  of  the  In- 


204  PROBLEMS   OF  POWER 

tenor,  M.  Braun,  calculates  that  sixty  percent,  of  the  men 
employed  in  the  metallurgic  industry  in  Luxembourg  are 
foreigners.1  The  population  of  the  Grand  Duchy  has  in- 
creased in  five  years  by  13,436  persons,  but  out  of  the  total 
number  of  inhabitants  in  1910 — 259,891 — nearly  40,000 
or  15  -28  per  cent,  were  foreigners.  Esch  has  grown  with  the 
mushroom  speed  of  an  American  town.  In  one  entire 
quarter  the  visitor  hears  only  Italian  spoken.  And  with 
the  growth  of  industry  the  cost  of  living  has  immensely 
increased,  while  wages  have  risen  fifty  per  cent,  since  1894. 
From  this  startling  movement  of  "  prosperity "  the 
inhabitants  have  no  doubt  reaped  a  certain  benefit,  but 
the  chief  beneficiaries  have  been  the  German  iron-masters, 
and  at  this  very  hour  the  whole  economic,  not  to  say  politi- 
cal, future  of  Luxembouig  is  in  the  balance,  owing  to  the 
efforts  of  the  famous  German  metallurgist,  Herr  Thyssen — 
whose  activity,  by  the  way,  has  at  the  same  time  been  suc- 
cessfully manifested  in  Normandy — to  obtain  the  concession 
of  all  the  mines  still  at  the  disposal  of  the  Luxembourg  State. 
The  European  aspects  and  bearings  of  industrial  energy  of 
this  admirable  German  kind  are,  one  would  suppose,  too 
obvious  to  be  overlooked.  The  Luxembourgeois  them- 
selves are  becoming  alarmed.  They  dread  their  eventual 
absorption  by  German  capital.  The  above  quoted  words 
of  a  member  of  the  Grand  Ducal  Chamber  were  subse- 
quently echoed,  in  the  same  debate,  by  a  colleague  who 
exclaimed  :  "  What  would  happen  if  our  national  interests 
were  to  find  themselves  in  conflict  with  those  of  one  of  the 
immense  German  establishments  ?  Would  there  not 
be  reason  to  fear  that  Berlin  would  exercise  pressure  on  the 
country  ?  "  It  is  likely  that  the  Government  of  Luxem- 
bourg has  not  failed  to  learn  the  lesson  of  Tangiers  and  of 
Agadir.  But  it  would  be  incredible,  if,  in  face  of  the  local 
anxiety  aroused  by  the  progress  of  Germany  in  Luxern- 

1  See  Luxembouig  Memorial,  Debate,  December  20,  1911. 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     205 

bourg,  the  Quai  d'Orsay  did  not  see  that  a  rapprochement 
with  the  Grand  Duchy  is  now  possible.  England,  whose 
interests  are  less  immediate,  has  had  the  courage  to  favour 
her  capitalists  in  their  efforts  to  thwart  the  Germans  in  their 
systematic  efforts  to  convert  Luxembourg  into  a  Prussian  fief : 
the  whole  of  the  Grand  Duchy  is  soon  to  be  lighted  by  elec- 
tricity produced  by  turbines  working  in  water  captured  from 
the  Sure  by  the  Science  and  Capital  of  Englishmen.  It  is  a 
first  blow  dealt  to  the  rapidly  growing  German  domination 
of  a  neutral  and  independent  State.  France,  on  the  other 
hand,  notwithstanding  the  overtures  of  the  Luxembourg 
Government,  still  delays  to  take  the  only  step  which  can 
effectually  restore  her  prestige  in  a  region  that  she  should 
prevent  at  all  costs  from  becoming  germanized  :  the  con- 
struction in  the  valley  of  the  Chiers  of  a  canal  which  shall 
open  Dunkirk,  Antwerp  and  Rotterdam  to  the  metallurgic 
industry  of  the  Grand  Duchy.  France,  which  purchases 
annually  from  Germany  some  fifteen  millions  of  tons  of 
coke  for  use  in  the  metallurgic  works  of  Longwy  and  of 
Briey — and  which,  for  this  reason,  hesitates  to  exclude 
foreigners  from  participation  in  French  mining  concessions, 
lest  the  interdiction  should  be  followed  by  reprisals — France 
would  manifestly  recover  more  than  the  disbursement  re- 
presented by  her  dependence  on  German  coal  should  her 
Minister  of  Commerce  revive  a  measure  which  would  be  as 
welcome  to  his  own  Eastern  compatriots  as  to  the  Luxem- 
bourg Government.  The  present  moment,  moreover,  is  a 
critical  one.  It  is  interesting  to  recall  that  the  successor  of 
Kiderlen-Waechter,  as  Secretary  of  State  for  foreign  affairs, 
is  Herr  Gottlieb  von  Jagow,  who  in  1908  was  German 
Minister  in  Luxembourg.  His  four  years  subsequently 
passed  in  Rome  will  not  have  obliterated  the  impressions  he 
gathered  in  his  quiet  post  overlooking  the  French  Eastern 
frontier.  If  France  does  not  bestir  herself  she  will  awake 
within  a  few  years  to  the  fact  that  the  Treaty  of  Vienna  has 
been  automatically  revised,  and  that  the  Grand  Duchy  of 


206  PROBLEMS   OF  POWER 

Luxembourg  is  no  longer  an  independent  Power.  The 
German  flag,  now  flying  from  the  donjon  of  Hoh  Koenigsburg, 
will  then  be  hoisted  on  the  ruined  heights  of  Vianden,  in  full 
view  of  the  windows  of  the  house  where  Victor  Hugo  wrote 
L' Annie  Terrible. 

Ill 

If  ever  the  Powers,  if  ever  France,  were  forced  to  tolerate 
such  a  fact  as  this,  it  would  be  because  they  had  failed  to 
fashion  in  their  arsenals  the  only  kind  of  weapon  which,  in 
the  twentieth  century,  is  a  really  effective  instrument  of 
combat.  Trade,  no  doubt,  follows  the  flag ;  but  more 
often  the  flag  follows  trade,  and  if  the  nations  are  awaken- 
ing to  the  fact  that  their  autonomy  is  being  menaced  by 
German  financial  initiative  and  by  German  industrial  enter- 
prise— and  it  is  not  only  the  smaller  Powers,  Holland,  Bel- 
gium, Luxembourg,  Switzerland,  but  even  France  and 
England  and  Brazil  which  are  face  to  face  with  the  problem 
of  stemming  the  German  commercial  tide — the  fault  is  their 
own ;  they  have  hitherto  neglected  to  employ  suitable  arms 
against  their  now  insinuating,  now  brow-beating  rival. 
There  is  thus  a  point  of  view,  the  detached  scientific  point 
of  view,  from  which  it  is  impossible  not  to  acknowledge  that 
Germany  deserves  all  she  has  got,  or  all  that  she  is  ever 
likely  to  get. 

The  old  agrarian  Germany  has  become  a  vast  workshop, 
dependent  on  the  foreigner  for  its  food  supplies.  It 
imports  cereals  and  other  food-products  for  one-seventh 
of  its  population,  nine  millions  of  its  inhabitants.  So  true 
is  this  that  Herr  von  Gwinner,  the  Manager  of  the  Deut- 
scher  Bank,  has,  perhaps  not  extravagantly,  said  :  "If 
Germany  were  to  lose  her  commercial  clientele,  she  would 
be  obliged  to  become  aggressive."  At  all  events  the  Ger- 
mans are  ceasing  to  emigrate.  Germany  annually  summons 
from  abroad  some  750,000  agricultural  labourers.  She  is 
bound,  in  her  struggle  for  life,  to  insist  on  an  open  market 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     207 

in  order  to  make  money  enough  to  purchase  the  foodstuffs 
which  she  is  unable  to  produce  at  home.  This,  no  doubt, 
is  the  secret  of  the  growth  of  her  naval  budget ;  and  there 
is  no  logical  obligation  for  the  other  nations  to  regard 
her  fleet  as  a  predestined  instrument  of  aggression.  It 
is  the  great  manufacturers,  the  "  business  interests,"  in 
Germany,  who  are  most  convinced  of  the  need  of  a  power- 
ful fleet.1  In  reply  to  the  British  First  Lord  of  the 
Admiralty,  they  insist  that  such  a  fleet  is  not  a  "  luxury," 
but  a  vital  necessity.2  It  exists  for  the  protection  of 
German  trade  as  the  British  fleet  exists  for  the  protection 
of  England's  trade.  Whatever  the  added  chances  of  inter- 
national collision  created  by  its  growth,  the  original  motives 
of  this  expansion  may  fairly  be  ascribed  to  economic  causes 
unmixed  by  bellicose  intent. 

One  can  admit  all  this  impartially,  and  yet  find  it  the 
more  difficult  to  account,  on  the  basis  of  this  so-called 
natural  hypothesis,  for  Germany's  refusal  loyally  to  accept 
England's  recent  practical  proposal  for  diminishing  the 
naval  rivalry  between  the  two  Powers.  And  the  difficulty 
grows  when  the  observer  notes  that,  simultaneously  with  this 
refusal  to  adopt  the  British  scheme  for  parallel  and  propor- 
tionate diminution  of  naval  power,  Germany  votes,  immedi- 
ately after  the  conclusion  of  the  Moroccan  arrangement 
with  France,  a  sum  of  nearly  £50,000,000  for  the  creation 
of  two  new  army  corps,3  one  of  which  is  to  be  stationed  at 
Sarrebourg,  linking  the  forces  at  Metz  and  Strasbourg, 
exactly  as  though  she  meant  to  put  in  speedy  practice  the 
well-known  plan  of  her  general  staff,  which  General  von 
Bernhardi  has  thus  bluntly  justified  :  "  Germany's  object 
is  to  crush  one  of  her  foes  before  the  other  has  dreamed  of 
intervention.  In  such  tactics  as  these  lies  Germany's  sal- 

1  Cf.  the  "  Inquiry  "   opened  by  the  Nord  und  Sud,  July,  1912. 

2  "  The  British  navy  is  to  us  a  necessity,  and,  from  some  points 
of  view,  the  German  navy  is  to  them  more  in  the  nature  of  a  luxury." 
— Speech  by  Mr.  Churchill  before  the  Clyde  Shipbuilders. 

»  Cf.  p.  68. 


208  PROBLEMS   OF  POWER 

vation."  At  the  same  time  Germany  is  increasing  the  strate- 
gic railways  which  lead  to  the  frontier  States  * ;  she  is  plan- 
ning to  widen  the  Kiel  Canal,  and  is  zealously  seeking  to 
reform  the  financial  system  which  is,  perhaps,  the  Achilles 
tendon  of  her  power.  All  these  acts,  manifestations,  ten- 
dencies, may  be  merely  coincidental,  and,  in  so  far  as  they 
are  the  sign  of  a  reflecting  policy,  the  mere  indication  of  a 
wish  to  render  Germany  impregnable  against  attack.  But 
in  presence  of  facts  so  numerous,  so  easily  admitting  of  a 
contrary  interpretation,  it  is  logical  for  even  other  than 
British  observers  to  conclude  that  Germany  constitutes  a 
danger  to  peace  and  that  the  danger  lies,  as  Mr.  Balfour 
said  in  the  June  issue  of  Nord  und  Sud  : — 

"  in  the  co-existence  of  that  marvellous  instrument  of  warfare  which 
is  the  German  army  and  navy,  with  the  assiduous,  I  had  almost  said 
the  organized,  advocacy  of  a  policy,  which  it  seems  impossible  to 
reconcile  with  the  peace  of  the  world  or  the  rights  of  nations.  For 
those  who  accept  this  policy,  German  development  means  German 
territorial  expansion.  All  countries  which  hinder,  though  it  be 
only  in  self-defence,  the  realization  of  this  ideal  are  regarded  as  hos- 
tile, and  war  or  the  threat  of  war  is  deemed  the  natural  and  fitting 
method  by  which  the  ideal  itself  is  to  be  accomplished."  2 

1  The  new  Malmedy-Stavelot  line  is  connected  with  the  German 
military  camp  at  Elsenborn,  and  with  Cologne,  Coblence  and  Treves. 
Another  line  parallel  to  the  Belgian  frontier  runs  south  from  Aix-la- 
Chapelle.     See  p.   171. 

2  The  origins  of  Anglo-German  misunderstanding  are  more  remote 
however,  than  Mr.  Balfour  has  felt  called  upon  to  indicate.     Edward 
Bernstein,  the  German  Socialist,  summarizes  them  in  his  pamphlet 
on  "  The  English  Danger  and  the  German  People."     They  started, 
he  thinks,  in  1879,  when  Germany  inaugurated  a  protectionist  tariff 
system,  which  injured  British  trade.     England's  distrust  of  Germany 
was  increased  when  the  latter  began  to  develop  a  colonial  policy. 
Some  years  later,  the  situation  was  aggravated  by  the  famous  Kruger 
telegram,  followed  by  German  Anglophobia  during   the  Boer  war. 
Thereupon  Germany  hastened  the  construction  of  her  fleet.     Why 
feel  surprise,  asks  Herr  Bernstein,  if  Edward  VII  immediately  under- 
took what  has  been  called  the  encerclement  of  Germany  ?     By  pro- 
claiming herself  the  Protector  of  Islam,  Germany  continued  to  alarm 
the  Mussulman  powers,  and  the  whole  Moroccan  business  was  calcu- 
lated, says  this  German  authority,  with  extraordinary  impartiality, 
to  pit  the  powers  against  Germany. 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     209 

The  impression,  in  a  word,  is  inevitable  that  not  only 
does  the  peace  of  Europe  depend  on  Germany,  but  that 
the  prosperity  of  Germany  lies  hi  her  own  hands.  If  she 
possessed  the  force  of  character  to  abandon  the  aggressive 
policy  of  the  last  ten  years  ;  if  she  could  convince  herself, 
and  then  convince  the  Powers,  that  the  motives  of  her 
political  action  are  peaceful,  that  she  is  not  trying  to  domi- 
nate the  universe ;  if  she  were  to  repudiate  the  majestic 
dreams  of  Pangermanism,  the  theories  of  the  General 
Bernhardis,  she  could  quietly  take  the  most  brilliant  and 
practical  revenge  for  all  the  humiliating  rebuffs  of  Tangiers 
and  Agadir.  By  the  employment  of  a  method  diametric- 
ally the  opposite  of  the  disquieting,  aggressive  attitude  she 
has  chosen,  she  could,  if  she  liked,  outstrip  all  the  Powers  in 
the  accumulation  of  wealth  and  in  world  expansion.  As 
long  as  Germany  remains  a  menace  to  America,  and  to 
France  and  England,  by  showing  that  she  fancies  herself 
obliged  to  oust  France  and  England  from  the  points  of  the 
globe  in  which  they  have  taken  root,  she  imperils  her 
economic  and  industrial  interests.  It  is  doubtful  whether 
France  has  gained  any  added  military  strength  by  her  de- 
claration of  a  Protectorate  in  Morocco.  She  is  probably 
weakened  in  her  Continental  military  power  by  taking 
possession  of  a  region  which  for  a  generation  will  require  at 
least  one  whole  army  corps  to  police  it.  The  Colonial 
Powers  that  have  won  so  much  territory  during  the  last 
twenty  years  at  the  apparent  expense  of  German  prestige 
night  easily  be  undone  by  Germany,  whose  genius  for  a 
certain  kind  of  Colonial  expansion — a  very  practical  kind, 
and  perhaps  the  only  kind  that  tells — is  superior  to  theirs. 
It  is  perfectly  true,  as  Mr.  Norman  Angell  says,1  that  there 
are  to-day  more  Germans  in  France  than  there  are  French- 
men in  all  the  Colonies  that  France  has  acquired  in  the  last 
half  century ;  and  German  trade  with  France  outweighs 

1  The  Mirage  of  the  Map.  Bulletin  of  the  American  Association 
for  International  Conciliation,  No.  53. 

P 


210  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

enormously  the  trade  of  France  with  all  the  French  Colonies. 
The  late  Prime  Minister,  M.  Caillaux,  argued,  in  his  speech 
defending  the  Franco-German  Agreement  with  regard  to 
Morocco  and  the  Congo,  that  the  possession  of  Colonies  was 
pure  vain-glory  in  comparison  with  the  advantages  to  be 
secured  from  the  probable  international  commercial  arrange- 
ments of  the  future.  France  is  to-day  a  better  Colony  for 
the  Germans  than  they  could  make  of  any  exotic  Colony 
which  France  owns.  The  distinguished  German  Socialist, 
Edward  Bernstein,  points  out  in  his  pamphlet,  "  The 
English  Danger  and  the  German  People,"  that  German  im- 
ports into  South  Africa  amount  to  £38,000,000,  whereas 
British  imports  hardly  reach  £4,000,000.  In  Egypt,  almost 
the  entire  trade  is  in  German  hands.  In  a  word,  German 
expansion  is  the  wonder  of  the  world.  Germany's  real  Colonies 
are  countries  she  has  never  owned.  German  colonizers 
are  of  the  cuckoo-race.  They  prefer  nests  built  by  others. 

The  pity  of  it  is  Germany  does  not  know  this/or  that  she 
is  making  up  her  mind  that  others  suspect  her  of  knowing  it, 
and  are  taking  their  precautions  accordingly.  Germany  is 
a  parvenu  Power,  and  full  of  Pangermans  who  want  to  "  make 
history,"  and  not  merely  to  "  make  money."  Germany 
deserves  our  sympathy.  She  lies  in  the  centre  of  Europe, 
an  enemy — one  of  them  mortal — on  each  hand,  the  two 
Powers  of  the  Dual  Alliance ;  and  when  she  lifts  her  eyes 
from  her  eyry  of  Heligoland  she  beholds  in  the  distance 
an  island  fortress  manned  by  men  whose  one  principle  of 
international  action  has  been  to  prevent  any  single  power 
from  dominating  Europe,  and  who  are  closing  their  Dominion 
markets  to  her  trade.  She  possesses — for  futile  ends  that 
have  nothing  to  do  with  the  vital  problems  of  economy — 
two  jealous  "  allies  "  ;  restive  megalomaniac  Italy,  whose 
King  is  biding  his  time  to  declare  himself  the  latest  of  the 
Roman  Emperors,  and  an  Aehrentalized  Austria  which 
has  ceased  to  be  satisfied  with  her  role  of  a  "  brilliant 
second,"  and  is  in  patriotic  duty  bound  to  avenge  thehumi- 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL   POLITICS     211 

liations  entailed  by  the  recent  Balkan  War.  In  interna- 
tional relations  Germany  is  reduced  to  a  day-by-day,  almost 
a  minute-by-minute  policy  of  opportunism.  Forced  to 
defend,  in  Europe,  a  status  quo  based  on  the  intolerable  crime 
and  egregious  blunder  of  the  Annexation  of  Alsace-Lorraine, 
when  Italy  makes  war  on  Turkey,  and  upsets  German 
prestige  at  Constantinople,  Germany's  one  hope  is  to  revive 
Crispianism,  to  pit  France  against  Italy,  and  in  general  to 
evoke  an  Italian  nationalism  which  will  render  her  more 
necessary  to  her  Austrian  ally.  Besides  this,  there  are 
all  the  domestic  ills,  the  simmering  unrest,  the  doubtful 
social  future  overshadowed  by  the  fundamental  contra- 
diction between  the  Democratic  constitution  of  the  German 
Empire  and  the  feudal  character  of  the  Prussian  state.1 
Moreover,  the  leaders  of  Germany's  foreign  policy  have 
for  ten  years  raised  rash  hopes  in  the  German  people,  and 
yet  steadily  showed  themselves  incapable  of  coping  with  the 
complex  problems  confronting  them.  Meanwhile,  the  youth- 
ful optimism  of  the  plutocratic  German  oligarchy,  nourish- 
ing, like  the  American,  colossal  fancies,  dreams  of  improvis- 
ing, with  the  aid  of  a  golden  wand,  a  Titanic  civilization 
superior  to  any  that  has  preceded  it.  The  Pan-German 
centaurs,  in  the  spirit  of  the  Valkyrie  out-riders,  are 
ready  to  plunge  rough-shod,  singing  their  mystic  battle 
song  of  Commercial  Imperialism,  over  the  Gallo-Roman 
fields  on  which  they  gaze  from  the  summits  of  the  Vosges. 
Thence,  traversing  the  Atlantic,  they  are  braving  the 

1  See  L' esprit  Public  en  Allemagne,  by  Henri  Moysset  (Felix  Alcan) 
and  Les  Embarras  de  I' Allemagne  by  Georges  Blondel  (Plon).  A 
significant  event  occurred  on  January  30,  1913,  in  the  debate  in 
the  Reichstag  on  the  expropriation  of  Polish  proprietors.  That 
assembly  passed  a  vote  of  censure  on  the  Chancellor.  He  came 
forth,  no  doubt,  constitutionally  intact,  because  he  depends  not 
on  the  Reichstag,  but  on  the  Emperor,  but  the  incident  was  a  sign 
of  the  times.  This  is  the  first  time  the  German  Democracy  has 
made  use  of  its  new  liberty  of  voting,  after  an  interpellation,  on  a 
Government  measure.  It  will  not  be  the  last. 


212  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

Monroism  of  the  North  Americans  in  Costa  Rica,  Guatemala, 
Nicaragua,  and  in  three  great  states  of  Southern  Brazil. 
In  the  provinces  of  .Santa  Catalina,  Parana  and  Rio-Grande- 
do-Sul  350,000  Germans  dominate  a  population  that  con- 
tains not  more  than  ten  per  cent,  of  native  born  Brazilians. 
The  Germans  occupy  there  some  8,000  square  miles.  They 
are  at  last  realizing  the  dreams  of  the  rich  bankers  of  Augs- 
burg, the  Velzers,  who,  three  centuries  ago,  purchased  from 
Charles  the  Fifth  a  vast  Venezuelan  province.1  And  it 
is  one  of  the  ironies  of  history  that,  at  the  University  of 
Harvard,  on  the  sacred  soil  of  old  Massachusetts,  one 
of  the  most  mettlesome  of  these  German  centaurs,  disguised 
as  a  professor  of  philosophy,  should  profit  by  the  hospitality 
accorded  to  him  to  battle  openly  against  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine, urging  the  citizens  of  the  United  States  to  cease  their 
vigilance  as  regards  the  invasion  of  the  South  American 
Continent  by  the  European.  The  excellent  German  who 
is  so  diligently  and  patriotically  engaged  in  spying  out  the 
American  Canaan  for  the  glory  of  the  Deutschtum,  has  found 
perhaps  unexpected  allies  among  the  more  innocent  com- 
patriots of  Wendell  Phillips  and  Emerson.  The  Atlantic 
Monthly  contained  recently  a  brilliant  but  specious  article 
opposing  the  fundamental  policy  of  the  United  States  on 
the  question  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  and  inspired  by  a 
fanatical  hostility  against  the  "  present  inhabitants  of  Latin 
America."  "  Let  us  have  a  new  Pan-Germanism,"  ex- 
claimed the  anonymous  author  of  this  article,  pretentiously 
entitled  "  A  Letter  to  Uncle  Sam." 

"  Let  our  race  (sic)  get  together.  ...  If  you,  who  owe  so  much 
to  the  German  in  this  your  own  fair  land,  in  the  civilization  they 
have  brought  here.  ...  If  you  still  want  to  fight  these  splendid 
people — who  want  to  find  expanding  room  as  you  once  sought  and 
found  expanding  room — in  order  to  bolster  and  uphold  the  wretched 
travesty  of  a  tyrannous  dictatorship  masquerading  as  a  paper  repub- 

1  See  Les  Democraties  Latines  de  I'Amerique,  by  F.  Garcia-Calderon, 
pp.  267-274. 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     213 

lie,  sir,  you  have  forfeited  the  world's  respect ;  you  have  not  adjusted 
yourself  to  the  new  day  ;  you  are  an  inadequate  steward  ;  you  are 
a  relic  of  the  nineteenth  century,  and  you  will  richly  deserve  the 
thrashing  you  will  surely  receive." 

Because  Germany  complains  that  the  British  Empire 
and  the  Monroe  Doctrine  are  blocking  her  expansion,  does 
England,  then,  and  do  the  United  States,  owe  her  the  same 
kind  of  "  compensations  "  which  she  claimed  from  France 
in  the  dark  days  of  1911  ?  This  eloquent  pro-Teuton — 
masquerading  as  a  kind  of  German-American  midwife  for 
an  Allemania  groaning  in  birth-pangs,  officina  et  vagina 
gentium — proposes  that  the  United  States  should  say  to 
Germany :  "  Welcome  to  South  Brazil  "  ;  that,  at  the  same 
time  Germany  should  say  to  Great  Britain :  "  Sleep  in 
peace.  We  have  no  further  need  of  your  possessions  " ; 
that  Germany  and  Great  Britain  should  both  say  finally  to 
the  United  States  :  "  We  guarantee  your  status  quo  and 
your  paramount  and  indisputable  interests  on  the  American 
hemisphere  from  Canada  to  the  Equator  "  ;  that  all  should 
say  to  Brazil,  and  Brazil  should  say  to  all : — but  that  he 
does  not  tell  us  ! 

It  is  obvious  that  this  writer  has  not  yet  got  at  the  root  of 
the  matter.  He  knows  that  the  economic  necessities  of  a 
nation  determine  its  policy  ;  but  it  is  no  longer,  as  has  already 
been  made  clear,  because  Germany  needs,  or  even  wants,  to 
possess  new  territory,  as  an  outlet  for  a  surplus  population, 
that  she  constitutes  a  danger.  On  the  contrary,  statistics 
show  that  her  sons  are  ceasing  to  emigrate,  that  her  birth- 
rate is  steadily  falling,  and  that  she  has  even  to  import 
labourers  from  abroad.  Count  Posadowsky,  Heir  von 
Bethmann-Hollweg's  predecessor  in  the  office  of  Imperial 
Minister  of  the  Interior,  insisted  on  these  facts,  in  November 
1911,  in  an  electioneering  speech  at  Bielefeld.  Germany, 
he  argued,  "  had  already  an  enormous  territory  to  open  up 
which  would  cost  a  lot  of  money  just  when  they  had  made  the 
imperial  finances  more  or  less  balance."  Antagonism  on 


214  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

the  part  of  the  Great  Powers  to  territorial  expansion  by 
Germany  in  tolerable  climates  was  as  dangerous  as  blocking 
up  the  safety  valve  of  a  steam-engine.  "  It  was,  however, 
absolutely  untrue  that  Germany  was  at  present  over-popu- 
lated and  needed  room  for  her  surplus  people.  The  truth 
on  the  contrary  was  that  Germany  had  to  import  hundreds 
of  thousands  of  foreigners  to  till  German  soil  and  work 
German  mines."  She  wants  an  open  market,  and  that  is 
an  ideal,  no  doubt,  which  British  Imperial  Preference 
would  endanger.  But  more  even  than  an  open  market  in 
which  to  sell  her  goods,  she  wants  an  open  market  from 
which  to  buy  other  essential  products,  the  possession  of 
which  is  to-day  a  matter  of  life  and  death  for  her.  She 
is  scouring  the  world  for  iron. 

During  the  first  ten  years  after  the  Franco-German  War 
German  industry  advanced  with  magnificent  strides,  under 
the  fostering  influence  of  the  Zollverein.1  The  French  mil- 
liards of  the  war  indemnity  helped  to  swell  the  mounting 
tide  of  industrial  and  commercial  expansion.  When,  in 
the  period  from  1880-1891,  Bismarck  introduced  a  protec- 
tionist system,  and  at  the  same  time  neglected  to  create  a 
colonial  empire  capable  of  becoming  the  national  receptacle 
of  the  over-production  at  home,  he  seemed  wantonly  to 
be  trying  to  arrest  the  steady  advance  of  the  previous  ten 
years.  The  neighbouring  nations  exercised  reprisals.  The 
number  of  foreign  markets  diminished.  Yet  the  German 
population  was  rapidly  increasing.  An  industrial  crisis  en- 
sued. Then  it  was  that  the  German  began  to  emigrate  in 
droves.  Afresh  war  might  have  helped  to  solve  the  situa- 
tion. Instead,  Germany  decided  to  alter  her  economic 
policy.  Between  1891  and  1907,  accordingly,  she  followed 
the  system  of  signing  commercial  treaties  with  the  different 
Powers.  Prosperity  seemed  to  return.  German  manufac- 
turers once  again  launched  forth  on  what  appeared  to  be  the 

1  See  Blondel :  L'Essor  Economiquc  du  Peuple  Allemand  and 
L  'A  llemagne  aux  abois,  by  Henry  Gaston.  Preface  by  General  Bonnal. 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     215 

route  of  a  magnificent  future.  Now,  instead  of  exporting 
her  citizens — many  of  whom  even  returned  from  abroad — 
she  lavishly  dumped  her  products  "  Made  in  Germany  " 
upon  all  the  world-markets.  Nothing  comparable  with 
this  moment  of  her  national  life  had  ever  before  been  seen, 
save  in  the  United  States,  where  the  phenomenon  of  the 
daring  commercial  "  boom  "  took  place  in  the  same  condi- 
tions. France,  following  a  policy  of  recueillement  and  caution, 
both  corresponding  to  her  needs  and  characteristic  of  her 
prudent  temperament,  allowed  herself  to  fall  steadily  be- 
hind in  the  race  for  the  capture  of  the  world-markets,  while 
Germany,  plunging  recklessly  on,  evolved  a  system  of 
financial  and  industrial  credit  which  it  is  necessary  to  analyse 
in  order  to  comprehend  the  existing  facts  affecting  interna- 
tional relations. 

The  [magnificent  development  of  German  industry  has 
been  rendered  possible  by  a  flexible — but  precarious — 
banking  system.  In  Germany  the  banks,  even  the  savings 
banks — which,  in  France,  employ  their  deposits  in  the 
purchase  of  State  bonds  or  in  stable  and  well-guaranteed 
securities — scatter  their  money  broad-cast,  lending  to  manu- 
facturers, discounting  bills,  or  buying  speculatively  uncer- 
tain shares.  In  case  of  a  "  run  "  on  a  bank  caused  by  a 
panic  it  is  not  always  easy  for  the  German  savings  bank  to 
reimburse  its  clients.  The  Pan-Germanists  discovered  this 
in  1911,  when  they  disseminated  a  war-scare.1 

At  the  same  tune  the  great  industrial  banks  felt  the 
pinch,  and  their  case  illustrated  the  inconveniences  of  the 
German  system.  Germany  is  "  rich,"  but  it  lives  on  bor- 
rowed money.  The  German  Michael  is  kept  in  a  semblance 
of  health  by  chronic  subcutaneous  injections.  French  or 
American  capital  is  the  galvanizing  drug.  German  home 
capital  does  not  suffice  to  fill  the  coffers  of  the  banks  that 
are  constantly  being  emptied  by  the  German  manufacturers' 

1  Cf.  Mermeix  :  Chronique  de  I' An  ign,  pp.  289-308,  6;  also  Les 
Grands  Marches  Financiers  (Alcan,  1912). 


216  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

and  traders'  demands  for  advances.  The  banks  conse- 
quently have  to  procure  money  from  abroad,  and  they  bor- 
row where  they  can.  Nowhere  in  the  world  is  there  a  larger 
stock  of  available  funds  than  in  France.  The  French  banks, 
therefore,  are  able  to  play  a  highly  advantageous  game 
with  the  German  bankers.  They  lend  their  money  at  a 
good  price  ;  and  if,  when  the  loan  has  expired,  the  German 
banker  finds  it  inconvenient  to  pay,  and  wants  to  renew  the 
loan,  the  French  bank  acquiesces  and  receives  a  fresh  com- 
mission. This  is  normal  and  remunerative  banking  business, 
and  it  is  in  the  common  interest  that  nothing  should  ever 
occur  to  hamper  it.  But  at  a  period  of  stress  and  strain,  of 
economic  or  social  unrest,  and  above  all  of  war-rumour, 
France  can  no  longer  afford  to  lend.  Ordinary  prudence 
obliges  the  banks  to  hoard  rather  than  disburse ;  when  the 
German  asks  for  money,  the  Parisian  banker  retorts  by 
claiming  the  settlement  of  his  loan  ;  and  the  German  banker 
is  forced  to  pay  his  debts  with  real  money  instead  of  with 
promissory  notes.  The  first  and  immediate  consequence  is 
that  German  industry  is  handicapped.  If  the  tightening 
is  prolonged,  the  great  manufacturing  and  business  enter- 
prises totter  and  fall  like  packs  of  cards.  To  prevent  such  a 
krach  the  German  banker,  the  great  French  credit  estab- 
lishments being  closed  to  him,  makes  a  desperate  appeal  for 
funds  to  the  money-kings  of  the  United  States.  In  Septem- 
ber and  October,  1911,  Germany  required  300,000,000 
francs  immediately.  The  American  bankers  saw  their 
opportunity,  and  lent,  at  a  rate  of  6  per  cent,  and  7  per  cent., 
money  which  in  normal  times  Berlin  could  have  got  from 
Paris  for  3  per  cent,  and  4  per  cent.  That  was  the  price 
Germany  had  to  pay  for  the  luxury  of  flying  her  flag  off 
Agadir. 

The  object-lesson  was  one  that  any  but  Pan-German  eyes 
could  read.  That  the  nation  as  a  whole  has  probably  learned 
it  was  proved  by  the  speech  of  William  II  at  the  Kiel  re- 
gattas in  June  1912,  when  he  reminded  the  people  of  the  old 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     217 

Hanseatic  principality  that  it  is  one  thing  to  hoist  your 
ensign  at  the  mast  and  another  to  haul  it  down  with  honour. 
Unfortunately,  however,  no  experienced  observer  will  have 
regarded  as  an  amende  honorable  this  diplomatic  liquidation 
of  the  humiliating  episode  of  Agadir.  It  was,  no  doubt,  an 
adroit  effort  on  the  part  of  the  Emperor  to  make  what  the 
Americans  call  "  the  best  of  a  bad  job,"  but  it  certainly 
marks  on  the  part  of  the  Prussian  masters  of  Germany 
no  diminution  in  the  passion  for  world-dominion,  no  change 
in  policy  ;  and  it  should  be  taken  merely  in  connexion  with 
recent  warnings  of  Herr  von  Lumm,  one  of  the  members  of 
the  Board  of  Directors  of  the  Reichsbank.  He,  at  least, 
has  drawn  the  inevitable  and  patriotic  conclusion  from  the 
events  of  1911  and  1912.  In  a  series  of  articles  in  the  Bank 
Archil)  he  reminded  the  German  banks  that,  in  scattering  so 
recklessly  the  money  deposited  with  them,  and  in  failing 
to  keep  a  stable  stock  in  hand,  they  are  doing  their  best  to 
produce  an  explosion  of  financial  and  industrial  panics. 
The  figures  cited  by  Herr  von  Lumm  in  respect  to  the 
speculations  on  shifting  securities  made  at  the  Stock  Ex- 
change through  the  intermediary  of  the  great  banks,  have 
so  alarmed  this  competent  observer  that  he  counsels  greater 
prudence  and  less  precipitation,  if  Germany  does  not  wish 
to  find  her  economic  evolution  hopelessly  paralysed.1 

German  industry,  German  trade,  therefore,  are  constantly 
checked  through  a  stoppage  of  fiduciary  circulation,  a 
kind  of  financial  thrombosis,  the  temporary  damming  up 
of  the  canals  of  liquid  money.  Such  are  the  possible  disad- 
vantages of  the  German  credit  system. 

But  German  industry  is  exposed  to  even  greater  risks 
from  outside.  Whenever  a  world-market  is  closed  to  it, 
when  tariff  walls  are  raised  against  it,  Germany  exclaims  : 
"  We  are  being  '  encircled/  hemmed  in."  It  never  seems 
to  occur  to  her  that  other  countries  have  the  same  "  right  " 

1  Cf .  the  articles  by  M.  Andre  Sayous  in  the  Information,  notably 
one  published  on  June  5,  1912. 


2i8  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

to  favour  their  own  industries  as  she  has  to  develop  hers. 
"  We  claim  our  place  in  the  sun,"  she  continues,  as  if  any 
of  the  Powers  had  the  slightest  wish  to  deprive  her  of  any 
unoccupied  region  with  a  southern  aspect  which  she  has 
the  capital  and  the  initiative  to  colonize.  Whenever  Eng- 
land, the  United  States,  France  even,  have  recovered  in  the 
world-markets  ground  of  which  they  had  been  temporarily 
deprived  through  the  splendid  campaign  of  the  German 
travelling  salesmen ;  whenever  these  Powers  establish 
trading  stations  in  regions  hitherto  monopolized  by  the 
German  manufacturer ;  when  Spain  slowly  wakes  to  the 
possibility  of  creating  her  own  public  works  instead  of 
appealing  to  German  capitalists  and  German  engineers ; 
when  any  other  country  that  had  formerly  looked  to  Ger- 
many for  aid  learns  to  get  on  without  her,  the  Germans  begin 
to  wonder  if  the  whole  world  is  not  conspiring  to  throttle 
their  national  life.  Such  is  the  legend  that  has  grown  up  in 
Germany,  and  England  is  uniformly  regarded,  and  most 
unfairly  regarded,  as  the  instigator  of  this  alleged  con- 
spiracy. Lord  Lansdowne,  who,  with  M.  Delcasse  and  the 
late  King  Edward,  has  been  one  of  the  chief  agents  of  the 
"  Time  Spirit "  in  giving  diplomatic  shape  to  the  present 
scheme  of  international  relations,  said  in  the  House  of  Lords 
on  February  14,  1912,  that  when  England  came  to  terms 
with  France,  in  1903  and  1904,  the  two  countries  had  "  am- 
ple materials  for  an  all-round  understanding,"  but  that 
"  there  was  no  such  array  of  acute  and  outstanding  difficul- 
ties between  England  and  Germany,"  for  the  excellent 
reason  that  during  the  twenty  preceding  years  one  British 
Government  after  another  had  been  settling  these  questions 
as  they  arose.  That  is  to  say,  Germany  has  no  legitimate 
grievance  of  any  kind.  As  a  Times  leading  article  had 
pointed  out  two  and  a  half  months  before  Lord  Lansdowne, 
the  Anglo-German  Agreement  of  1890,  denning  the  British 
and  German  spheres  of  influence,  not  only  in  East  Africa  but 
in  West  and  in  South- West  Africa,  and  ceding  Heligoland 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS    219 

to  Germany  in  return  for  the  British  protectorate  over 
Zanzibar,  was  the  very  first  of  the  series  of  agreements 
afterwards  concluded  on  similar  lines  with  other  Powers. 
This  treaty  was  a  public  British  acknowledgment  of  Ger- 
many's status  as  a  Colonial  Power.  It  was  followed  up  in 
1898  by  an  understanding  which  rendered  Anglo-German 
competition  impossible  in  the  event  of  the  Portuguese 
colonies  coming  into  the  market.  A  year  later  England 
allowed  Germany  to  hoist  her  flag  on  the  two  most  important 
islands  of  the  Samoan  group.  In  China  in  1897  and  1900 
England  continued  to  manifest  her  sense  of  Germany's  Colo- 
nial needs  and  "  rights."  In  short,  up  to  the  moment 
when  England  decided  to  compose  her  differences  with 
France,  as  well  as  with  the  other  Powers,  by  bartering  her 
Moroccan  "  rights  "  off  against  the  "  rights  "  of  France"  in 
Egypt,  Germany  had  never  dreamed  of  propagating  the 
legend  of  a  world-cabal  organized  by  England  to  thwart  her 
progress.  This  legend  is  a  fiction,  but  it  is  a  fiction  that 
has,  in  the  German  brain,  to  use  the  expressive  word  of  a 
French  philosopher,  M.  Fouillee,  all  the  characteristics  of  an 
idee-force.  This  legendary  belief  has  resulted  in  the  German 
notion  that  the  rest  of  the  world  owes  her  something,  that 
she  must  be  bribed  to  he  down  peaceably  in  her  kennel ; 
and  to-day  no  ordinary  bone  will  satisfy  her  appetite  for 
"  compensations." 

Herr  Hans  Delbriick,  a  professor  of  history  and  one 
of  the  German  mastiffs  keepers,  announced  recently 1 
that  the  latest  arrangement  with  France  was  only  tem- 
porary, and  that  Germany  now  feels  justified  in  claiming 
the  Congo  Free  State,  the  Portuguese  Colonies  in  East 
Africa  (she  would  like  England  to  steal  them  for  her),  Zan- 
zibar, and  what  remains  of  French  territory  between  the 
Cameroons  and  the  mouth  of  the  Congo.  If  England's 
arrangement  with  Russia  with  regard  to  Persia  should  result 
in  a  virtual  partition  of  that  country,  Germany  must  put  in 

1  Preitssische  Jahrbiicher,  March  1912. 


220  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

further  claims  for  "  compensations."  "  The  world,"  says 
Heir  Delbriick,  "  will  have  to  get  used  to  our  applying 
throughout  the  world,  wherever  there  is  a  change  of  fron- 
tiers, exactly  the  same  policy  that  we  employed  in  Morocco." 
This  authority  does  not  say  whether  he  looks  forward  to  this 
policy  being  employed  with  exactly  the  same  result.  If  so, 
perhaps  the  Powers  will  not  complain.  The  conduct,  the 
attitude,  the  manner,  and  the  manners,  of  the  Pan-German 
are  reminiscent  of  an  ingenuous  confession  of  one  Mr.  Good- 
fellow,  a  traveller  in  New  Guinea,  who  writing  to  The  Times 
on  "  Modern  Men  of  the  Stone  Age,"  said  :  "  The  people  we 
met  in  the  unknown  interior  seemed  to  be  extremely  stupid. 
We  used  to  strike  matches  in  front  of  them,  and  do  other 
things  which  we  thought  might  interest  them,  but  they 
would  not  look  ;  they  turned  their  heads  away. ' '  Germany  of 
late  years  has  been  behaving  like  these  artless  explorers.  She 
thinks  it  clever  to  treat  other  world-tribes  as  primitive 
peoples,  and  is  constantly  trying  to  frighten  them  with 
Tartarin  roarings  or  childish  boos  !  She  keeps  on  stupidly 
striking  matches  in  front  of  them,  but  they  are  ceasing  even 
to  look.  Though  the  world's  increasing  armaments  sug- 
gest a  return  to  savagery,  some  one  may  yet  say  to  Germany 
what  a  North  Queensland  native  said  to  the  British  Com- 
missioner, Walter  Roth,  who  had  been  trying  the  match- 
striking  trick.  "  Having,"  Mr.  Roth  says,  "  struck  match 
after  match  before  a  crowd  of  natives  who  showed  not 
the  slightest  signs  of  surprise,  notwithstanding  that  a  lucifer- 
box  was  an  absolute  novelty  to  them,  I  asked  the  interpreter 
to  discover  what  those  primitive  children  of  nature  thought 
of  the  performance.  He  informed  me  truly  and  tersely : 
'  He  say  "  what  for  no  gib  (give)  it  he  ^(him)  ?  "  He  say 

"  you  d fool,  throw  it  away  "  ! '  " 

Meanwhile  the  legend  of  Germany's  encerclement  by  Eng- 
land has  been  skilfully  used  by  the  German  Government  as  a 
pretext  for  increasing  its  naval  and  military  power,  and 
whatever  may  be  the  pacific  intentions  of  the  Emperor, 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     221 

there  is  hardly  a  speech  of  his  during  the  last  ten  years  but 
has  sedulously  watered  the  soil  in  which  such  rank  legends 
grow.  In  July  1900,  at  the  launching  of  the  ironclad 
Wittelsbach,  William  II  eloquently  declared  that  the  "  Ocean 
was  indispensable  to  German  greatness,"  and  he  defined  his 
thought  as  follows : — 

"  The  ocean  teaches  us  that  on  its  waves  and  on  its  most  distant 
shores  no  great  decision  can  any  longer  be  taken  without  Germany 
and  without  the  German  Emperor.  I  do  not  think  that  it  was  in 
order  to  allow  themselves  to  be  excluded  from  big  foreign  affairs  that 
thirty  years  ago  our  people,  led  by  their  princes,  conquered  and 
shed  their  blood.  Were  the  German  people  to  let  themselves  be 
treated  thus,  it  would  be,  and  forever,  the  end  of  their  world-power  ; 
and  I  do  not  mean  that  that  shall  ever  be  the  case.  To  employ,  in 
order  to  prevent  it,  the  suitable  means,  if  need  be  extreme  means,  is 
my  duty  and  my  highest  privilege." 

Suiting  the  acting  to  the  word,  William  II  landed  at  Tan- 
giers  and  began,  in  Morocco,  a  policy  which  has  not  only 
signally  failed  of  its  object,  but  has  aroused  against  Germany 
the  hostile  distrust,  the  suspicious  vigilance,  of  the  entire 
world.  Such  a  policy  of  meddlesome  agressiveness — a  policy 
marked,  as  has  previously  been  said,  by  inevitable  contradic- 
tions— trembles  like  a  panic-struck  compass  when  the  needle 
is  beset  in  turn  by  influences  from  all  parts  of  the  horizon. 
What  is  the  most  important  of  these  influences  ?  Allu- 
sion has  already  been  made  to  it.  It  is  the  imperious  call  of 
iron.  The  foregoing  analysis  of  the  international  situation 
in  Luxembourg  will  have  given  some  idea  of  the  nature  of 
German  unrest.  It  has  been  calculated  that  by  the  middle 
of  the  present  century  the  German  iron-mines  will  be  ex- 
hausted. Within  thirty  years  the  same  fate  will  have  be- 
fallen those  of  Luxembourg.  When  the  iron-famine  comes, 
the  vast  foundries  and  steel  industries  of  Westphalia, 
Silesia,  the  Rhenish  Provinces  and  the  valley  of  the  Sarre 
will  have  to  put  out  their  fires.  Twenty  millions  of  Ger- 
many's population  willj  be  driven  to  look  elsewhere  for 
a  livelihood.  Now,  the  iron-ore  deposits  which,  in  the 


222  PROBLEMS  OF   POWER 

twentieth  century,  are  as  indispensable  an  asset  as  corn- 
fields for  a  civilized  community,  abound  just  over  the 
Franco-German  border,  in  the  department  of  the  Meurthe 
and  Moselle.  In  the  basin  of  Briey  there  is  iron  enough 
to  last  for  250  years  ;  and  Briey  is  nearer  than  China, 
where  there  are  still  unplundered  stores  of  coal.  Germany 
thought  she  had  included  in  the  provisions  of  the  Treaty 
of  Frankfort  all  the  iron-mines  of  Eastern  France.  The  in- 
vention, in  1880,  of  the  so-called  Thomas  process,  which 
revolutionized  the  metallurgic  industry,  and  the  discovery 
shortly  afterwards  of  the  mines  of  Briey,  revealed  on  French 
soil  undreamed-of  sources  of  wealth  which  became  (as  the 
author  of  L'Allemagne  aux  Abois  puts  it)  a  "  veritable 
torture  of  Tantalus  "  to  the  Germans  over  the  border.  But 
while  the  iron  in  France  is  practically  inexhaustible,  coal 
is  by  no  means  as  abundant.  Most  of  the  coal  required  for 
the  iron-works  of  the  Meurthe  and  Moselle  is  imported  from 
Germany.  Whenever  the  Essen  Syndicate  in  Westphalia 
chooses  to  do  so,  it  can  starve  out  all  the  iron-masters  of 
French  Lorraine.  The  situation  is  singularly  simple. 
Germany  says  to  France  :  "  Give  us  iron,  and  I  will  continue 
to  give  you  coal."  What  more  tempting  and  reasonable 
basis  for  a  commercial  Entente,  leading  up  to  a  political 
understanding  which  would  shatter  the  agreement  between 
France  and  England,  and,  as  Germany  urges,  surrender  to 
France  and  herself  the  domination  of  the  world  ?  Franco- 
German  commercial,  industrial  and  financial  co-operation 
would  settle  all  Germany's  problems  for  a  century.  But, 
alas  for  German  ambition,  the  question  of  Alsace-Lorraine 
still  remains  unsolved.  The  history  of  France  makes  it 
difficult  for  her  sons  to  regard  as  glorious  the  fate  which 
befell  Greece  when  she  was  conquered  by  Rome.  The  Ger- 
man mentality,  however,  appears  to  be  lacking  in  the  deli- 
cacy to  appreciate  such  susceptibilities  as  these.1  Their 

1  See,  however,  the  Declarations  of  the  German  Ambassador  in 
London,  p.  258. 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     223 

Government  untiringly,  even  insolently,  goes  on  seeking  to 
bribe  France  into  financial  and  commercial  arrangements 
which,  if  accepted,  would  place  France  in  virtually  the 
same  position  towards  her  as  this  or  that  Central  American 
State  occupies  towards  the  great  Northern  Republic.  It 
is  easy  to  show  in  detail  the  curious  results  of  the  Agreement 
of  1909,  followed  by  a  succession  of  necessarily  unsuccessful 
efforts  to  form  unobjectionable  Franco-German  Companies 
for  the  exploitation  of  Morocco,  the  Congo  and  the  Came- 
roons.1  Fortunately,  France  is  not  altogether  dependent 
on  Germany  for  coal.  She  may  buy  it  in  England,  and  if 
worse  comes  to  the  worst,  she  can  dig  it  out  of  the  hitherto 
unworked  mines  in  immediate  reach  of  her  own  furnaces. 
A  more  enlightened  and  energetic  policy  on  the  part  of 
her  Ministry  of  Public  Works  would  already  have  forced 
upon  the  Chamber  of  Deputies  the  construction  not  only  of 
a  Canal  through  the  valley  of  the  Chiers,  opening  up  Dun- 
kirk, Antwerp  and  Rotterdam,  but  of  the  Canal  du  Nord- 
Est  which  is  to  link  the  Northern  and  Belgian  coal-fields 
to  the  iron  regions  of  Meurthe  and  Moselle.  When  France 
has  done  this,  she  will  become  for  the  first  time  com- 
mercially independent  of  Germany,  but  she  may  have  in- 
creased intolerably  her  neighbour's  exasperation.  The  old 
formula  that  "  a  nation  requires  the  army  and  the  fleet  of 
its  foreign  policy  "  will  meanwhile  have  to  be  altered  to  read : 
"  A  country  requires  the  army  and  the  navy  of  its  economic 
policy."  Germany  requires  not  only  French  and  American 
gold  to  keep  her  credit  system  in  working  order  ;  she  requires 
also  an  army  of  foreign  clients  willing  to  buy  her  products, 
and  she  will  shortly  require  French  minerals  to  feed  her 
hundreds  of  furnaces.  "  France  seems  destined,  if  all  goes 
well,  to  become  the  most  powerful  nation  of  metallurgists 
in  the  world."2  The  invasion  of  Normandy  by  Herr 
Thyssen,  who  is  even  now  building  three  hauts  fourneaux 

1  See  pp.  242-246. 

2  L'Allemagne  aux  Abois,  p.  35. 


224  PROBLEMS   OF   POWER 

adjoining  the  mines  of  which  he  has  obtained  the  con- 
cession, and  the  establishment  in  Meurthe  and  Moselle  of 
two  or  three  other  German  mining  magnates,  show  what 
might  happen  if  Germany's  foreign  policy  were  not  so 
blunderingly  conducted.  Unable  to  induce  France  to  for- 
get ;  exasperated  by  her  inability  to  induce  France  to  sign 
an  alliance  with  her,  she  shows  her  teeth.  She  goes  to 
Agadir.  As  the  Paris  correspondent  of  The  Times  has  put 
it,  she  agrees  to  a  friendly  conversation,  but  on  sitting  down 
she  lays  a  revolver  on  the  table.  Meanwhile,  pending  the 
moment  when  her  armies  may  win  for  her  the  mines  of 
Meurthe  et  Moselle,  she  is  hunting  for  iron  throughout  the 
world.  Writing  on  July  18,  1911,  in  the  Daily  Mail,  Mr. 
Frederic  William  Wile,  the  Berlin  correspondent  of  that 
paper,  said : — 

"  The  Ivlannesmanns'  mining  activities  in  Morocco  are  said  to  be 
inspired  by  the  necessity  of  assuring  the  German  steel  and  iron  indus- 
try new  sources  of  ore  supply.  There  is  alleged  to  be  genuine  concern 
over  the  diminishing  supply  in  German  mines.  Great  firms  like  the 
Krupps,  of  Essen,  "  King  "  August  Thyssen  and  Matthias  Stinnes, 
the  uncrowned  potentates  of  Rhineland-Westphalia,  are  associated 
with  the  Mannesmanns  in  the  Moroccan  ventures,  and  between  them 
make  up  the  25  per  cent,  of  German  interest  in  the  Union  des  Mines 
Marocaines  which  figures  so  conspicuously  in  the  Moorish  turmoil. 
The  Krupps,  Thyssens  and  Stinneses  are  also  heavily  interested  in 
steel  mills,  iron  mines,  and  transportation  projects  affecting  their 
industry  in  Scandinavia  and  Russia,  and  have  even  established  them- 
selves in  French  Normandy."  l 

1  For  the  details  of  the  German  metallurgists'  dreams  in  Morocco 
see  M.  Andre  Tardieu's  "  Le  Mystere  d' Agadir."  A  succinct  statement 
of  German  operations  in  Normandy  was  given  in  The  Times  in  October 
1912  :  "  Negotiations  between  the  French  concern  Etablissements 
Gail,  and  the  Gewerschaft  Deutscher  Kaiser  in  Bochum  have  re- 
sulted in  the  formation  of  the  Societe  des  Hauts  Fourneaux  et 
Acieries  de  Caen,  with  30,000,000!,  for  the  purpose  of  erecting  and 
working  a  large  plant,  to  include  two  blast  furnaces  having  a  yearly 
output  of  200,000  tons  of  pig  iron,  and  to  be  fitted  with  a  complete 
gas-purifying  plant.  The  scheme  contemplates  also  the  provision 
of  rolling  mills  for  the  manufacture  of  sheets,  sections,  and  merchant 


A  STUDY  OF   INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     225 

There  are,  no  doubt,  many  indications  that  the  German 
rulers  may  eventually  come  to  regard  a  war  as  the  sole  solution 
for  the  life  and  death  economic  problems  with  which  they  are 
confronted.  France,  England  and  the  United  States  appear 
to  Germany  to  be  blocking  her  way.  The  nature  of  the  sole 
solution  that  can  maintain  the  peace  of  Europe  has  already 
been  stated.  Germany  must  find  some  means  of  convincing 
the  Powers  of  the  purity  of  her  intentions.  She  must  cease 
her  bluff  and  her  bluster ;  she  must  become  convinced 
that  no  nation  in  the  world  is  capable  of  contemplating  an 
attack  on  her ;  she  must  seek  some  outlet  for  that  furor 
teutonicus  invoked  by  a  former  minister  of  war,  General 
von  Einen,  in  his  Detmold  speech,  and  she  must  cease  to 
propagate  at  home  the  Nietzschean  forms  of  mystical  and 
metaphysical  imperialism,  that  faith  in  the  divine  right  of 
brute  force  which,  inherited  from  Bismarck,  inspires  the  ora- 
tory of  her  pan-German  deputies,  her  press,  and  her  ca- 
pricious diplomatic  action.  Sir  Edward  Grey  excellently 
described  the  present  situation  when  he  declared  that  if 
German  policy  really  aimed  solely  at  rendering  Germany 
powerful,  and  not  aggressive,  "  within  two  or  three  years 
every  chance  of  war  would  have  disappeared."  The  German 
Emperor,  who  has  in  his  veins  a  goodly  proportion  of  French 
blood,  should  take  to  heart  the  lines  of  Corneille  :  Ne 
veuillez  point  vous  perdre,  et  vous  serez  sauves  !  J 

bars,  and  of  coke  ovens  with  apparatus  for  the  recovery  of  by- 
products. The  company  have  acquired  a  site  extending  over  an 
area  of  350  hectares  situated  in  Herouville  and  Colonbelles  (near 
Caen).  The  ore  is  to  be  obtained  from  the  mines  of  Soumont  and 
Perrieres,  worked  by  the  Societe  des  Mines  de  Soumont,  and  an 
electric  railway  35  km.  long  will  be  constructed  to  convey  it  to  the 
works.  The  works  are  to  be  connected  with  a  site  on  the  sea  coast 
where  important  developments  are  contemplated,  and  it  is  expected 
that  they  will  thus  be  situated  favourably  in  regard  to  the  exporta- 
tion of  the  finished  products  and  the  importation  of  fuel." 

There  is  as  yet  no  mention  of  the  establishment  of  a  German 
coaling  station. 

1  The  German  Emperor  counts,  perhaps,  on  the  economic  "  salva- 

9 


226  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

IV 

The  foregoing  analysis  of  the  plight  growing  out  of  Ger- 
many's industrial  situation  and  of  her  perilous  banking  sys- 
tem, is  one  which  suggests  as  many  arguments  to  the  apostles 
of  peace  as  to  the  most  pessimistic  of  the  prophets  of  war. 
The  facts  adduced  might  be  used  to  illustrate  the  remarks  of 
Mr.  Norman  Angell  in  his  brilliant  lecture  read  before  the 
Institute  of  Bankers  on  January  17,  1912  :  "  With  the 
freedom  of  communication  in  every  sense  that  now  exists  in 
the  world,  it  has  become  a  material  impossibility  to  prevent 
French  money  aiding  German  trade  in  one  form  or  another  "  ; 
just  as  they  could  be  made  to  point  the  moral  of  the  utterance 
of  M.  Jaures,  in  the  French  Chamber  of  Deputies,  on  De- 
cember 20,  1911  :— 

"  The  international  action  of  the  capital  in  the  hands  of  the  great 
bankers  constitutes  a  formidable  new  power,  which,  if  it  is  not  con- 
trolled by  opinion,  if  it  is  not  controlled  by  Governments  independent 
of  it,  if  it  is  not  controlled  by  enlightened  and  autonomous  Demo- 
cracies, may  prostitute  pretexts  of  peace  to  miserable  combinations, 
but  which,  if  it  is  enlightened,  controlled,  supervised  by  great 
nations,  independent  and  proud,  may,  at  certain  moments  in  the 
unstable  equilibrium  of  the  world,  add  to  the  chances  of  peace." 

Yet  the  same  set  of  facts  might,  perhaps,  with  even  greater 
force,  be  employed  to  controvert  the  whole  main  contention 
of  these  two  seers.  It  is  owing  to  the  devices  of  banking, 
they  argue,  that  two  countries  like  France  and  Germany  are 
able  to  divide  their  labour  according  to  their  characteristics, 

tion  "  of  his  country  through  the  medium  of  the  Diesel  engine,  destined 
to  render  the  steam-engine  archaic.  The  invention  of  the  Augsburg 
engineer  consumes  not  only  crude  oil  but  coal  tar.  It  is  claimed, 
therefore,  that  it  will  prove  to  be  a  means  for  the  utilization  of  coal 
much  more  economical  than  hi  the  past :  when  coal  is  entirely  con- 
verted into  coke  and  coal-tar,  the  resulting  economic  progress  will 
relegate  the  steam-engine  to  the  Museums  of  Applied  Arts.  Thus 
Germany,  abundantly  provided  with  coal,  need  no  longer  dread 
the  future.  But,  by  the  same  token,  England,  whose  coal-supplies 
are  even  richer  than  those  of  Germany,  will  be  able  to  maintain  a 
steady  economic  advance. 


A  STUDY  OF   INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     227 

one  country  being  a  maker,  and  the  other  a  user,  of  capital : 
"  The  very  stagnation  of  France,  which  set  free  this  capital, 
is  precisely  the  factor  which  makes  it  impossible  for  Ger- 
many to  crush  her."     But  the  stagnation  of  France  does  not 
necessarily   prevent    Germany   from   trying  to   crush   her. 
Such  stagnation  is  no  guarantee  against  the  possibility  that 
a  peaceful  German   Government,  however  profoundly  con- 
vinced of  the  economic  soundness  of  a  thesis  like  that  of  Mr. 
Norman  Angell,  may,  at  some  moment  of  international  fric- 
tion, be  driven  to  make  war  in  response  to  the  clamours  of  a 
population  grossly  misinformed  as  to  the  hostile  intentions 
of  this  or  that  foreign  power  or  set  of  powers,  or  mortified 
beyond  endurance  by  such  a  series  of  diplomatic  rebuffs 
as  the  German  people  have  had  to  endure  of  late,  notably 
during  the  summer  and  autumn  of  191  r.1    For  ten  years, 
moreover,  German  amour-propre  has  been  in  a  constant  state 
of  irritation.    The   dramatic  resignation   of  the   German 
Colonial  Minister,  Herr  von  Lindequist,  after  refusing  to 
sign  a  treaty  exchanging  Germany's  magnificent  hopes  of 
Moroccan  mines  and  an  Atlantic  port  for  what  he  called 
"  the  marshy  and  malaria-haunted  regions  of  the  Congo," 
was  almost  a  reflex  action  symbolizing  the  disgust  of  the 
German  people  with  their  rulers.     At  the  signal,  an  immense 
wave   of   foaming   chauvinism   swept    over    the    country. 
This  patriotic  movement,  which  forced  the  Government  to 
increase    the    naval    and    military    estimates,    immensely 
reinforced  the  authority  of  the  Pan-Germanist  Association, 
of  the  Naval  League  and  of  the  German  Colonial  Society. 
In  other  words,  the   German  Government  is   pacific,  but 
German    opinion    bellicose — because  the  Government    has 
been  blundering  for  ten  years.     For  a  century  and  a  half 
Europe   has    been    endeavouring    to    deprive    Kings    and 

1  Compare,  moreover,  the  risks  of  war  during  November  and  Decem- 
ber, 1912,  owing  to  the  excited  state  of  Austrian  public  opinion  in 
connexion  with  Servian  pretensions  to  annexing  a  strip  of  the  Adriatic 
coast-line. 


228  PROBLEMS   OF  POWER 

Governments  of  the  right  to  make  war  and  peace.  Philo- 
sophers and  historians  have  argued  that  it  was  owing 
to  the  ambitions  of  kings  and  the  intrigues  of  courtiers 
that  peace-loving  nations  had  had  to  go  to  war  against  their 
will.  This  is  the  burden  of  the  battle-song  of  the  Inter- 
nationale ;  and  it  has  been  thought  that  with  the  coming  of 
an  era  in  which  war  should  depend  on  the  people's  will, 
peace  would  prevail  throughout  the  world.  But  what 
answer  is  given  by  events  ?  If  Turkey  has  lost  Tripoli  it  is 
because  the  warlike  enthusiasm  of  a  new  nationalistic 
Italy  has  forced  the  hand  of  her  Government.  It  was  the  war- 
like temper  of  Bulgarian,  Servian,  Greek  and  Montenegrin 
public  opinion,  not  the  bellicose  spirit  of  the  Balkan  Govern- 
ments, that  mobilized  the  Balkan  peoples  against  Turkey 
in  the  autumn  of  1912.  In  Germany,  not  merely  the  Oppo- 
sition, but  the  Press  have  constantly  reproached  the  Govern- 
ment for  its  pusillanimity.  That  public  opinion  upon  which 
M.  Jaures  counts  to  "  control,"  to  temper,  the  action  of 
the  international  bankers,  cannot  even  "  control  "  itself. 
The  steadying  influence  of  la  haute  finance,  of  finance  in 
general,  is  certainly  all  that  it  is  represented  to  be  ;  but 
such  peaceful  influence  as  it  exerts  is  exercised,  in  our 
time,  almost  solely  upon  Governments.  In  presence  of 
the  rise  of  a  sudden  gust  of  chauvinistic  passion,  Govern- 
ments will  be  forced  into  line  at  the  head  of  the  self-mad- 
dened mob,  and  the  philosophers  in  the  van  will  have  to 
advance  with  the  rest.1 


1  No  crescendo  of  conventional  votes,  leading  up  to  an  ultimatum 
in  accordance  with  the  rules  of  the  game  of  war,  as  prepared  by  the 
Professors  of  International  Law,  warned  the  world  that  Japan  in- 
tended to  open  hostilities  against  Russia,  or  that  Italy  intended  to 
take  Tripoli.  None  will  temper  the  force  of  the  shock  when  Germany 
decides  to  fall  upon  Nangy.  As  M.  Rene  Pinon  says  (Revue  des  Deux 
Mondes,  June  i,  1912,  pp.  619,  620)  :  "  The  only  premonitory  indi- 
cation of  war,  in  our  Democratic  epoch,  is  the  temper  of  public  opinion. 
When  a  nation's  pulse  beats  at  the  fever  cadence,  when  its  blood  is 
boiling  and  the  whole  organism  shivers  and  trembles,  the  danger 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     229 

V 

It  is  not  only  by  the  scrutiny  of  the  mechanism  of  Ger- 
man industrial  and  financial  organization  that  the  hidden 
springs  of  European  peace  and  war  are  laid  bare.  It  has 
been  pointed  out  that  France,  following  a  policy  of  re- 
cueillement  and  caution,  both  characteristic  of  her  needs  and 
characteristic  of  her  prudent  temperament,  has  allowed 
herself  to  fall  steadily  behind  in  the  race  for  the  capture 
of  the  world-markets.  It  is  necessary  to  develop  this 
remark  in  detail. 

A  writer  signing  himself  "  Lysis,"  who  has  published  two 
books,  Centre  I' Oligarchic  Financier e  en  France  and  Les 
Capitalistes  Franfais  contre  la  France,  has,  for  the  last  few 
years,  conducted  a  courageous  campaign  with  the  object 
of  enlightening  Frenchmen  as  to  the  risks  of  their  own 
admirable  credit-system.  He  aims  at  a  reform  of  the 
existing  financial  organization  of  France,  and  his  under- 
taking has  already  borne  fruit.  It  is  significant  that  an 
ex-minister  of  Finance  of  the  experience  and  authority  of 
M.  Caillaux — who,  whatever  his  occasionally  misguided 
activity  during  the  negotiations  of  1910  with  Germany, 
has  proved  his  practical  knowledge  of  the  mechanism  of 
French  society  to  be  that  of  a  competent  specialist — should 
have  ventured,  however  guardedly,  to  corroborate  certain 
of  the  views  of  "Lysis"1: — 

"  Gentlemen,"  he  said,  "  tell  your  representatives  to  consider 
the  question  of  the  organization  of  industrial  and  commercial  credit, 
I  mean  of  that  credit  which  ought  to  be  at  the  disposal  of  the  small 

is  near.  At  such  psychological  moments  hi  the  life  of  a  people,  argu- 
ments based  on  Constitutional  Law  have  no  longer  any  hold,  and 
Governments  become  powerless  to  arrest  the  impulses  of  the  nation. 
The  epoch  of  the  old  politique  des  Cabinets  has  gone  by,  and  the  best 
diplomatist  to-day,  is  he  who  is  able  to  penetrate  the  deep -lying 
intentions  of  the  peoples  and  to  divine  their  spontaneous  impulses." 
If  M.  Pinon  had  written  these  words  after  the  Balkan  War  of  1912- 
1913  he  would  have  been  tempted  to  print  them  in  italics. 
1  In  a  speech  delivered  on  January  9,  1911,  at  Lille. 


230  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

shopkeepers  and  the  small  manufacturers,  and  which  is  at  present 
doled  out  to  them  so  parsimoniously.  A  good  deal  has  been  written 
of  late  on  the  economic  and  financial  organization  of  France.  There 
has  been  violent  criticism  of  the  system  of  exportation  of  French 
capital,  without  reflecting  that  a  large  portion  of  our  economic  and 
political  force  abroad  is  due  to  the  fact  that  we  are  perhaps  the 
biggest  money-lenders  in  the  whole  world.1.  .  .  These  criticisms 


1  M.  Caillaux  forgets,  or  neglects  to  mention,  that  while  readiness 
and  capacity  to  lend  money  to  Foreign  Powers  increases  the  "  poli- 
tical force  "  and  the  diplomatic  prestige  of  a  State  during  the  period 
prior  to  the  conclusion  of  a  loan,  the  lending  State,  once  the  operation 
is  concluded,  becomes,  to  a  large  degree,  the  slave  of  the  borrowing 
nation,  and  is  placed  in  a  position  of  dependency  that  hampers  its 
future  diplomatic  action.  Moreover,  as  Lysis  says  :  "  Foreign  loans 
are  not  productive ;  they  do  not  serve  to  develop  the  wealth  of  the 
borrowing  peoples,  but  to  cover  the  costs  of  military  preparations  .  .  . 
Bad  for  the  borrowers,  the  operation  is  full  of  risks  for  the  lenders. 
Two  thousand  millions  of  francs  of  Rumanian,  Bulgarian  and  Ser- 
vian securities  are  quoted  on  the  Paris  Bourse,  the  greater  portion 
of  which  is  in  French  hands.  We  have  thus  an  immense  amount 
of  capital  engaged  in  the  most  dangerous  corner  of  Europe,  exposed 
to  the  chances  of  war,  of  domestic  strife,  of  political  revolutions 
and  of  bad  crops."  This  is  a  kind  of  fact  that  might  no  doubt  be 
utilized  by  the  Norman  Angells  and  the  Jaureses  to  support  their 
argument  as  to  the  pacific  influence  of  cosmopolitan  capital,  but  it  is, 
at  the  same  time,  obviously  as  legitimate  ground  for  anxiety  to  those 
Frenchmen  who,  realizing  that  the  counter-influences  making  for 
war  are  immensely  preponderant,  reflect  with  dismay  what  is  to 
become  of  their  exported  savings  when  war  breaks  out,  suddenly 
involving  States,  great  or  small,  in  which  their  capital  is  engaged. 
In  the  first  week  of  the  Balkan  Scare  of  October  1912,  an  unwarran- 
table panic  fell  upon  the  Paris  Bourse,  whereas,  in  191 1,  when  France 
was  on  the  eve  of  war  with  Germany,  the  French  money  market 
remained  calm.  The  depreciation  of  the  securities  quoted  on  the 
Paris  Bourse  ranged  from  five  to  twenty  per  cent.,  yet  French  and 
German  financial  interests  as  regards  Balkan  Questions  were  identical 
in  kind.  Writing  in  June  1907  in  the  Revue  des  Deux  Mondes,  M. 
Jacques  Siegfried  described  the  exodus  of  French  capital  as  "a 
veritable  new  revocation  of  the  Edict  of  Nantes  in  the  domain  of 
Economics,"  and  called  upon  the  Government  to  remedy  "  this  dis- 
tressing fact."  The  question  is  discussed  in  all  its  bearings  by  M. 
Andre  Cheradame,  in  his  remarkable  book  La  Crise  Franfaise.  In 
the  Correspondant  (Jan.  25,  1912)  this  writer,  with  reference  to  the 
futile  efforts  made  by  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  to  negotiate 


A  STUDY  OF   INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     331 

were  dictated  by  the  sentiment  that  in  France  the  small  shopkeepers 
and  business  men  have  inadequate  facilities  for  obtaining  long  credit. 
In  our  country,  if  a  manufacturer,  who  is  at  the  head  of  a  moderate 
business  representing,  for  instance,  200,000  or  300,000  francs,  wishes 
to  develop  it,  while  giving  full  guarantees  as  to  business  capacity,  the 
only  way  of  procuring  the  requisite  capital  is  to  appeal  to  private 
individuals.  Save  in  exceptional  cases  no  banking  organization 
exists  to  provide  him  with  capital,  and  the  situation  is  worse  still 
in  the  case  of  the  small  shopkeeper  or  the  small  manufacturer  whose 
business  represents  a  sum  of  10,000,  20,000  or  50,000  francs.  The 


in  Paris  a  loan  of  100,000,000  francs,  to  be  quoted  on  the  Paris 
Bourse,  shows  that  if  the  attempt  failed,  it  was  because  of  the  sound 
intuitions  of  French  public  opinion,  as  manifested  in  the  Press,  and 
not  at  all  because  of  the  prudent  policy  of  the  Government.  M. 
Cheradame  concludes  that  collusion  between  French  finance  and 
French  diplomacy  is  indispensable.  He  suggests  that  before  French 
financiers  agree  to  lend  money  to  a  Foreign  State  they  should  first 
advise  the  Quai  d'Orsay,  in  order  to  learn  whether  the  principle  of 
the  contemplated  operation  is  in  harmony  with  French  foreign 
policy.  After  a  favourable  reply,  but  only  after  such  a  reply,  they 
may  come  to  terms  with  the  Foreign  State.  The  necessity  of  some 
such  permanent  mechanism  as  this  has  now  become  generally  recog- 
nized in  France.  The  echo  of  this  altered  public  opinion  was  heard 
in  the  last  words  of  the  ministerial  declaration  of  the  late  French 
Government.  M.  Poincare  said  that  the  policy  of  his  Government 
was  to  "  reconcile,  as  twin  and  convergent  forces ,  the  financial  power 
which  was  of  such  great  assistance  to  France,  with  her  military  and 
naval  power."  In  October  [1912  he  applied  this  principle  in  vir- 
tually prohibiting  French  bankers  from  lending  money  to  Bulgaria, 
but  later  on,  when  Bulgaria  was  successful,  it  would  appear  that 
this  prohibition  was  withdrawn.  One  of  the  ablest  journals  in 
Europe,  L' Information — the  very  existence  of  which,  by  the  way,  is 
a  sign  of  the  rapidly  increasing  interest  taken  by  the  French  people  in 
financial,  economic  and  political  questions — has  of  late  published 
many  remarkable  studies  by  such  authorities  as  MM.  Andre  Sayous, 
Alfred  Neymarck,  Alexis  Rostand,  on  themes  which,  ten  years  ago 
even,  would  have  attracted  no  general  attention  :  "  French  Savings 
and  Financial  Education,"  "  The  Reform  of  the  Banking  System 
with  reference  to  the  organization  of  credit  for  small  industries  and 
small  shopkeepers,"  "  The  Admission  of  Foreign  Securities  to  the 
Stock  Exchange,"  etc.  The  commercial  expansion  of  France  is  a 
fact  with  which,  more  and  more,  Germany  and  England  will  have 
to  reckon.  It  is  shown  later  on  (pp.  235-238)  that  this  revival  will 
not,  perhaps,  turn  out  to  be  an  unmixed  good  for  the  country. 


232  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

conclusion  to  be  drawn  from  these  incontestable  facts  is  not  the 
necessity  of  altering  existing  conditions,  but  the  necessity  of  creating 
some  new  supplementary  institution.  Besides  the  existing  estab- 
lishments of  credit,  which  should  continue  their  present  activity, 
there  ought  to  exist  organisms  the  sole  object  of  which  should  be  to 
assist  small  business  men,  small  manufacturers.  .  .  .  Various 
types  of  local  banks  should  be  created,  bolstering  up  a  central  bank." 

And  M.  Caillaux  went  on  to  extol  the  utility  of  the 
Japanese  Industrial  Bank,  and  to  urge  the  adoption  of  a 
similar  institution  in  France  "  in  order  to  arouse  the  spirit 
of  private  initiative."  1 

The  question  of  private  initiative  and  of  individual  re- 
sponsibility is,  indeed,  one  of  the  most  urgent  of  all  questions 
for  the  Frenchmen  of  to-day.  The  authoritative  character 
of  the  Napoleonic  political,  legal  and  social  traditions,  which 
have  been  codified  by  the  French  Constitution,  French  laws 
and  French  customs,  is  utterly  unlike  the  undisciplined  in- 
dividualism characterizing  Anglo-Saxon  institutions.  Fur- 
thermore, the  problems  with  which  French  civilization  has 
to  deal  are  almost  exactly  the  opposite  of  those  confronting 
civilization  in  the  United  States,  or  even  in  England  and 
the  Dominions.  Individualism,  which  has  made  America, 
and  is  still  running  riot  there,  has  little  action  in  French 
affairs.  But  what,  for  the  moment,  is  significant  is  that 
just  as  American  financial  institutions  are  the  reflection  of 
American  individualism,  so  French  financial  institutions 

1  Less  than  a  year  later  (December  1912)  M.  Klotz,  the  Minister  of 
Finance  in  the  Poincare  Cabinet,  brought  in  a  bill  embodying  all  of 
M.  Caillaux's  proposals.  In  the  Preamble  M.  Klotz  pointed  out  that, 
notwithstanding  certain  advantages  that  had  accrued  to  trade  and 
industry  from  the  exceptional  banking  concentration  in  France — 
notably  the  maintenance  of  the  rate  of  discount  at  a  low  level — this 
concentration  had  unfortunately  resulted  in  the  disappearance  of 
numerous  local  banks,  and  small  merchants  and  manufacturers  had 
thus  been  deprived  of  the  financial  support  on  which  they  had  for- 
merly been  able  to  count.  The  Klotz  bill,  which  is  open  to  serious 
criticism  (see  the  article  by  M.  Andre  Sayous  in  L' Information  of 
Feb.  n,  1913)  is  now  (March,  1913)  before  the  French  Parliament. 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     233 

are  the  product — and  the  incentive — of  French  conser- 
vatism, French  bourgeois  spirit,  French  dislike  of  responsi- 
bility. 

It  is  worth  while  considering  the  point  somewhat  curi- 
ously. It  may  safely  be  affirmed  that  the  establishments  of 
credit  have  immensely  increased  that  tendency  to  thrift 
which  characterizes  the  average  Frenchman  and  which  is 
partially  due  to  the  provisions  of  the  French  testamentary 
law.  The  Depopulation  Commission  of  the  Ministry  of  the 
Interior  has,  indeed,  passed  more  than  one  resolution  for  a 
reform  of  the  French  Civil  Code  permitting  French  citizens 
to  make  wills  which  shall  reconcile  the  two  natural  human 
ambitions,  the  desire  to  survive  in  one's  property,  and  the 
desire  to  survive  in  one's  posterity.  In  France,  for  more 
than  a  century,  the  law  has  forced  French  fathers  to  choose  ; 
and,  as  Dr.  Jacques  Bertillon  points  out,  they  have  uniformly 
made  the  choice  which,  from  the  purely  economic  stand- 
point, was  most  injurious  to  their  country's  interests. 
To  preserve  the  property  they  have  sacrificed  the  race.1 
M.  Arsene  Dumont,  the  author  of  Natalite  et  Civilisation, 
insists  on  the  direct  relation  between  the  French  system  of 
not  having  more  than  two  children  and  French  love  of 
economy. 

"  Economy,"  he  says,  "  is  the  cause  of  the  limitation  of  the  French 
population.  .  .  .  The  wealth  of  France  is  merely  economized  money. 
But  is  a  nation  really  rich  if  it  hoards  its  pennies  in  coffers  or  in 

1  The  statistics  are  conclusive.  The  birth-rate  has  decreased  in 
France  since  the  beginning  of  the  nineteenth  century.  During  the 
last  ten  years  the  decrease  has  been  accelerated.  (It  is  during  this 
period  that  the  financial  regime  of  France  has  become  oligarchic.) 
It  should  be  said,  however,  that  the  German  birth-rate  is  almost 
as  unfavourable.  In  1911  the  falling  off  in  the  growth  of  the  popu- 
lation in  Prussia  and  Bavaria  together  was  more  than  100,000.  The 
Prussian  Government  has  organized  an  inquiry.  Voluntary  restric- 
tions, artificial  infecundity,  are  the  real  causes  of  the  decline  of  the 
birth-rate  in  all  countries.  But  the  question  is,  what  are  the  causes 
that  favour  the  adoption  of  certain  practices  ?  Is  the  ground  par- 
ticularly favourable  in  France  ? 


234  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

woollen  stockings  ?  Isn't  it  richer  if  it  disposes  of  its  money,  if  it 
uses  it  for  some  business  or  industrial  enterprise  ?  The  Frenchman 
is,  of  all  peoples,  known  to  me,  not  excepting  the  Spaniard,  the  one 
possessing  the  least  spirit  of  enterprise.  The  French  millionaire, 
as  well  as  the  French  peasant  and  working  man,  has  but  one  desire  : 
to  economize,  and  above  all  not  to  risk  his  money." 

Dr.  Jacques  Bertillon,  who  is  of  the  same  opinion,  cites 
his  authorities  to  show  that  the  ideal  of  thrift  and  economy 
of  the  French  bourgeoisie  has  become  that  formulated  by  one 
of  its  teachers,  the  Bible  of  the  French  school,  La  Fontaine  : 
Un  tiens  vaut  mieux  que  deux  tu  V auras.  "  The  ideal  of 
France  was  formerly  incarnated  by  the  knight,  it  is  to-day 
personified  by  the  functionary  and  the  pensioner."  Dr. 
Bertillon  suggests  that  this  evolution,  may  be  due  to  the  fact 
that  the  wars  of  the  First  Empire  cut  off  the  bravest  and 
most  adventuresome  Frenchmen  without  leaving  them  the 
time  to  found  a  family,  and  thus  left  to  the  infirm  the  task 
of  carrying  on  the  race — hence  the  relative  rarity  of  ener- 
getic characters  and  the  predominance,  as  a  national 
characteristic,  of  an  excessive  prudence.  But,  apart  from 
the  fact  that  an  observer  like  Balzac  had  excellent  reasons 
for  holding  the  view  summed  up  in  the  phrase  les  coeurs 
furent  alors  (during  the  Napoleonic  epopee)  nomades  comme 
les  regiments,1  France  can  adduce  impressive  facts — the 
energy  and  initiative  of  her  explorers,  the  enthusiasm  and 
courage  of  her  aviators,  the  moral  and  physical  health  of 
the  present  younger  generation,  the  incomparable  spectacle 
afforded  by  the  Dreyfus  Case  and  the  resiliency  of  the  nation  in 
1905, 1910,  and  1913,  under  the  pricking  of  the  German  goads  * 
— to  show  that  the  chivalrous,  magnanimous,  daring,  adven- 
turous France  of  the  crusaders,  of  the  seventeenth  century 
colonizers  and  of  the  soldiers  of  the  Revolution  and  the 
Empire,  is  still  more  even  than  in  being.  It  is  to  that  France 
that  allusion  has  already  been  made  in  the  earlier  pages  of 

1  La  Paix  du  Menage. 

*  Cf.  La  Renaissance  de  I'Orgueil  Franfais,  by  Etienne  Rey. 


A  STUDY  OF   INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     235 

this  book.  If  for  a  long  period  there  has  been  an  enfeeble- 
ment  of  the  spirit  of  enterprise,  consequent  on  habits  of 
excessive  thrift,  it  is  mainly,  no  doubt,  to  be  accounted  for  by 
the  fact  that,  after  her  defeat,  France  for  a  long  period  neces- 
sarily remained  a  stunned  and  bewildered  nation,  and  that 
when  she  woke  out  of  this  condition  of  apathy  it  was  to  find 
herself  called  upon  to  lay  the  foundations  of  a  new  society 
before  she  could  indulge  in  the  luxury  of  cherishing  her  old 
dreams  ;  but  it  is  also  to  be  accounted  for  by  the  slow  but 
fatal  action  of  the  French  Civil  Code  in  its  stipulations 
concerning  the  disposition  of  property  and  regulation  of 
marriage,  and  the  enervating  parallel  influence  of  the  great 
institutions  of  credit,  which,  after  having  canalized  French 
savings  into  their  vast  central  reservoir,  have  used  those 
savings  for  the  sole  ends  of  cosmopolitan  finance,  instead  of 
'employing  them  to  irrigate  French  soil  and  to  encourage 
French  industrial  and  economic  initiative.  After  hav- 
ing succeeded  in  altering  the  French  law  of  inheritance, 
the  French  Society  known  as  L'Alliance  Nationale  pour 
1'Accroissement  de  la  Population — which  is  only  one  of  the 
admirable  associations  now  endeavouring  to  solve  the  pro- 
blem of  French  race-suicide — would  do  well  to  turn  its 
attention  not  so  much  to  the  revision  of  the  fiscal  laws  of 
France  (the  principle,  for  instance,  of  proportioning  taxa- 
tion to  the  size  of  families)  as  to  the  furthering  of  the  natural 
French  expansiveness  and  spirit  of  initiative.  Every  ex- 
traneous influence  tending  to  stifle  that  expansiveness  and 
that  initiative  should  be  ruthlessly  destroyed.  Such  an 
influence  of  repression  would  seem  to  be  the  peculiar  activity 
of  the  French  financial  oligarchy,  and  Parliamentary  inter- 
vention is  required  to  determine  the  limits  of  that  activity 
and  to  supplement  the  existing  credit  establishments  by  a 
financial  system  which  will  tend  to  develop,  and  not  throttle, 
the  spirit  of  energy  and  of  responsibility. 

In    pleading,    however,    for    the    direction    of    French 
activity  towards  the  development  of  economic  and  indus- 


236  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

trial  interests  ;  in  counselling  a  systematic  effort  to  use 
French  initiative  for  the  cultivation  of  the  natural  re- 
sources of  France,  and  for  the  fructification  on  French 
soil  of  the  prodigious  savings  of  the  French  people,  the 
student  of  French  Institutions  should  not  be  blind  to  the 
curiously  interesting,  almost  paradoxical,  fact  that  it  is 
largely  because  France  is  so  backward  in  economical  and 
industrial  development  that  she  enjoys  to-day  a  relative 
social  and  political  tranquillity,  whereas  England,  Germany, 
Austria-Hungary,  Japan  and  the  United  States  are  racked  by 
a  spirit  of  revolutionary  unrest.  France  is  sadly  behind  the 
times  ;  her  industry,  her  public  works,  her  business  and  her 
commercial  habits  are  not  "  up-to-date  "  ;  and  this  back- 
wardness, no  doubt,  marks  a  serious  economic  inferiority 
compared  with  the  industrial  activity  of  her  neighbours  and 
rivals.  Yet  it  is  just  this  inferiority  which,  perhaps,  accounts 
in  a  measure  for  her  relatively  greater  social  stability  ; 
which  explains  why  her  people  are  to-day  the  most  "  con- 
servative "  and  the  least  revolutionary  under  the  sun ;  which 
finally — and  this  chiefly  concerns  the  subject  in  hand — 
enables  her,  owing  to  her  ready  money,  her  immediately 
accessible  reserves,  to  contemplate  with  comparative 
equanimity  the  possibility  of  having  to  wage  war.  This 
point  is  so  important  that  it  should  be  put  more  explicitly. 
The  present  critical  condition  of  the  modern  State  is  so 
universal  that  more  than  one  writer  l  has  certainly  been 
justified  in  comparing  it  with  the  no  less  universal  unrest  of 
1848.  Republics,  Constitutional  Monarchies,  Empires, 
Despotisms,  Parliamentary  Regimes  are  one  and  all  suffering 
from  a  kind  of  locomotor  ataxy,  and  so  deep-seated  is  the 
disorder  that  the  political  writers  and  the  juris-consults  who 
still  discuss  the  questions  once  so  beautifully  dealt  with  by 
Montesquieu,  are  like  a  band  of  Sagrados  who  should  under- 

1  See  Alexander  D.  Noyes,  article  "  Politics  and  Prosperity," 
published  in  the  Atlantic  Monthly  ;  and  Paul  Louis,  "  La  Crise  de 
1'Etat  moderne,"  Mercure  de  France,  April  i,  1912. 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     237 

take  to  cure  a  victim  of  St.  Vitus'  dance  by  painting  his  face. 
This  crisis  of  the  modern  State  is,  in  its  essence,  an  economic, 
not  a  political  crisis.  Questions  of  changing  the  form  of 
government  may  arise  in  connexion  with  it  and  characterize 
its  evolution,  but  such  questions  are  of  slight  importance 
in  comparison  with  the  essential  point,  that  of  the  organic 
economy  of  the  community.  The  present  crisis  is  of  the 
nature  of  a  struggle  between  the  upper  middle  class,  la 
bourgeoisie  who  possess,  the  beati  possidentes,  the  aristo- 
cratic and  privileged  few  in  power,  and  the  "  people,"  the 
proletariat,  who,  to  a  large  degree  without  property,  are  yet 
the  producers  of  wealth,  and  who  consequently  regard 
themselves  as  les  desherites.  The  democratic  laic  masses 
have  ceased  to  "  clamour  in  the  desert  "  for  equality  of  privi- 
lege, and  are  rapidly  inventing  the  most  ingenious  engines 
of  savage  warfare  against  Established  Things  :  humanitarian 
idealism,  liberty,  irreligion ;  or  instruments  of  assault  from 
without :  syndicalism,  "  direct  action,"  sabotage.  It  is 
a  duel  to  the  death  between  the  conservative  Social  Forms 
based  on  property  and  the  Revolutionary  Coalitions 
(syndicats]  that  are  gradually  disciplining  the  mass  of  pro- 
ducers. And  behold  the  result  in  France  !  France  is  the 
country  which  contains  the  largest  number  of  property- 
owners  ;  it  is  the  classic  realm  of  thrift ;  it  is  the  corner  of 
the  globe  where  the  land  is  most  equally  divided,  where  the 
bas-de-laine  is  always  darned,  where  the  pitcher  of  the 
Danaids  is  a  constantly  replenished  jar  of  wine.  Such  in- 
dustrialism as  has  taken  root  on  French  soil  has  of  course 
produced  the  same  kind  of  friction  as  the  clash  between 
capital  and  labour  has  brought  about  in  other  parts  of 
the  world.  But  industrialism,  business  initiative,  have 
been  less  characteristic  of  modern  France  than  of  the  German 
Empire,  of  England  and  of  the  United  States.  The  com- 
paratively greater  diffusion  of  property  in  France,  and  the 
simpler  economic  and  industrial  organization,  have  kept  her 
people  "  backward  " ;  but  these  very  causes  have,  at  the 


238  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

same  time,  determined  her  conservatism,  for  they  have 
counterbalanced  the  revolutionary  spirit  engendered,  in 
France  as  elsewhere,  by  the  tyranny  of  the  privileged  class  in 
possession  of  authority  and  property.  France,  indeed,  has 
invented,  and  become  the  propagator  of,  Syndicalism  (as  she 
always  invents,  because  she  thinks  quickly,  and  because  she 
has  a  gift  for  large  clear  ideas)  ;  but  Syndicalism  is  less 
applicable,  one  might  almost  say  less  needed,  in  her  case 
than  in  that  of  the  other  modern  States.  Yet,  true  as 
this  is,  it  may  be  argued  that  Syndicalism  is  more  needed  in 
France  than  elsewhere,  since  at  a  time  of  social  disintegra- 
tion (when  religious  scepticism,  political  and  financial 
scandals,  parliamentary  frivolity  and  general  irresponsi- 
bility are  corroding  the  sentiment  of  respect)  the  tyrannical 
discipline  of  Syndicalism  may  be  the  one  element  capable  of 
transforming  French  individualism  into  an  instrument  of 
altruistic  action,  pending  the  economic  adjustments  of  the 
society  of  the  future.  The  dictatorial  demagogues  who 
founded  Syndicalism  may  all  unwittingly  have  been  render- 
ing a  singular  service  to  the  ideal  of  Social  order. l 

1  Since  the  above  was  written  a  similar  suggestion  has  been  made 
by  an  astute  realist,  the  late  Minister  of  War  in  the  Poincare  Cabinet, 
M.  Millerand.  Interviewed  by  the  Paris  correspondent  of  the  Neue 
Freie  Presse  on  the  question  of  the  abolition  of  standing  armies  in 
consequence  of  modern  social  evolution,  M.  Millerand  expressed 
the  view  that  any  such  result  would  be  disastrous  for  the  Republic. 
"  Compulsory  education  in  neutral  schools,  the  unbridled  liberty 
now  rife,  freedom  of  speech  and  of  the  press,"  he  said,  "  have  made 
us  a  people  in  constant  intellectual  ferment,  who  run  the  risk  of 
having  all  the  elementary  rules  of  any  established  social  order  utterly 
obliterated  in  our  souls.  Amid  this  atmosphere  of  complete  liberty, 
in  this  chaos  of  confused  ideas,  the  army  intervenes,  giving  our  chil- 
dren the  sense  of  discipline  and  sacrifice  without  which  man  is  an 
incomplete  being.  .  .  .  The  slow  work  of  organization  now  pro- 
ceeding will  be  greatly  furthered  by  the  development  of  Syndicalism." 
It  is  to  be  regretted  that  the  French  Minister  of  War  did  not  develop 
this  idea.  If  he  had  done  so,  it  is  likely  that  he  would  have  ex- 
plained himself  in  language  resembling  that  used  recently  by  Mr. 
Norman  Angell  in  a  series  of  suggestive  articles  on  "  The  Labour 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL   POLITICS     239 

VI 

The  reader  who  has  made  his  way  through  the  somewhat 
obscure  tangle  of  the  foregoing  exposition  of  two  contrasted 
financial  and  economic  organizations  will  perceive  that  he 
has  now  reached  a  clearing  in  the  heart  of  the  subject. 

It  has  been  shown  that,  given  the  utterly  dissimilar 
"  states  of  mind  "  of  Germany  and  of  France,  the  diplomatic 

Unrest,"  published  in  the  Daily  Mail  (May  30,  1912).  He  said  : 
"  The  expression  of  these  new  tendencies  is  not  likely  to  be  revolu- 
tionary. .  .  .  The  revolutionary  who  has  '  arrived  '  is  compelled 
to  realize  that  society  is  an  organism — a  thing  which  is  alive  and 
grows  ;  and  even  if  his  view  is  more  mechanical  than  this  and  he 
regards  its  organization  as  a  machine,  it  is  a  machine  which  has  to  be 
perpetually  in  motion.  Now,  a  machine  which  has  to  be  kept  in 
motion  cannot  be  altered  radically  by  a  rough  blow  here  and  there, 
and  the  alteration  of  one  wheel  alters  others  which  there  was  no  in- 
tention to  touch.  More  and  more,  for  instance,  is  it  the  case  in  any 
great  strike  that  it  is  the  working  classes  which  pay  the  piper.  In 
the  British  coal  strike  it  was  not  the  capitalist  who  suffered  most. 
In  the  French  railroad  strike  it  was  not  the  bourgeoisie  who  was 
most  distressed,  but  the  working  men  in  other  trades  deprived  of 
their  work  in  a  quarrel  which  did  not  directly  concern  them.  A 
'  class  war  '  in  which  your  own  side  in  every  battle  suffers  more 
than  the  enemy  is  one  doomed  to  failure  from  the  start.  As  has 
been  said,  the  general  strike  is  a  very  powerful  weapon — with  which 
to  commit  suicide. 

"  And  the  same  forces  which  doom  the  general  strike  to  failure  doom 
to  failure  also  the  predatory  schemes  of  forcible  confiscation  and 
dispossession  of  which  we  used  to  hear  in  connexion  with  plans  of 
social  reorganization  a  good  deal  more  than  we  do  now.  Wealth  in 
the  modern  world  cannot  be  seized  and  transferred  in  this  simple 
fashion  ;  it  is  not  in  the  nature  of  a  fixed  or  tangible  quantity  at  all ; 
it  is  dependent  upon  the  maintenance  of  certain  functions  ;  stop 
them  and  the  wealth  disappears — there  is  none  to  seize.  And  all 
these  confiscatory  schemes  involve  the  stoppage  of  some  vital  func- 
tion. Those  who  have  some  knowledge  of  the  work  of  the  world — 
its  processes  and  necessary  conditions — know  such  schemes  to  be 
childishly  impracticable.  And  every  day  makes  them  more  so.  ... 
The  permanent  element  of  Syndicalism,  which  means  the  drift  of 
real  power  from  a  large  general  body  possessing  no  special  compe- 
tences, like  Parliament,  to  bodies  like  trade  unions  organized  for 
special  industrial  functions,  will  not  necessarily  be — will  almost 
certainly  not  be  marked  by  revolutionary  processes." 


240  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

methods  and  machinery  of  the  two  Powers  are  bound  to 
be  correspondingly  different.  Cherishing  different  ideals, 
wanting  different  results,  the  two  countries  have  a  different 
mentality.  It  is  not  merely  that  mutual  comprehension  is 
necessarily  hindered  by  the  reciprocal  distrust  due  to  the 
dismemberment  of  France.  Quite  apart  from  their  skele- 
ton in  the  closet  there  exists,  between  modern  Germany 
and  France,  a  lack  of  imaginative  sympathy  due  to  radical 
differences  of  temperament.  Any  successful  diplomatic 
conversation  between  them  presumes,  on  the  part  of  both, 
a  long  preliminary  effort  to  place  themselves  temporarily 
at  a  point  of  view  for  which  no  past  experience  has  prepared 
them.  While  France  is  still,  in  the  conventional  civilized 
way,  loyal  to  the  appeal  of  great  principles,  respectful  of 
accepted  ideals  of  international  law,  and  of  recognized 
notions  of  justice,  and  correspondingly  indifferent  to  the 
purely  material  aspects  of  any  problem,  to  the  concrete  value 
of  the  elements  in  a  diplomatic  bargain,  Germany,  the  great 
modern  parvenu  power,  bereft  of  all  deep-rooted  historical 
traditions,  unrestrained  by  precedent — save  that  of  the 
original  sin  of  Alsace-Lorraine — has  been  able  to  put  her- 
self abreast  of  the  time,  and  adopt  the  methods  best  fitted 
to  a  period  dominated  by  economic  interests.  "  What  has  a 
policy  of  partial  understanding  and  of  business  profit  to  do 
with  the  Treaty  .of  Frankfort  ?  "  said  Herr  von  Kiderlen- 
Waechter,  the  German  Foreign  Minister,  to  a  French  journa- 
list, M.  Georges  Bourdon.1  "  Cannot  France  cherish  her 
hopes  in  her  heart,  without  refusing  to  participate  in  the 
general  life  of  the  time  ;  and,  above  all,  when  economic 
problems  are  paramount,  are  historical  quarrels  (sic)  to  domin- 
ate the  necessary  development  of  nations  ?  "  Many  Germans 
lack  a  sympathetic  imagination,  and  it  is  owing  to  this  lack 
that  German  diplomacy  has  become  almost  exclusively 


Figaro,  August  6,  1912. 


A  STUDY  OF   INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     241 

a  diplomacy  of  mercantile  bargaining.1  Emperor,  Chan- 
cellor, Reichstag,  have  one  and  all  been  forced,  no  doubt, 
in  spite  of  themselves,  to  become  the  spokesmen  of  German 
industrial  and  commercial  interests.  At  the  centenary  of 
the  firm  of  Krupp,  at  Essen,  the  Emperor  William  delivered 
one  of  his  characteristic  speeches. 

"  The  history  of  the  firm,"  he  said,  "  is  a  piece  of  Prussian  and 
German  history.  .  .  .  Krupp  guns  have  been  with  the  Prussian 
lines  and  have  thundered  on  the  battlefields  which  made  ready  the 
way  to  German  unity,  and  won  it  at  last.  .  .  .  Services  rendered 
to  the  Fatherland  in  war  and  peace  have  won  for  this  firm  an  especial 
position  in  my  State,  and  for  three  generations  brought  its  proprie- 
tors and  their  families  into  a  relation  of  friendship  and  confidence 
with  my  ancestors  and  myself." 

Again,  when  in  a  disaster  at  the  Bodium  mines,  scores  of 
men  are  swept  away  by  choke  damp,  the  Emperor  adds  his 
tribute  of  mourning  to  the  expression  of  German  sympathy, 
and  describes  the  miners  as  the  German  "  coal  army  corps." 
The  protection  of  industrial  and  commercial  interests  is  the 
main  motive  of  Germany's  agitated  activity,  her  capricious 
opportunism,  her  frequently  unaccountable  aggressiveness, 
her  Shylockian  insistence  on  the  pound-of-flesh  "  compen- 
sation." England,  for  a  time,  notably  in  the  strenuous 
days  of  the  colonization  of  the  Niger,  seemed  to  be  providing 
Germany  with  an  excellent  precedent  for  the  employment 
of  certain  forms  of  national  insolence.  But  the  British 
principle  that  "  business  is  business  "  has  never,  even  in 
England,  been  allowed  to  become  the  sole  principle  of 
diplomatic  action;  whereas  competence  in  international 
business  has  become  for  Germany  the  unique  qualification 
of  her  foreign  agents.  Nothing  is  more  characteristic 
of  modern  Germany  than  the  career  at  Constantinople  of 
a  Marschall  von  Bieberstein,  and  the  sole  object  of  that 
ambassador's  transfer  to  London  was  to  "do  business  " 

1  There  are  occasional  exceptions.  Cf.  the  utterances  of  Prince 
Lichnowsky  cited  on  p.  258. 


242  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

with  a  people  whose  business  education,  excellent  as  it  is 
— and  superior  as  it  has  been  to  that  of  the  French — has 
never  been  systematically  enough  applied  to  diplomacy  to 
justify  the  hope  of  success — for  British  interests — in  any 
Anglo-German  negotiation.  France,  at  last,  has  learned 
the  lesson  of  the  spectacle  of  Germany's  agitation  :  she  has 
"  found  Germany  out,"  although  she  has  had  to  pay  dear 
for  the  finding.  When  the  French  senator,  M.  Pierre  Baudin, 
was  called  on  to  draw  up  the  report  of  the  Senatorial  Com- 
mittee on  the  Franco-German  Agreement  of  November  4 
1911,  he  pointed  the  moral  of  the  long  tension  between  the 
two  countries  as  follows  : — 

"  The  Germans,"  he  said,  "  are  accustomed  to  seeing  their  diplo- 
macy act  the  part  of  permanent  agent  of  the  national  industry.  This 
is  the  kind  of  aid  they  expect  of  their  diplomacy.  They  look  to  it 
not  only  for  the  discovery  of  business  opportunities,  not  only  to  begin 
negotiations,  but  also  for  such  unflinching  protection  as  shall  exer- 
cise pressure  on  all  rivals,  and  feel  no  hesitation  at  the  idea  of  con- 
ferring a  privilege.  French  traditions  and  ntoeurs  are  altogether 
different.  They  have,  unfortunately,1  removed  us  for  too  long  a 
period  from  the  great  economic  struggles  that  are  nowTgoing  on 
throughout  the  world." 

French  traditions  and  moeurs  are,  no  doubt,  undergoing  a 
change.  They  are  harmonizing  to-day  with  the  general 
current  of  things.  But  M.  Pierre  Baudin  would  like  to  see 
French  diplomatists  less  timid,  less  discreet,  and,  in  a  word, 
better  informed,  smarter  business-men. 

The  history  of  the  relations  between  France  and  Germany 
during  the  last  three  years  perfectly  illustrates  the  truth  so 
clearly  enunciated  by  M.  Pierre  Baudin,  and  should  be 
studied  in  detail  by  the  public  men  of  every  country.  That 
history,  moreover,  is  an  admirable  instance  of  the  fact  that 
behind  the  fagade  of  Government  financial  considerations 
are  determining,  with  increasing  frequency  and  power,  the 
policies  of  States.  In  January  1912  a  Prime  Minister  of 

1  This,  as  has  been  seen  (pp.  235-238),  is  a  debatable  point, 


243 

France,  M.  Caillaux,  was  hunted  out  of  office  and  exposed  to 
obloquy,  for  more  reasons  than  one ;  but  one  of  these  reasons 
was  that  he  had  ventured  to  interpret  to  the  letter  the 
Agreement  which  a  preceding  minister,  M.  Pichon,  had  made 
in  1909  with  Germany.  By  that  Agreement,  Germany 
for  the  first  time  acknowledged  the  preponderance  of  French 
political  rights  in  Morocco ;  but  in  the  spirit  of  the  do  ut  des — 
the  donnant,  donnant,  "  business  is  business,"  principle  of 
modern  diplomatic  bargaining — she  demanded  an  equiva- 
lent. France  promised  to  co-operate  with  her  in  Morocco, 
frankly  and  consecutively,  in  purely  economic  matters.1 
Unfortunately,  however,  there  are  no  such  things  in 
the  modern  world  as  "  purely  economic "  matters. 
Economic  preponderance,  when  long  assured,  inevitably 
takes  the  shape  of  political  domination,  and  the  French  nego- 
tiators of  the  Franco-German  Agreement  of  1909  ignored 
this  fact,  and  forged,  thereby,  the  first  link  of  a  chain  of 
consequences  which  was  sure  to  bind  them  in  the  end  to 
the  car  of  German  hegemony.  The  former  Prime  Minister 
of  France,  M.  Raymond  Poincare,  who,  as  first  reporter 
of  the  Senate  Committee  on  the  Franco-German  Agree- 
ment of  1911,  had  had  'access  before  taking  office  to  all 
the  documents  concerning  the  efforts  of  successive  French 
Ministers  to  apply  the  Agreement  of  1909,  declared  frankly 
in  the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  on  March  15, 1912,  that  "  France 
in  1909,  in  1910,  and  in  1911,  honestly  endeavoured  to 
carry  out  the  Agreement  of  1909  "  ;  but,  he  went  on,  "  elle 
s'est  heurtee  a  des  obstacles  multiples  .  .  .  ei  lorsqu'on 
a  tente  d'elargir  V application  de  cette  entente  economique  et  de 
I'etendre  au  reste  de  I'Afrique,  .  .  .  on  a  rencontre  tantdt 
des  complications  financieres  imprevues,  tantdt  des  oppo- 
sitions parlementaires  inevitables." 

If  the  Agreement  of  1909  had  been  loyally  observed  dur- 

1  Textually,  the  two  Governments  declared  "  qu'ils  chercheraient 
a  associer  leurs  nationaux  dans  les  affaires  dont  ceux-ci  pourraient 
obtenir  Venterprise." 


244  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

ing  a  period  of  five  years  the  Triple  Entente  would  have  been 
shattered,  and  shattered  against  the  will  of  three  nations. 
England  would  have  been  betrayed — unintentionally — by 
France,  and  isolated  in  Europe,  while  Germany  would  finally 
have  realized  her  dream  of  achieving  a  predominance  that 
should  neutralize  the  results  of  French  and  English  policy 
during  the  last  ten  years  :  the  restoration  of  the  balance  of 
power  in  Europe.  The  method  of  solving  the  Moroccan 
difficulty  adopted,  in  1909,  by  the  French  Foreign  Office,  was  a 
method  involving  political  consequences  which  neither 
France  nor  England  perceived  at  the  time  (see  Speech  of 
M.  Pichon,  February  8,  1912).  The  Agreement  of  1909  had 
seemed  an  effective  device  for  neutralizing  German  political 
hostility,  and  only  a  few  perspicacious  observers  saw  in 
it  a  first  successful  move  on  the  part  of  Germany  to 
fulfil,  by  a  round-about,  but  effective,  method,  her  fixed 
purpose  of  destroying  the  Entente  between  France  and 
England,  and  the  economic  subjection  of  both  peoples. 
England  acquiesced  without  apparent  apprehension  in  an 
Agreement  which  seemed  to  make  solely  for  the  peace  of 
Europe,  and  France  proceeded  loyally  to  carry  out  that 
Agreement,  to  the  letter,  as  well  as  in  the  spirit.  The  con- 
sequences of  France's  loyal  action  are  full  of  suggestion. 
Franco-German  economic  co-operation  became  the  chief 
preoccupation  of  the  Quai  d'Orsay,  not  merely  in  Morocco, 
but  also  in  Central  Africa  and  the  Middle  East.  Inter- 
national trusts  for  the  working  of  Moroccan  mines,  and 
for  the  building  of  public  works  in  Morocco,  were  negotiated 
in  conditions  conforming  with  the  spirit  of  the  Agreement 
of  1909,  but  singularly  disadvantageous  to  the  interests  of 
the  Powers  who  were  not  partners  to  that  Agreement.  In 
the  same  blind  spirit  of  good  faith,  successive  French 
Ministers  for  Foreign  Affairs  proposed  to  extend  the  applica- 
tion of  the  new  entente  policy  with  Germany  to  regions 
beyond  the  limits  of  Morocco.  In  July  1909  M.  Pichon, 
acting,  as  he  believed,  in  the  interests  of  European  peace, 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     245 

yet  supposing  himself  to  be  still  following  the  main  lines  of 
French  foreign  policy,  suggested  to  the  great  French  colonial 
company  of  Ngoko-Sangha  the  advisability  of  a  consortium 
with  the  German  Company  of  the  Southern  Cameroons  for 
the  common  development  of  the  frontier  region.  The 
French  Company  accepted,  and  negotiations  were  begun. 
They  were  formally  concluded  some  eighteen  months  later 
in  M.  Pichon's  private  room  at  the  Quai  d'Orsay,  in  presence 
of  the  German  Ambassador  and  of  high  officials  of  the 
French  Colonial  Office.  About  two  months  afterwards  the 
Briand-Pichon  Government  fell  without  having  submitted 
this  project  to  Parliamentary  ratification.  The  Government 
that  succeeded,  that  of  M.  Monis,  refused  to  adopt  the 
plan  of  a  consortium  of  French  and  German  Companies  ; 
and  in  response  to  the  natural  protests  of  the  German 
Government,  the  French  Prime  Minister  sought  to  tranquillize 
German  susceptibilities  by  casting  about  for  a  fresh  scheme 
of  Franco-German  co-operation.  The  "  fresh  scheme " 
was  soon  found.  Early  in  the  summer  of  1910,  French 
and  German  financiers,  acting  on  behalf  of  French  and  Ger- 
man ministers,  began  the  friendly  discussion  of  a  project  for 
the  construction  of  a  railway  traversing  the  territories  of  the 
German  Cameroons  and  of  the  French  Congo,  and  having 
its  terminus  on  German  soil.  The  scheme,  as  presented  to 
the  French  Foreign  Minister,  M.  Cruppi,  by  the  French  Min- 
ister of  Finance  and  the  French  Minister  of  the  Colonies, 
MM.  Caillaux  and  Messimy,  would  inevitably  have  laid  open 
to  the  political  influence,  and  no  doubt  to  the  political  pre- 
ponderance, of  Germany,  the  basins  of  the  Sangha,  the  Uban- 
gui  and  the  Chan. 

A  new  Government,  that  of  M.  Caillaux,  succeeded, 
and  M.  Cruppi  remained  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs. 
M.  Cruppi  rejected  the  project,  and,  at  the  same  time, 
without  asking  the  permission  of  Germany — who,  it 
must  be  borne  in  mind,  had  repudiated,  by  the  Agreement 
of  1909,  all  claim  to  political  rights  on  Moroccan  territory 


246  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

— induced  the  Government  of  which  he  was  a  member  to 
send  an  expedition  to  Fez.  The  German  Government, 
which  had  thus  witnessed  the  failure  of  each  successive 
project  for  economic  and  commercial  co-operation  with 
France,  concluded  that  such  co-operation  could  be  best 
secured  by  more  active  measures,  and  sent  to  Agadir  the 
gunboat  Panther.  When  France  finally  asked  her  what 
she  meant  by  this  act,  she  replied  :  Compensations  ;  and 
thereupon  began  the  international  tension  of  the  summer 
of  1911,  the  tragic  weeks  when  the  dogs  of  war  were  heard 
baying  in  all  the  kennels  of  Europe.  Out  of  this  period 
of  tension  was  to  come  the  Franco-German  Treaty  of  Novem- 
ber 4,  1911.  France,  by  that  diplomatic  instrument,  in 
return  for  a  virtual  protectorate  of  Morocco,  ceded  to  Ger- 
many vast  regions  of  the  Congo,  regions  which,  but  for  the 
consequences  of  the  misguided  arrangement  of  1909,  she  need 
never  have  given  up.  In  other  words,  M.  Caillaux  was 
hounded  from  office  partially  for  reasons  which  those  who 
approved  of  the  agreement  of  1909  were  logically  bound 
to  repudiate.1  The  incident  shows  that  the  qualifications 

1  See  Le  Mystere  d' Agadir,  by  M.  Andre  Tardieu,  pp. 72-73,  etpassim. 
Every  page  of  this  remarkable  book,  by  one  of  the  sanest  and  most 
perspicacious  students  of  politics  and  diplomacy  of  the  present  day, 
confirms  the  author's  view  that  the  Agreement  of  1909 — in  facilita- 
ting the  realization  of  German  economic  Imperialism  to  the  detri- 
ment of  the  legitimate  ambitions  of  the  other  signatories  of  the  Act 
of  Algeciras,  and  to  the  virtual  nullification  of  the  French  claims  to 
positive  predominance  in  Morocco — was  an  incredible  blunder  on  the 
part  of  the  Quai  d'Orsay.  When  M.  Jules  Cambon  and  Baron  de 
Schoen  signed  that  Agreement,  they  signed  at  the  same  time  the 
potential  death-warrant  of  the  Triple  Entente ;  they  dug  a  mine 
and  filled  it  with  explosives  under  the  sole  diplomatic  instrument — 
the  Act  of  Algeciras — guaranteeing,  at  the  time,  French  political 
supremacy  in  North- West  Africa ;  and  not  a  day  passed  between 
1909  and  the  arrival  of  the  Panther  at  Agadir,  without  aggravating 
the  consequences  of  the  mistake  of  the  French  Foreign  Office.  In 
this  connexion  it  is  noteworthy  that  M.  Andre  Tardieu,  whose  in- 
fluence, as  Foreign  Editor  of  the  Tetnps,  was  not  foreign  to  the  fall 
of  M.  Pichon,  was  one  of  the  most  efficient  coadjutors  of  the  policy 


A  STUDY  OF   INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     24? 

required  of  the  modern  diplomatist  are  no  longer  what 
they  were  even  at  the  time  of  the  Congress  of  Berlin.  It 
shows  that  economic  problems  are  coming  to  be  the  domin- 
ant themes  in  diplomatic  conversations,  and  that  the 
modern  successors  of  Richelieu  and  Bismarck  will  probably 
learn  more  by  studying  the  career  of  a  Colbert  and  a  Pier- 
pont  Morgan  than  from  perusal  of  Le  Testament  Politique, 
or  even  of  the  Busch  Memoirs. 

VII 

There  can  be  no  doubt  that  social  questions,  economic 
questions,  financial  questions,  are  henceforth  to  occupy 
the  attention  of  States  to  the  gradual  exclusion  of  political 
preoccupations.  It  is  not  merely  German  diplomacy  which 
is  becoming  more  and  more  what  the  French  senator  M. 
Pierre  Baudin  has  called  une  diplomatic  de  negoce,  and  what 
Washington  designates  as  "  dollar  diplomacy."  It  is  not 
only  in  Germany  that  behind  the  Government,  hemming 
it  in,  besieging  it,  there  is  an  army  of  business  men,  of  metal- 
lurgists, of  mine  owners,  and  that  there  are  vast  popula- 


explicitly  formulated  in  the  Agreement  of  1909  ;  but  that  to  attack 
him,  as  he  has  been  attacked,  for  loyally  undertaking  to  facilitate  the 
application  of  that  Agreement,  is  an  absurd  injustice.  He  does 
not  appear  to  have  understood,  in  1909,  nor  yet  in  1910 — any  more 
than  Downing  Street  or  the  Quai  d'Orsay  understood — that  Germany, 
in  inducing  France  to  sign  the  Agreement  of  1909,  had  laid  a  trap 
for  the  Dual  Entente,  and  that  the  logical  consequences  of  the 
economic  co-operation,  reciprocally  accepted  by  France  and  Germany, 
would  be  to  thwart  that  very  ideal  of  "  European  Equilibrium  " 
which  he  himself  has  done  more  than  any  other  French  journalist 
to  foster.  It  should  be  added  that  the  services  rendered  to  European 
peace  during  the  last  ten  years  by  the  untiring  energy,  the  remark- 
able lucidity  and  the  argumentative  resource,  with  which  this  great 
journalist  has  daily  forced  his  compatriots  to  face  the  realities  of  the 
European  situation,  are  of  incomparable  value.  During  the  period 
in  question,  not  even  any  French  statesman,  with  the  single  excep- 
tions of  M.  Delcasse  and  M.  Poincare,  has  played  so  interesting,  so 
intelligent,  and  so  original,  a  part. 


248  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

tions  of  working-men  or  farmers  whose  claims  determine,  to 
a  large  degree,  the  world-policy  of  this  or  that  Power.  The 
same  evolution  is  taking  place  throughout  the  world,  and  a 
people  which  fails  to  recognize  the  growing  importance  of 
financial,  commercial  and  industrial  interests  in  international 
relations  is  fated  to  be  left  behind  in  the  international  race. 
The  first  obligation  of  the  modern  diplomatist  is  to  acquaint 
himself  with  the  economic  facts,  determining  the  political 
aspirations  and  the  social  organization  of  the  country  to 
which  he  is  accredited.  For  the  eloquent  idioms  and 
generalizing  formulas  of  the  old  diplomacy  is  substituted 
today  the  precise  language  of  the  counting-room.  A  diplo- 
matic instrument  is  no  longer  read  in  its  spirit,  it  is  scru- 
tinized to  the  letter.  Woe  to  the  partner  to  an  agreement 
who  has  forgotten  to  define,  with  legal  definiteness,  the 
possible  points  which  the  shifting  course  of  events  may 
raise  in  the  interpretation  of  the  Treaty  !  Thus  the  numer- 
ous germs  of  conflict  latent  in  the  Franco-German  Treaty 
of  1911  are  due  to  the  fact  that  French  Foreign  Office  nego- 
tiators have  not  yet  completely  assimilated  the  business 
methods  that  prevail  at  the  Wilhelmstrasse.  They  con- 
tinue to  follow  the  French  habit  of  securing  the  recognition 
by  their  opponents  of  the  general  principles  that  are  re- 
garded as  essential,  and  in  neglecting  the  material  and  con- 
crete application  of  those  principles.  In  the  Treaty  just 
mentioned,  it  would  be  possible  to  point  out  half  a  dozen 
instances  of  ambiguities  or  omissions  calculated  to  en- 
danger the  peace  of  Europe.  But  this  Treaty  has  been 
cited  solely  as  a  typical  modern  case.  From  the  point  of 
view  of  the  science  of  international  relations,  the  Franco- 
German  negotiations  of  1911  are  one  with  the  Trans-Iran- 
ian projects  of  the  Triple  Entente,  one  with  the  still  uncon- 
cluded  negotiations  respecting  the  construction  of  the  Bagh- 
dad Railway,  one  with  the  Italian  expedition  to  Tripoli, 
and  one  with  the  problem  of  a  Servian  outlet  to  the  sea  ; 
behind  the  fa9ade  of  Government,  financial  considerations, 


A  STUDY  OF   INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     249 

with  increasing  frequency  and   force,  are  determining  the 
policies  of  States. 

Signor  Guglielmo  Ferrero  has  pointed  out  that  "  if  Turkey 
has  lost  Tripoli,  it  is  because  the  bellicose  enthusiasm  of 
a  new  nationalistic  Italy  has  forced  the  hand  of  the  Govern- 
ment." The  rapid  rise  and  the  effective  activity  of  the 
young  Italian  nationalists  is  one  of  the  most  interesting 
socio-political  phenomena  of  our  time.  But,  behind  this 
remarkable  movement,  a  curious  series  of  invisible  financial 
causes  prepared  Italian  public  opinion  for  the  conquest  of 
the  ancient  Roman  province  of  Libya.  The  story,  as  told 
by  an  excellent  authority,  M.  Pinon,1  shows  how  readily 
the  flexible  Italian  soul,  delighting  in  combinazioni,  suc- 
ceeds in  reconciling  the  most  reciprocally  contrary  senti- 
ments when  "  interest  "  is  paramount. 

"  At  the  beginning  of  the  reign  of  Leo  XIII,  the  Banco  di  Roma 
was  a  financial  house  of  relatively  slight  importance,  established  by 
private  individuals.  Its  manager,  Ernesto  Pacelli,  succeeded  in 
winning  the  confidence  of  the  Pope's  entourage,  and  Leo  XIII 
entrusted  to  him  the  funds  of  the  Holy  See.  The  addition  of  this 
new  capital  made  it  possible  for  the  Banco  di  Roma  to  develop  its 
business.  But  its  relations  with  the  Vatican  prevented  it  from 
penetrating  into  the  business  world  connected  with  the  Quirinal, 
and  notably  to  get  its  bills  discounted  by  the  Bank  of  Italy.  Eager 
to  force  that  door,  the  Banco  di  Roma  sought  advice  in  Government 
circles.  The  President  of  its  Board  of  Directors  was  the  President 
of  the  Chamber  of  Commerce,  brother  of  the  then  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  Signor  Tittoni.  It  was  the  period  when  the  Italian  Govern- 
ment was  signing  with  M.  Delcasse  the  Agreements  declaring  that 
France  repudiated  her  interests  in  the  Tripolitaine  and  that  Italy 
repudiated  hers  in  Morocco  (1902).  The  Italian  Government  wished 
to  secure  in  the  Tripolitaine  economic  interests,  which  would  permit 
it  to  develop  Italian  industry  and  commerce  there,  which  would 
virtually  amount  to  securing  a  mortgage  on  the  province,  and  might, 
were  the  case  ever  to  arise,  provide  an  opportunity  for  armed  inter- 
vention. The  Banco  di  Roma  secured  the  coveted  business  con- 
nexion with  the  Bank  of  Italy,  promising  in  return  to  participate 


1  See  "  L' Europe  et  la  Guerre  Italo-Turque,"  by  Rene  Pinon,  the 
Revue  des  deux  Mondes,  June  i,  1912. 


250  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

in  Italian  enterprises  in  the  Tripolitaine  and  in  Cyrenaica.  A  whole 
series  of  undertakings  and  ventures  were  then  founded  in  Tripoli 
and  along  the  coast,  with  the  capital,  and  under  the  direction  of  an 
agent  of  the  Banco  di  Roma,  Signer  Bresciani,  an  ex-official  in 
Erythrea :  oil  industries,  soap  manufactures,  grain  elevators, 
fisheries,  the  sponge  trade,  the  purchase  of  land,  electric  works  at 
Benghazi,  a  shipping  line  subventioned  by  the  Government,  and 
possessing  at  present  four  steamers.  Missions  were  sent  inland  to 
enter  into  relations  with  the  influential  chiefs  and  marabouts.  The 
Banco  di  Roma  increased  its  capital  to  80,000,000  francs,  and  recently 
augmented  it  still  further.  Notwithstanding  these  efforts  trade 
remained  stagnant ;  business  did  not  develop ;  the  capital  ex- 
pended remained  unproductive ;  the  financial  obligations  became 
more  and  more  serious.  The  Ottoman  officials  put  all  kinds  of 
obstacles  in  the  way  of  the  economic  development  of  the  province, 
seeking  particularly  to  thwart  the  Italian  ventures  ;  at  Benghazi, 
for  instance,  the  electric  power  works,  for  the  lighting  of  the  town, 
were  not  authorized.  The  Banco  di  Roma,  having  engaged  a  con- 
siderable capital  in  Africa,  in  the  interest  and  almost  at  the  sugges- 
tion of  the  Government,  with  the  assurance  that  one  day  the  Tri- 
politaine and  Cyrenaica  would  pass  under  Italian  domination,  and 
that  the  expectations  of  the  shareholders  would  eventually  be 
recompensed,  found  itself,  it  is  said,  in  difficulties.  Last  year,  its 
manager  informed  the  Government  that  he  was  on  the  point  of  being 
driven  to  a  liquidation  of  his  interests  in  the  Tripolitaine,  and  that 
he  was  preparing  to  enter  upon  pourparlers  with  an  English  group 
and  a  German  group.  It  would  appear  that  this  prospect  greatly 
contributed  to  the  determination  of  the  Government  to  intervene, 
if  necessary,  by  arms.  Once  hostilities  begun,  the  Banco  di  Roma 
obtained  the  contract  for  the  commisariat  operations  and  the  clothing 
of  the  troops  of  the  expeditionary  corps.  It  remains  associated 
with  the  Government  for  the  development  of  Italian  interests  in  the 
Tripolitaine.  Thus,  the  Bank  which  has  the  confidence  of  the  Vatican 
happens,  at  the  same  time,  to  be  the  first  and  foremost  promoter 
of  Italian  enterprises  in  the  Tripolitaine  :  an  elegant  combinazione, 
uniting,  for  a  work  of  Italian  expansion  and  Christian  propaganda, 
the  two  historic  forces  in  Rome  which  officially  ignore  each  other 
and  mutually  combat  one  another." 


An  elegant  combinazione,  indeed !  And  what  more 
conclusive  illustration  of  the  modern  craving  for  a 
happy  mixture  of  idealism  and  of  economic  well-being  ? 

Perhaps  if  any  could  be  had  it  would  be  found  in  the 
case  of  Servia's  long  struggle  for  economic  emancipation. 


25* 

Up  to  1905  this  little  nation  of  farmers  and  stock-breeders 
(in  1912,  Servian  exports  amounted  to  about  one  hundred 
million  francs,  out  of  which  62  per  cent,  was  represented  by 
the  products  of  the  soil,  and  20  per  cent,  by  cattle  and 
pork),  remained  in  economic  subjection  to  Austria.    Austria's 
dream  was  to  annex  Servia  to  her  great  composite  Empire. 
Whenever  Servia  displayed  signs  of  political  independence, 
Austria,  who  all  but  monopolized  Servian  exports,  began 
the  economic  blackmailing  of  her  emprisoned  neighbour  by 
closing  her  markets  to  Servian  pork  and  beef.    A  Servian 
statesman,  M.  Paschitch,  resolved  to  put  an  end  to  these 
humiliations.     In  1906  he  proposed  a  customs  union  between 
the  three  Slav  states  of  the  Balkans  ;   he  thus  took  the  first 
step  for  the  formation  of  that  Balkan  Confederation  which 
six  years  later  was  to  astonish  the  world.     Servian  live-stock 
was  partially  diverted  from  the  old  Austrian  routes,  and 
transported  by  the  Danube,  the  Ludwigs-Canal  and  the 
Main  to  German  markets.     A  second  outlet  for  Servian 
products  was  procured  at  Varna  by  means  of  concessions 
accorded  on  the  Bulgarian  railways.     A  favourable  treaty 
of  commerce  was  arranged  with  France.     Little  by  little 
the  old  trade-current  through  Bosnia  and  to  the  Dalmatian 
coast  was  diminished  and  Servia  was  now  selling  her  pork 
and  cereals,  without  the  Austrian  middleman,  through  the 
channel  of  the  Black  Sea  ports  and  Salonica,  in  all  the 
Mediterranean  ports,  from  Syria  by  way  of  Egypt  to  Italy. 
The  need  of  direct  communication  between  the  Danube 
and  the  Adriatic  became  steadily  more  obvious,  and  Servian 
claims  to  economic  autonomy,  the  only  form  of  independence 
which  in  the  modern  world  is  the  sign  of  political  autonomy, 
became  more  and  more  legitimate.     Austrian  imports  fell 
from  60  per  cent,  to  35  per  cent.    Then  came  the  war  of 
1912.    Within  only  a  few  days  after  the  opening  of  hostilities, 
Austria  beheld  the  Servian  troops  in  possession  of  Uskub, 
of  old  Servia,  of  a  large  portion  of  the  Sandjak  of  Novi-Bazar, 
and  rapidly  making  for  the  Adriatic  coast-line.     A  national 


252  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

policy  of  more  than  thirty  years  was  thereby  suddenly  stul- 
tified. Servia  had  burst  her  bounds,  and  was  no  longer  the 
ward  of  the  Dual  Monarchy.  In  an  adroit  appeal  addressed 
to  English  sympathy,  through  The  Times  (November  24, 
1912),  the  Servian  Prime  Minister,  M.  Paschitch,  explained 
that  independence  of  trade  and  economic  liberty  were  not 
only  necessary  for  Servia' s  development,  and  even  for  her 
existence,  but  also  advantageous  to  the  world  ;  an  Adriatic 
outlet,  he  argued,  would  give  Servia  new  neighbours, 
"  since  every  maritime  nation  would  then  be  Servia' s  neigh- 
bour as  much  as  Austria  is  to-day."  Servia  was  particularly 
happy  at  the  thought  that  she  was  thus  to  secure  direct 
contact  with  England,  and  to  live  henceforth  in  close  rela- 
tions with  the  nations  of  the  West. 

It  is  obvious  at  last  that  the  general  desire  for  reform,  and 
the  outburst  of  nationalism,  on  the  one  hand,  and,  on  the 
other,  the  positive  recognition  of  the  fact  that  money  is 
to-day  the  chief  instrument  of  rapid  and  successful  action, 
are  merely  different  aspects  of  the  same  state  of  mind. 


BOOK    IV 


BOOK    IV 


THE  precarious  settlement  of  the  seven  years'  Moroccan 
quarrel  between  France  and  Germany  was  an  humilia- 
tion for  the  latter  Power,  and  not  merely  because  she  failed 
to  secure  a  naval  basis  on  the  Atlantic  coast  of  Morocco  and 
a  free  hand  to  delve  in  the  mineral  riches  of  that  region.  The 
episode,  above  all,  revealed  to  the  world  Germany's  inability 
to  sunder  England,  France  and  Russia,  and  also  the  un- 
stable equilibrium  of  her  own  financial  and  economic  re- 
sources. The  existing  lame  solution  of  the  Moroccan  difficulty 
provisionally  settled  only  one  of  the  differences  between 
France  and  Germany.  The  Great  Misunderstanding  re- 
mained more  acute  than  ever.  The  German  people  at  last 
clearly  perceive  the  inconvenient  consequences  of  the  ill- 
advised  foreign  policy  of  their  rulers  :  a  resuscitated  France, 
throbbing  with  optimism  and  potentially  belligerent ; 1 
a  British  Empire,  which — after  a  period  in  which  the  Colonies 
seemed  to  be  breaking  away  from  England,  like  so  much  Im- 
perial star-dust  bent  on  parabolic  careers  of  their  own — is 
now  re-forming,  in  centripetal  spiral  movements,  under  the 
astonished  eyes  of  the  world  ; 2  an  Entente  Cordiale  between 
the  new  British  Imperial  System  and  the  Dual  Alliance ; 

1  "  II  n'a  pas  dependu  de  nous  de  conserver  la  paix  aux  autres. 
Pour  nous  la  conserver  toujours  a  nous-memes,  il  faut  garder  en 
nous  toute  la  patience,  toute  I'e'nergie,  toute  la  fierte",  d'un  peuple  qui 
ne  veut  pas  la  guerre  et  qui  pourtant  ne  la  craint  pas." — Speech  of  the 
French  Prime  Minister,  M.  Poincare,  at  Nantes,  October  27,  1912. 
Cf.  also  Note,  p.  172. 

3  Even  the  native  rulers  of  the  Dependencies  are  feeling  the 
thrill  of  Imperialism.  In  November,  1912,  the  Federated  Malay 

865 


256  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

a  Dual  Alliance  between  France  and  Russia,  closer  knit  than 
ever  by  definite  engagements  that  are  bound  to  upset  the 
whole  balance  of  power  in  the  Baltic,  the  North  Sea,  and 
eventually  in  the  Mediterranean  ;  and  a  Far  East,  which, 
owing  to  the  Russo-Japanese  precautions  for  the  monopoly 
of  vast  tracts  of  China,  is  becoming  more  rapidly  closed  to 
German  political  expansion  than  ever  Africa  was  closed  to 
such  expansion  by  the  shortsightedness  of  Bismarck. 

These  events  and  tendencies — of  which  the  list  might 
have  been  much  enlarged — are  the  evident  logical  conse- 
quence of  Germany's  anti-German  foreign  policy  during 
the  last  seven  years,  and  some  are  the  direct  result  of  the 
latest  of  her  blunders,  the  despatch  of  the  Panther  to  Agadir. 

It  was  inconceivable  that  she  should  not  have  learned  the 
lesson  temporarily ;  yet  the  German  Emperor,  sceptical  as 
to  the  perspicacity  of  his  people,  recently  reminded  them 
that  pan-Germanism  is  not  a  panacea  for  the  revival  of 
German  prestige.  The  confession  was  a  courageous  act  of 
political  wisdom.  But  calculated,  as  it  would  have  seemed, 
to  point  the  full  moral  of  a  sequence  of  German  blunders, 
William  II  evidently  regarded  it  as  utterly  inadequate. 
Early  in  July,  1912,  a  few  days  only  after  the  Russian 
Duma  had  voted  grants  for  the  construction  of  four  "  Dread- 
noughts "  of  30,000  tons,  four  ironclad  cruisers,  eighteen 
torpedo  boats,  and  twelve  submarines,  as  "  the  necessary 
guarantee  of  the  national  dignity  and  security  "  (words  of 
Mr.  Kokovtzof,  June  19)  which  had  been  endangered  at 

States  presented  to  the  British  Government  a  first-class  armoured 
ship.  On  December  5,  1912,  Canada  offered  three  Dreadnoughts 
to  the  British  Navy,  and  at  one  o'clock  in  the  morning  of  February 
14,  1913,  amid  scenes  of  great  enthusiasm,  the  Borden  Naval  Bill, 
providing  for  the  application  of  a  sum  of  $35,000,000,  "  for  the 
purpose  of  immediately  increasing  the  effective  naval  forces  of  the 
Empire,"  was  passed  by  115  votes  to  83.  South  Africa  will  shortly 
come  into  line  with  Canada,  New  Zealand  and  Australia,  and  contri- 
bute its  quota  of  ships  to  the  strength  of  the  British  Navy.  A 
Defence  Conference  at  Vancouver  in  1913  will  register  results  un- 
dreamed of  before  Agadir. 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL   POLITICS     257 

Tsushima,  the  German  Emperor  met  the  Tsar  at  Port- 
Baltic,  and  when  the  two  sovereigns  parted  the  following 
authorised  statement  was  given  out : — 

The  political  conversations,  which  extended  to  all  questions  of 
the  day,  strengthened  on  both  sides  the  conviction  that  it  still 
remains  of  the  highest  importance  for  the  interests  of  the  two  neigh- 
bour Empires  and  of  the  general  peace  to  maintain  the  mutual 
contact,  based  upon  reciprocal  confidence.  There  could  be  no 
question  either  of  new  agreements,  because  there  was  no  particular 
occasion  for  them,  or  of  producing  alterations  of  any  kind  in  the 
grouping  of  the  European  Powers,  the  value  of  which  for  the  main- 
tenance of  equilibrium  and  of  peace  has  already  been  proved. 

Nicholas  II  thus  became  answerable  before  the  world  for 
the  sincerity  of  William  II's  pacific  intentions,  but  for  this 
service  he  demanded  a  compensation.  He  forced  William  II 
to  declare  to  the  world,  and  to  his  own  people,  that  the 
policy  of  the  Triple  Entente,  which  Germany  had  untiringly 
attacked,  was  a  policy  that  had  restored  the  balance  of 
power  in  Europe  and  that  made  for  peace.  Germany's  atti- 
tude at  Port  Baltic  was  either  the  mea  culpa  of  a  prodi- 
giously disinterested  European  patriotism  or  an  ingenious 
device  for  gaining  time,  in  order  to  begin  again,  at  a  more 
favourable  moment,  the  old  German  policy  of  intimidation. 
In  either  case  it  was  the  direct  result  of  forces  actively  at 
work  during  the  previous  years,  of  which  Agadir  may  be 
taken  as  the  supreme  symbol.  Port-Baltic  was  the  reverse 
of  the  medal  of  Agadir.  Germany's  decision  to  be  prudent, 
or,  at  all  events  to  play  a  mystifyingly  prudent  game  and  to 
adopt  a  franker  idiom — to  speak  English  and  French  instead 
of  German  x — had  been  foreshadowed  by  the  despatch  to 

1  "  Odo  gave  some  curious  details  of  the  interview  between 
Bismarck  and  Thiers.  The  eventful  one  which  terminated  in  the 
signature  of  the  treaty  lasted  nearly  eight  hours.  The  old  French- 
man's volubility  began  to  wear  the  Chancellor's  patience,  and, 
after  many  hours,  he  said  :  '  You  talk  a  language  I  cannot  follow, 
and  reply  to,  as  you  do.  I  will  answer  you  in  my  own  ' — well 
knowing  that  Thiers  did  not  understand '^German.  Thereupon  en- 
sued a  Babylonia  of  jabber,  Bismarck  using  very  strong  language  in 

3 


258  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

London  of  one  of  her  ablest  statesmen,  Baron  Marschall  von 
Bieberstein.  The  business  methods  of  that  distinguished 
negotiator  had  immensely  advanced  his  country's  interest  at 
Constantinople.  The  issue  of  the  Franco-German  colloquy 
of  1911,  and  the  events  which  Agadir  precipitated  in  Europe, 
appreciably  limited  the  potential  range  of  his  activity. 
What  took  place  in  Europe  during  1912,  and  notably  the 
declarations  of  his  intelligent  master  at  Hamburg  and  Port- 
Baltic,  rendered  the  role  of  this  German  ambassador  in 
London  one  which  was  bound  to  be  rather  that  of  a  consular 
than  of  a  diplomatic  agent.  While  he  was  biding  his  time 
and  laying  his  plans,  Baron  Marschall  suddenly  died  (Sep- 
tember 24,  1912).  Less  than  a  month  later,  simultane- 
ously with  the  conclusion  of  peace  between  Turkey  and 
Italy,  and  with  the  outbreak  of  war  between  Turkey  and 
the  Balkan  States,  Prince  Charles  Max  Lichnowsky  was 
appointed  his  successor.  In  the  Deutsche  Revue,  three 
months  before,  when  the  Balkan  Day  of  Judgment  still 
seemed  remote,  Prince  Lichnowsky  had  frankly  declared 
his  conviction,  that  "  no  diplomatic  artifice  could  possibly 
destroy  the  friendship  between  France  and  England." 
He  added  :  "  We  Germans  must  accept  the  new  conditions 
of  existence  created  in  Europe  by  the  alliances  and  ententes, 
alliances  and  ententes  in  which  we  have  not  participated, 
and  which  have  constantly  been  formed,  if  not  against  us, 
at  all  events  independently  of  us."  The  confession  of  Port- 
Baltic  would  seem  to  have  been  the  echo  of  the  prudent 
and  reasonable  declarations  of  the  future  German  am- 
bassador in  London.  But,  in  spite  of  these  declarations — 
and  even  if  the  war  in  the  Balkans  had  not  exposed  the 
stability  of  the  Triple  Entente  to  grave  and  unexpected 
risks — the  members  of  that  group  should  keep  well  in  mind 

his  vernacular,  which,  in  reply  to  Thiers'  frantic  inquiries  :  '  Qu'est 
ce  qu'il  dit  ?  '  was  not  translated  literally  by  the  bystanders." — 
Anecdote  from  the  private  and  unpublished  papers  of  Hamilton 
Aide,  in  the  possession  of  the  author  :  "  Notes  of  Evenings  at  Lady 
W.  Russell's.  Sunday,  April  18,  1871." 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     259 

that  the  anomalous  and  unstable  character  of  the  German 
Imperial  Constitution — the  particularism  of  the  States 
composing  an  Empire  provisionally  welded  into  a  kind  of 
puzzle-nation  solely  by  economic  interest  and  by  the  in- 
genious creation  of  a  Reichsland  regarded  as  a  sort  of  national 
Pan-German  park — constitutes  a  danger  for  Europe  and  for 
peace.  A  Confederation  like  the  German  Empire  can  hold 
together  only  as  long  as  it  is  in  the  interest  of  the  majority 
of  its  members  to  co-operate  hamoniously.  When  such 
co-operation  ceases  to  "  pay  "  economically,  or  is  not  needed 
in  order  to  repulse  foreign  aggression,  dissolution  inevitably 
sets  in.  It  follows  that  a  prolonged  economic  crisis  or  a 
lasting  condition  of  European  peace  would  tend  to  disin- 
tegrate the  German  Empire  ;  whereas  steady  economic  well- 
being  and  a  chronic  state  of  military  panic  belong  to  the  class 
of  causes  that  favour  the  maintenance  of  German  unity  and 
the  development  of  a  German  national  spirit.  Thus  Im- 
perial Germany  longs  with  the  same  passion  for  both  peace 
and  war.  In  the  case  of  such  a  Power  a  consistent  foreign 
policy  is  impossible.  The  tactics  of  its  rulers,  responsible 
for  the  defence  of  the  essential  Imperial  interests  that  the 
Bismarckian  policy  bequeathed  to  them,  are  bound  to 
gyrate  between  patient,  methodical,  and  apparently  peace- 
ful activity  and  hysterical  and  brutal  intimidation  and 
bluff ;  and  both  attitudes  are,  from  the  German  point  of 
view,  equally  advisable  and  equally  sincere.  The  corre- 
sponding attitude  incumbent  on  Germany's  neighbours  is 
evident.  When  Germany  is  calm  they  should  prepare  for 
war  ;  when  Germany  blusters  they  should  be  calm.  They 
should  neither  be  the  dupe  of  her  friendly  overtures  nor  the 
panic-struck  victim  of  her  facile  bluff.  And  if  ever  the  time 
comes  when  she  oversteps  the  mark,  her  own  Teutonic 
mark  or  any  other  ;  if  ever  the  necessity  of  preserving  German 
national  unity  suggests  to  her  princes  the  wisdom  of  preach- 
ing to  the  German  people  a  new  crusade  for  the  salvation 
of  the  German  soul,  the  French  and  the  English  need  only 


260  PROBLEMS  OF   POWER 

heed  the  words  of  the  Damoysel  de  la  Mer  in  Amadis  de 
Gaule  :  "  S'ils  voyent  seulement  vos  visages  asseurez,  je 
suis  sur  qu'ils  ne  les  pourront  souffrir  :  donnons  dedans  : 
car  Dieu  nous  ayde." 

II 

The  utility  of  the  present  grouping  of  the  Powers  is  now 
generally  acknowledged.  No  fears  engendered  by  the 
Balkan  Scare  should  obliterate  from  the  consciousness  of 
the  Powers  of  the  Triple  Entente  the  knowledge,  so  labori- 
ously acquired,  of  the  real  conditions  of  international  peace. 
Germany  remains  Germany  in  spite  of  the  Balkan  League. 
The  fact  of  war  in  the  Balkans  made  it  all  the  more  necessary 
for  the  Powers  of  the  Triple  Entente  to  entrench  themselves 
in  their  positions  and  to  prepare  for  contingencies.  It  was, 
indeed,  characteristic  of  German  methods  that  at  the  very 
outset  of  the  Balkan  war,  when  it  was  natural  to  anticipate 
the  probable  assembling  of  a  European  conference,  for  the 
purpose  of  vamping  up  the  worn-out  clauses  of  the  Treaty 
of  Berlin,  Germany  revived  its  old  policy  of  blandishment  of 
France.  An  inspired  German  press  defended  the  thesis  that 
in  the  Balkan  Crisis  the  position  of  France  and  Germany 
was  almost  identical.  The  suggestion  was  that,  since  both 
desired  European  peace,  they  enjoyed  the  singular  privilege 
of  being  able  to  co-operate  for  maintaining  it.  But  such 
co-operation  would  have  implied  another  experiment  in 
rapprochement  of  the  kind  which  proved  so  disastrous  in 
1909  and  ended  at  Agadir. 

Henceforth  partners  to  the  Triple  Entente  must  work 
together  throughout  the  world,  and  not  merely  at  this  or 
that  danger-spot,  such  as  the  North  Sea,  the  Mediterranean, 
or  the  Caribbean.  Common  action,  however,  is  impossible 
if  the  three  Powers  are  distracted  by  their  several  domestic 
problems.  A  necessary  preliminary  of  effective  common 
action  on  the  part  of  the  pacific  Triple  Entente  is  that  its 
members  shall  severally  put  their  houses  in  order.  When 


A  STUDY  OF^  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     261 

they  shall  have  completed  that  urgent  task,  and  when, 
furthermore,  they  shall  have  secured  all  the  necessary 
subterranean — or  other  ! — channels  of  communication  be- 
tween each  other's  domains,  then,  but  only  then,  will  they 
have  the  leisure  to  work  out  a  common  and  elastic  line 
of  action,  embracing  all  possible  contingencies  and  aiming 
at  and  assuring  the  maintenance  of  peace  in  the  world. 
Then,  but  only  then,  moreover,  can  they  begin  to  do  business 
(negotiations  :  neg-otium),  collectively  or  individually,  with 
Germany. 

The  "  European  Concert,"  in  the  old  sense  of  the  word, 
is  possible  only  at  the  price  of  war.  The  only  form 
of  "  Concert  "  now  possible  is  one  organized  for  provi- 
sional ends  between  the  two  distinct  groups  of  Powers ; 
each  group  of  three  acting  as  a  single  integral  Power, 
after  independently  concerted  arrangements  between  the 
several  members  of  each  group.  This  was  the  character 
of  diplomatic  action  during  the  Balkan  war.  Through- 
out that  episode  the  Triple  Entente  sought  "  to  bring 
about  a  general  understanding  of  all  the  Powers,"  and 
distinctly  avoided  "  seeking  to  settle  the  difficulties  of 
the  moment  by  dwelling  on  any  systematic  opposition  of 
the  international  groups."  1  But  the  diplomatic  action 
of  the  Powers  of  the  Triple  Entente  was  common  action, 
the  nature  of  which  was  determined  by  protracted  pre- 
liminary negotiations  between  them,  negotiations  in  which 
the  members  of  the  Triple  Alliance  had  played  no  part. 
The  method  thus  practised — and  the  efficacy  of  which  was 
proved  notably  after  Enver  Bey's  and  Shevket  Pasha's 
coup  d'etat  of  January  24,  1913 — bore  no  analogy  with  the 
classic  method  employed  in  the  period  prior  to  Bismarck's 
death,  the  method  recalled  with  regret  by  the  Wilhelmstrasse, 
and  still  apparently  extolled  by  certain  irresponsible  French 
statesmen,  among  whom  the  most  eminent  is  the  ex-Foreign 

1  Speech  of  the  French  Prime  Minister,  M.  Poincare,  in  the 
Chamber  of  Deputies,  December  21,  1912. 


a6a  PROBLEMS  OF   POWER 

Minister,  M.  Hanotaux.  To  revert  to  this  old  method 
to-day  would  not  be  to  reconstruct  Europe  ;  it  would  be 
to  shatter  Europe.  Destruction  of  either  one  of  the  present 
groups  would  instantly  be  followed  by  a  general  war.  This 
is  why  the  "  European  Concert,"  in  the  old  sense  of  the 
word,  is  possible  only  at  the  price  of  war. 

The  Triple  Entente,  if  it  has  learned  anything  from  the 
events  of  the  last  ten  years,  will  certainly  have  learned  to 
say  :  "  United  we  stand,  divided  we  fall."  It  must  hence- 
forth act  in  one  spirit  and  as  one  agent.  When,  having 
solved  their  own  several  domestic  problems,  its  partners 
proceed  to  draw  up  a  plan  of  common  action,  they  can 
give  Germany  every  assurance  that  Power  may  require  of 
their  willingness  to  see  her  obtain  any  reasonable  place  in  the 
sun  on  which  she  may  have  set  her  heart.  International 
business  may  be  allowed  to  proceed  unhampered  by  any 
other  restrictions  than  those  established  by  each  self-re- 
specting nation  in  the  defence  of  its  own  national  integrity. 
Russia  and  Germany  may  work  out,  with  no  risk  to  the 
Entente,  all  the  legitimate  consequences  of  the  arrangements 
of  Potsdam.  France  and  Germany  may,  to  their  common 
advantage,  conclude  the  consortium  of  Ouenza,  an  arrange- 
ment of  immense  advantage  to  the  great  French  colony  of 
Algeria,  and  to  the  more  than  ever  indispensable  naval 
station  of  Bizerta.1  And  England  may  say  to  the  successor 
of  Baron  Marschall  von  Bieberstein :  "  Since  you  and 
your  government  at  last  know  where  we  stand,  there  is 
no  longer  any  reason  why  we  should  not  come  to  terms 
over  certain  little  matters  that  still  await  solution." 

Fresh  from  inspection  of  the  Krupp  works  at  Essen,  Sir 
Robert  Hadfield,  F.R.S.,  former  President  of  the  Iron  and 

1  The  appointment  of  M.  Jonnart,  ex-Governor-General  of  Al- 
geria, to  the  post  of  Foreign  Minister  in  the  Briand  Cabinet  of  Jan- 
uary, 1913,  is  an  earnest  of  the  rapid  realization  of  the  long-deferred 
Franco-German  arrangement  for  the  exploitation  of  the  Ouenza 
mines,  and  of  the  construction  of  a  railway  system  which  will  further 
the  development  of  an  extensive  region  of  North  Africa.  .  , 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     263 

Steel  Institute,  was  recently  interviewed  by  the  Berlin 
correspondent  of  the  Daily  Mail,  to  whom  he  revealed 1  the 
fact  that  Germany,  the  Doubting  Thomas  of  the  nations, 
had  now  reached  a  frame  of  mind  in  which  mere  protesta- 
tions of  good  will  towards  her  were  waste  of  breath ;  that 
what  she  now  wanted  from  England  was  a  sign,  a  "  tangible 
act  like  the  cession  of  Walfisch  Bay."  Sir  Robert  Hadfield, 
convinced  that  the  destiny  and  future  progress  of  the  world 
are  largely  in  the  hands  of  England,  Germany  and  the 
United  States,  proposed  a  triple  entente  of  those  three  Powers 
in  China,  with  the  object  of  .exploiting  "  the  greatest  stores 
of  coal  and  iron  in  the  world."  He  urged  the  appointment 
of  an  Anglo-German  board  of  twenty  members,  all  business 
men,  "  ten  great  Englishmen  and  ten  great  Germans, 
clothed  with  plenipotentiary  powers  by  their  respective 
governments,  to  discuss  and  seal  what  might  be  called  a 
'  Treaty  of  Toleration.' '  Diplomatists,  soldiers  and  sailors, 
added  Sir  Robert  Hadfield,  are  too  "  professionally 
myopic  "  to  be  of  any  use  on  such  a  committee.  What  is 
certain  is  that  France  and  Germany  might  indeed  come 
rapidly  to  terms  if  their  national  affairs  could  but  be  treated 
as  mere  "  business  propositions  "  ;  if,  in  a  word,  there  were 
no  such  complications  of  their  problem  as  have  been  set 
forth  in  this  attempt  to  survey  the  world's  history  from 
the  Treaty  of  Frankfort  to  the  opening  of  the  Panama  Canal, 
and  if  theoretical  economists  might  only  be  free  to  settle  the 
question  of  international  relations  by  leaving  out  all  the 
factors  that  make  their  solution  difficult.  It  would  be  possi- 
ble to  adopt  the  principle  of  Sir  Robert  Hadfield's  plan, 
provided  the  conditions  just  indicated  have  previously  been 
laid  down  ;  and,  indeed,  this  principle  is  sure  to  be  applied 
before  long  in  a  rational  way  ;  but  if  ever  England  were  com- 
placently to  favour  the  diversion  of  German  expansion  from 
Asia  towards  Africa,  not  only  would  she  undo  the  work  of 
twenty  years,  and  weaken  her  French  ally,  but  she  would  be 
1  "  What  Germany  wants,"  Daily  Mail,  February  20,  1912. 


264  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

preparing  for  herself  a  future  complicated  by  fresh  problems. 
She  would  be  furthering  German  combinations  for  the  estab- 
lishment of  Atlantic  coaling  stations  just  at  the  critical  mo- 
ment of  the  opening  of  the  Panama  Canal.  England  should 
afford  Germany  certain  opportunities  for  working  off  her  sur- 
plus energy,  her  surplus  production  in  Asia,  but  should  avoid 
any  arrangement  permitting  her  to  become  a  greater  rival 
than  she  already  is  along  the  Atlantic  trade  routes.  Thus,  in- 
stead of  confirming  the  treaty  of  1898  relative  to  the  eventual 
dismemberment  of  the  Portuguese  Colonies,  she  should  seek 
for  a  fresh  arrangement  undoing  that  dangerous,  and  incom- 
prehensible pact.  Within  the  last  fourteen  years  the  con- 
ditions determining  the  balance  of  power  in  the  world  have 
been  altogether  altered  :  so  that  there  are  obviously  some 
things  that  England  can  do,  and  some  things  she  cannot  do, 
whenever  the  time  may  come  for  "  talking  business."  But 
she  can  do  nothing,  nor  can  either  of  her  friends  do  any- 
thing, with  safety,  until  they  have  one  and  all  put  their  house 
in  order.  The  question  that  presses  is  :  In  what  does 
that  operation  consist  ? 

Ill 

Both  France  and  England  are  now  facing  the  delicate 
and  urgent  obligation  of  an  electoral  and  constitutional 
reform  which  shall  either  suppress  or  discipline  those 
elements  of  anarchy  already  analysed.  In  Russia,  not- 
withstanding the  criticism  evoked  by  the  first  experimental 
efforts  to  reconcile  the  absolutism  of  the  Tsars  with  the 
interests  and  the  claims  of  an  awakened  middle  class  and  an 
awakening  fourth  estate,  the  national  assembly  of  the  Duma 
has  continued  to  justify  its  existence.  The  constitutional 
regime  has  already  taken  root.  The  agrarian  and  edu- 
cational policy  of  the  government  and  the  Duma,  the  indus- 
trial and  financial  progress  of  the  community,  the  reorganiza- 
tion of  the  military  and  naval  power,  in  general  the  immense 
social  and  economic  improvement,  are  results  attesting 


A  STUDY  OF   INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     265 

Russia's  steady  advance  in  her  efforts  to  recover  in  Europe 
the  place  lost  at  Tsushima  and  at  Mukden.  Her  domestic 
outlook  is  darkened  by  the  grave  problem  of  assimilating 
certain  nationalities  now  constrained  to  call  her  master ; 
but  in  spite  of  the  risks  in  a  too  rapid  and  rigorous  Russi- 
fication  of  certain  subject  peoples,  her  future  has  never  been 
brighter.  While  Prussia  is  still  persecuting  the  Poles,1  Russia 
would  be  well  advised — and  more  than  ever  since  the  rise 
of  the  Balkan  Powers — to  evolve  a  Pan-Slav  policy  charac- 
terized at  last  by  a  more  generous  and  prudent  treatment 
of  the  Polish  nation. 

As  for  France,  in  the  summer  of  1911  her  crying  needs  were 
the  revival  of  Authority,  and  the  restoration  of  Constitu- 
tional order ;  and  it  was  quite  clear  at  that  date  that  these 
ends  could  be  attained  only  by  re-establishing  the  principle 
of  the  Separation  of  Powers.  The  policy  of  constructive 
nationalism,  systematically  applied  by  a  ministry  containing 
statesmen  like  M.  Poincare,  M.  Delcasse,  M.  Briand  and 
M.  Bourgeois,  has  already  made  such  progress  that  France, 
at  this  hour,  is  the  most  compactly  self-conscious  community 
in  Europe.  The  project  for  the  reform  of  the  electoral 
law,  a  project  consisting  in  the  substitution  of  proportional 
representation  and  of  the  scrutin  de  liste  for  the  former 
scrutin  d'arrondissement,  will,  when  it  is  adopted  by  the 
French  Parliament,  necessitate  the  formation  of  disciplined 
parties  and  reinforce  the  function  of  the  head-of-the-state. 
It  will  give  the  President  of  the  Republic  the  courage,  and 
sanction  his  right,  to  make  use  of  the  prerogative  of  Disso- 
lution, already  accorded  him  by  the  Constitution  (in  agree- 
ment with  the  Senate),  but  hitherto  practically  inoperative 
to  the  great  detriment  of  French  public  life.2  With  the  rein- 

1  See  note,  p.  211. 

2  Before  M.  Raymond  Poincare  became  President  of  the  Republic 
he  formally  stated,  in  an  admirable  little  manual  entitled  Ce  que 
demande  la  Citt  (p.  54,  Hachette),  that  dissolution  was  the  natural 
guarantee  of  the  Separation  of  Powers.     "  Elle  ne  merite  pas,"  he 
said,  '•  1'impopularite  dont  les  evenements  1'ont  enveloppee." 


266  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

forcement  of  the  Executive,  and  the  revival  of  Ministerial 
responsibility,  as  a  consequence  of  the  reaffirmation  of  the 
principle  of  the  Separation  of  Powers,  France  will  be  free 
to  complete  the  task  of  reorganizing  the  national  defence 
and  of  preparing  her  ports,  her  railways  and  her  canals  for 
the  economic  battles  of  the  future.  Foremost  among  her 
preoccupations  should  be  the  construction  on  her  eastern 
frontier  of  a  canal  permitting  Dunkirk  to  become  a  rival  of 
Antwerp,  the  iron-masters  of  the  Meurthe  and  Moselle 
to  buy  their  coal  in  England  instead  of  in  Germany,  and  the 
whole  French  industrial  world  to  break  loose  from  the  bonds 
now  linking  them  to  their  German  rivals.  The  industrial, 
financial,  economic  organization  of  France  has,  indeed,  now 
taken  a  sportsmanlike  start,  and  this  movement  synchronizes 
with  the  revival  among  the  younger  generation  of  a  taste 
for  adventure,  a  craving  for  responsible  action,  the  re- 
awakening of  a  patriotic,  genuinely  national  spirit,  the 
growth  of  religious  tolerance,  and  the  recognition  of  the 
need  of  re-establishing  the  secular  relations  of  France  with 
the  Vatican.  The  inconvenience,  the  absurdity  even,  of 
the  suppression  of  the  French  Embassy  at  the  Vatican, 
are  rapidly  becoming  patent  even  to  the  most  politically 
inexperienced  of  French  Jacobin  fanatics.  Even  they  are 
now  deploring  the  decay  of  the  French  protectorate  of 
Eastern  Christians,  the  ecclesiastico-political  problems  pre- 
sented by  the  declaration  of  a  French  protectorate  over 
Morocco,  and  in  general  the  advantage  enjoyed  by  the  rivals 
of  France  who  possess  an  official  representative  through 
whom  they  may  negotiate  with  the  Vatican  in  defence  of 
their  national  interests. 

There  remains  the  case  of  England.  Her  Constitutional 
problem,  which  a  year  ago  seemed  almost  insoluble,  but  the 
solution  of  which  has  now  been  rendered  relatively  easy 
owing  to  the  consequences  of  the  incident  of  Agadir,  is, 
after  all,  no  new  question.  It  is  twenty-five  years  since  one 
of  the  most  suggestive  of  English  writers,  the  author  of 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     267 

Oceana,  while  pointing  out  the  impossibility  of  there  ever 
being  a  "  British  Empire,"  argued  in  the  same  breath  that 
nothing  was  more  feasible,  if  only  politicians  would  cease 
to  meddle,  than  a  "  Commonwealth  "  of  the  British  nations, 
held  together  by  common  blood,  common  interest  and  a 
common  pride  in  the  great  position  which  unity  can  secure. 
The  "  Commonwealth  "  dreamed  of  by  Froude  is  on  the 
point  of  hoisting  on  all  the  seas  the  flag  of  the  five  self- 
governing  nations  finally  welded  together,  not  only  by 
common  blood  and  a  common  pride,  but  by  the  sense  of  a 
common  danger.  Under  the  dissolvent  of  Free  Trade  the 
"  British  Empire "  has  been  steadily  disintegrating  for 
more  than  a  generation.  The  divergency  of  fiscal  policies 
engendered  a  divergency  of  foreign  policies.  At  one 
moment  the  Imperial  Government  would  conclude  a  com- 
mercial treaty  with  Japan  for  the  sole  benefit  of  the  United 
Kingdom,  at  another  Canada  signed  similar  treaties  with 
France  and  Germany  without  regard  to  their  effect  upon 
British  trade.  Then  Canada  and  Australia  passed  Naval 
Defence  Acts,  with  the  warning  to  the  British  Admiralty 
that  the  Imperial  Government  should  be  allowed  to  use 
their  battleships  only  if  they  so  decided.  Five  separate 
systems  of  commercial  treaties,  five  separate  systems  of  de- 
fence, and  one-fifth  of  a  foreign  policy  !  Such  has  been  the 
agglomeration  that  for  many  years  has  been  passed  off  as  the 
British  Empire,  to  a  world  astounded  at  the  apathy  and 
blindness,  the  procrastination  and  the  parochial  short- 
sightedness of  England's  statesmen  and  England's  Parlia- 
ment. The  Mother  Island  had  taken  it  for  granted  that  her 
Colonies  were  lost  to  her,  and  had  not  even  gone  into  mourn- 
ing. Interest  alone  holds  nations  together,  yet  Mr.  Chamber- 
lain proposed  Imperial  Preference  to  unheeding  ears. 
Empires  as  well  as  nations  must  have  a  sense  of  unity  in 
order  to  maintain  their  integrity,  yet  the  dominant  forces 
among  the  disjointed  portions  of  the  British  Empire  were 
centrifugal. 


268  PROBLEMS   OF   POWER 

But  nations  and  empires  must  have  not  only  a  sense  of 
unity  ;  they  must  have  also  a  symbol  of  unity.  Viewed 
from  the  outposts  of  Empire  in  the  seven  seas,  England 
would  have  been  utterly  invisible  if  it  had  not  been  for  a 
certain  shimmer  on  the  far  horizon  which  was  identified  as 
that  of  the  splendour  of  the  British  Crown.  Amid  the 
ruins  of  her  aristocratic  traditions  and  Parliament,  the 
institution  of  the  Crown,  the  King,  the  growing  part  played 
by  the  sovereign,  the  increasing  utility  of  his  role,  rapidly 
became  apparent.  It  was  seen  that  the  King  was  the  key- 
stone in  the  imperial  dome,  the  foundations  of  which  rested 
in  the  four  quarters  of  the  earth.  It  was  discovered  that  it 
was  the  sovereign  alone  who  had  been  holding  the  Empire 
together ;  that  to  the  Dominions  the  British  Parliament, 
British  statesmen,  British  liberties  were  nothing ;  the 
Queen  and  the  King  all.  The  West  has  found  it  difficult  to 
comprehend  the  feeling  of  the  Japanese  for  the  Mikado. 
The  divinity  of  a  Mikado,  as  the  divinity  of  an  Augustus, 
is  a  notion  that  no  longer  fits  into  the  idioms  and  frames  of 
thought  of  our  radical  democracies.  But  the  positive 
reality  and  utility,  the  practical  constitutional  value  of  the 
conception,  began  to  dawn  upon  the  mind  of  the  most  un- 
reflecting citizen  of  England,  as  he  watched  the  far-away 
Colonies  moving  out  on  their  orbits,  without  need  or  thought 
of  the  island  home,  save  when  they  beheld  a  chance  gleam 
of  sunlight  on  the  British  imperial  crown.  From  having 
been  a  mere  survival,  from  having  dwindled  to  a  fairly 
futile  part  of  the  constitutional  machinery,  a  political  fiction, 
a  mere  figure-head  that  "  ruled  "  but  did  not  govern,  the 
sovereign  turned  out  to  be  the  sole  really  necessary  portion 
of  the  constitutional  edifice,  the  one  hope  of  lasting  union, 
the  only  interesting  and  essential  British  symbol  visible 
over  the  top  of  the  sea.  Thus  there  has  survived  from  the 
old  constitution  a  symbol,  the  King,  which  will  help  to 
create  the  sense  of  unity  ;  and,  happily  for  the  idea  that  he 
represents,  happily  for  England,  happily  for  the  incipient 


26g 

Commonwealth  of  British  Nations  dreamed  of  by  Froude, 
the  sense  of  the  importance  of  this  symbol  has  been  en- 
hanced, and,  it  is  to  be  hoped,  definitively  affirmed,  by  the 
sense  of  common  danger  created  by  German  imperialism 
and  American  commercial  rivalry.  King  Edward  died 
as  King  of  England,  Emperor  of  India.  His  son  will  reign 
as  all  that,  but  as  more.  Shortly,  in  a  fresh  and  unexpected 
sense,  he  will  be  the  British  Imperial  Sovereign.  He  alone, 
during  the  dark  period  of  1910  and  1911,  when  British 
institutions  seemed  crumbling,  with  the  Dover  Cliffs,  into  the 
sea,  he  alone,  with  a  conscious  and  conscientious  activity, 
was  working  for  the  preservation  of  the  best  of  England's 
past,  and  for  the  adjustment  of  her  present  to  her  future. 
Grandson  of  the  Queen  who  had  maintained  intact  the 
traditions  of  the  people  that  first  gave  practical  efficiency  to 
the  idea  of  Freedom,  son  of  the  King  whose  sound  sense 
and  direct  action  were  the  most  powerful  factors  in  the 
restoration  of  the  balance  of  power  in  Europe,  King  George, 
sailor,  traveller,  practical  man-of-business,  makes  the  tour 
of  his  island  kingdom  and  of  his  imperial  domains,  gets  him- 
self crowned  at  Delhi,  crowns  his  boy  in  Wales,  holds  his 
Court  in  turn  in  the  principal  British  possessions,  and  at  the 
same  time,  keenly  alive  to  practical  things,  seeks  to  inocu- 
late in  a  people  "  infected  with  a  kind  of  restlessness  exempli- 
fied in  the  week-end  habit  "  l  the  antidote  of  an  example 

1  Fortnightly  Review,  August  i,  1911  :  "A  Business-like  King." 
Germany  would  seem  to  be  aware  of  the  disadvantages  of  the 
'  week-end  habit '  in  England.  When  she  made  up  her  mind  to 
startle  Europe  by  the  '  Coup  d'Agadir '  she  chose  the  date  of  July  10 
1911,  which  was  a  Saturday.  In  consequence  of  the  deliberations 
of  the  French  Government  on  Saturday  afternoon  it  was  decided  to 
telegraph  to  London  to  the  French  Ambassador,  M.  Cambon, 
directing  him  to  find  out  from  the  English  Government  whether  they 
would  send  a  war-ship  to  Agadir  in  case  France  decided  to  do  so.  M. 
Cambon  replied  late  in  the  afternoon  that  Sir  Edward  Grey  was 
out  of  town,  and  would  not  be  back  until  Monday.  He  had  had  a 
talk,  however,  with  the  permanent  Under-Secretary  of  State,  Sir 
A.  Nicholson,  who,  without  engaging  the  responsibility  of  his  chief, 


270  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

based  on  his  knowledge  that  the  prosperity  of  the  oversea 
dominions,  as  well  as  of  Germany  and  of  the  United  States, 
is  due  to  the  enterprise  and  the  dogged  industry  of  their  sons. 
He  took  over  the  direction  of  the  destinies  of  the  new  British 
Empire  (knit  together  at  present  solely  by  the  post  and  the 
telegraph)  just  at  the  moment  when  the  problem  of  their 
union  is  taking  the  form  of  a  magnificent  joint-stock  enter- 
prise which  must  be  managed  in  the  interests  of  the  common 
shareholders.  No  sovereign  ever  had  a  greater  opportunity. 
"  The  earnest  object  of  my  life,"  said  George  V.  on  his  acces- 
sion, "  will  be  to  uphold  the  Constitutional  government 
of  these  realms."  How  could  he  know  at  the  time  that  this 
great  ideal  would  so  speedily  have  to  be  superseded  by 
another,  for  the  realization  of  which  he,  the  author  of  the 
cry,  "  Wake  up  England,"  seems  to  have  been  predestined  ? 
How  could  he  divine  that  by  the  force  of  things,  the  force  of 
German  and  American  things,  there  would  be  added  to  the 
sense  of  a  common  blood  and  a  common  pride,  cherished  by 
Englishmen  all  over  the  world,  the  sense  of  a  common 

declared  that  England  would  certainly  adopt  the  policy  of  France. 
The  French  Cabinet  thereupon  deliberated  on  the  question  of  the 
proper  reply  to  be  made  to  Germany  but  were  unable  to  make  up 
their  minds.  On  the  morrow,  Monday,  the  French  Foreign  Minister 
left,  with  the  President  of  the  Republic,  for  Holland  on  a  visit  that 
could  not  be  deferred.  On  Monday  evening  M.  Cambon  telegraphed 
to  Paris  that  he  had  at  last  been  able  to  find  Sir  Edward  Grey  at 
the  Foreign  Office,  and  that  the  minister,  while  assuring  France  of 
England's  intention  to  support  her  in  her  Moroccan  policy,  seemed 
to  doubt  the  advisability  of  making  a  naval  demonstration,  unless 
France  insisted  on  doing  so.  At  all  events  the  matter  could  only 
be  settled  in  Cabinet  Council  on  Tuesday,  the  4th.  Meanwhile  M. 
Caillaux,  the  Prime  Minister  of  France,  had  decided  not  to  send  a 
ship  to  Agadir,  and  on  Tuesday  morning  he  telegraphed  to  M. 
Cambon  bidding  him  inform  the  British  Govermment  of  his  decision. 
The  telegram  reached  M.  Cambon  after  the  British  Cabinet  Council 
had  come  to  the  same  decision  as  M.  Caillaux, — not  to  reply  to  the 
German  challenge  !  This  Aesopian  fable  teaches  that,  while  times 
and  places  often  make  timid  men  bold,  on  other  occasions  the  same 
causes  often  make  responsible  men  timid  ;  and  it  likewise  teaches 
the  risks  of  the  British — and  now  the  American — '  week-end  habit.' 


A  STUDY  OF   INTERNATIONAL   POLITICS     271 

danger,  and  that  this  new  situation  would  transform  his  task 
from  that  of  "  upholding  the  constitutional  government  of 
his  realms  "  into  that  of  assisting  in  the  construction  of 
a  brand-new  Imperial  Constitution,  and  of  determining  the 
common  functions  of  the  United  Kingdom,  the  auto- 
nomous Dominions  and  the  Crown  Colonies,  all  of  them 
owing  allegiance  to  but  one  king,  one  flag,  one  Empire  ? 

IV 

The  members  of  the  Triple  Entente  must  henceforth 
work  together  throughout  the  world,  and  the  speedy  settle- 
ment of  their  domestic  problems  is  the  necessary  condition 
of  effective  common  action.  It  remains  to  survey  the  wide 
sphere  of  their  common  action  in  the  various  seas  and 
regions  where  their  fleets  are  to  fraternize. 

The  Northern  question  may  be  dismissed  with  a  brief 
allusion.  Of  the  active  discussion  relative  to  the  foreign 
policy  of  the  Scandinavian  States  that  has  been  going  on  in 
the  three  Northern  countries  ever  since  the  separation  of 
Norway  and  Sweden  in  1905,  only  rare  rumours  reach  the 
ears  of  Londoners  and  Parisians.  But  what  is  known  shows 
that  the  policy  of  neutrality,  strict  and  unalloyed  neutrality, 
developed  in  the  more  recent  speeches  of  both  the  Danish  and 
the  Swedish  Foreign  Ministers,  is  one  warranting  the  belief 
that  the  pact — signed  by  Germany,  France,  Great  Britain, 
Russia,  Holland,  Denmark,  and  Sweden  in  1908 — for  the 
maintenance  of  the  status  quo  in  the  countries  around  the 
North  Sea  and  the  Baltic  is  perhaps  more  likely  to  be  re- 
spected than  any  other  international  declaration  or  treaty 
now  under  the  sceptical  scrutiny  of  the  Powers.  The  ex- 
change of  views  in  August  and  September,  1912,  between 
the  Foreign  Ministers  of  the  Powers  of  the  Triple  Entente 
in  St.  Petersburg,  London  and  Paris,  and  the  visits  of 
Russian  and  British  vessels  to  Scandinavian  ports  in  Sep- 
tember, have  consolidated  the  pact  of  1898.  The  hardy 
voyages  of  the  German  "  Zeppelins  "  above  the  North  Sea 


272  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

merely  serve  to  remind  the  Dutch,  the  Scandinavians,  the 
English,  and  the  French  that  in  an  alert  Triple  Entente 
lies  the  one  hope  of  peaceful  existence  in  the  waters  bathing 
the  sides  of  the  triangle  marked  by  Stockholm,  Copenhagen, 
and  Christiam'a.1 

The  more  immediate  scenes  of  the  action  of  the  Triple 
Entente  are  mainly  in  other  waters  and  in  other  countries. 
They  may  be  classed  under  the  general  heads  of  the  Medi- 
terranean, the  Far  East,  and  the  American  Mediterranean, 
the  Caribbean  Sea. 


In  the  Mediterranean  and  on  its  shores  the  policies  of 
England  and  of  France  are  for  the  first  time  in  history  easily 
assimilable.  The  lapsing  of  the  Triple  Alliance  has  happily 
synchronized  with  the  settlement  of  the  Macedonian  question, 
and  it  was  in  the  interest  of  the  peace  of  the  world  that  that 
alliance  should  be  renewed  without  delay.  Its  fourth 
renewal  early  in  December,  1912,  has  in  nowise  imperilled 
the  naval  position  of  the  partners  of  the  Entente  Cordiale 
in  the  Mediterranean ;  it  has,  on  the  contrary,  rendered 
more  stable  than  ever  the  balance  of  power  in  the  Middle  Sea. 
Italy,  which  has  secured  Tripoli  through  the  collusion  of 
England  and  France  and  to  the  regret,  no  doubt,  of  Austria, 
as  well  as  to  the  certain  embarrassment  of  Germany,2 
seems  to  be  aware  that  by  remaining  in  the  Triple  Alliance 
she  can  not  only  best  harmonize  her  own  antagonistic  ends, 

1  On  Friday,  November  29,  1912,  it  became  known  that  an  aerial 
navy  bill  was  about  to  be  proposed  by  the  German  War  Office  and 
Admiralty  "  for  the  creation  of  a  fleet  of  twenty  Zeppelin  airships 
of  about  920,000  cubic  feet  capacity,  capable  of  travelling  at  fifty-one 
miles  an  hour,  and  remaining  aloft  for  four  days  and  four  nights 
without  an  intermediate  landing." 

1  In  the  late  summer  of  1911,  it  was  well  known  in  Constantinople 
that  if  Italy  did  not  go  immediately  to  Tripoli,  she  would  be  fore- 
stalled by  Germany,  seeking,  in  the  concession  of  a  North  African 
coaling  station,  a  Mediterranean  compensation  for  the  loss  of  the 
Atlantic  port  of  Agadir. 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     273 

but  also  preserve  the  balance  of  power  in  the  Mediterranean 
and  establish  peace  in  Europe. 

This  seems  a  paradox.  The  reason,  however,  is  clear. 
When  Italy  adhered,  in  May,  1882,  to  the  Austro-German 
treaty  of  1879,  and  concluded  the  five  years'  pact  which 
became  known  as  the  Triple  Alliance,  she  assumed  merely 
Continental  responsibilities :  nothing  in  the  Alliance 
offered  her  any  guarantee  as  to  the  inviolability  of  her  coast- 
line. It  suited  Bismarck  to  foster  Italian  jealousy  of 
French  and  British  sea  power,  and,  notwithstanding 
Italy's  insistent  request,  he  refused  to  extend  the  Alliance 
to  the  Mediterranean.  This  refusal  placed  the  subtle 
Italian  partner  in  one  of  those  ambiguous  positions  he  loves. 
The  Italian  is  never  happier  than  when  a  situation  makes  it 
natural  to  try  to  invent  a  combinazione.  Before  the  first 
lapsing  of  the  Alliance — in  consequence  of  meditations  which 
have  already  been  analysed — Italy  arranged  a  comple- 
mentary Mediterranean  Agreement  with  France.  When 
France  and  England  concluded  the  Entente  Cordiale  in 
1904,  the  Mediterranean  clauses  of  their  Arrangement  were 
integrally  bound  up  with  the  Anglo-Italian  and  Franco- 
Italian  understandings  with  regard  to  the  same  waters. 
Once  again,  all  the  diplomatic  roads  led  to  Rome  ;  all  save 
one,  the  Russian  road,  and  even  that  highway  was  finally 
opened  at  Racconigi  in  1909. 

Thus,  during  the  period  when  German  naval  power  was 
steadily  growing,  Germany's  ally,  Italy,  was  helping  to 
close  the  great  Middle  Sea  to  German  expansion.  For  the 
moment,  however,  Germany  paid  no  heed.  Even  so  recently 
as  ten  years  ago  Prince  Billow  proclaimed  in  the  Reichstag 
that  this  state  of  things  did  not  matter  :  such  is  Germany's 
veneration  for  the  Iron  Chancellor  that  even  the  most 
deplorable  consequences  of  his  greatest  blunders  are  patri- 
otically ignored  by  the  levites  entrusted  with  the  security 
of  the  ark  of  the  Teutonic  covenant.  Bismarck  had  refused 
to  extend  the  Triple  Alliance  to  the  Mediterranean ;  Ger- 


274  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

many  reaped  the  consequences.     Those  consequences  were 
too  patent  for  her  not  to  try  to  remedy  the  mischief  done. 

When,  in  the  winter  of  1912,  after  Kirk-Kilisse,  Germany 
beheld  the  sudden  shattering  of  many  of  her  plans  for 
hegemony  in  the  territory  between  Buda-Pest  and  Con- 
stantinople ;  when  she  perceived  that  matters  were  moving 
so  fast  in  the  Balkans  that  if  she  did  not  intervene  between 
her  two  allies,  Austria-Hungary  and  Italy,  those  Powers 
would  probably  come  to  blows  even  before  the  stipulated 
date  of  June  28,  1913,  fixed  as  the  limit  within  which 
the  Alliance  could  be  renewed ;  Germany  acted  in  the  in- 
terests of  European  peace  in  urging  the  instant  renewal  of 
that  pact  on  whatever  possible  terms.  For  some  months 
before  the  Balkan  War  the  German  newspapers  had  been 
insinuating  that  Italy  would  act  wisely  in  confiding  to  the 
Triple  Alliance  the  direction  of  her  Mediterranean  interests  ! 
No  Italian  fish  were  caught  by  the  tinsel  of  this  fly-bait  made 
in  Berlin.  Bismarck  had  failed  to  take  the  chance  that 
Crispi  offered  him.  It  was  too  late,  in  1912,  for  the  Italians 
to  agree  to  extend  the  Triple  Alliance  to  the  Mediterranean. 
To  renew  the  Alliance  in  the  old  form,  however,  was  an 
immediate  guarantee  of  peace.  So  to  revise  it  as  wantonly 
to  introduce  German  dreadnoughts  into  the  Mediterranean, 
in  consequence  of  an  international  pact,  would  have  been 
to  upset  the  whole  balance  of  power  in  that  sea,  and  multiply 
the  chances  of  war.  The  Wilhelmstrasse,  therefore,  did 
not  insist,  and  the  Alliance  was  happily  renewed  on  the  old 
terms.  This  event  was  a  positive  victory  for  peace  and  a 
negative  victory  for  the  Triple  Entente.  And  it  should  be 
said  in  this  connexion  that  if,  throughout  all  the  negotiations 
connected  with  the  peace  settlement  consequent  on  the 
Balkan  war,  Russia  displayed  so  exemplary  a  prudence — 
not  even  seeking  the  natural  opportunity  to  take  her  re- 
venge for  the  humiliations  of  1909  and  to  realize  her  dream 
of  opening  the  Dardanelles — her  motives  were,  in  general, 
a  firm  resolution  to  work  sincerely  in  the  interests  of  peace 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     275 

and,  in  particular,  to  avoid  any  initiative  which  would 
warrant  Germany's  raising  the  question  of  the  partition 
of  the  Greek  islands  in  a  form  permitting  that  Power,  for 
instance,  to  establish  a  naval  base  at  Alexandretta,  the 
terminus  of  one  of  the  embranchments  of  the  Baghdad 
Railway. 

Thus,  unlike  the  Triple  Entente,  which  is  a  pact  between 
Powers  united  by  a  common  interest  and  by  a  genuine 
reciprocal  regard,  the  Triple  Alliance  is  an  arrangement, 
a  self-denying  ordinance,  between  three  mortal  enemies  who 
have  decided  to  grip  each  other  as  tightly  as  they  can,  lest 
if  any  one  of  them  be  given  elbow-room  he  should  fly  at 
the  others'  throats.  Again,  when  at  Sinaia  Count  and  Coun- 
tess Berchtold  and  King  Charles  and  Queen  Elizabeth 
drank  one  another's  health  in  honour  of  the  secret  con- 
solidation of  the  pact  between  the  Emperor  Francis  Joseph 
and  the  "  hero  of  Plevna,"  for  the  maintenance  of  a  Balkan 
status  quo,  whatever  the  issue  of  the  war  between  Turkey 
and  the  Balkan  League,  these  precautions  were  only  demon- 
strations on  a  smaller  scale  of  the  same  artfully  jiu-jitsu 
diplomacy  of  which  the  secondary  Powers  had  an  excellent 
model  in  the  Triple  Alliance.1  Count  Aehrenthal  revealed 

1  In  the  present  state  of  Europe  the  only  prudent  jiu-jitsu  pre- 
cautions for  Rumania  are  those  that  will  link  her  destinies  with 
those  of  Bulgaria  and  Servia  against  the  encroachments  of  the  Triple 
Alliance.  After  having  haughtily  claimed  for  many  years — and 
with  reason — not  to  be  one  of  the  Balkan  States,  she  sought  in 
January,  1913,  during  the  armistice  negotiations  after  the  Balkan 
War,  and  even  after  the  rupture  of  the  negotiations  on  January 
29,  to  exact  territorial  "  compensations "  of  Bulgaria,  for  not 
having  made  war  on  the  Allies  while  they  were  engaged  in  driving 
the  Turk  out  of  Macedonia  !  She  put  forward  the  plea  that  the 
balance  of  power  in  the  Balkans  had  been  upset  by  the  victory  of  the 
Allies  !  King  Charles's  efforts  to  parody  Pan-German  policy  would 
hardly  have  been  possible  but  for  the  Austro-Rumanian  under- 
standing. That  arrangement  must  either  be  abolished  or  be  limited 
by  a  frank  convention  with  Bulgaria.  A  native  "  Latin  "  com- 
binazione  would  be  more  effective  in  the  long  run  than  Hohenzollern 
blufi. 


276  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

to  the  world  what  Austria-Hungary  thinks  of  Germany,  and 
the  retirement  of  the  germanophile  Archduke  Eugene  from 
the  commandment  of  the  Tyrol  and  Vorarlberg  in  favour  of 
Baron  Konrad  von  Hotzendorf,  former  head  of  the  Austro- 
Hungarian  General  Staff,  and  the  subsequent  recall  of 
General  Konrad  von  Hotzendorf  to  his  old  post  in  the  place 
of  General  von  Schemua,  show  how  Austria-Hungary  feels 
about  Italy.  The  Tyrol,  in  spite  of  the  Triple  Alliance,  has 
become  an  arsenal  of  the  national  defence,  a  fortified  camp 
dominating  Italy.  The  latest  Italian  enterprise,  the  Tri- 
politan  Expedition,  has  produced,  among  its  most  certain 
consequences,  an  aggravation  of  the  Austro- Italian  tension 
concerning  the  ultimate  destination  of  the  Albanian  port  of 
Valona,  the  hinterland  of  which  is  slowly  being  won  over 
to  Austrian  sympathies  by  the  steady  propaganda  of  Fran- 
ciscan monks  taking  their  orders  from  the  Ball-Platz.  In 
1904  Signor  Tittoni,  Italian  Foreign  Minister,  declared  in  the 
Chamber  that  Albania  was  not  in  itself  of  much  importance, 
but  that  its  shores  and  ports  would  ensure  to  their  possessors 
"  the  uncontested  military  and  naval  supremacy  of  the 
Adriatic."  1  It  is  this  statesman,  now  Italian  ambassador 
in  Paris,  who  has  been  notoriously  the  most  assiduous  com- 
panion of  that  Russian  ambassador,  M.  Isvolski,  whose 
dreams  of  offering  an  open  Dardanelles  to  his  sovereign  were 
wrecked  by  the  premature  action  of  the  members  of  the 
Triple  Alliance  in  tearing  up  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  before 
Russia  was  ready.  When  the  Tsar  and  Victor  Emmanuel 
met  at  Racconigi,  accompanied  by  their  Ministers,  the  Sove- 
reigns laid  the  foundations  of  an  entente  cordiale  the  prin- 
ciple of  which  was  their  common  hostility  to  the  realization 
of  German  and  Austro-Hungarian  interests  in  the  Balkans, 

1  The  Italians  have  never  forgotten  that  the  "  Latin  Sea,"  the 
Adriatic,  was  known,  in  the  fifteenth  and  sixteenth  centuries,  as 
il  golfo  di  Venezia.  They  dream  of  a  railway  from  the  Adriatic  to 
the  Danube  (Scutari-Cladova)  counterbalancing  the  line  Vienna- 
Sal  onica,  and  placing  Italy  in  direct  communication  with  Servia, 
Rumania  and  Russia. 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     277 

and  a  direct  consequence  of  which  was  Montenegro's  declara- 
tion of  war  in  October,  1912,  against  Turkey.  Italy  has 
ceased  to  be  the  Cinderella  of  the  Triple  Alliance.  Of  the 
three  members  of  that  Alliance  it  is  Germany,  after  all,  that 
has  reaped  the  least  benefit  from  the  pact  during  the  last 
ten  years.  William  II  has  done  his  best  to  keep  his  two 
partners  in  the  humiliating  posture  of  a  "  brilliant  second  " 
and  a  Sancho  Panza  third.  But  Count  Aehrenthal's 
initiative  in  taking  Bosnia-Herzegovina  was  followed  by  that 
of  Signor  Giolitti  in  seizing  Tripoli — and  the  Teuton  leading- 
strings  were  snapped.  The  consequences  of  the  Tripolitan 
expedition  on  the  irridentist  spirit  were  immediate.  Europe 
too  readily  forgets  that  it  is  not  France  alone  which  has  an 
Alsace-Lorraine  problem  to  solve.  When,  on  November 
12,  1911,  the  Italian  journalists  at  Tripoli  offered  a  banquet 
to  the  correspondent  of  the  Temps,  M.  Jean  Carrere,  the 
entire  company  greeted  the  intervention  of  Signor  Scipio 
Sighele,  one  of  the  Nationalist  leaders,  with  the  cry  :  Vivent 
Trente  et  Trieste !  Italy  has  not  yet  achieved  her  ideal 
unity,  and  the  "  long  hopes  and  the  vast  thoughts  "  which 
she  has  stifled  for  so  many  years  are  once  again  becoming 
articulate,  now  that  her  enthusiasm  has  been  re-kindled  by 
the  Roman  prowess  of  her  troops  in  the  antique  Libya. 
The  nationalist  spirit  which  has  of  late  inflamed  Italy  is  no 
new  thing  ;  it  is  only  the  resurgence  of  an  old  passion.  In 
May,  1891,  one  of  the  most  eminent  political  economists  in 
Italy  remarked  * : — 

"  The  idea  that  Italy  supported  Signor  Crispi  entirely  against  her 
will  still  prevails  abroad,  and  it  is  entirely  erroneous.  The  truth  is 
Signor  Crispi  personified,  in  a  perhaps  exaggerated  form,  the  megalo- 
maniac propensities  of  the  majority  of  the  governmental  classes. 
He  fell  not  because  the  country  had  had  too  much  of  his  '  grand 
policy/  but  solely  because  he  had  hurt  certain  local  interests  .  .  . 
and  the  same  megalomania  persists  to-day,  and  his  successor  will 
have  to  heed  these  tendencies  if  he  wishes  to  continue  in  office." 

This  was  in  1891.     In  1912,  after  the  bombardment  of 
1  Letter  to  the  author  by  Signor  Vilfredo  Pareto. 


278  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

Tripoli  and  the  occupation  of  the  /Egean,  the  Nationalist 
movement,  born  in  Florence,  was  justified  by  its  works ; 
irridentism  took  on  a  fresh  vigour,  it  was  fired  by  a  new  hope. 
But  while  the  Turco- Italian  War  did  not  make  for  the  peace 
of  Europe,  it  made  even  less  for  the  stability  of  the  Triple 
Alliance.  These  considerations  suggest  once  more  how  im- 
mensely it  was  in  the  interest  of  the  peace  of  the  world  that 
that  pact  should  be  renewed — above  all,  in  anticipation  of 
the  fatal  day  when  the  Emperor  Francis  Joseph  is  to  hand 
over  the  great  composite  world  of  Austria-Hungary  to  Heaven 
alone  knows  what  destinies. J  The  Triple  Entente  has  need  of 

1  Notwithstanding  all  appearances  to  the  contrary,  it  seems 
probable  that  while  the  Emperor- King  lives  Austria-Hungary  will 
do  its  best  to  keep  the  peace.  What  is  known  as  the  "  Berchtold 
Proposition  "  was  an  ambiguous  appeal  made  to  Europe  in  August, 
1912  (by  the  Power  that  in  1908  took  from  Turkey  Bosnia-Herze- 
govina), to  assist  the  Ottoman  Government  in  applying  a  policy  of 
progressive  decentralization  in  favour  of  the  Macedonian  nationali- 
ties, and  to  urge  upon  the  Balkan  States  a  peace-policy.  This  pro- 
posal, made  while  the  French  Prime  Minister,  M.  Poincare,  was  in 
Russia  conferring  with  the  Tsar's  Government,  aroused  suspicion  in 
Europe.  It  was  generally  regarded  as  an  attempt  to  steal  a  march 
on  Russia  and  to  checkmate  the  policy  of  the  Triple  Entente.  Yet 
the  good  faith  of  the  Austro-Hungarian  Government  would  seem  to 
have  been  demonstrated  by  the  subsequent  course  of  events.  Count 
Berchtold's  initiative  was  certainly  the  efficient,  it  was  not  neces- 
sarily the  final,  cause  of  the  Balkan  Crusade.  The  Balkan  States, 
crushed  between  the  Young  Turks  and  Austria-Hungary,  fearing 
both  the  growth  of  Ottoman  Imperialism  and  the  descent  of  Austria 
to  Salonica,  had  achieved  their  miraculous  union  under  the  hegemony 
of  the  Bulgarian  tsar.  Meanwhile  the  prolongation  of  the  Turco- 
Italian  war  aroused  their  dormant  ambition.  The  Ball  Platz  is 
nearer  Belgrade  and  Sofia  than  are  the  Quai  d'Orsay  or  Downing 
Street,  or  even  St.  Petersburg.  Austria-Hungary  is  even  more  con- 
cerned for  the  maintenance  of  peace  in  the  Balkans  than  France, 
England  or  Russia ;  and  Count  Berchtold  was  no  doubt  better 
informed  than  the  foreign  ministers  of  the  other  Powers  as  to  the 
danger  of  immediate  war.  He  formulated  his  famous  proposal  calcu- 
lated to  forestall  and  avert  just  such  irreparable  action  on  the  part 
of  the  Balkan  League  as  took  place  two  months  later  when  the  four 
Balkan  States  declared  war.  At  the  same  time  he  went  to  Sinaia 
to  induce  Rumania  to  refrain  from  war  in  case  his  efforts  to  mobilize 


279 

the  Triple  Alliance ;  it  needs  the  Alliance  hi  order  to  sim- 
plify its  own  problems.  As  long  as  the  Alliance  holds  to- 
gether, so  long  are  the  prospects  of  peace  between  the  great 
Powers  of  Central  Europe  approximately  certain.  And 
the  existence  of  the  Triple  Alliance  is  no  obstacle  to  the 
friendly  ententes  between  two  of  its  members  and  this 
or  that  member  of  the  rival  group. 

Thus  hi  Mediterranean  waters  the  interests  of  France  and 
England  (even — with  certain  reservations — of  Russia) 
are  now  identical.  Their  common  aim  is  maintenance  of  an 
open  sea  :  the  one  for  the  security  of  her  Carthaginian 
naval  base  at  Bizerta,  and  because  of  the  need  of  an  unen- 
cumbered highway  for  the  transport  of  her  army  corps  or 
even  of  her  black  troops  in  case  of  an  European  war ;  the 
other  because  the  Mediterranean,  which  is  one  of  the  great 
central  portions  of  the  maritime  world,  is  also  the  highroad 
of  the  chief  purveyors  of  England's  food-supplies.  The 
military  correspondent  of  the  Times  has  put  a  part  of  the 
case  very  neatly  : — 

"It  is  not  in  our  interest  that  the  trade  of  the  Bosphorus  and  the 
Dardanelles  should  suffer  considerable  interruption.  It  is  not  in 
our  interest,  nor  in  that  of  Russia,  Rumania,  or  Turkey  that  the 
islands  of  the  ^Egean,  which  have  good  harbours,  and  which  can 
enable  ships  based  upon  them  to  control  the  trade  issuing  from  the 
Dardanelles,  should  rest  in  the  hands  of  a  strong  and  unfriendly 
naval  Power.  Our  interests  and  those  of  Russia  in  particular  are 
identical  in  this  respect,  and  if  hereafter  the  Black  Sea  fleet  of  Russia 
were  to  be  permitted  by  international  agreement  to  steam  into  the 
Mediterranean,  we  should  probably  nowadays  make  no  opposition. 

In  a  word,  the  situations  that  have  already  arisen,  that  are 

European  diplomacy  at  the  eleventh  hour  in  favour  of  peace  should 
prove  unavailing.  When  Count  Berchtold's  fears  were  finally 
realized  and  war  broke  out,  the  Austro- Hungarian  Minister  for  War 
took  the  natural  precautions ;  he  asked  for  supplementary  grants 
amounting  to  250,000,000  crowns.  To  conclude,  as  certain  Hungarian 
and  French  journalists  (see  article  by  M.  Jacques  Bardoux  in  the 
Opinion,  Oct.  19,  1912)  have  concluded,  that  "  the  Ball  Platz  must 
have  worked  to  precipitate  the  Balkan  war  "  is  a  gratuitous  inter- 
pretation. 


280  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

arising,  or  that  are  bound  to  arise  in  consequence  of  the 
Turco-  Italian  War  and  of  the  Herculean  efforts  of  the  Balkan 
League  to  clean  up  the  Augean  stables  of  Macedonia,  form 
an  interesting  illustration  of  the  general  drift  of  the  time, 
the  present  phenomenon  of  nationalistic  concentration  in 
resistance  to  the  disintegrating  action  of  cosmopolitan 
economic  forces  ;  while,  viewed  in  the  light  of  politics  and 
diplomacy,  they  show  that  the  present  grouping  of  the 
Powers,  in  the  interests  of  world  peace  and  equilibrium,  is 
rational,  and  that  it  is  likely,  for  yet  a  considerable  period, 
to  remain  what  it  is  to-day.  At  all  events,  it  is  clear,  since 
that  is  the  immediate  question  in  hand,  that  the  members 
of  the  Triple  Entente  must  hold  together  in  the  Mediter- 
ranean. Even  the  eventual  opening  of  the  Straits  need  not, 
and  will  not,  be  regarded  as  a  matter  that  in  any  way  con- 
cerns the  principle  of  the  maintenance  of  the  integrity  of 
the  Ottoman  Empire.  But  it  is  impossible  to  treat  it  merely 
as  a  question  of  political  economy,  a  problem  with  which 
national  honour  and  national  prestige  have  nothing  to  do, 
an  operation  that  can  be  accomplished  solely  by  inter- 
national finance  and  by  commercial  treaty.  If  it  could  be 
thus  isolated,  the  Time  Spirit  would  never  have  solved  an 
historic  problem  more  neatly  nor  offered  an  object-lesson 
more  characteristic  of  the  time.  But  it  cannot  thus  be  iso- 
lated. It  has  to  be  considered  in  connexion  with  the  whole 
question  of  the  balance  of  power  in  the  Mediterranean,  a 
question  that  includes,  as  has  been  seen,  the  ultimate  par- 
tition of  the  "  Greek  "  islands,  and  such  immediate  realities 
as  the  French  protection  of  all  the  Eastern  Christians.1 

1  In  1905,  after  M.  Loubet's  visit  to  Rome,  when  the  relations 
between  France  and  the  Vatican  were  particularly  strained,  the 
Rouvier  Ministry  heedlessly  displayed  its  friendship  for  Italy  by 
granting  the  religious  orders  in  the  East  the  privilege  of  renouncing 
French  protection  for  that  of  Italy.  From  1905  to  1911  thirty -three 
Italian  monastic  establishments  in  the  East  substituted  the  Italian 
for  the  French  flag.  When  the  Turco-Italian  war  broke  out,  and  the 
Italians  were  expelled  from  Turkey,  the  Italian  monks  who  had  re- 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     281 

Italy's  cravings  for  possession  of  Rhodes,  if  satisfied  by  the 
Powers,  in  consequence  of  a  European  Conference,  would  im- 
ply compensations  to  those  Powers  commensurate  with 
the  importance  of  the  concession.1  Rhodes  commands  the 
route  of  the  Dardanelles,  Asia  Minor,  and  the  Suez  Canal. 
It  counterbalances  Cyprus  and  menaces  Malta  and  Bizerta. 
Even  the  presence  of  the  Russian  fleet  in  the  Mediterranean 
could  not  suffice,  in  itself,  to  compensate  the  Triple  Entente 
for  the  sudden  shock  given  to  the  present  relations  of  the 
fleets  of  the  Entente  Cordiale  by  the  establishment  of  the 
House  of  Savoy  in  the  citadel  where  the  Knights  of  St.  John 
repulsed  the  troops  of  Mahomet  II.  The  settlement  of  the 
questions  suddenly  forced  upon  the  attention  of  the  mem- 
bers of  the  Triple  Entente  by  the  turn  taken  by  the  Turco- 
Italian  War  and  by  the  success  of  the  Balkan  League  will 
be  the  supreme  test  of  the  solidity  of  that  pact  and  of  the 
intelligence  of  French,  British,  and  Russian  statesmen. 
Even  before  the  outbreak  of  the  Balkan  War,  after  six 

mained  under  French  protection,  as  well  as  other  Italian  monks 
who  had  accepted  the  protection  of  Italy,  appealed  for  protection 
to  the  French  Consuls.  Now  that  the  war  is  over,  the  Italians  are 
wondering  whether  France  will  try  to  keep  under  her  protection 
the  Italian  monks  who  during  the  war  rushed  to  the  shelter  of  the 
tricolour.  The  Vatican  still  remains  anti-French  and  pro-Italian. 
But  French  patriotism  is  no  longer  what  it  was  in  the  days  of  M. 
Combes.  M.  Poincare  is  as  well  aware  as  was  Gambetta  that  anti- 
clericalism  ought  not  to  figure  on  the  list  of  French  exports.  On 
November  21,  1912,  while  the  Turks  and  Bulgarians  were  still  facing 
each  other  in  the  Tchataldja  lines,  he  informed  the  Ottoman  Govern- 
ment that  France,  "  acting  as  the  Protectress  of  the  Eastern  Christians, 
would  be  obliged  to  hold  the  Ottoman  Government  responsible  for 
any  violence  exercised  against  them."  The  resolute  courage  of  the 
French  Prime  Minister  will  have  far-reaching  consequences. 

1  In  the  Preliminaries  of  Peace  signed  between  Turkey  and  Italy 
at  Ouchy  (Oct.  16,  1912),  Italy  agreed  to  restore  to  Turkey  the 
uEgean  Islands  already  occupied  by  her.  But  for  the  realization  of 
her  promise  she  imposed  certain  conditions  which  necessitated  the 
maintenance  of  her  garrisons  in  the  ^Egean  not  only  during  the  war 
between  Turkey  and  the  Balkan  League,  but  until  the  Powers 
should  take  in  hand — either  by  a  Conference  or  by  war — the  whole 
question  of  the  revision  of  the  Treaty  of  Berlin. 


282  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

months  of  the  Italo-Turkish  War,  when  Italy  had  seized 
more  than  one-third  of  the  islands  of  the  Aegean,  and  Ger- 
many, her  ally,  had  announced  the  intention  of  placing  in 
the  North  Sea  a  fleet  the  equal  of  that  of  England,  then  at 
last  there  was  belated  talk  in  England  of  an  alliance  with 
France.  Even  Lord  Haldane,  whom  a  German  foreign 
office  communique  in  1906  had  described  as  "a  very 
germanophile  minister,"  x  warned  his  compatriots  that 
they  were  "  getting  slack  "  over  questions  of  national  de- 
fence, and  he  added  :  "  In  no  distant  time  we  ought  to  be 
the  most  powerful  military  and  naval  nation  combined 
that  the  world  has  ever  seen."  The  disinterested  outsider 
who  overhears  such  words  as  these  can  only  reply  :  "  There 
is  no  time  to  be  lost." 

There  is  no  time  to  be  lost — and  not  merely  because 
Spain  appears  to  be  moving  towards  a  dynastic  revolution, 
and  because  the  future  of  the  incomparable  Spanish  coast- 
line concerns  the  Powers  directly  interested  in  the  Mediter- 
ranean ;  nor  yet  because  the  mystic  and  the  superstitious 
believe  in  the  Vaticinium  Lehninense,  the  Prophecy  of 
Mayence  and  the  Predictions  of  Fiensberg,  fixing  for  1913  the 
end  of  the  German  Empire.2 

1  Deutsche  Revue,  September,   1906,  article  on  "  Germany  and 
Foreign  Policy." 

2  In  1849,  when  William  I,  then  Crown  Prince  of  Prussia,  was 
engaged  hi  repressing  the  revolution  in  Baden,  he  chanced  to  find 
himself  one  day  in  the  little  village  of  Fiensberg,  where  dwelt  an  old 
lady  famous  for  her  gift  of  prophecy.     He  sent  for  her  and  asked  her 
to  reveal  to  him  his  destiny.     The  pythoness  wrote  down  the  date 
1849,  and,  in  succession,  under   the  nine,  the  figures  i,  8,  4,  9.     She 
added  the  whole,  announcing  that  the  result,  1871,  would  give  the 
prince  the  date  of  his  coronation.     "  What  year  shall  I  die  ?  "  asked 
the  prince.     The  old  lady  wrote  down  the  number  "  1871  "  and, 
inscribing  beneath  the  "  one,"  according  to  the  same  method,  the 
numbers  i,  8,  7,  i,  added  these  figures,  producing  "  1888."     "  When 
will  the  German  Empire  be  destroyed  ?  "  continued  the  prince. 
The  process  already  employed,  when  applied  to  1888,  gave  the  date 
of  "  1913."     On  the  famous  "  Prophecies  of  Hermann,"  which  date 
from  the  Middle  Ages,  and  are  known  all  over  Germany,  there   is 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS    283 

Kirk-Kilisse  marks  the  end  of  an  epoch,  the  Bismarckian, 
and  the  beginning  of  a  new  era,  not  merely  of  European, 
but  of  world  history.  Thirty-nine  years  before  the  dis- 
covery of  America  the  Turks  took  Constantinople.  Four 
hundred  and  fifty-nine  years  later  Turkey  ceased  to  be  a 
European  Power.  She  has  been  thrust  back  into  Asia  by 
a  military  coalition  of  the  small  Slav  States.  This  is  the 
first  result  of  the  Balkan  War  of  1912.  What  are  the 
consequences  of  that  result  ?  They  are  numerous  and 
remarkable. 

The  War  has  put  an  end  to  the  dream  of  Catherine  II  : 
the  road  to  Byzantium  is  closed  to  Russia.  At  the  same 
time  the  enforced  concentration  of  the  Turks  in  Asia  will 
oblige  Russia  to  exercise  special  vigilance  in  the  region  be- 
tween the  Black  Sea  and  the  Caspian,  and  particularly  in 
her  sphere  of  influence  in  Armenia.  But  while  Russia 
has  been  arrested  in  her  overland  march  to  the  Middle  Sea, 
Austria  has  been  arrested  as  well,  and  Germany  also : 
a  new  Slav  empire,  the  United  States  of  Balkany,  has  taken 
the  place  left  vacant  by  the  Ottomans,  closing  the  road  to 
Salonica,  and  the  Pan-German  hopes  of  eventually  making 
Trieste  an  integral  part  of  the  national  patrimony  of;  Greater 
Germany  have  thus  been  dissipated.  In  other  words,  the 
rise  of  the  Balkan  States,  provided  they  succeed  in  maintain- 
ing their  union — if  they  devise  a  workable  Federation,  which 
will  lift  them,  as  allied  Powers,  to  the  dignity  of  a  Quadruple 
Entente  capable  of  assuring  their  political  and  economic 
independence  in  face  of  the  Triple  Entente  and  the  Triple 
Alliance 1 — will  have  effectually  altered  some  of  the  most 

an  abundant  literature.  The  latest  edition  of  the  text,  as  well  as 
of  the  text  of  the  "  Predictions  of  Mayence,"  may  be  found,  with 
adequate  comment,  in  an  amusing  publication,  La  Fin  de  I'Empire 
Allemand  pour  1913,  by  J.  H.  Lavaur  (Editions  Pratiques  et  Docu- 
mentaires,  Paris). 

1  A  quick  and  ingenious  way  for  them  to  cement  their  union 
would  be  to  insist  on  making  Albania  a  kind  of  Balkan  Reichsland,  the 
keystone  of  their  Federal  Constitution—a  territory  belonging  to  all 


284  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

important  factors  of  world-politics.  Certain  constant 
quantities  hitherto  figuring  in  one  entire  series  of  problems 
have  suddenly  been  eliminated.  The  statesmen  most 
embarrassed  by  this  alteration  of  the  accustomed  political 
formulas  are  those  of  the  Triple  Alliance.  The  perplexity 
of  France,  England  and  Russia  is  comparatively  slight. 
These  three  countries  have  been  able  to  settle  down  to 
the  solution  of  the  modified  problems,  without  undue  anxiety 
as  to  their  ability  to  integrate  the  new  factors.  Germany 
and  Austria,  on  the  contrary,  suddenly  confronted  by  Kirk- 
Kilisse,  are  called  on  to  deal  with  an  unknown  set  of  variables 
of  uncertain  bearing  and  value.  All  they  really  know 
to-day  is  that  Bismarck  blundered ;  and  that  the  Balkan 
factors  in  the  problems  of  the  modern  world  are,  after  all, 
turning  out  to  be  worth  more  than  the  prehistoric  and 
legendary  bones  of  the  Pomeranian  grenadier. 

As  a  result  of  the  Balkan  War,  the  German  drang  nach 
Osten  has  been  checked,  and  Austria  called  back  westward. 
It  has  already  been  shown  that  the  Balkan  ambitions  of 
Austria  were  the  result  of  her  disasters.  Napoleon  drove 
her  out  of  Italy  and  Germany,  and  offered  her  Istria  and 
Dalmatia.  Bismarck,  continuing  the  work  of  Napoleon, 
took  from  her  Venice,  promised  her  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina, 
and,  constructing  a  solid  German  bulwark  at  her  back, 
launched  her  on  her  perilous  voyage  down  the  Danube. 
He  gave  her  a  free  pass  across  Macedonia,  and  thereby 
lured  her  forth  on  her  ambiguous  destiny.  Although  Austria 
is  a  Power  essentially  German,  Bismarck  sought  to  make 
her  Slav ;  and  she  went  on  assimilating  the  territories  of 
the  Slavs  until  she  became  positively  "  saturated  "  with 

the  Balkan  States  but  monopolized  by  none,  and  nominally  governed 
by  rotatory  delegates  of  the  several  members  of  the  Balkan  League. 
Austria  alone  would  object  to  this  solution  for  the  Albanian  Question  ; 
Italy  would  not  complain.  The  creation  of  a  vaguely-defined  Al- 
bania, overlapping  the  region  of  the  recent  Servian  conquests,  in 
order  to  appease  Austria,  would  keep  the  Eastern  Question  still 
open. 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     285 

them.  "  Saturated  "  is,  indeed,  the  very  word  employed  by 
Comte  d'Aehrenthal,  the  first  of  her  public  men  to  recoil 
before  the  consequences  of  pursuing  a  German,  rather  than  a 
purely  Austrian,  policy.  When  Uskub  and  Ipek  were  cap- 
tured by  the  Servians  six  million  men  of  their  blood  in 
Austria-Hungary  applauded.  Eleven  million  Germans  and 
eight  million  Hungarians  govern  to-day  in  Austria-Hungary 
some  twenty-five  million  Slavs.  But  for  the  Balkan  War, 
Austria  would  have  gone  on  thus  absorbing,  or  trying  to 
absorb,  the  Balkan  Slavs,  and  she  would  soon  have  awaked 
to  the  fact  that  she  had  become  a  sort  of  pudding  stone  of 
peoples,  a  Plural  Monarchy  ripe  for  disintegration.  To 
have  played  much  longer  the  role  of  Prussian  vassal  would 
have  been  to  substitute  for  the  Eastern  Question  a  much 
more  complicated  Austrian  Question.  The  victories  of  the 
Balkan  League  have  come  at  the  "  psychological  moment." 
Austria  must  perforce  alter  her  national  policy.  She  is 
thrust  back  upon  herself.  She  is  given,  for  the  first  time 
since  1878 — for  the  first  time  since  Sadowa ! — the  oppor- 
tunity to  meditate  on  her  real  interests,  and  evolve  a  self- 
respecting  national  policy,  while  eliminating  the  germs  of 
anarchy,  fast  propagating  in  her  loosely-knit  composite 
empire.  Kirk-Kilisse,  which  has  stopped  the  German  offensive 
in  the  Balkans,  should  be  a  blessing  in  disguise  to  Austria. 
On  September  17,  1877,  Crispi,  who  was  then  President 
of  the  Italian  Chamber  of  Deputies,  and  who  had  been  sent 
by  the  Italian  Government  on  a  confidential  mission  to 
Berlin,  was  received  by  Bismarck,  with  whom  he  had  a 
long  and  remarkable  conversation,  carefully  reported  in  his 
Memoirs.  During  this  conversation  Bismarck  said  to  the 
Italian  statesman  :  "I  cannot  conceive  of  a  case  in  which 
Austria  would  be  our  enemy."  Crispi  replied  that  Austria 
at  the  time  evidently  stood  in  need  of  German  support, 
since  she  had  to  restore  her  financial  situation  and  reconstruct 
her  army  ;  but  "  Austria,"  he  added,  "  cannot  look  favour- 
ably on  the  new  German  Empire." 


286  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

"  You  say,"  continued  Crispi,  "  that  Germany  has  no  interest 
in  the  Eastern  Question.  Yet  you  cannot  forget  that  the  Danube 
is  to  a  large  degree  a  German  river  ;  it  flows  through  Ratisbonne,  and 
is  the  channel  of  German  trade  to  the  Black  Sea.  At  all  events,  we 
Italians  cannot,  like  you,  ignore  the  Eastern  Question.  ...  If  the 
Great  Powers  were  to  agree  to  abstain  from  all  conquest  in  the  Balkan 
provinces,  and  decide  that  the  territory  taken  from  the  Turks  should 
be  left  to  the  native  populations,  we  should  have  nothing  to  say. 
But  it  is  said  that  Russia,  in  order  to  conciliate  Austria,  has  offered 
the  latter  Bosnia  and  Herzegovina.  Now,  Italy  could  not  permit 
Austria  to  occupy  those  territories.  In  1866,  as  you  know,  the  king- 
dom of  Italy  was  left  without  frontiers  in  the  Eastern  Alps.  If 
Austria  were  to  obtain  new  provinces,  strengthening  her  position 
in  the  Adriatic,  our  country  would  be  caught  in  a  vice,  and  exposed 
to  invasion  at  the  pleasure  of  the  neighbouring  empire.  You  ought 
to  help  us.  We  are  loyal  to  treaties  and  demand  nothing  of  any- 
body. You  ought  to  dissuade  Count  Andrassy  to-morrow  from  any 
wish  to  take  over  Ottoman  territory." 

"  Austria,"  replied  Prince  Bismarck,  "  is  pursuing  an  excellent 
policy  at  present.  Only  one  case  could  arise  that  would  cause  a 
rupture  between  Austria  and  Germany,  namely  a  difference  between 
the  policies  of  the  two  Governments  in  Poland.  .  .  .  We  cannot 
allow  the  establishment  of  a  Catholic  kingdom  on  our  frontiers. 
It  would  be  a  France  in  the  North.  We  already  have  one  France. 
We  should  then  have  two,  which  would  naturally  be  allied,  and  we 
should  be  between  two  enemies.  .  .  .  Austria  knows  we  are  loyal 
friends.  She  is  following  a  good  course,  and  has  no  reason  to  change. 
If  she  did  change,  and  became  the  protectress  of  Catholicism,  we 
should  change  too,  and  then  we  should  be  with  Italy.  .  .  .  Don't 
try,  by  exciting  her  suspicions,  to  provide  Austria  with  a  pretext 
to  change  her  policy.  The  Danube  does  not  concern  us.  It  is 
navigable  only  from  Belgrade.  At  Ratisbonne  there  are  only  a 
few  rafts.  Bosnia,  the  whole  Eastern  Question,  is  of  no  interest  to 
Germany.  If  it  became  a  cause  of  quarrel  between  Austria  and 
Italy,  it  would  distress  us  to  see  two  friends  fighting  whom  we  wish 
to  see  living  in  peace.  Moreover,  if  Austria  took  Bosnia,  Italy  could 
take  Albania,  or  some  other  territory  on  the  Adriatic." 

It  is  more  than  thirty-five  years  since  this  conversation 
took  place.  Read  in  the  light  of  the  argument  of  the 
present  book,  there  is  not  a  sentence,  there  is  scarcely  a 
word,  in  it  that  is  not  rich  in  suggestion.  "  I  cannot  conceive 
of  a  case  in  which  Austria  would  be  our  enemy,"  said  Bis- 
marck to  Crispi,  and  in  the  same  breath  the  same  Bismarck 
remarked  :  "  We  cannot  allow  the  establishment  of  a  Catho- 


A  STUDY  OF   INTERNATIONAL   POLITICS    287 

lie  kingdom  on  our  frontiers."  Yet  Austria  has  now 
been  turned  back  westward  well  up  under  the  German 
bastions,  and  she  is  the  Austria  of  the  grandiose,  politico- 
religious  Eucharistic  Congress  of  1912.  She  has  struggled 
for  more  than  a  generation,  against  her  German  birthright, 
to  become  Slav  and  Balkan ;  she  is  constrained  at  last  to 
renew  her  devotion  to  her  ancestral  German  gods.  The 
Hapsburgs  are  an  older  race  than  the  Hohenzollerns  ;  they 
wore  an  Imperial  crown  350  years  before  William  of  Prussia 
passed  under  the  arch  of  the  Place  de  1'Etoile  in  Paris. 
"  I  cannot  conceive  of  a  case  in  which  Austria  would  be 
our  enemy !  "  The  potential  "  case "  has  arrived.  If 
Austria  has  finally  learned  the  whole  lesson  of  the  winter 
of  1912,  her  rulers — who  were  dumbfounded  (and  who  can 
wonder  ? )  by  the  sudden  shattering  of  the  dreams  of  a 
generation — will  with  statesmanlike  calm  readjust  their 
policy  to  the  new  exigencies  of  the  situation.  They  will 
understand  that  the  victory  of  the  Balkan  States  has  at 
last  made  it  possible  for  their  country  to  assert,  shoulder 
to  shoulder  with  Germany,  her  equal  moral  rights  and  her 
national  dignity ;  they  will  frankly  and  loyally  accept  the 
new  status  quo.  Austria,  as  the  nearest  neighbour  of  the 
new  Slav  federation,  will  learn  to  live  in  good  international 
comity  with  States  whose  economic  future  is  bound  up 
with  her  own.1  No  consequence  of  the  Balkan  War  is  more 
interesting  than  this  :  the  Austria  that  Germany  seemed  to 
have  bewitched  into  pursuing  the  unending  task  of  following 

1  The  economic  consequences  of  the  Balkan  War  are  for  Austria- 
Hungary  far  more  serious  than  the  political.  Before  the  war  its 
trade  with  Turkey  exceeded  its  entire  trade  with  all  the  Balkan 
Slates.  Turkey  was  satisfied  with  an  per  cent,  ad  valorem  tariff, 
whereas  the  duties  imposed  by  Bulgaria  and  Servia  on  such  articles 
as  sugar,  timber,  leather,  men's  underwear,  beer,  etc.,  are  most  oner- 
ous for  Austrian  industry.  The  United  States  of  Balkany  may  seek, 
by  a  Balkan  zollverein,  to  close  their  markets  to  Austrian  and  German 
trade.  Thus  economic,  quite  as  much  as  political,  apprehensions 
accounted  for  Austria's  attitude  during  the  Balkan  War,  and  will 
determine  its  policy  after  the  war. 


288  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

out  the  Bismarckian  plan  ;  the  blind  blond  pathetic  giant, 
doomed  to  "  toil  at  the  mill  with  slaves  "  for  the  Wilhelm- 
strasse,  is  finally  liberated.  The  Philistines  have  decided 
to  do  their  work  themselves.  Austria  had  so  long  been 
used  to  taking  orders  from  Berlin  that  when  the  task  Berlin 
had  set  her  was  suddenly  interrupted  her  very  destiny 
seemed  ended.  She  made  a  magnificent  effort  to  survive ; 
in  December,  1912,  she  converted  the  loosely-knit  agglomer- 
ation of  peoples  ruled  by  Francis  Joseph  into  a  compact 
bristling  camp,  with  the  object  of  showing  the  world  she 
was  a  nation.  It  is  certain  that  the  spectators  most  im- 
pressed were  the  Germans.  Kirk-Kilisse"  will  have  emanci- 
pated not  merely  the  Balkans.  It  will  have  marked  the 
rebirth  of  German  Austria. 

But  the  mobilization  of  Austria,  and  its  causes,  did  not 
merely  constitute  a  lesson  for  Germany.  They  were  also  a 
warning  for  Italy.  Italy,  indeed,  as  has  already  been  seen, 
had  no  need  of  such  a  warning.  She  has  always  had  a 
perfectly  clear  idea  of  the  peculiar  nature  of  the  armed 
neutrality  and  reciprocal  distrust  which  are  the  very  basis 
of  the  pact  uniting  her,  in  a  defensive  alliance,  to  her  partners 
in  the  Triplice.  "  Italy  could  not  permit  Austria  to  occupy 
Bosnia  and  Herzegovina,"  said  Crispi  to  Bismarck  in  1879, 
and  Bismarck  retorted  jauntily  :  "Do  what  you  like  about 
the  Eastern  Question  ;  we  have  no  interests  in  the  Balkans  ; 
if  Austria  takes  Bosnia,  Italy  could  take  Albania  or  some 
other  territory  on  the  Adriatic."  Crispi  left  Bismarck 
without  having  obtained  satisfaction.  A  year  later  at  the 
Congress  of  Berlin,  moreover,  Italy  beheld  closed  against  her 
all  the  Adriatic  doors  of  the  Balkans  :  the  port  of  Antivari 
was  given  to  Montenegro,  and  all  the  Montenegrin  waters 
were  shut  to  the  war-vessels  of  the  nations,  yet  the  maritime 
police  of  the  Montenegrin  coast-line  was  handed  over  to 
Austria,  and  Austria,  not  Italy,  was  permitted  to  "  accord 
her  consular  protection  to  the  Montenegrin  merchant  flag." 
Italy,  still  preserving  the  memory  of  the  old  trade  route, 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     289 

the  Via  di  Zenta,  and  of  the  still  more  ancient  Roman  way, 
the  Via  Egnatia — the  very  one  followed  in  the  winter  snows 
towards  Durazzo  by  the  Servians  on  their  glorious  march 
to  the  sea — Italy  came  forth  from  the  Berlin  Congress  with 
the  sense  that  her  interests  had  been  sacrificed  to  those  of 
Austria.  Bismarck  had  in  fact  made  it  possible  for  Austria 
to  organize  the  pacific  penetration  of  a  region  that  ought 
really  to  have  been  opened  to  Italy  :  "  Montenegro  must 
come  to  terms  with  Austria-Hungary  as  to  the  right  of 
constructing  and  maintaining  a  route  and  a  railway  across 
the  new  Montenegrin  territory  "  (Clause  29  of  the  Treaty  of 
Berlin).  Count  Corti,  the  Italian  plenipotentiary,  took  an 
amusing  and  futile  revenge,  during  the  very  deliberations 
of  the  Congress,  in  daily  allowing  the  more  important  results 
of  the  proceedings  to  leak  out  into  the  columns  of  The  Times, 
through  the  intermediary  of  M.  de  Blowitz.  But  Crispi 
was  already  meditating  a  vengeance  of  a  finer  Italian  quality. 
In  spite  of  his  appeal  to  Bismarck,  Bosnia  had  been  given 
to  Austria  for  eventual  occupation,  and  Albania  had  not 
been  given  to  Italy,  nor  had  she  been  offered  any  other 
territory  on  the  Adriatic.  Pending  some  satisfactory  re- 
venge Italy  took  provisionally  the  only  measure  that  could 
"  give  the  time  time."  II  tempo  e  galantuomo.  As  the  best 
practical  device  for  checking  Austrian  expansion  in  the 
Adriatic,  she  became  a  partner  to  the  Alliance  between 
Germany  and  Austria,  and  slowly  laid  her  plans  to  extricate 
herself  from  the  Germano-Austrian  web. 

In  1890  Crispi  wrote  privately  to  Lord  Salisbury  :  "If 
we  had  Tripoli,  Bizerta  would  no  longer  be  a  menace  for 
Italy  nor  for  Great  Britain."  The  British  Prime  Minister's 
reply  was  not  unfavourable,  but  he  conjured  his  Italian 
colleague  to  wait.  Crispi,  as  a  true  Italian,  could  not  ask 
for  more  ;  but  a  year  later  (January  i,  1891)  he  fell  from 
office,  and  the  occupation  of  Tripoli  was  adjourned  for 
twenty  years.  This  letter,  however,  was  the  origin  of  the 
Mediterranean  arrangement  with  England — scon  to  be 


2go  PROBLEMS   OF   POWER 

followed  up  by  the  Franco-Italian  arrangements  of  1892, 
which  were  to  result  in  a  Mediterranean  Triple  Alliance 
between  England,  France  and  Italy,  an  alliance  which  was  to 
form  an  obstacle  in  the  future  to  many  a  belated  German 
scheme.  Algeciras  was  the  Nemesis  of  Germany.  The 
Germans  had  fancied  that  the  impetus  given  to  their  foreign 
policy  by  Bismarck  required  no  watching.  They  had 
counted  without  the  subtle  diplomacy  of  the  Consulta. 
The  general  result  of  that  diplomacy  had  been  to  assure 
to  Italy — not  in  spite,  but  because,  of  her  apparently  con- 
flicting engagements  to  the  members  of  the  two  recipro- 
cally hostile  European  groups — a  position  of  independence 
superior  to  that  of  any  of  the  European  Powers,  not  excepting 
England.  She  seemed  to  have  allowed  herself  to  be  bound 
fast.  Seen  from  afar  she  looked  like  a  Laocoon  in  the  coils 
of  the  two  monstrous  serpents.  Yet  she  felt  herself  free  in 
all  her  movements.  She  was  less  free  than  she  fancied,  as 
she  discovered  when,  early  in  the  Italo-Turkish  War,  she 
proceeded  to  bombard  the  Albanian  coast,  in  order  to 
bring  Turkey  to  terms,  and  suddenly  found  herself  warned 
off  the  precincts  of  Valona  by  her  excellent  neighbour  and 
ally,  Austria-Hungary.  This  veto  rankled.  Obviously 
the  effects  of  the  Bismarckian  envoutement  of  Europe  were 
not  yet  wholly  spent.  Italy  decided  to  fight  out  her  destiny 
in  Africa,  and  meanwhile  subtly  contrived  a  still  more  effective 
vengeance  for  the  Treaty  of  Berlin.  When  the  King  of 
Montenegro,  father  to  the  Queen  of  Italy,  and  himself  a 
pensioner  of  that  Tsar  who  at  Racconigi  signed  with  Victor 
Emmanuel  a  treaty  concerning  the  Balkans,  declared  war 
against  Turkey,  Signor  Giolitti  must  have  poured  libations 
to  the  manes  of  the  great  Crispi.  Italy  had  managed  to  obtain 
a  long-coveted  strip  of  the  North  African  coast-line,  and 
she  had  moreover  partially  contributed  to  the  creation  of  a 
situation  in  the  neighbouring  Balkans  which  would  permit 
her,  at  last,  to  challenge  her  relentless  rival,  and  "  ally," 
Austria,  in  regions  from  which  both  Germany  and  Austria 


A  STUDY   OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS    291 

had  for  thirty  years  done  their  best  to  exclude  her.  Face 
to  face  with  a  potential  United  States  of  Balkany,  Italy* 
in  her  diplomatic  disputes  with  Austria,  now  has  a  tangible 
object  for  which  to  fight.  Austria,  by  the  same  token — 
driven  back  westward,  and  confronted  with  a  problem  of 
constructive  nationalism  which  can  be  solved  only  to  the 
diminution  of  the  prestige  of  Germany — becomes  a  greater 
menace  than  ever  to  Italy.  Never  did  a  responsible  sove- 
reign give  a  more  certain  proof  of  pacific  intention  than 
William  II  when  he  induced  his  allies  of  Rome  and  Vienna 
to  renew,  while  the  Balkan  War  was  still  in  progress,  and 
before  the  fate  of  the  Eastern  Adriatic  was  settled,  the 
pact  of  the  Triple  Alliance.  By  what  device  Italy  managed 
to  maintain  her  independence,  while  still  renewing  this 
pact,  and  thus  rendered  a  service  not  only  to  peace,  but 
also  to  the  Powers  of  the  Triple  Entente,  has  already  been 
explained. 

Thus,  among  the  numerous  consequences  of  the  Balkan 
War  that  have  now  been  examined,  one  of  the  most  signifi- 
cant is  that  Italy  will  be  more  than  ever  inclined  to  use 
to  the  utmost  her  Mediterranean  Agreements  with  France 
and  England,  and  less  than  ever  ready  to  further  the  growth 
of  the  sea-power  of  her  Triple  Alliance  partners  in  the  Medi- 
terranean. Speaking  at  the  Farnese  Palace  on  New  Year's 
Day,  1913,  the  French  Ambassador,  M.  Barrere,  said  : — 

"  Nothing  that  has  taken  place  in  Africa  has  been  able  to  alter 
the  sentiments  of  mutual  understanding  and  common  interest  that 
inspired  the  negotiation  of  the  Franco-Italian  Agreements  of  1900 
and  1902.  These  Agreements  subsist  with  undiminished  vigour; 
their  object  remains  intact.  They  have  given  France  and  Italy 
twelve  years  of  friendly  relations,  based  on  mutual  recognition  of 
their  interests,  and  so  firmly  established  that  we  can  take  it  as 
certain  that  they  will  continue  to  develop  for  the  prosperity  and 
grandeur  of  both  countries.  Finally  these  Agreements  have  been  a 
precious  guarantee  of  European  equilibrium.  .  .  .  During  the  past 
year  France  and  Italy  became,  by  a  magnificent  effort  of  national 
energy,  neighbours  in  the  Dark  Continent,  as  they  are  in  the  Alps 
and  in  the  Mediterranean.  This  fresh  contract  imposes  upon  the 


292  PROBLEMS  OF   POWER 

two  Latin  nations  an  increase  of  confidence,  friendly  intercourse  and 
mutual  aid.  For  they  are  defending  together  the  same  ideal  of 
civilization,  and  their  moral  interest  in  this  great  and  noble  task 
is  identical." 

These  are  the  words  of  one  of  the  half-dozen  makers  of 
contemporary  Europe.  They  were  uttered  after  the  renewal 
of  the  Triple  Alliance.  Italy's  decision  to  acquiesce  in  the 
renewal  of  that  Alliance — on  condition  that  its  purely 
defensive  character  be  not  altered,  and  that  it  should  not 
be  extended  to  the  Mediterranean — is  clear  evidence  of  her 
conviction  that  her  Mediterranean  Agreements  with  France 
and  England  have  been  among  the  most  effective  guarantees 
of  European  peace.  Her  decision  suggests  also  that  now, 
face  to  face  as  she  is  with  Islamism,  and  with  a  concentrat- 
ing Austria,  she  will  seek  to  supplement  these  Agreements 
by  further  arrangements  with  England  and  France,  tending 
to  establish  peace  for  a  generation  in  the  "  Latin  Sea,"  and 
on  the  North  African  coast-line.1  "  If  we  had  Tripoli, 
Bizerta  would  no  longer  be  a  menace  for  Italy  nor  for  Great 
Britain,"  said  Crispi  to  Salisbury.  But  when  Crispi  wrote 
these  words  France  and  England  were  deadly  enemies.  In 
1913  the  problem  of  British  sea-power  has  become  a  function 
of  an  even  larger  problem,  that  of  the  maintenance  of  the 

1  In  a  remarkable  speech  (February  23,  1913)  before  the  Italian 
Chamber,  the  Marquis  di  San  Giuliano,  Italian  minister  for  Foreign 
Affairs,  drew  an  elegant  distinction  between  balance  of  power  in 
the  Adriatic  and  balance  of  power  in  the  Mediterranean.  The 
former  problem,  he  said,  was  "  going  to  be  "  solved  by  "  the  inti- 
mate collaboration  of  Italy  and  Austria-Hungary,  the  co-operation 
of  Germany,  and  the  broad  and  pacific  spirit  of  equity  of  the  other 
Great  Powers."  Some  critics  concluded  that  the  phrase  :  "  co- 
operation of  Germany  "  implied  Italian  acquiescence  in  Germany's 
proposal  to  extend  the  Triple  Alliance  to  the  Mediterranean. 
The  reference  was  obviously  to  Albania.  As  to  the  general  balance 
of  power  in  the  Mediterranean  the  Italian  minister  insisted  on  the 
fact  that  that  sea  must  be  an  open  highway  to  all  the  nations,  but 
he  declared  that  the  Mediterranean  Agreements  with  France  and 
England  were  still  in  existence,  and  he  avoided  any  fresh  reference 
to  "  German  co-operation." 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     293 

British  Empire.  This  is  a  situation  which  Italy's  ambigu- 
ous position,  as  member  of  two  reciprocally  hostile  groups 
of  Powers,  renders  particularly  acute.  Kirk-Kilisse  has 
tended  to  turn  Italy  more  than  ever  towards  the  Powers  of 
the  Mediterranean ;  but  it  has  not  detached  her  from  the 
Triple  Alliance.  At  present  she  is  so  placed  as  to  be  able  to 
play  a  preponderant  role  in  the  counsels  of  Europe.  It  is 
significant  that  when,  on  the  death  of  Kiderlen  Waechter, 
William  II  had  to  choose  a  secretary  of  state  for  foreign 
affairs,  his  choice  fell  on  the  German  Ambassador  in  Rome. 
And  it  should  now  at  last  be  clear  why  the  settlement  of  the 
questions  suddenly  forced  upon  the  attention  of  the  members 
of  the  Triple  Entente,  by  the  turn  taken  by  the  Turco- 
Italian  War  and  by  the  success  of  the  Balkan  League, 
is  to  be  the  supreme  test  of  the  solidity  of  that  pact. 


VI 

Meanwhile,  the  three  Powers  must  act  together  in  the  Far 
East.  This  is  the  second  theatre  of  the  concerted  activity 
of  the  Triple  Entente.  Three  special  arrangements  already 
fix  the  conditions  in  which  that  Entente  is  to  work  out 
its  programme  in  that  vast  region.  There  is  the  Anglo- 
Russian  Entente,  there  is  the  Anglo- Japanese  Alliance, 
and  there  is  the  latest  Russo-Japanese  Agreement.  These 
three  pacts  were  formed,  have  been  occasionally  modified, 
and  will  continue  to  be  respected,  with  the  object  of  main- 
taining peace  in  Persia,  China,  and  Far  Eastern  waters. 
Eight  years  after  the  battles  of  Manchuria,  Russia  and 
Japan,  with  a  practical  sense  that  should  make  a  Bismarck 
turn  in  his  grave/are  coming  to  terms  for  the  common  econo- 
mic domination  of  China,  and  it  is  within  England's  power 
to  share  this  hegemony  and  eventually  convert  it  into  political 
predominance.  France,  the  ally  of  Russia,  and  England,  the 
ally  of  Japan,  have  their  parts  cut  out  for  them  :  it  is 


394  PROBLEMS   OF   POWER 

nothing  less  than  vigilantly  to  prevent  the  Russo-Japanese 
understanding  from  becoming  an  instrument  for  the  de- 
struction of  China.  Gen.  Homer  Lea  has  pointed  out  (ch. 
vii,  The  Day  of  the  Saxon)  the  vital  necessity  for  Eng- 
land both  to  thwart  the  naval  expansion  of  Japan  in 
the  Pacific,  and  to  defend  the  integrity  of  China.  The 
maintenance  of  the  political  and  military  equilibrium  of  the 
Pacific  is,  Indeed,  one  of  England's  first  Imperial  duties  : 
hence  the  predominant  part  played  by  India  in  British 
Imperial  strategy.  The  natural  alliance  was  between 
England  and  China,  not  between  England  and  Japan.  But 
from  the  point  of  view  of  the  balance  of  power  in  the  Pacific, 
France,  sovereign  in  Indo-China,  has  the  same  interests  as 
England.  The  partners  to  the  Dual  Entente  ought  to  co- 
operate, therefore,  in  the  establishment  of  good  government 
in  China,  and  prevent  any  Russo-Japanese  arrangement 
from  hampering  their  common  action.  It  should  not, 
however,  be  a  cause  of  regret  to  either  Power  if  Russo- 
Japanese  co-operation  in  Northern  China  diverts  Japanese 
ambition  from  the  Pacific  towards  the  Continent,  and  Rus- 
sian expansion  from  India  to  North-Eastern  China.  As 
Gen.  Lea  has  said  :  "  Should  Japan,  to  extend  her  sovereignty 
on  the  Asian  continent,  neglect  to  first  gain  control  of  the 
Pacific,  then  the  duration  of  her  national  greatness  will  draw 
to  an  end."  Russia  and  Japan,  it  will  be  remembered, 
celebrated  the  fourth  of  July  (American  Independence  Day), 
1910,  by  declaring  that  if  the  Manchurian  status  quo  were 
menaced,  "  they  would  come  to  terms  as  to  the  measures 
they  might  deem  necessary  to  take  for  the  maintenance 
of  the  said  status  quo."  This  was  an  apt  and  timely  retort 
to  the  sensational  and  ill-advised  proposals  of  Mr.  Taft's 
Government  for  the  internationalizing  of  the  Manchurian 
railways.  It  was  an  amusing  instance  of  Monroism  in 
Asiatic  waters.  Since  then  the  sphere  of  Chinese  territory 
over  which  the  Russians  and  the  Japanese  have  publicly 
extended  their  prohibitive  sway  has  been  made  to  include 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS    295 

Mongolia,1  and  the  two  Powers  are  already  prospecting 
these  new  spheres  for  the  construction  of  railways.  England, 
who  helped  Japan  to  secure  her  foothold  hi  Corea,  cannot 
be  surprised  at  what  has  happened,  and  the  United  States 
has  even  less  cause  to  wonder,  even  though  Russo-Japanese 
co-operation  in  Asia  probably  implies  the  shattering  of  the 
Germano- American  principle  of  the  "  open  door."  *  Great 
Britain,  in  revising,  in  July,  1911,  her  treaty  of  Alliance  with 
Japan,  took  the  first  step  towards  the  realization  of  what 
should  be  her  chief  aim,  the  fusing  of  the  British  Empire ; 
but,  in  so  doing,  she  virtually  left  Japan  in  the  lurch.  To 
please  the  President  of  the  United  States,  to  appease  the 
Prime  Ministers  of  the  Dominions,  and  to  avoid  entangle- 
ments in  connexion  with  the  opening  of  the  Panama  Canal, 
she  insisted  on  emasculating  her  agreement  with  Japan,  and 
left  her  old  ally  to  shift  for  herself  in  her  home  waters.8 

1  By  the  Russo-Mongolian  Agreement  of  October  21,  1912,  Russia 
is  to  "  lend  Mongolia  support  in  the  maintenance  of  the  autonomous 
regime  established  by  the  latter."  In  return  the  Regent  of  Mongolia 
concedes  to  Russian  subjects  and  to  Russian  trade  the  enjoyment  of 
special  rights  and  privileges.  The  Mongolian  Government  is  not 
to  conclude  any  agreement  with  China  or  any  other  Power  "  travers- 
ing or  modifying  the  Treaty  with  Russia  "  without  the  assent  of 
the  Imperial  Russian  Government.  We  shall  shortly,  no  doubt, 
learn  the  Japanese  counterpart  of  this  Treaty. 

8  Yet  both  the  Treaty  of  Portsmouth  (September  5,  1906)  and  the 
second  and  third  Anglo- Japanese  Treaties  of  Alliance  (August  12, 
1905,  and  July  13,  1911)  admitted  the  principle  of  the  Open  Door  in 
Manchuria.  Clause  4  of  the  Russo-Japanese  Treaty  agreed  "  not 
to  oppose  the  general  measures  common  to  all  the  Powers  which 
China  might  take  for  the  development  of  the  trade  and  industry  of 
Manchuria "  ;  and  the  Anglo-Japanese  treaties,  going  further, 
stated  it  to  be  the  object  of  those  agreements  "  to  preserve  the  com- 
mon interests  of  all  Powers  in  China  by  ensuring  the  independence 
and  integrity  of  the  Chinese  Empire,  and  the  principle  of  equal 
opportunities  for  the  commerce  and  industry  of  all  nations  in  China." 
It  is  in  consequence  of  the  action  of  just  such  protestations  as  these 
in  favour  of  the  "  integrity  of  the  Ottoman  Empire,"  that  Turkey 
has  been  crumbling  and  will  continue  to  crumble. 

3  That  was  the  upshot — on  paper  ! — and  probably  the  intention, 
of  the  revised  treaty  of  July  13,  1911.  England  accepted  the  clause 


296  PROBLEMS   OF   POWER 

Happily,  the  Russo-Japanese  War  was  concluded  without 
leaving  behind  it  an  Asiatic  Alsace-Lorraine.  One  Treaty 
of  Frankfort  is  enough  for  one  century.  The  former  enemies 
rushed  into  each  other's  arms.  The  consequence  is  simple 
but  prodigious.  The  bugaboo  of  the  Yellow  Peril  will 
be  definitely  laid  by  Russo-Japanese  co-operation.  No 
result  could  be  either  more  desirable  or  more  logical ;  none 
could  be  more  convenient  for  Great  Britain  and  for  France, 
nor,  it  should  be  added,  for  the  United  States,  whose  atten- 
tion for  some  time  to  come  must  be  steadily  concentrated 
north  and  south  of  Colon  and  Panama.  The  apprehensions 
of  the  Powers,  lest  with  the  "  break-up  "  of  China  the  whole 
race  should  be  submerged  by  a  muddy  and  mounting  tide  of 

obliging  both  Powers  to  come  to  each  other's  rescue  should  they  be 
the  object  of  an  unprovoked  attack,  but  it  inserted  in  the  new 
treaty  a  fresh  clause  providing  that  if  "  either  Contracting  Party 
concluded  a  treaty  of  general  arbitration  with  a  third  Power,  nothing 
in  the  Agreement  should  entail  upon  such  Contracting  Party  an 
obligation  to  go  to  war  with  the  Power  with  whom  such  treaty  of 
arbitration  was  in  force."  This  fresh  clause  was  a  concession  to 
Canada,  Australia,  and  the  United  States.  But  it  is  one  of  the  ironies 
of  history  that  the  Taft  project  of  unrestricted  arbitration,  signed 
by  England  and  the  United  States,  was  not  ratified  by  the  American 
Senate.  England,  like  the  dog  in  the  fable,  sacrificed  the  bone  for 
the  shadow ;  and  the  result  was  that  Japan,  herself  on  the  point  of 
being  left  in  the  lurch,  turned  towards  Russia  for  moral  and  material 
support  against  the  Powers  aiming  at  the  hegemony  of  the  Pacific. 
By  the  failure  of  the  Arbitration  scheme,  moreover,  England  slipped, 
as  it  were,  between  two  stools.  She  lost  Japanese  goodwill,  and  she 
did  not  obtain  that  of  the  United  States.  England  is  now,  in  spite 
of  the  revision  of  the  Japanese  treaty,  exactly  where  she  was  before 
its  revision,  as  regards  her  obligations  towards  Japan  in  case  of  war. 
In  a  word,  Mr.  Roosevelt  and  Mr.  Henry  Cabot  Lodge,  by  their 
violent  hostility  to  Mr.  Taft's  Arbitration  Treaty,  knocked  the  bottom 
out  of  the  British  plan  to  render  a  friendly  service  to  the  United 
States,  while  satisfying  the  insistent  claims  of  the  Dominion.  As 
things  are  now,  therefore,  England  would  have  to  defend  Japan  by 
arms  if  Japan  were  attacked,  say,  by  the  United  States.  The  pre- 
dicament of  the  Dominions  would  then  be  a  peculiar  one.  Happily, 
the  new  Japanese  arrangements  with  Russia  are  likely  to  render 
less  probable  an  eventual  shock  between  Japan  and  the  United 
States  in  the  Pacific. 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     297 

yellow  men,  are  being  conjured  away.  China  is  not  break- 
ing up  ;  China  is  being  organized.  The  trade,  the  industry, 
and  the  finance  of  the  world,  American  and  German  and 
British  business  enterprise,  and  American,  French  and 
British  money,  are  shortly  to  render  Chinamen  so  busy  at 
home,  under  the  surveillance  of  Japan  and  the  Triple  En- 
tente, that  many  of  the  now  urgent  problems  of  immigra- 
tion which  are  disturbing  the  nights  of  American,  Canadian, 
Mexican,  Chilian,  and  Australian  statesmen  will,  temporarily 
at  all  events,  be  shelved.1  And  for  the  United  States, 
above  all,  it  is  an  event  of  the  happiest  omen  that,  just  on 
the  eve  of  the  opening  of  the  Panama  Canal,  Japan  should 
seem  to  be  turning  her  main  attention  to  the  problem  of 
co-operation  with  Russia  to  do  the  world's  work  in  those 
regions  of  the  Pacific  where  her  share  of  the  white  man's 
burden  is  and  where  her  responsibilities  seem  to  lie.  She 
needs  no  naval  base  on  the  other  side  of  the  Pacific,  at  Mag- 
dalena  Bay  or  elsewhere,  to  complete  the  marvellous  epic  of 
her  rise  to  the  rank  of  a  Great  Power  by  achievements  as 
glorious  as  those  that  marked  even  the  miraculous  reign  of 
Mitsu-Hito.  For  the  moment  she  has  enough  to  do  at 
home.  The  new  era  of  Taisho  is  to  test  her  national  char- 
acter as  it  was  never  tested  even  in  the  era  of  Meiji.  Japan 
has  had  to  pay  dear  for  the  luxury  and  honour  of  becoming  a 
World-Power.  Six  months  after  the  close  of  the  war  her 
public  debt  amounted  to  1,850,000,000  yen,  and  her  taxes 
were  5-27  yen  per  inhabitant.  Five  years  later,  March  31, 
1911,  the  debt  was  2,650,000,000,  while  the  taxes  were  6'2 
yen  per  inhabitant.  Thus  the  taxes,  the  majority  of  which 
are  still  the  taxes  imposed  because  of  a  great  war,  remain 
virtually  unaltered  and  must  be  revised.  The  burden  of 
taxation  borne  by  the  Japanese  citizen  is  twice  that  weighing 
on  the  shoulders  of  Frenchmen  or  Englishmen.  A  policy  of 

1  The  Japonization  of  China  has  been  remarkably  treated  by  M. 
Ren6  Pinon  in  La  lutte  pour  le  Pacifique,  pp.  97-152. 


298  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

retrenchment  and  reform  is  absolutely  necessary.  Already 
a  Japanese  minister  of  finance,  Mr.  Yamomoto,  introducing 
into  the  State  administration  the  principle  of  festina  lente, 
has  succeded  in  curtailing  the  ambitions  of  his  colleagues 
of  the  departments  of  public  works,  of  the  army  and  of  the 
navy,  while  promising  the  Japanese  people  to  lighten  their 
burdens  in  the  next  budget.  The  circumstances  attending 
the  resignation  of  the  Japanese  Cabinet  early  in  December, 

1912,  owing   to   the   deadlock   between  the  civil  and   the 
military    elements,    and    the    Tokyo    riots    of    February, 

1913,  showed  the  immense    change    that  has   come   over 
Japan  in  the  last  ten  years  as  regards  the  growth  of  a 
public  opinion  hostile  to  Imperialism  and  in  favour  of  re- 
trenchment.    This  is  a  state  of  things  that  should  not  be 
overlooked  in  attempting  to  plot  the  curve  of  Japanese- 
American  relations  in  the  Pacific.     Japan  must  remain  busy 
at  home  or  within  the  immediate  precincts  of  her  own  home- 
waters.     Five  years  at  least  of  peace  and  a  rigorously  prudent 
financial  and  fiscal  policy  will  be  required  to  place  her  in  a 
position  permitting  her  to  contemplate  the  future  without 
dismay.     Already  she  has  had  to  borrow  money  abroad  to 
pay  the  interest  on  loans  previously  contracted.    An  immense 
specie  reserve  of  Japan's  money  is  thus  immobilized  in  Eng- 
land.    Additional  foreign  loans  will  still  be  necessary. 

In  general,  it  may  be  said  that  the  first  quarter  of  the 
twentieth  century  will  probably  be  marked  in  world  chron- 
icles as  that  in  which  the  hinterland  of  the  eastern  shores  of 
Asia  was  rapidly  laid  open  to  the  play  of  economic  and  financial 
forces.  In  order  that  this  evolution  may  proceed  in  peace, 
Russia  and  Japan  must  be  suffered  to  police  those  waters 
with  the  military  and  financial  co-operation  of  their  friends 
and  allies.  This  operation,  which  will  be  made  immeasurably 
easier  by  the  opening  of  the  Panama  Canal,  will  take  place 
far  more  rapidly  than  is  generally  suspected,  and  before, 
from  the  Caspian  across  Siberia  to  the  sea  of  Okhotsk, 
and  from  Teheran  to  the  Yellow  Sea,  the  colossal  interior 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL   POLITICS      299 

of  the  Asiatic  triangle,  the  apex  of  which  is  notched  by  the 
indentations  of  Cadiz,  Brest,  London  and  Marseilles,  will 
be  criss-crossed  with  railways  built  by  Western  capital, 
that  will  discipline  in  civilizing  ways  a  population  ready  to 
take  its  part  in  the  task  of  world  organization.  It  seems 
hard  to  believe  that  certain  Englishmen,  deaf  to  the  appeal 
of  observers  like  Sir  Valentine  Chirol,  are  still  hesitating  to 
take  into  friendly  consideration  the  proposal  for  the  con- 
struction of  a  Trans-Persian  railway  :  a  railway  that  is 
certain  to  be  built ;  that,  if  built  by  Russia,  France  and 
England,  will  solidify  the  Triple  Entente  ;  that  will  "  help 
to  restore  the  economic  prosperity  of  Persia,"  "  strengthen 
the  central  authority  and  pacify  the  turbulent  regions 
through  which  it  will  pass  "  ;  and,  finally,  will  render  India 
an  accessibly  tangible  portion  of  the  British  Empire  and 
insert  a  prosperous  buffer-State  between  Russia  and  Eng- 
land. While  these  hesitations  are  being  prolonged,  the 
Russian  Government  has  launched  out  on  a  vast  scheme  of 
public  works  that  are  to  transform  its  Asiatic  possessions. 
Russia  is  building,  or  is  about  to  build,  feelers  to  its  great 
railway  across  Siberia  ;  another  railway  from  the  shores  of 
the  Caspian  by  way  of  Merv  and  Bokhara,  along  the  fron- 
tier of  Afghanistan  to  Samarkand  ;  still  another  linking 
the  Volga  to  the  Sea  of  Aral ;  and  another  opening  up 
Turkestan  as  far  as  Tashkent.  These  projects  are  but  a  few 
items  in  the  vast  programme  which  the  solid  co-operation  of 
the  Triple  Entente  with  Japan  may  carry  out  in  the  interests 
of  the  economic  improvement  of  Asia,  and  of  the  peace  of 
the  world  during  the  next  twenty  years.  The  detached 
critic  of  world-movements  may  apply  to  this  whole  series 
of  schemes  the  words  applied  by  The  Times  to  the  project 
of  the  Trans- Iranian  :  "  We  only  hope  that  when  the  moment 
comes  for  sifting  them  they  will  be  judged  with  greater  fore- 
sight than  was  shown  by  British  Governments  in  the  case  of 
the  Suez  Canal ;  for  fortune  may  not  again  enable  us  to 
redeem  the  folly  of  narrow  views." 


300  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

VII 

But  the  era  of  "  narrow  views  "  is  past.  Mankind  is  living 
amid  a  contagion  of  adventure.  The  moment  is  at  hand  when 
the  dream  of  Columbus,  of  ultimately  reaching  India  if  he 
sailed  steadily  into  the  West,  is  on  the  point  of  fulfilment. 
The  nations  are  already  rushing  into  the  vortex  of  the 
Caribbean.  The  Panama  Canal  will  be  open  in  1914.  On 
the  other  side  of  the  world,  the  Japanese,  two  years  ahead 
of  time,  have  already  completed  the  trans-Corean  railway 
linking  the  Russian  station  of  Kharbine  to  the  landing- 
stage  at  Fousan,  and  have  signed  a  contract  with  the 
"  French  Sleeping  Car  Company  "  for  the  organization  of  a 
direct  bi-weekly  service  between  Paris  and  Tokyo.  Even 
a  "  little  Englander "  will  reflect  before  really  trying  to 
wreck  the  Trans-Iranian. 

The  Powers  are  rushing  into  the  Caribbean,  and  only 
Poseidon,  the  Earth-Shaker,  who  in  August,  1912,  altered  the 
shore-line  of  the  Dardanelles,  and  who  has  a  revenge  to  take 
for  Nicaragua,  can  now  stem  the  tide.  The  Caribbean, 
it  has  been  noted,  is  the  third  field  of  activity  for  the  Triple 
Entente.  In  reality,  in  considering  the  Triple  Entente, 
the  common  interests  of  France  and  England  alone  need 
be  dealt  with,  with  regard  to  the  opening  of  the  Panama 
Canal.  Russia  may  be  left  out  of  account  until  she  has 
realized  her  project  of  bridging  Behring's  Sea.  But  in  the 
American  Mediterranean,  between  Venezuela  and  the  Gulf 
of  Mexico,  France  and  England  are  confronted  with  quite 
another  set  of  conditions  ;  they  are  face  to  face  with  a  new 
Power.  Here  they  have  to  deal  no  longer  with  the  members 
of  the  Triple  Entente  alone,  but  with  a  great  State  which 
had  hitherto  made  it  a  point  of  honour  to  be  able  to  get  on 
alone,  independently  of  an  "  effete  Europe,"  and  has 
ridiculed  almost  as  roundly  as  England  herself  (it  is  in  the 
blood)  the  possible  advantages  of  "  entangling  alliances." 
There  is  evidence  that  the  United  States  is  not  even  yet 


A  STUDY  OF   INTERNATIONAL   POLITICS     301 

aware  of  the  changes  in  store  for  it  in  consequence  of 
the  unconcerted,  but  common  and  glorious,  achievement 
of  M.  Bunau-Varilla  and  Mr.  Roosevelt :  the  Revolution 
of  Panama  and  the  completion  of  the  Canal.  It  is  probable 
that  the  Americans,  absorbed,  as  Rear-Admiral  Mahan 
puts  it,  in  their  "  national  ignorant  self-sufficiency," 
preoccupied  by  the  pressing  problem  of  organizing  demo- 
cracy on  the  vastest  scale  on  which  that  operation  has  ever 
been  attempted,  engaged  in  the  gigantic  task  of  construc- 
tive nationalism  to  which  they  have  been  impelled  by  the 
energy  and  intelligence  of  Mr.  Roosevelt,  may  not  yet  be 
alive  to  all  the  consequences  of  their  Martian  enterprise. 
But  their  national  self-defence  is  a  matter  of  constructive 
nationalism,  and  in  view  of  the  rapid  march  of  time  it  is 
perhaps  the  main  matter  with  which  they  have  now  to 
deal. 

During  the  ten  years  following  on  the  Spanish-American 
War,  the  American  Government  pursued  but  half-con- 
sciously  the  policy  of  introducing  her  voice  into  the  coun- 
sels of  Europe  and  the  world.  The  imperialism  of  her  drift, 
though  it  escaped  the  notice  of  the  average  American  citizen, 
was  clearly  perceived  by  the  outside  world,  and  it  has 
already  been  shown  that  this  fact,  and  this  alone,  gave  Mr. 
Roosevelt  his  prestige  in  Europe.  While  holding — some- 
what arrogantly — to  a  vague  and  intangible  principle  known 
as  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  the  United  States  meddled  in 
matters  which  it  might  have  been  thought  logical,  but 
which  it  was  practically  impossible,  for  it  to  ignore.  The 
United  States  had  not  intervened  in  the  China- Japanese 
war  of  1894-1895.  In  1897,  as  is  recalled  by  M.  Ren£ 
Pinon  in  his  Lutte  pour  le  Pacifique,  Mr.  Sherman,  the 
Secretary  of  State,  declared  to  a  French  diplomatist  that 
the  United  States  "  had  not  a  cent's  worth  of  trade  with 
China,  and  would  never  send  a  soldier  there."  Yet  in  1900 
the  United  States  took  part  in  the  Peking  Expedition.  What 
had  happened  was  that  a  protective  tariff  had  made  the  ex- 


302  PROBLEMS   OF   POWER 

portation  of  cotton  goods  from  Massachusetts  into  Manchuria 
a  desirable  object  of  American  activity,  and  a  sufficient  pre- 
text for  the  American  claim  to  the  maintenance  of  an 
"  Open  Door  "  in  Eastern  Asia,  at  the  very  moment  that 
the  United  States  was  establishing  itself  in  the  Philippines. 
Every  day,  in  fact,  revealed  the  fundamental  antinomy 
between  the  principle  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  and,  not  merely 
certain  of  the  moral  and  intellectual  and  economic  forces  of 
the  modern  world,  but  the  consensus  of  opinion,  philosophic 
and  juristic,  which  the  pressure  of  those  forces  was  causing 
to  be  codified  in  international  law.  At  the  same  time,  there 
was  revealed  to  the  United  States  the  necessity  of  possessing 
the  fleet  of  its  policy,  the  arm  that  could  permit  it  the 
luxury  of  a  Monroe  Doctrine.  It  made  frantic,  character- 
istic, even  sincere  efforts,  to  stick  to  the  logic  of  its  Doctrine 
without  a  fleet.  Whatever  happened  it  would  hold  to  its 
inexperienced  American  idealism.  In  1902  it  handed  over 
the  administration  of  Cuba  to  its  own  people.  In  1909,  after 
having  governed  the  island  for  three  years  in  order  to  stave 
off  civil  war,  it  shirked  a  second  time  the  duty  of  facing 
plain  political  facts.  A  lack  of  intellectual  probity  is  often 
characteristic  of  Anglo-Saxon  statesmanship,  and  of  late 
years,  in  America,  Mr.  Roosevelt  alone  would  seem  to  have 
had  an  inkling  of  the  profound  practical  truth  of  Spinoza's 
remark  :  "  It  matters  little,  as  regards  the  security  of  the 
State,  what  the  motives  of  rulers  may  be  in  the  successful 
administration  of  affairs.  Liberty  or  strength  of  soul  are 
the  virtue  of  private  persons  ;  the  virtue  of  the  State  is 
security."  Yet  the  United  States  continued  to  hold  the 
Philippines  and  Hawaii,  and  to  insist  on  an  Open  Door  in 
China.  In  spite  of  itself,  it  became  a  positive  factor  in 
the  manoeuvres  by  which  the  Powers  sought  to  parcel  out 
the  whole  of  Eastern  Asia,  until  they  were  reminded  that 
that  region  was  a  sphere  of  influence  of  Russia  and  Japan. 
At  Algeciras,  meanwhile,  the  United  States — again  owing 
to  the  quick  resolution  and  the  diplomatic  sense  and  know- 


A   STUDY   OF   INTERNATIONAL   POLITICS      303 

ledge  of  Mr.  Roosevelt — had  shown  that  it  was  on  occasion 
one  of  the  essential  factors  of  international  peace. 

But  all  these  instances  of  American  co-operation  in  the 
international  political  work  of  the  world  have  somewhat 
lacked  continuity.  At  all  events  they  have  not  possessed 
an  adequate  sanction.  Their  uncoordinated,  of  ten  illogical 
character,  will  be  revealed  to  the  most  indifferent  once  the 
Panama  Canal  is  opened.  The  United  States  must  hence- 
forth have  a  consistent  world-policy  supported  on  a  fleet 
adequate  to  protect  its  interests  in  the  Atlantic  and  the 
Pacific.  It  has  summoned  the  world  to  its  doors.  It 
must  henceforth  not  only  defend  the  precincts  of  its  house, 
but  be  able  to  justify  its  action  with  pretexts  acceptable 
to  its  competitors  and  enemies. 

The  preliminary  efforts  of  the  United  States  to  attain 
this  end  have  thus  far  neither  been  adequate  nor  sufficiently 
intelligible  and  explicit.  This  point  requires  explanation. 

American  coast-wise  trade  is  an  American  monopoly. 
Now,  as,  practically  speaking,  the  Canal  has  become — in 
Rear-Admiral  Mahan's  view,  and  as  was  held  by  President 
Hayes — a  part  of  the  coast-line  of  the  United  States,  it  is 
argued  that  such  trade  may  be  allowed  by  the  United  States 
to  use  the  Panama  Canal  under  any  terms  that  the  Govern- 
ment may  see  fit  to  propose.  Being  a  part  of  the  American 
coast-line  the  Canal  should  be  fortified,  and  for  like  reasons 
should  be  connected  with  the  Cuban  naval  base  of  Guan- 
tanamo.  The  defence  of  the  United  States  is  what  the 
mathematicians  call  "  a  function  of  the  problem  of  control  " 
of  the  Canal,  and  no  parallel  case  exists  in  the  world. 

Lord  Lansdowne's  queries  with  regard  to  the  Dardanelles 
have,  however,  raised  certain  points  or  suggestions  that  may 
be  cited  as  militating  against  this  view.1  Every  one  can  see 
the  peculiar  advantage,  for  the  United  States,  in  case  of 
war,  of  possessing,  between  the  Atlantic  and  the  Pacific, 
a  safe  open  highway  which  it  is  at  liberty  to  fortify  as 

1  See  p.  7. 


304  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

part  of  its  coast-line.  But  once  the  currents  of  traffic 
have  begun  to  flow  through  the  Canal,  it  is  possible,  it  is 
indeed  probable,  that  the  South  American  States  of  the 
Pacific,  and  even  Australia,  will  be  even  more  benefited 
than  the  United  States  by  the  use  of  the  Canal ;  and  at  such 
a  moment,  which  will  not  be  long  deferred,  the  great  States 
that  are  international  carriers,  England,  Germany,  France, 
even  Japan,  would  find  their  interests  seriously  affected  by 
the  closing  of  the  Canal.  The  question  of  the  neutraliza- 
tion of  the  Canal  might  then  conceivably  be  made  the  object 
of  a  common  protest,  and  if  the  United  States  refused  to 
heed  such  a  protest,  the  Powers  would  have  only  the  redress 
of  the  Hague  Arbitration  Tribunal  (should  the  United 
States  consent  to  bring  the  matter  before  such  a  Tribunal) 
or  war.  If  a  case  of  this  kind  were  brought  to-day  before 
any  Court  of  International  Law,  there  can  be  little  doubt 
as  to  the  verdict  of  such  a  Court.  In  a  "  Consultation  " 
made  in  the  name  of  the  protesting  Powers,  whose  "  na- 
tionals "  (certain  foreign  life-insurance  companies  established 
in  Italy)  are  threatened  with  confiscation  by  the  Italian 
Government,  which  desires  to  establish  a  state  monoply  of 
life-insurance,  Maitre  Edward  Clunet  has  martialled  the  argu- 
ments now  universally  adduced  by  international  jurists  to 
prove  that  the  right  of  a  State  to  legislate  in  sovereign 
independence  is  limited  by  the  right  of  other  States  to  see 
that  the  interests  of  their  own  "  nationals  "  are  not  injured 
by  such  legislation. 

"  By  the  very  fact  of  their  coexistence  in  multiple,  homogeneous 
and  independent  groups,  modern  nations  have  become  alive  not 
only  to  their  rights  but  to  their  obligations,"  writes  Maitre  Clunet ; 
and  his  views  are  corroborated  by  Professor  von  Bar  for  Germany, 
Professor  Holland  for  Great  Britain,  Professor  Lamsnarch  for 
Austria,  Professor  Alberic  Rolin  for  Belgium,  Professor  Lyon-Caen 
for  France,  Professors  Anzelotti  and  Gabba  for  Italy,  Councillor  of 
State  Asser  for  Holland,  and  Professor  Roguin  for  Switzerland. 
"  To  avoid  anarchy,  or  sterile,  endless,  sanguinary  strife,  modern 
nations  have  followed,  in  time  of  war  as  well  as  in  time  of  peace, 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     305 

certain  customs  and  traditions.  The  continued  conformity  to  these 
rules  of  conduct  has  resulted  in  the  creation  of  a  kind  of  common  law, 
which  presents  the  greater  resistance  to  negative  criticism  because 
it  is  purely  empiric.  From  the  interpenetration  of  peoples  by  the 
communication  of  ideas,  by  the  contact  of  individuals,  by  the  dove- 
tailing of  moral  and  material  factors,  there  has  resulted  a  formidable 
mingling  of  interests,  sentiments  and  needs.  From  this  common 
law  of  civilized  nations,  as  now  fixed  by  the  experience  and  the  com- 
mon consent  of  the  most  enlightened  among  them,  it  is  possible  to 
deduce  the  following  principles  : — 

"  States,  in  virtue  of  the  right  of  sovereignty,  are  independent. 
This  fact  confers  on  them  the  faculty  of  legislating  on  their  territory, 
according  to  their  own  views  and  needs.  , 

"  States,  however,  by  definition,  find  solitary  existence  repugnant ; 
they  are  unable  to  live  in  isolation,  even  though  that  isolation  be 
splendid.  Whatever  their  condition,  they  form  part  of  the  civilized 
Community,  of  theMagna  Civitas,  of  the  maxima  respublica  gentium. 
This  necessity  is  inherent  in  the  nature  of  things  ;  it  is  impossible 
for  States  to  avoid  it,  and  the  necessity  engenders,  and  imposes  on 
them,  certain  rights  and  duties. 

"  The  fact  of  their  coexistence  imposes  on  States  certain  limits, 
not  to  the  enjoyment,  but  to  the  exercise,  of  their  right  of  sovereignty. 

"  This  limit  is  fixed  at  the  point  where  the  right  of  the  other  States 
to  a  reasonable  and  equitable  treatment,  for  themselves  or  their 
dependents,  in  international  relations,  begins  to  make  itself  felt. 

"  Collective  right,  of  which  sovereignty  is  the  expression,  comports, 
like  individual  right,  a  jus  utendi  et  abutendi  ;  but  the  jus  abutendi 
stops  normally  when  grave  damage,  damnum  latum,  is  knowingly 
done  to  third  parties  in  the  exclusively  personal  interest  and  ad- 
vantage of  the  State  which  is  the  author  of  the  injury. 

"  If,  from  political  or  economic  considerations  of  a  domestic 
order,  a  State  feels  called  on  to  infringe  these  principles,  such  an  act 
gives  rise  to  a  demand  for  material  reparation  or  a  compensatory 
indemnity,  according  to  the  forms  accepted  by  international  cus- 
tom. 

"  Thus,  a  State  which,  notably  with  regard  to  its  trade,  should 
adopt  a  system  of  complete  isolation,  would  thereby  renounce  the 
enjoyment  of  the  common  law  of  nations." 

This  clear  and  logical  statement  is  not  merely  the  verdict 
of  a  certain  number  of  specialists  in  international  law ; 
it  represents  as  well  the  point  of  view  of  reflecting  public 
opinion ;  and  there  is  no  doubt  that  the  ideal  of  inter- 
national relationship  which  it  expresses  tends  more  and  more, 
notwithstanding  such  manifestations  as  the  Coup  d'Agadir, 

x 


306  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

to  become  the  aim  of  practical  statesmen  in  the  present  day. 
It  is  because  statesmen  like  Mr.  Roosevelt  and  Mr.  Henry 
Cabot  Lodge,  and  specialists  like  Rear-Admiral  Mahan, 
were  so  keenly  alive  not  merely  to  the  paramount  importance 
of  the  Panama  Canal  for  the  National  Defence  of  the  United 
States,  but  also  to  the  consensus  of  international  juristic 
opinion  as  to  the  general  principle  of  the  subordination  of 
the  sovereign  right  of  a  State  to  the  other  ideal  of  human 
and  international  solidarity,  that  they  so  stubbornly  con- 
tested in  advance  the  wisdom  of  Mr.  Taft's  proposed  un- 
restricted arbitration  treaties,  which  would  have  rendered 
"  justiciable "  just  such  questions  as  the  closing  of  the 
Canal  in  time  of  war  to  an  enemy's  war-ships,  or  as  the 
right  of  the  United  States  to  eject  from  the  coast-line  ad- 
joining the  Canal  corporations  purposing  to  acquire  terri- 
tory for  transfer  to  a  Foreign  Power,  even  under  the  appa- 
rently inoffensive  forms  of  joint-stock  companies.  The 
opening  of  the  Canal  will  not  diminish,  but  aggravate  that 
distrust  of  the  United  States  which  marks  the  rapidly  grow- 
ing nationalism  of  the  South  American  States.  Pan-Ameri- 
canism will  become  more  than  ever  a  Utopia.  And  while 
the  opening  of  the  Canal  may  make  it  possible  to  apply  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  and  in  a  more  pronounced  form,  in  Cen- 
tral America,  in  the  Caribbean,  and  in  the  Pacific  Coasts  of 
Mexico,  it  will  be  a  less  and  less  applicable  principle  of  South 
American  action. 

These  and  other  pretensions  put  forward  by  the  United 
States  Government  may,  therefore,  conceivably,  sooner  or 
later,  find  themselves  in  opposition  with  the  national  in- 
terests of  rival  Governments  plausibly  justified  by  a  more 
up-to-date  interpretation  of  international  law  ;  and  in  such 
a  case  the  question  could  be  decided  only  by  the  nation 
or  nations  possessing  the  greatest  naval  or  military  power. 
Hence  the  need  for  the  United  States,  as  a  corollary  to 
the  fortifying  of  the  Panama  Canal,  to  build  a  powerful 
battle  fleet  rendering  it  predominant  in  the  Caribbean, 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     307 

and  perhaps  in  the  Pacific.  If  the  Mahans,  the  Roosevelts, 
the  Lodges  are  wrong ;  if  the  Canal  be  not,  as  President 
Hayes  argued  that  it  was,  part  of  the  coast-line  of  the 
United  States,  but  merely  an  international  highway  of  as 
little  direct  interest  to  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific  States  of  the 
Union  as  the  Suez  Canal,  then  the  United  States  can  spare 
itself  the  expense  of  a  fleet,  and  of  naval  bases  at  Guan- 
tanamo  and  in  the  Canal  Zone.  But  if  that  view  were  to 
be  taken  in  Washington,  naval  bases  would  quickly  be  built 
by  World-Powers  that  have  learned  by  hard  experience 
never  to  defer  the  taking  of  defensive  precautions. 

Fortunately — or  unfortunately,  as  it  may  be  regarded — 
the  United  States  has  no  choice.  By  the  mere  fact  of  decid- 
ing to  construct  a  Canal  at  Panama  it  crossed  the  Rubicon, 
took  the  step  from  which  there  is  no  going  back,  and  de- 
finitively sealed  the  destiny  opened  for  it  in  1898,  when  it 
drove  Spain  out  of  Cuba.  At  any  moment  during  the 
years  succeeding  the  Spanish-American  War,  even  after  its 
grave  decision  virtually  to  annex  the  Philippines,  at  any 
moment  previous  to  the  glorious  and  fatal  resolution  to 
build  the  Panama  Canal,  it  might  have  undone  the  conse- 
quences of  its  past,  thwarted  its  destiny,  and  remained 
isolated  from  the  European  and  Asiatic  worlds,  a  self- 
sufficient  mistress  of  half  the  North-American  Continent, 
and  Protector  and  Over-lord  of  Latin-America.  The 
Panama  Canal  has  changed  all  that.  The  United  States 
is  now  out  in  the  open.  It  is  shortly  to  be  swept  into  the 
centre  of  the  world's  currents  and  counter-currents,  and  it 
must  learn  to  trim  its  sails  to  the  winds  against  which  the 
other  Powers  are  tacking,  and  to  lookout  for  the  pirate  fleets 
of  its  rivals.  The  Panama  Canal,  which  is  the  gateway 
to  the  Eastern  Pacific,  will  be  the  only  highway  between  the 
three  coasts  of  the  United  States,  and,  as  Rear-Admiral 
Mahan  has  pointed  out,  it  will  impose  upon  America  a  great 
national  obligation,  that  of  securing  her  influence  (not  her 
supremacy)  in  the  Pacific.  A  strong  American  Navy  has 


308  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

become  a  vital  necessity  for  the  security  of  the  United 
States.  America  has  courted  a  great  responsibility,  and  she 
must  rise  to  it,  or  pay  the  consequences  by  dismemberment. 

It  is,  furthermore,  of  grave  significance  that  the  United 
States  is  assuming  these  new  responsibilities,  that  it  is  coming 
forth  definitively  from  its  magnificent  isolation,  just  after  the 
failure  of  its  endeavours  to  bring  about  the  Reciprocity 
Treaty  with  its  Northern  neighbour,  England's  great 
Dominion.  The  success  of  this  scheme  would  probably  have 
compassed  the  downfall  of  England.  Its  failure  has  saved 
the  British  Empire  ;  but  at  the  same  time  it  has  flung 
the  United  States  back  on  its  own  resources,  and  it  now 
finds  itself  face  to  face  with  a  Foreign  Power  as  morally 
self-sufficient  as  itself,  no  less  rich  and  enterprising  than 
it,  and  as  suddenly  awakened  to  a  sense  of  the  practical 
realities  of  world-politics.  The  new  situation  thus  pre- 
sented (mainly  as  one  of  the  most  significant  corollaries  of 
Germany's  persistent  aggressiveness)  raises  again  for  the 
United  States  a  question  it  fancied  it  had  settled  seventy 
years  ago  by  the  Webster-Ashburton  Treaty  of  1842. J 
Some  fifteen  years  ago  Mr.  Chamberlain  put  it  to  her 
afresh :  "  Do  the  Great  Lakes  divide  two  enemies  ? 
Is  an  Anglo-American  Alliance  useful  ?  "  But  the  scope 
of  the  question  is  shortly  to  become  wider.  As  the 
fatal  day  of  the  opening  of  the  Canal  approaches,  Wash- 
ington will  begin  to  ask  itself  another  question :  "Is 
an  Anglo-American  Entente  imperative  ?  "  Sir  Edward 
Grey  aimed  at  securing  an  American  Alliance  by  means 
of  an  unlimited  Arbitration  Treaty,  and  failed.  There  are 
perils  and  special  contingencies  in  the  new  responsibilities 
imposed  on  the  United  States  as  it  finds  itself  at  last  in 
the  thick  of  the  warring  interests  of  the  world-powers — 
England  and  her  Dominions,  Germany  and  Italy,  South 
American  Pan-Latinism,  Japan  and  Russia ;  and  these 

1  See  "  One  Hundred  Years  of  Peace,"  by  Henry  Cabot  Lodge, 
The  Outlook,  January  4,  19131 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     309 

perils  may  make  it  more  than  a  mere  matter  of  convenience 
to  come  to  an  explicit  political  understanding  with  the 
British  Empire.  It  is  not  merely  that  England,  the  United 
States  and  France  have  common  commercial  interests  all 
along  the  Eastern  Pacific,  interests  which  they  cannot 
share  with  Germany,  who  is  already  at  so  many  points  a 
triumphant  competitor.  It  is,  as  Rear-Admiral  Mahan  has 
so  conclusively  shown,  that  the  great  effect  of  the  Panama 
Canal  will  be  the  indefinite  strengthening  of  Anglo-Saxon 
institutions  along  the  North-East  shores  of  the  Pacific, 
from  Alaska  to  Mexico,  by  multiplying  the  inhabitants  of 
those  regions  and  by  a  consequent  augmentation  of  shipping 
and  commerce.  Moreover,  the  identity  of  f  eeling  between  the 
North-American  Pacific  and  Australia,  both  inheritors  of 
the  same  political  tradition,  as  to  the  question  of  Asiatic 
immigration,  is  certain  to  create  political  sympathies,  and 
may  draw  into  a  common  action  the  nations  of  which  each 
forms  a  part.  The  question  of  Asiatic  immigration  is,  in- 
deed, one  on  which  Canada,  the  Western  United  States, 
Western  South-America,  Australia,  and  the  rulers  of  the 
Islands  of  the  Pacific  are  all  at  one.  It  is  a  question  in 
which  the  Triple  Entente  agrees  with  the  United  States. 
It  is  a  question  on  which  the  four  countries  will  continue  to 
agree  for  many  years  to  come.  It  is  a  question  on  which 
the  members  of  the  Triple  Entente  disagree  with  Japan  and 
China,  and  to  a  certain  degree  even  with  Germany.  The 
Panama  Canal  will  thus  undoubtedly  tend  to  Europeanize 
the  North-Eastern  and  South-Western  Pacific,  while  it 
leaves  the  Western  Pacific  Asiatic. 

But  the  important  fact  is  that,  just  at  the  moment  when 
the  opening  of  the  Panama  Canal  is  linking  the  general 
interests  of  the  new  British  Empire  and  of  the  United 
States  in  the  Pacific  America's  need  of  English  sympathy 
and  friendliness  is  increased  by  the  fact  that  the  Cana- 
dian border  will  soon  cease  to  be  a  colonial  boundary 
and  become  really  a  British  Imperial  Frontier ;  that  a  new 


310  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

Canadian  fleet,  which  is  a  British  fleet,  is  constructing 
North  of  Colon,  while  an  Australian  fleet,  and  perhaps  a 
New  Zealand  fleet,  will  shortly  be  sailing  up  out  of  the 
South- West  and  meeting  the  Canadian  ships  in  the  road- 
stead at  Kingston.  Just  as  for  many  years  the  fleets  of 
the  world  have  entered  the  Mediterranean  under  Eng- 
land's guns  at  Gibraltar,  so  henceforth  the  ironclads  and 
merchant  vessels  of  the  Powers  will  pass  from  the  Caribbean 
to  the  Pacific  between  the  fortifications  of  the  United 
States.  But,  magnificent  vantage  point  as  that  of  the 
Americans  will  be,  let  them  cherish  no  illusions  as  to  its 
meaning.  The  geographical  centre  of  gravity  will  have  been 
shifted  from  the  Mediterranean  to  the  Caribbean,  and 
national  isolation,  freedom  from  "  entangling  alliances," 
will  no  longer  be  possible  for  the  United  States.  Established 
finally  in  the  seat  of  customs,  the  Americans  will  hence- 
forth have  to  reason  and  act  as  political  animals,  in  con- 
formity with  the  prejudices  and  customs  of  the  world.  No- 
thing is  more  obvious  than  that  now  at  last  the  United  States, 
having  issued  from  its  isolation,  having  become,  sooner  than 
it  expected,  perhaps  sooner  than  it  wished,  a  responsible, 
and  no  mere  dilettante  member  of  the  concert  of  nations, 
will  be  called  on  by  those  nations,  driven,  that  is,  by  the 
force  of  things,  to  conform  its  favourite  principle  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  to  the  Law  of  Nations.  No  spasmodic, 
provisional,  merely  empirically  opportunist  readjustment 
of  that  Doctrine  to  this  or  that  new  need  or  situation,  as 
they  may  arise,  will  any  longer  be  tolerated.  The  attempt 
to  defer  the  complete  solution  of  this  grave  problem  by 
arousing  waves  of  enthusiasm  in  favour  of  Hague  Con- 
ferences, unrestricted  Arbitration  Treaties,  or  any  other 
desirable  and  elevated  form  of  the  humanitarian  and  Chris- 
tian ideal  of  Pacifism,  will  be  regarded  as  hypocritical,  and 
may  even  suggest  the  cuttle-fish  policy  of  spurting  forth  an 
inky  channel  to  cover  its  escape  from  its  pursuers.  Mean- 
while the  most  elementary  attempt  to  preserve  the  essence 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     311 

of  its  great  national  "Doctrine,"  while  introducing  it 
into  the  recognized  corpus  of  International  Law,  will  prove 
to  the  United  States  the  wisdom  of  becoming  as  speedily 
as  possible  a  strong  naval  and  military  Power.  The  same 
self-interest  will  suggest  the  parallel  prudence  of  not 
doing  anything  to  alienate  the  vast  Imperial  Community 
of  men  of  its  own  flesh  and  blood,  who,  previously 
separated  from  it  by  an  estranging  sea,  have  now  become 
its  close  neighbours,  and  even  a  possible  menace  to  its 
insufficiently  protected  borders. 

If,  from  failure  to  divine  the  inevitable  drift  of  the  time, 
to  distinguish  clearly  the  character  of  the  forces  to  which 
it  must  conform,  the  United  States,  repudiating  its 
idealistic  past,  were  to  suffer  serious  friction  to  be  set  up 
along  the  new  frontiers  now  uniting  it  to,  instead  of 
dividing  it  from,  the  British  Empire ;  if  it  were  to  let 
the  problems  created  by  the  Panama  Canal  engender  be- 
tween it  and  England,  Canada  and  Australia,  such  ill- 
feeling  as  would  prepare  the  diplomatic  ground  at  Wash- 
ington for  the  signing  of  an  entente  between  Berlin  and 
Washington  for  their  common  defence  against  British  and 
Russo-Japanese  competition,  both  military  and  commercial 
— should  it  drift  into  such  a  situation,  it  would  have 
to  bear  the  responsibility  of  an  act  which  would  upset 
the  entire  balance  of  power  in  Europe,  and  result  in  a 
war  involving  the  interests  of  the  entire  population  of 
our  planet.  The  United  States,  alone  among  the  strong 
nations,  lived,  up  to  the  last  ten  years  of  the  nineteenth 
century,  under  self-imposed  limitations  of  two  sorts — 
one  that  had  to  do  with  geography,  and  another  that  had 
to  do  with  public  morality.  As  ex-President  Harrison  put 
it,  only  ten  years  ago,  "  We  do  not  want,  in  any  event, 
territorial  possessions  that  have  no  direct  relation  to  the 
body  of  our  national  domain,  and  we  do  not  want  any 
territory  anywhere  that  is  acquired  by  criminal  aggression."1 

1  North  American  Review,  "  Musings  upon  Current  Topics," 
February  15,  1901. 


312  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

But  now  America  has  become  a  World  Power.  She  is  a 
new-comer  among  the  World  Powers,  and  she  is  an  innocent 1 
member  of  the  international  band  of  land-grabbers  whose 
principle  of  action  is  reciprocal  vigilance  during  their  free- 

1  Her  "  innocence  "  is  really  what  the  Germans  would  call  "  colos- 
sal." In  November,  1911,  the  President  of  the  United  States  pub- 
lished, in  the  Woman's  Home  Companion,  an  article  on  "  The  Dawn 
of  World  Peace,"  which  was  speedily  reproduced  in  a  special  bulletin 
of  the  "  American  Association  for  International  Conciliation."  In 
that  article  President  Taft  said  :  "  If  the  United  States  has  a  mission, 
besides  developing  the  principles  of  the  brotherhood  of  man  into  a 
living,  palpable  force,  it  seems  to  me  that  it  is  to  blaze  the  way  to 
universal  arbitration  among  the  nations.  ...  It  is  known  to  the 
world  that  we  do  not  covet  the  territory  of  our  neighbours,  or  seek 
the  acquisition  of  lands  on  other  continents.  We  are  free  of  such 
foreign  entanglements  as  frequently  conduce  to  embarrassing  com- 
plications. .  .  .  The  spirit  of  justice  governs  our  relations  with  other 
countries,  and  therefore  we  are  specially  qualified  to  set  a  pace  for 
the  rest  of  the  world."  Not  nine  months  later — at  a  moment, 
moreover,  when  American  marines  were  guarding  the  railway  lines 
in  Nicaragua — a  friendly  European  Government  was  making  re- 
peated representations  to  the  American  Government  against  the 
alleged  disloyalty  of  the  United  States  in  passing,  relative  to  the 
Panama  Canal,  a  law  which  the  friendly  Power  in  question  holds  to 
be  an  infringement  of  treaty  obligations.  It  is  evident  that  since, 
as  President  Taft  says,  the  United  States  is  "  known  to  the  world 
as  a  Power  that  does  not  covet  the  territory  of  its  neighbours," 
and  since  "  the  spirit  of  justice  governs  the  relations  of  the  United 
States  with  other  countries,"  he  has  himself  beautifully  "  blazed 
the  way  " — as  he  puts  it — to  arbitration  on  the  question  raised  by 
the  protest  of  the  British  Government.  Mr.  Taft  belatedly  admitted 
this  in  an  address  on  January  4, 1913,  before  the  International  Peace 
Forum.  He  promised,  "  if  necessary,"  to  submit  the  Panama 
Canal  Tolls  Dispute  to  arbitration.  This  decision  was  not  taken, 
however,  until  after  American  public  opinion  had  forced  the  hand, 
as  it  were,  of  his  Administration  ;  and  in  the  same  breath  he  de- 
fended the  treaties  he  had  concluded  with  England  and  France 
for  the  settlement  even  of  questions  of  national  honour  by  arbitra- 
tion, declaring  that  the  nations  of  the  world  look  to  the  United 
States,  and  "  properly  look  to  the  United  States,"  as  a  leader  in  the 
matter  of  establishing  peace,  "  because  we  are  so  fortunately  placed 
between  oceans  and  without  troublesome  neighbours  [sic]  that  we  can 
go  on  without  fear  of  consequences  [sic]  to  establish  a  condition  in 
which  we  shall  settle  every  question  [sic]  by  reference  to  an  arbitral 
tribunal." 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS     313 

booting  raids,  lest  any  one  obtain  a  little  more  soil  than  his 
neighbour.  The  only  influences  in  the  world  capable  of 
putting  an  end  to  these  predatory  methods  are  the  combined 
forces  of  the  new  British  Empire,  and  a  self-denying  United 
States  and  France.  Were  the  Americans  of  the  United 
States,  in  the  present  state  of  the  world,  to  succumb  to  the 
blandishments  of  Germany,  and  accept  any  exclusive  arrange- 
ment with  that  Power,  they  would  be  selling  their  birth- 
right, sacrificing  the  essentials  of  what  has  made  their 
history  worth  anything  in  the  world's  annals,  and  losing 
their  "  lives,  their  fortunes  and  their  sacred  honour."  * 

It  was  a  dream  of  Jefferson,  at  the  end  of  his  life,  that 
Cuba  and  Canada  should  one  day  be  incorporated  in  the 
United  States.  A  part  of  this  dream  has  been  fulfilled : 
the  United  States  now  possesses  its  "  South  Coast  Line," 
extending  from  Cuba  to  Colon  and  Panama,  and  it  chances 
that  that  line  is  to  be  one  of  the  new  axes,  perhaps  the  one 
new  axis,  of  world-policy.  The  other  part  of  the  dream 
seems  less  likely  to  be  realized ;  the  disintegration  of  the 
British  Empire,  which  M.  Garcia-Calderon  in  his  Latin 
Democracies  of  America  (p.  367)  prophesied  "  would  be 
the  work  of  the  Yankees,"  seems  a  contingency  more  remote 
than  ever.  Mexico,  which  Japan  has  already  been  trying 
to  colonize,  may  before  long  become  dependent  on  the 
United  States,  as  the  dummy  State  of  Panama  virtually 
is  already,  and  as  Central  America  will  unquestionably  be 
within  a  relatively  brief  time.  But  these  embarrassingly  ad- 
vantageous strategic  additions  to  its  territory  will  not  give 
the  United  States  a  fleet ;  they  will  not  help  it  to  compete 
with  the  commercial  enterprise  of  the  rival  Powers  in  the 
ports  of  the  Eastern  Pacific  ;  they  will  not  arrest  the  mag- 
nificent movement  of  the  nations  in  their  preparation  for  the 

1  "  England,  and  not  the  United  States,"  says  the  author  of  The 
Day  of  the  Saxon,  "  guarantees  the  independence  of  American  nations  ; 
and  in  the  preservation  of  the  British  Empire  rather  than  in  the 
doctrine  of  Monroe  is  to  be  found  the  basis  of  their  security." 


314  PROBLEMS  OF  POWER 

economic  (and  perhaps  military)  struggle  of  which  the 
Pacific  Ocean  is  soon  to  be  the  scene.  The  Americans 
have  been  dredging  their  harbour  at  San- Juan  in  Porto 
Rico  since  1908,  and  have  already  given  it  an  average  depth 
of  twenty-eight  feet.  Galveston,  where  they  are  still  hard 
at  work,  is  rapidly  becoming  the  third  Atlantic  Port  of  the 
United  States.  Key  West  has  been  bridged  to  the  Continent, 
over  100  miles  of  sea,  by  a  railway  that  is  one  of  the  marvels 
of  modern  engineering.  At  Santiago,  in  Cuba,  and  at  Colon, 
the  Americans  are  constructing  feverishly  and  well.  But 
meanwhile  the  Germans  are  prospecting  the  Caribbean  and 
the  Gulf  of  Mexico  for  coaling  stations  or  ports  of  call,  and, 
after  having  secured  a  coaling  station  at  Haiti,  have  already 
settled  on  a  point  in  the  Danish  West  Indies,  the  island  of 
Saint  Thomas,  which  the  United  States  tried  to  buy  in  1902, 
yet  which  Danish  nationalism  seems  now  incompetent  to 
hold.  Out  in  the  Pacific,  west  and  south  of  Panama,  Germany 
is  linking  up  her  possessions  by  wireless  telegraphy.  When 
the  Canal  is  opened,  France  will  have,  a  little  to  the  south 
of  the  British  Imperial  "  All-Red  Route,"  an  All-Blue 
Route  belting  the  globe.  The  belt  of  French  Colonies  or 
Possessions  reaches  from  Tahiti  through  the  Canal,  by 
Guadeloupe  and  Martinique  to  Dakar,  thence  to  Bordeaux 
and  Brest  and,  by  the  Rhone  Valley,  to  Marseilles,  where, 
once  again  taking  to  the  sea,  and  skirting  the  North-African 
Coast  from  Algiers  to  Bizerta,  it  proceeds  through  the  Suez 
Canal  to  Jibutil  in  the  Persian  Gulf,  and  to  the  Grand  Co- 
mores,  Madagascar  and  La  Reunion  in  the  Indian  Ocean. 
It  then  turns  northward,  touching  Asia  at  Saigon ;  and, 
passing  thence  just  to  the  north  of  Australia,  finds  in 
the  New  Hebrides  and  in  New  Caledonia  (where  Australia 
may  one  day  procure  the  iron  of  which  she  stands  in  need) 
its  last  station  before  it  is  riveted  again  at  Tahiti,  in  mid- 
Pacific.  There  an  official  mission  is  already  investigating 
the  problem  of  preserving  for  France  commercial  predomin- 
ance in  the  Polynesian  Seas.  It  is  unnecessary  to  await 


A  STUDY  OF  INTERNATIONAL  POLITICS  315 

official  confirmation  to  affirm  that  Tahiti,  halfway  between 
New  Zealand  and  Panama,  on  one  of  the  direct  Austra- 
lasian routes,  is  destined  to  a  great  commercial  future 
provided  France  constructs  in  that  [island  a  modern  port 
and  coaling  station.1  If  the  French  supplement  their 
maritime  route  through  the  Panama  and  Suez  Canals  by 
an  overland  route ;  if  the  Old  World  prolongs,  from  Brest 
to  Vladivostok  or  Fousan,  the  great  trunk  railway  lines 
of  the  United  States  and  Canada,  now  linking  San  Fran- 
cisco and  Vancouver  to  New  York  and  Halifax,  the  world  will 
wonder  how  a  trifling  matter  like  that  of  the  Baghdad  rail- 
way could  ever  have  fired  the  imagination,  and  divided 
the  diplomacy,  of  serious  Powers.2  Evidently  no  nation 
has  ever  had  a  more  glorious  opportunity  than  has  France 
at  this  hour,  of  co-operating  with  the  drift  of  the  time  and 
with  the  nature  of  things  for  the  aggrandizement  of  her 
prestige  as  well  as  for  the  good  of  humanity.  Franco- 
Latin  co-operation  in  South  America,  Anglo-American  colla- 
boration in  the  islands,  and  on  the  High  Seas,  of  the  Pacific  ; 
a  solemn  Franco-Anglo-American  pact  for  the  peace  of  the 
world :  such  are  the  potential  realities  which  may  already 
be  descried  from  the  heights  above  Culebra. 

1  For  a  more  detailed  treatment  of  the  future  of  the  relations  of 
the  United  States  and  France  in  connexion  with  the  Panama  Canal 
see  the  author's  lecture,  delivered  at  the  Theatre  Michel,  Paris,  on 
February  12,  1913,  and  reproduced  in  a  volume  published  by  Alcan. 

2  See  "  La  France  et  le  Monde  de  Demain,"  by  M.  Victor  Be"rard, 
and  the  series  of  articles  on  "Les  Ports  Ame'ricains  et  le  Canal,"  by 
M.  Casimir  P6rier,  in  the  Figaro,  April  and  May,  1912. 


INDEX 


Abarzuza,  Sefior,  57 

Abdul  Hamid,  132,  133,  137 

Adowa,  49,  68 

Adriatic,  The,  251,  276,  286,  288,  289 

f  gean  Islands,  The,  281,  282 

Aehrenthal,  Count,  4,  5,  9,  150,  168,  174,  175, 

275,  277,  285 
Afghanistan,  299 
Africa,  23,  48,  54,  131,  243,  250,  263,  290,  291 

South,  186,  210,  256 

North,  262 

East,  218,  219 

West,  218 

Central,  244 

North-west,  246 

Agadir,  46,  68,  73,  103,  131,  139,  148-151, 
165,  168,  172,  175,  179,  186,  187,  189- 
191,  204,  209,  216,  217,  224,  246,  256- 
258,  260,  266,  269,  270,  272,  305 

Aide,  Hamilton,  258 

Alaska,  308 

Albania,  276,  286,  288,  289 

Albin,  Pierre,  Le  Coup  d'Agadir,  54 

Algeciras,  24,  175,  3°2 

Conference  of,  69,  103,  144,  290 

Act  of,  168,  246 

Algeria,  262 

Algiers,  88,  314 

Archbishop  of,  88 

Alexander  the  Great,  8,  195 

I,  46 

II,  Introduction  vii,  45,  47 

Ill,  49 

Alexandretta,  275 

Alsace-Lorraine,  5,  26,  43,  47,  50,  70,  140, 
I55,  'S^,  160-163,  165-167,  169,  201- 
203,  211,  222,  240,  277,  294 

America,  United  States  of,  2,  8-13,  15-19, 
21-25,  31,  34-36,  39.  4°,  42,  55,  65, 
98,  106,  117,  118,  120,  123,  125,  128, 
I39>  I52i  *59i  *76,  183-189,  191,  198, 
209,  212,  213,  215,  216,  218,  225,  232, 
236,  237,  263,  270,  283,  294-296,  300- 
303,  305-315 

Colonies  of,  4 

South,  12,  315 

Central,  169 

Andover  Hill,  19 
Andrassy,  138,  286 
Andr6,  General,  83 
Andrieux,  M.,  no 

Angell,  Norman,  The  Great  Illusion,  161-163, 
200 

The  Mirage  of  the  Map,  209 

226,  227,  230,  238,  239 

Angers,  85 

Antivari,  288 

Antwerp,  8,  205,  223,  266 

Anzelotti,  Professor,  304 

Aquitaine,  131 

Ariovestus,  32 

Armenia,  283 

Arnold,  Matthew,  Essays  in  Criticism,  13, 18 


Arques,  152 

Asia,  48,  66,  104,  263,  264,  283,  294,  298, 
299,  301,  302 

Minor,  281 

Asquith,  Mr.,  158,  178-180,  182,  183,  190 

Asser,  Councillor  of  State,  304 

Atlantic  Ocean,  The,  103,  104,  211,  302,  303, 

306 

Augsburg,  212 
Aulard,  M.,  lot 
Aumale,  Due  d",  121 

Australia,  256,  267,  295,  303,  309,  311,  314 
Austria-Hungary,  3,  9,  44-46,  49-51,  132,  135, 

174,  175,  210,  236,  251,  252,  272,  274, 

276,  278,  283,  292,  304 
Avlona,  172 

B 

Baden,  Grand  Duchy  of,  167,  282 

Baghdad,  179 

Baghdad  Railway,  50,  151,  169,  248,  275,  315 

Balfour,  Arthur  J.,  55,  158,  181,  208 

Balkan  States,  The,  Introduction  viii,  4,  9, 
46,  50,  131,  132,  135,  136,  162,  179, 
201,  228,  251,  258,  260,  274,  275,  278, 
283-285,  287,  288,  290,  291 

Baltic  Sea,  The,  256,  271 

Balzac,  234 

Bar,  Professor  von,  304 

Bardoux,  Jacques,  279 

Bardo,  Treaty  of,  45 

Barrere,  M.,  53,  140,  291 

Bane's,  Maurice,  99,  166 

Bas-Rhin,  155 

Baudin,  Pierre,  242,  247 

Bavaria,  233 

Bazaine,  158 

Beaconsfield,  Lord,  138 

Belgium,  167,  171,  206,  304 

Belgrade,  136,  278,  286 

Benghazi,  250 

Beranger,  Henri,  118 

Be'rard,  Victor,  53,  140 

Le  Droit  de  Voisinage,  168 

La  France  et  le  Monde  de  Demain,  315 

Berchtold,  Count,  5,  58,  275,  278,  279 
Berlin,    Introduction    viii,  24,   68,  132,  140, 

153,  155,  204,  216,  274,  288,  311 

Congress  of,  44,  68,  138,  247,  288,  289 

Treaty  of,  46,  132,  138,  168,  260,  276, 

281,  289,  290 

Bemhardi,  General  von,  207,  209 
Bernstein,  Edward,  210 
Bertillon,  Dr.  Jacques,  233 
B6theny,  30 

Bethmann-Hollweg,  Heir  von,  37,  147,  213 
Bieberstein,  Baron  Marschall  von,  160,  161, 

241,  258,  262 
Bielefeld,  213 
Bismarck,    Introduction  vii,  viii,  25,  30,  35, 

41,  43-49,  63,  64,  68,  87,  129,  138,  141, 

157,  214,  225,  247,  257,  261,  273,  274, 

284-286,  288-290,  293 
Bizerta,  262,  279,  281,  289,  492,  314 


INDEX 


Blache,   Captain  Vidal  de  la,   The  Lorraine 

Valley  of  tht  Meitse,  aoa 
Black  Sea,  The,  7,  279,  383,  286 
Blondel,    Georges,    Les    Embarras    cU    fAUe- 

magne,  211,  214 

Blowitz,  M.  de,  29,  45,  33,*54,  56,  88,  289 
Blumenthal,  M.,  166 
Bokhara,  299 
Bonnal,  General,  214 
Bordeaux,  113,  156,  314 
Borden,  Mr.,  190,  191 
Bosnia-Herzegovina,    9,™"5if'**i3J,r'  131,"  174, 

251,  277,  278,  284,  286,  388,  389 
Bosphorus,  279 
Bossuet,  Introduction  vii,  18 
Boston,  19,  20,  187 
Bourdon,  Georges,  240 
Bourgeois,  M.,  30,  154,  265 
Bourges,  Archbishop  of,  91 
Bourget,  M.,  99 
Bourgin,  Georges,  Le  Proteetionnisme  Owner, 

199 

Braun,  M.,  204 
Brazil,  206,  213 
Bresciani,  Signor,  250 
Brest,  298,  314 

Briand,  M.,  3,  83,  119,  125,  365 
Briey,  205,  222 
Brisson,  M.,  89,  156 
Broqueville,  Baron  de,  171 
Brunetiere,  M.,  96,  99 
Buda-Pest,  274 

Bulgaria,  3,  7,  50,  51,  135,  137,  231,  375,  "287 
Bulow,  Prince,  68,  69,  273 
Bunau-Varilla,    Philippe,    168,    300 
Butler,  Bishop,  172 
Butler,  President  Nicholas  Murray,  61 
Byzantium,  283 


Cadiz,  298 

Caen,  145,  224,  225 

Cassar,  Julius,  2,  37  M    J 

Caillaux,  73,  210,  229,  230,  232,  243,  245,  246, 

270 

Calvin,  133 

Cambon,  Jules,  52,  53,  246,  269,  270 
Cambrai,  Mgr.  de,  Archbishop,  85 
Cambridge,  19 

Cameroons,  The,  47,  219,  223,  245 
Canada,  9,  13,  183-186,  188,  190,  191,  213, 

256,  267,  295,  309,  311,  313 
Canterbury,  Archbishop  of,  159 
Carolina,  North,  15 
Carrere,  Jean,  277 

Caribbean  Sea,  The,  260,  272,  299,  300,  309,  313 
Casablanca,  69,  144,  156,  174 
Caspian  Sea,  The,  283,  298,  299 
Catherine  II,  283 
Chamberlain,  Joseph,  n,  54,  55,  64,  183,  199, 

267,  308 

Chambord,  Comte  de,  8r 
Champagne,  102,  104,  116 
Chari,  Basin  of,  245 
Charles  V,  212 

Charles,  King  of  Portugal,  5* 
Charleston,  187 
Cheerier  Andrf,  119 
Chgradame  Andr£,  160 

La  Crist  Franfaise,  2  30,  "2  31 

Chicago,  19 

Chiers,  202 

Valley  of,  205,  223 

China,  9,  24,  55,  68,  219,  323,  256,  263,  293- 

296,  301,  302,  309 
Chjrol,  Sir  Valentine,  298 


Christiania,  34,  273 
Churchill,  Winston,  66,  68,  »oj 
Clam,  Lt.-Col.  du  Paty  de,  96 
Cleznenceau,  M.,  Introduction  viii,  Jt,  89,  HI, 
114,  120,  148,  156 

La  Melee  Sociale,  112 

Clunet,  Maltre  Edward,  304 
Cochin,  Denys,  28 
Colbert,  247 

Colmar,  166 

Colon,  296,  309,  313 

Colonbelles,  225 

Colson,  M.,  Organisme  £conomique  ft  Ditordrs 

Social,  117 

Columbia  University,  61 
Combes,  M.,  78,  80,  92,  94,  106,  281 
Compiegne,  30 
Comte,  132 
Conde,  8 
Condorcet,  133 
Congo,  The,  2,   176,  210,  223,  227,  245,  346 

Free  State,  219 

Connecticut,  20 

Constant,    MM.   d'Estoumelles   de,    154,    158 
Constantinople,  7,  125, 132,  136,  146,  149,  i  5*, 

211,  241,  258,  274,  383 
Copenhagen,  272 
Corea,  294 
Corinth,  163 
Corneilles,  225 
Corti,  Count,  289 
Costa  Rica,  212 
Coyer,  Abbe,  33 
Crewe,  The  Marquis  of,  67 
Crillon,  152 

Crispi,  53,  285,  286,  288-290,  292 
Croly,  Mr.,  The  Promise  of  Ameritun  Life,  18, 

130 

Cruppi,  M.,  245  3 
Cuba,  24,  31,  34,  302,  307,'3ii 
Culebra,  315 
Curzon,  Lord,  146,  149 
Cyrenaica,  250 

D 

Dabry,  AbW  Pierre, T^Les  CaiholiquesZR&pttb- 
licains;  Histoire  et  Souvenirs,  Sj 

Dakar,  314 

Dalmatia,  284 

Danish  West  Indies,  314 

Dante,  43 

Danube,  The,  104,  251,  276,  284,  286 

Dardanelles,  The,  6,  8,  274,  276,  279,  281,  300, 
3°3 

Dauphine,  Passes  of,  142 

Delaisi,  Francis,  La  Democratie  et  les  Finan- 
ciers, 128 

Delbruck,  Professor  Hans,  157,  219,  220 

Delcasse,  M.,  52,  53,  56-58,  69,  70,  73,74,Ji39, 
140,  143,  148,  156,  174,  218,  247,  249, 

^    265 
Delhi,  269 
Denmark,  271 
Deroulede,  M.,  38,  39 
Deschanel,  Paul,  132 
Dreyfus  Affair,  51,  53,  55,  jfi,  68,  74,  75,  80, 

90,  91,  95,  96,  98-100,    117,    141,    153, 

234 

Captain,  96 

Drumont,  118 

Ducrocq,  Georges,  166 

Ducrot,  General,  153 

Duluth,  19 

Dumont,  Arsene,  rtataliU  et  CiviKtaiion,  333, 

234 

Dunkirk,  205,  223,  266 
Durazzo,  289 


INDEX 


319 


E 

EdwardjVII/King  of  England,  55,  56,  69,  139, 
218,  269 

Einen,  General  von,  325 

Eliot,  Ex-President  of  Harvard,  187 

Egypt,  53,  58,  190,  210,  219,  251 

Emerson,  R.  W.,  212 

Engels,  196 

England,  5,  7,  9,  25,  46,  48-50,  52-59,  62-66, 
68,  69,  74,  98,  103,  106,  117,  128,  131, 
132,  136,  139,  141,  143-152,  158,  159, 
170-175,  178-191,  199,  205-207,  209, 
213,  218-220,  223,  225,  226,  231,  232, 
236,  237,  241,  244,  252,  255,  258,  262- 
264,  266-273,  278,  279,  282,  284,  289- 
296,  298-300,  303,  304,  307-309,  311, 

a",  313 

Enver  Bey,  134,  261 

Erythrea,  250 

Escaut,  The,  170 

Esch,  204 

Eugene,  Archduke,  376 

Europe,  1-315 

F 

Faguet,  M.,  Le  Culte  de  V Incompetence,  et 
I'Horreur  des  ResponsabiliUs,  122,  130 

125,  160 

Fashoda,  49,  53,  55,  56,  68,  142,  143 

Faure,  F61ix,  55 

Favre,  Jules,  153 

Ferdinand,  Tsar,  of  Bulgaria,  137 

Ferrero,  Guglielmo,  L' Ideal  et  la  Richesse,  196 

20,  249 

Ferry,  Jules,  73,  74,  78,  80,  82,  84,  86,  154 

Fez,  246 

Fichte,  Introduction  vii. 

Fiensberg,  Predictions  of,  282 

Fisher,  Mr.,  189 

Florence,  278 

Flushing,  8,  150,  170,  171 

FouiUee,  M.,  219 

Fousan,  299,  314 

France,  2-4,  8,  9,  12,  23-30,  33,  38-47,  49-60, 
62,  65,  66-70,  74-132,  136,  139-176, 
185,  196,  205-207,  209-211,  215,  216, 
218,  219,  222-227,  229-240,  242-248, 
255,  256,  258,  260,  262-266,  270-273, 
278-281,  284,  286,  290-293,  296,  298, 
300,  303,  304,  308,  312,  314,  315 

Francis  Joseph,  Emperor,  275,  278,  288 

Frankfort,  Treaty  of,  25,  27,  28,  44,  87,  138, 
160,  163,  166,  222,  242,  263,  295,  296 

Franklin,  24 

Freeman,  Professor,  62 

Freppel,  Mgr.,  Bishop  of  Angers,  85-87 

Freycinet,  78 

Friedrichshof,  69 

Froude,  267,  269 

Fullerton,  W.  Morton,  Patriotism  and  Science, 
81,  86,  117,  161 

Fuzet,  Mgr.,  Archbishop  of  Rouen,  79 


Gabba,  Professor,  304 

Galata,  2 

Galveston,  313 

Gambetta,  28,  32,  70,  78,  82,  89,  nr,  119,  124, 

156,  164,  165,  281 
Garcia-Calderon,  F.,  Les  Demoeratits  Latines 

de  I'Amerique,  212,  313 
Garibaldi,  4,  23 
Gary,  Indiana,  201 
Gascony,  104 
Gaston.     Henry,     L'Essor     Economigue     du 

P tuple  Attemand  and  L'Alltmagne  aux 

« dot's,  214 


Gaul,  a 

Gayraud,  AbM,  94 
Geneva,  133,  197 
Genghiz  Khan,  9 

George  V,  King  of  England,  269,  370 
George,  Lloyd,  13,  178,  189 
Germany,  5,  9, 12,  25,  30,  35,  37,  43-50,  52-55, 
E?57,  63,  65,  66,  68,  69,  73,  104,  117,  131, 

132,  135,  138,  141-145,  147,  149-152, 
1     156-176,  183,  185,  189,  190,  196,  204- 

229,  231,  236,  237,  239-248,  255-257, 

259-264,   269-277,   282-291,  303,   304, 

308,  309,  314 
Gibraltar,  309 
Giolitti,  Signer,  277,  290 
Gladstone,  William  Ewart,  61,  64,  147 
Glasgow,  64 

Gobat,  Albert,  Le  Cawhemar  de  I'Europt,  167 
Goltz,  Marshal  von  der,  133 
Good  fellow,  Mr.,  220 
Goschen,  Mr.,  65 
Gouthe-Soulard,  Mgr.,  86 
Goyau,  Georges,  L'Idec  de  Paine  ft  Humani- 

tarisme,  154 
Grand  Comores,  314 
Greece,  4,  7,  19,  20,  51,  195,  222 
Greenwich,  150 
Gr6vy,  President,  141,  151 
Grey,  Earl,  191 
Grey,  Sir  Edward,  66,  67,  69,  149,  150,  152, 

159,  225,  269,  270,  308 
Grundy,  G.  B.,  Thucydides  and  the  History  of 

His  Age,  2 
Guadeloupe,  314 
Guantanamo,  303,  306 
Guatemala,  16,  212 
Gwinner,  Herr  von,  206 

H 

Hadfield,  Sir  Robert,  F.R.S.,  262,  363 

Hague,  The,  24,  30,  140,  153,  155,  159-161, 

172,  303,  310 
Haiti,  314 

Haldane,  Viscount,  146,  149,  184,  282 
HalSvy,  Daniel,  Luttes  et  Problem**,  52 
Halifax,  315 
Hamburg,  167,  199,  258 
Hanotaux,  Gabriel,  40,  48,  52-54, 15°,  151.  26* 

Fashoda,  53 

Hansen,  Jules,  Ambassade  A  Paris  du  Baron 

de  Mohrenheim,  45,  74 
Hardenberg,  Introduction  vii 
Harrison,  Ex-President,  311 
Harvard  University,  187,  212 
Haut-Rhin,  155 
Hawaii,  50,  65,  302 
Hay,  Mr.,  61 

Hayes,  President,  303,  306 
Heligoland,  210,  218 

Henri  IV,   King  of  France,  60,  63,  95,   15* 
Hermann,  Prophecies  of,  282 
Herou.ville,  225 

Holland,  98,  170,  171,  206,  270,  304 
Holland,  Professor,  304 
Honduras,  16 

Hotzendorf,  Baron  Konrad  von,  276 
Hugo,  Victor,  L' Annie  Terrible,  206 


I 


He  de  France,  198 
Iowa,  118 
Ipek,  285 

India,  62/189,  190 
Istria,  284 
Isvolski,:M.,  276 


320 


INDEX 


Italy,  4,  9,  45,  46,  49,  51,  52,  54,  142,  210, 
211,  228,  249-251,  258,  272-274,  276, 
277,  280-282,  284,  286,  288-292,  304, 
308 


Jagow,  Gottlieb  von,  205 

Jameson  Raid,  The,  49 

Japan,  5,  6,  12,  48,  148,  200,  228,  236,  267, 

293-298,  302,  303,  308,  309,  313 
Jaures,  M.,  3,  28,  118,  154,  158,  226,  228,  230 
Jerrold,  Laurence,  The  Real  France,  74 

126 

Jibutil,  314 
Joan  of  Arc,  70 
Joly,  Henri,  198 
Jonnart,  M.,  262 
Jowett,  Mr.,  149 
Jura,  169 

K 

Kahn,  Maurice,  Introduction  viii 
Karageorgewich,  Pierre,  137 
Kharbine,  299 

Kiderlen-Waechter,  Herr,  205,  240,  292 
Kiel  Canal,  48,  63,  208 

216 

Kingston,  309 

Kipling,  Rudyard,  185,  189 

Kirk-Kilisse,  46,  68,  162,  274,  283-285,  288, 

292 

Kitchener.fViscount,  49 
Klotz,  M.,  232 
Knox,  Mr.,  169] 
Koenigsburg,  206 
Kokovtzof,  Mr.,  256 
Kruger,  President,  49 
Krupp  Company,  The,  224,  241 


Ladysmith,  55,  56 

Lafayette,  121 

Lamsnarch,  Professor,  304 

Lansdowne,  Lord,  7,  55,  57,  58,  218,  303 

Laurier,  Sir  Wilfrid,  184,  186,  188,  189,  191 

Lavigerie,  Cardinal,  88 

Lavisse,  M.,  27,  165 

Lavour,  J.  H.,  La  Fin  de  FEmpire  Allemand 

pour  1913,  283 
Lea,  General  Homer,  The  Day  of  the  Saxon, 

63,  293,  294 

Lebon,  Dr.  Gustave,  95,  116 
Lemaitre,  Jules,  99 
Lenox,  20 

Leo  XIII,  8p,  82,  86-89,  91,  93,  249 
Leroy-Beaulieu,  M.A.,  105 
LeVy,  Sam,  Les  Mefaits  [du  Comite  Union  et 

Progres,  136 
Leyret,  Henry,  Le  President  de  la  Republique, 

34 

La  Republique  et  les  Politidens,  108 

Les  Tyrans  Ridicules,  109,  124 

Lichnowsky,  Prince,  241,  258 
Lille,  229 

Lindequist,  Herr  von,  227 
Lisbon,  54 

Lodge,  Henry  Cabot,  296,  305,  306,  308 
London,  13,  24,  96,  132,  133,  140,  145,  155, 
189,  196,  222,  241,  258,  271,  298 

Treaty  of,  170 

Long  Island,  20 

Longwy,  202,  205 

Lorraine,  198,  202 

Loubet,  M.,  93,  280 

Louis  XIV,  King  of  France,  63,  98,  126 


Louis  Philippe,  121 

Louis,  Paul,  236 

Louise,  The  Princess,  Introduction  vii 

Lubeck,  167 

Lumm,  Herr  von,  217 

Luxembourg,  167,  201-206,  221 

Lyon-Caen,  Professor,  304 

Lyons,  14,  113 

•  Congress  of,  85 

"  Lysis,"    Contre    FOligarchie    Financiire    en 

France  and  Capitalists  Franfais  contre 

la  France,  229,  230 

M 

Macedonia,  50,  51,  132-134,  136,   137,  275 

280,  284 

McClure,  S.  S.,  129 
McMahon,  Marshall,  121 
Madagascar,  314 
Madrid,  24,  57 
Magdalena  Bay,  297 
Magnier,  153 
Mahan,  Rear-Admiral,  ir,  186,  189,  300,  303, 

305-308 

Malay  States,  255,  256 
Malta,  281 

Manchester  University,  178 
Manchuria,  49,  50,  169,  293-295,  301 
Manhattan  Island,  14,  18 
Manila,  50 

Mannesmann  Company,  The,  224 
Marchand,  General,  49 
Marcus  Aurelius,  6r 
Marseilles,  298,  314 
Martinique,  314 
Marx,  Karl,  196 
Massachusetts,  301 
Marmora,  Sea  of,  50,  137 
Maurras,  Charles,  99,  118,  119 
— - —  Kiel  et  Tanger,  54 

L' Action  Franyaise,  123 

Mayence,  Predictions  of,  282,  283 
Mediterranean  Sea,  The,   68,   104,   256,   260, 

272-274,  278,  280-282,  291,  292,   309 
Meline,  irg 

Mercy- Argenteau,  Countess  de,  157 
Meredith,  George,  146 
Merv,  299 
Messimy,  M.,  245 
Metz,  49,  157,  166,  207 

Meurthe,  Department  of,   156,   222-224,  266 
Meuse,  Valley  of,  201,  202 
Mevil,  Andre,  De  la  paix  de  Francfort  a  la 

Conference  d'Algesiras,  53 
Mexico,  169,  307,  308,  313 

Gulf  of,  300,  313 

Meyer,  Arthur,  Memoirs  of,  160 
Michelet,  M.,  99,  103,  104,  158 
Midhat  Pasha,  134 
Mikhailowsky,  Introduction  viii 

Mill,   John  Stuart,  A   Few   Words  on   Non- 
intervention, 63 
MiUerand,  M.,  96,  238 
Millevoye,  118 
Mississippi  State,  16 
Mohonk,  Conference  of  Lake,  61 
Mohrenheim,  Baron  de,  74 
Monastir,  133 
Mongolia,  67,  294 
Monis,  M.,  T03,  245 
Mont  Saint  Martin,  202 
Montenegro,  50,  51,  277,  28S,  289 
Montesquieu,  236 
Montreal,  13,  r87,  188 
Morgan,  J.  Pierpont,  21,  247 
Morley,  Viscount,  44,  178 


INDEX 


321 


Morocco,  53,  57,  58,  68,  95,  103,  132,  165,  169, 
173.  T75>  2O9>  2I°,  22O>  22I>  223>  **4> 
243,  244,  246,  249,  255,  266 

Morristown,  20 

Moselle,  Department  of,  156,  222-224,  266 

Moysset,  Henri,  L' Esprit  Public  en  Allemagne, 
211 

Mukden,  49,  34,  265 

Muertzsteg,  Agreement  of,  131 

Monster,  Count,  54 

MQnsterberg,  Prof.  Hugo,  21 

Muravieff,  Count,  48 

Muscat,  146,  151 

N 

Nancy,  228 
Napoleon,  Introduction  vii,  viii,  61,  68,  79,  98, 

284 

Napoleon  III,  29,  37,  59-6r,  63,  125,  157 
Napoleon,  Louis,  30,  59,  61,  153 
Nantes,  Edict  of,  97,  99,  230 

255l 

Necker,  29 

New  Caledonia,  314 

New  Guinea,  220 

New  Haven,  19 

New  Hebrides,  314 

New  Jersey,  17,  20 

New  York,  13,  14,  19,  20,  187,  198,  315 

New  Zealand,  186,  256,  309,  314 

Newman,  Cardinal,  61 

Neymarck,  Alfred,  3,  61,  231 

Nicaragua  Canal,  168 

212,  300,  312 

Nicholas  II,  Tsar  of  Russia,  26,  27,  29-31,  48, 

257,  276 

Nicholson,  Sir  A.,  269 
Nicolaides,  Dr.  Kleanthes,  135 
Niel,  Marshall,  153 
Nietzsche,  130 
Niger,  241 
Nile  Valley,  The,  18 

The,  ro4 

Nimegue,  Treaty  of,  32 

Normandy,  131,  204,  223,  224 

North  Sea,  The,  104,  171,  256,  260,  271,  282 

North  Sunderland,  66 

Norway,  271 

Novi-Bazar,  251 

Noyes,  Alexander  D.,  236 

O 

Odo,  257 

Okhotsk,  298 

Ollivier,  Emile,  V Empire  Liberal,  157 

Ouchy,  281 

Ouenza,  262 


Pacelli,  Ernesto,  249 

Pacific,  The,  293-298,  302,  303,  306,  308,  309, 

313-315 

Pacific,  Islands  of,  95 
Pagny,  46 
Panama  Canal,  The,  8,  n,  18,  74,  117,  186, 

187,  263,  264,  295-300,  303,  303,  305- 

309,  3"~3H 

Isthmus  of,  35,  55,  168 

State  of,  313,  314 

Paradol,  PreVost,  109 

Parana,  212 

Pareto,  Vilfredo,  277 

Paris,  13,  14,  24,  25,  31,  38,  54,  74,  113,  132, 

133,  15°,  155.  I59i  17*,  *86,  198,  216, 

271,  276,  287,  300 
Paris,  Comte  de,  121 
Paschitch,  M.,  251,  252 


Pecci,  Cardinal,  88 

Peel,  The  Hon.  George,  The  Future  of  Eng- 
land, 9 

Peel,  Sir  Robert,  64 

P6guy,  Charles,  122,  124 

Peking,  301 

Pelissier,  158 

Pelletan,  153 

P6rier,  Casimir,  315 

Perrie'res,  225 

Persia,  168,  219,  293,  298 

Perthes,  Justus,  150 

Persian  Gulf,  The,  132,  151 

Philip  II,  King  of  Spain,  63 

Philip  of  Macedon,  195 

Philippines,  301,  302,  307 

Phillips,  Wendell,  212 

Pichon,  M.,  74,  15°,  243~246 

Pilant,  Paul,  Le  Patriotisme  en  France  ft 
rttranger,  32 

Pindar,  19,  20 

Pinon,  Rene,  France  el  Allemagne,  53 

La  Lutte  pour  le  Pacifique,  195,  196,  296 

301 

228,  229,  249 

Pisgah,  104 

Pius  IX,  80-82,  87 

Pius  X,  93-95 

Poincar6,  Raymond,  95,  109,  no,  118,  120, 

126,  139,  172,  231,  243,  247,  255,  26i, 

265,  278,  281 

Ce  que  demands  la  Citf,  265 

Poitou,  T3i 
Poland,  199,  286 
Port  Arthur,  49,  65,  68 
Port  Baltic,  257,  258 
Porto  Rico,  313 
Portsmouth,  24 

Treaty  of,  295 

Posadowsky,  213 

Poseidon,  300 

Potsdam,  140,  151,  169,  175.  26? 

Prato,    Giuseppe,    II   Protexionismo   Operaw, 

i  199-201 
Proudhon,  116 
Provence,  198 

Prussia,  King  of,  Introduction  vii 
Prussia,  Introduction  vii,  27,  63,  153,  166, 

2or,  233,  265,  282 


Qua tref ages,  21 
Quebec,  188 
Quenet,  M.,  99,  158 

R 

Racconigi,  273,  276,  290 
Radziwill,  Princess,  Introduction  vii 

Prince,  55 

Rambaud,  82 

Rampolla,  Cardinal,  88 

Ratisbonne,  286 

Rawson,  Admiral,  54 

Renan,  L'Avenir  de  la  Science,  98 

Rennes,  52 

Rey,    Etienne,    La    Renaissance   de 

Franyais,  73 
Rhine,  The,  104 
Rhodes,  281 
Rhone,  The,  14,  18,  20 

Valley  of,  314 

Richelieu,  Cardinal,  60,  98,  247 
Richmond,  19 
Rio-Grande-do-Sul,  212 
Roche,  Jules,  38,  39,  86 
Roberts,  Lord,  67,  146,  149 " 
Robespierre,  133 


322 


INDEX 


Roguin,  Professor,  304 

Rolin,  Professor  Alberic,  304 

Rome,  53,  93,  104,  140,  205,  222,  280,  291 

Roosevelt,  Ex-President  Theodore,  15,  23-25, 
30-36,  38,  40-43,  128,  129,  168,  184, 
1 86,  296,  300-302,  305,  306 

Rosebery,  Lord,  64 

Rostand,  Alexis,  231 

Roth,  Walter,  320 

Rotterdam,  172,  205,  223 

Roubaix,  112 

Rouen,  79 

Rousseau,  J.  J.,  Contrat  Social,  153 

Rouvier,  78 

Rumania,  3,  7,  51,  275,  276,  278,  279 

Rumelia,  Eastern,  135 

Russell,  Lady  William,  258 

Russia,  6,  7,  25,  27,  28,  45,  46,  49,  50,  52,  54, 
65,  69,  74,  95,  132,  139-141,  144,  I45, 
148-151,  160,  175,  219,  224,  228,  255, 
256,  262,  264,  265,  271,  274,  276,  278, 
279,  283,  284,  286,  293-295,  297-300, 
302,  308 


Sadowa,  Introduction  viii,  45,  285 

Saigon,  314 

St.  Petersburg,  140,  271 

St.  Quentin,  164 

Saint  SeVerin,  104 

St.  Sophia,  51 

Saint  Thomas,  Island  of,  314 

Salisbury,  Lord,  Introduction  viii,  53-55,  74, 
292 

Salonica,  51,  133,  134,  136,  137,  172,  251,  276, 
278,  283 

Samarkand,  299 

Samoa,  47 

San  Domingo,  34,  35 

San  Francisco,  198,  315 

San- Juan,  313 

San  Stefano,  Treaty  of,  138 

Sangha,  Basin  of,  245 

Saone,  The,  14 

Santa  Catalina,  212 

Santiago,  313 

Sarre,  Valley  of,  221 

Sarrebourg,  207 

Sarrou,  Major,  La  feune  Turquie  et  la  Revolu- 
tion, 134 

Savonarola,  33 

Savoy  Alps,  169 

Sayous,  Andre1,  217,  231,  232 

Scandinavia,  224 

Scheldt,  The,  8 

Schemua,  General  von,  276 

Schiller,  Introduction  vii 

Schleiermacher,  Introduction  vii 

Schleswig-Holstein,  43,  63 

Schnoebele,  46 

Schoen,  Baron  de,  246 

Schopenhauer,  44 

Seattle,  13 

Selves,  M.  de,  173 

Sedan,  Introduction  viii,  45,  60,  62,  154 

Servia,  3,  50,  51,  137,  350-232,  375,  276,  287 

Shakespeare,  William,  177 

King  Lear,  184,  185 

Sherman,  Mr.,  301 

Shevket,  Pasha,  261 

Shimonoseke,  Treaty  of,  48 

Siberia,  398,  399 

Sicily,  i 

Siegfried,  Jacques,  230 

Sighele,  Scipio,  277 

Silesia,  231 


Simon,  Jules,  153 

Sinaia,  275,  278 

Sofia,  136,  137,  278 

Solon,  i 

Soubise,  158 

Soumount,  225 

Smith,    Prof.    J.    Allen,    Spirit   of   American 

Government,  128 
Smyrna,  132 

Spain,  55,  57,  143,  318,  382,  307 
Spinoza,  62,  302 
Spuller,  M.,  89,  119 
Stamboul,  172 
Stead,  W.  T.,  161 
Steed,  Wickham,  9 
Stein,  Introduction  vii 
Stinnes,  Mathias,  224 
Stockholm,  19,  272 
Stoflel,  Colonel,  153 
Stolypin,  M.,  140 
Strabo,  170 

Strasbourg,  46,  49,  153,  157,  207 
Suez  Canal,  The,  7,  18,  282,  299,  306,  314 
Sweden,  271 

Switzerland,  167,  206,  304 
Syria,  95,  251 


Taft,  Ex-President,'i2,  152,  158,  159,  169,  184, 

185,  294,  296,  305,  311,  312 
Tahiti,  314 

TaiOandier,  Georges  Saint-Ren6,  107 
Taine,  107,  109 
Talleyrand,  46 

Tangiers,  57,  68,  204,  209,  221 
Tardieu,  Andr6,  68,  139,  151 

Le  Mysore  d'Agadir,  224,  246,  247 

Tashkent,  299 

Tchataldja,  281 

Teheran,  298 

Thiebaud,  Georges,  Les  Secrets  du  Riant,  121 

Thiers,  M.,  60,  76,  257,  258 

Thrace,  50 

Thyssen,  August,  204,  223,  224 

Tilsitt,  Introduction  vii 

Tirpitz,  Admiral,  67 

Tittoni,  Signor,  249,  276 

Tokyo,  297,  300 

Tongking,  46 

Transvaal  War,  55 

Trieste,  283 

Tripoli,  53,  58,  228,  248-250,  272,  277,  278, 

289,  292 

Tshushima,  257,  265 
Tunis,  45,  46,  142 
Turenne,  158 
Turkestan,  299 

Turkey,  European,  Inroduction  viii,  50 
Turkey,  9,  50,  55,  132-137,  146,  211,  228, 

249,  258,  275,  277-281,  283,  287,  290, 

295 
Tyrol,  376 

U 

Ubangui,  Basin  of,  245 
Uskub,  51,  257,  283 

V 

van  Dyke,  Dr.  Henry,  Tht  Spirit  of  Atntric*, 

15,  21 

Vancouver,  256,  315 
Vandal,  Albert,  28 
Valenciennes,  8 
Valona,  276,  290 
Varna,  251 
Vaugelas,  98 
Venezuela,  58,  300 


INDEX 


3*3 


Venice,  284 

Vercingetorix,  70 

Versailles,  Introduction  viii,  26,  97,  lao 

Vianden,  206 

Victor  Emmanuel,  King  of  Italy,  93,  276,  290 

Victoria,  Queen  of  England,  53,  64 

Vienna,  Introduction  vii 

Treaty  of,  170,  203,  276,  291 

Viollet,  Paul,  76 

Virgil,  43 

Vitry,  Fort  of,  30 

Vladivostok,  514 

Volga,  The,  299 

Vorarlberg,  276 

Vosges,  The,  80,  156,  165,  169,  198,  211 

Vrooman,  Frank  Buffington,  15 

W 

Wales,  269 

Waldeck,  Rousseau,  78,  91,  92,  112,  114 

Walfisch  Bay,  263  v  , 

Ward,  Wilfred,  88 

Washington,  12,  n8,"i55,  247,  308,  311 


Waterloo,  Introduction  viii 

Webster-Ashburton  Treaty,  308 

West  Point,  19 

Westphalia,  221,  223 

Whitman,  Walt,  191 

Wile,  Frederic  William,  224 

William  I,  Emperor  of  Germany,  38,  383,  087 

William  II,  Emperor  of  Germany,  43,  47-49, 

68,    69,    174,    2l6,    320,    331,    2»5,    341, 

236,  257,  277,  291,  392 
Wilson,  Dr.  Woodrow,  g6 
— —  The  State,  121,  137 


Yamamoto,  Mr.,  297 
Yellow  Sea,  The,  298 
Yildiz  Kiosque,  131 


Zanzibar,  219 

Zislin,  1 66 

Zola,  Emile,  52,  97 


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